

**From Poverty and War to Prosperity and Peace?  
Sustainable Livelihoods and Innovation in Governance of  
Artisanal Diamond Mining in Kono District, Sierra Leone**

by  
**Estelle Agnes Levin**  
**M.A. (Hons) The University of Edinburgh, 1999**

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Lastly, I dedicate the thesis to my parents, David and Rita Levin, who taught me that love has only a little to do with diamonds and a lot more to do with passion, consideration, endurance and good humour. It is in this spirit that this work has been attempted.

## **Abstract**

In 2002 Sierra Leone emerged from a brutal war which had lasted for eleven years. The war was made both possible and desirable by the existence of diamonds. In 1999 an American development consultancy firm, Management Systems International (MSI), was invited by USAID to manage its efforts to assist peacebuilding in the country. Since then, MSI has guided 3 projects (the Diamond Policy and Management project, the Peace Diamond Alliance, and the Integrated Diamond Management Model of Resource Governance) which cumulatively are attempting to restructure the political economy of the diamond industry through innovation in resource governance in order to achieve its principal objective, which is to make diamonds work for peace and prosperity for the people of Sierra Leone. This thesis evaluates the Diamond Sector Reform Programme (DSRP) by examining the programme and its object of intervention (the political economy of the industry), and by evaluating its objectives and techniques through an exploration and analysis of the causes of war and poverty in Kono district. The sustainable livelihoods framework was used to guide the research design as well to conduct the poverty analysis. The research's overarching conclusion is that the DSRP is altogether very well conceived and designed in order to meet its objectives and that it is attending to many of the issues which perpetuate poverty and might once again motivate war. The research has also suggested possible obstacles to the success of the DSRP may lie in the inadequate consideration of certain issues, such as the links between the diamond industry's political economy with Kono's wider socio-political landscape, issues surrounding gender, mining and poverty, the infeasibility of desirable livelihood options in diamond mining communities, the homogenisation of the local economy around the diamond industry, and the re-emergence of patronage and patrimonialism as the key systems of social securitisation in an environment of post-conflict recovery.

## **1. Introduction**

In January 2002 Sierra Leone officially emerged from a brutal civil war which had lasted for 11 years. At that time Sierra Leone was the poorest country in the world (UNDP 2003). When the war began in March 1991 the country was already on its knees. The formal economy had effectively stalled to a stop with political sovereignty and economic accumulation situated firmly outside the state in what Will Reno calls the ‘shadow state’ (Reno 1995). The networks of patronage, which had previously provided political predictability and security to citizens in the absence of a functioning state, had all but disintegrated in the face of excessive demand and limited resources (Richards 1996b, Reno 1995, Silberfein 2004). Excluded from economic and political opportunity and relief, tired of years of kleptocracy, corruption and predation by officials and elders, and supported by Liberian interest and Mummar Qaddafi’s ideology of pan-Africanism, Sierra Leonean youths resorted to war to challenge the system and exploit the opportunities a gun and a uniform could bring (Abdullah 1998, Alao 1999, Archibald and Richards 2002, Bangura 2002, Opala 1998, Richards 1996a, b, 1999).

Sierra Leone has limited strategic importance internationally. Even during the Cold War the West supported it less for political or ideological reasons than for the economic opportunities buried beneath its lateritic soils. Yet this little country of 4.5 million people received a lot of international attention in 2000 once the UN hostage crisis that May diverted the world’s attention to the somewhat paradoxical connections between its brutal civil war and the international symbol of love and ‘forever’ commitment: diamonds (for example Alao 1999, Campbell 2004, Gberie 2002, 2003, Global Witness 2000, P. Hirsch 2001, Perez 2000, Smillie, Gberie & Hazelton 2000. See also chapter 5). While the suggestion that diamonds caused the war is largely rejected (e.g. Keen 2002, Abdullah 2004), there is no doubt that their existence and geography made war possible once the RUF had claimed the diamond fields in 1994 (see also chapter 5). The rebels, and consequently the various factions fighting with or against them, made it their priority to control the means of diamond production committing appalling atrocities in the process (see Human Rights Watch 1998). For this reason the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was put into effect (see [kimberleyprocess.com](http://kimberleyprocess.com) and chapter 3). Since the end of the war a plethora of international aid and development agencies, including USAID and the British Department for International Development (DFID), have set up projects in the country to make diamonds a force for peace, not war. The key question for these agencies is that if diamonds were sufficient to fund a war, what prevents them from being used to fuel development at least in the areas where they are mined, if not in the entire country? This thesis attempts to answer this question, alongside others, in order to achieve its principle objective, which is to evaluate the Diamond Sector Reform Programme (DSRP).

The DSRP is funded principally by USAID and managed by Management Systems International (MSI), which is a Washington D.C.-based private development consultancy. The DSRP was conceived as a peacebuilding intervention, perceiving development as the means to achieve peace and not necessarily an end in itself<sup>1</sup>. Today its objective is to contribute positively to peace and prosperity in Sierra Leone by improving local and national diamond governance (Moyers 2003), specifically by “trying to change incentives for folks to stop smuggling” in order to “keep diamonds away from fighters”<sup>2</sup>. Its object of intervention is the political economy of the diamond industry and specifically the organisation of production and the markets for financing production and selling diamonds. The programme is guided by neoliberal principles of democracy, market-led development, anti-corruption, and structural adjustment.

Since this research has been partly funded by USAID, it was required that it be useful to them in some way (i.e. relevant to improving the programme), that it holds up to the penetrating gazes of practitioners as well as academics, and *because* of this funding connection, that it has methodological integrity. Furthermore, the DSRP is complex and multi-faceted and so any quick analysis of it, as my project had to be, would require a tool to manage this complexity. To satisfy these criteria, the sustainable livelihoods

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<sup>1</sup> Email from MSI Technical Advisor, Mark Renzi, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2004.

<sup>2</sup> Email from MSI Technical Advisor, Mark Renzi, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2004.

framework (SLF) was used to organise, design and conduct the analysis. The framework has been especially relevant in the assessment of the causes of poverty in Kono's artisanal mining communities.

This thesis therefore draws on literature relating to the SLF. The SLF emerged from work conducted by academics, NGOs and donors in the 1990s (Ashley & Carney 1999) and especially the work of Chambers in the 1980s and Chambers and Conway in 1992 (see also DFID 2001, section 1.2). It has since been adopted by a wide variety of organisations as a tool for research, policy planning and designing, monitoring, and reviewing development interventions (DFID 2001). These organisations, which include the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, CARE, and Oxfam, differ in their interpretations of the framework but agree on some fundamental aspects such as the importance of assets, capabilities, and macro-micro links in profiling livelihoods (Hussein 2002; Carney et al. 1999; Solesbury 2003). There are now manuals and online resources to assist researchers and practitioners in planning their livelihoods analyses, which I also used<sup>3</sup>. My understanding of the framework was principally informed by DFID's sustainable livelihood guidance sheets (see DFID 2001). This thesis contributes to the literature on the SLF through its differentiation between different types of livelihood strategies: coping, mitigating and emancipatory strategies.

Initially the livelihoods approach was designed for alleviating poverty in rural communities. This placed the emphasis firmly on agricultural livelihoods and gave very limited consideration to the multiplicity of livelihood options which exist in rural areas, including artisanal mining (see for example Scoones 1998). Consideration of the framework's applicability in mining communities began with Labonne and Gilman's proposal to produce an "assessment of policy-specific interventions to reduce poverty in artisanal mining communities" (1999: 7). Since then, various other academic and development projects have surfaced which have been using the livelihoods approach to study and alleviate poverty in artisanal mining communities<sup>4</sup>. Although there has been some research conducted on post-conflict agricultural livelihoods in north-western Sierra Leone (Longley, Kamara & Fanthorpe 2003), no research has applied the livelihoods approach to artisanal diamond mining in the country and so it is hoped this thesis will contribute to this field.

This thesis also draws on literature on artisanal mining more generally<sup>5</sup>. The majority of this literature is produced by development institutions, such as the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development Project (e.g. MMSD 2002), and industry associations, like the International Labour Organisation (e.g. ILO 1999). The Community and Small-scale Mining division of the World Bank (CASM) also collates and makes available on their website ([www.casmsite.org](http://www.casmsite.org)) articles and reports by academics, consultants, and practitioners writing on this field. The academic literature on artisanal diamond mining (ADM) is very slim in general and specifically with regard to Sierra Leone. The majority of publications focus on the role of diamonds in conflict, especially from a macro perspective, disregarding the particularities of regional production and marketing in the industry (e.g. Alao 1999). Two notable exceptions, however, are Greenhalgh's comparative analysis of West African diamonds and Zack-Williams's Marxist analysis of the relations of production in ADM in pre-1980 Sierra Leone (Greenhalgh 1985, Zack-Williams 1995). It is hoped that this thesis will help move the dialogue beyond war to consider the role diamonds might have in helping improve, not destroy, people's lives.

Through its engagement with issues surrounding war, poverty and development this thesis draws on a wide range of academic fields. Epistemologically, postdevelopmentalism and political ecology have informed the lens with which I have perceived the connections between war, development and natural

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<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Noetstaller et al. 2004, Helmore & Singh 2001, Rennie & Singh 1996, the Livelihoods Connect website at [www.livelihoods.org](http://www.livelihoods.org), and UNDP's sustainable livelihoods documents at <http://www.undp.org/sl/Documents/documents.htm>

<sup>4</sup> See UN ECA & UN DESA 2002, Gilman 1999. Intermediate Technology Consultants ([www.itcltd.com](http://www.itcltd.com)) have livelihoods projects in artisanal mining communities in Sri Lanka, Madagascar, and Zambia. Also email from Ian Barney of the Centre for Development Studies, University of Swansea, to the author 29<sup>th</sup> March 2003.

<sup>5</sup> I thank Jennifer Hinton for directing me towards this literature.

resources in Sierra Leone (e.g. Watts 2003, 2004, Escobar 1995, Yapa 1996, Bebbington 2002), though obviously I have also drawn on authors from the camps of political science (e.g. Jackson 1982, Bayart 1993, Bayart, Ellis & Hibou 1999, Reno 1995, 1998) and especially resource wars and conflict resources (e.g. Berdal & Malone 2000, Clapham 2003, Cooper 2003, Collier & Hoeffler 2002, Silberfein 2004, Snyder & Bhavani 2004) to understand the particularities of African politics and informal and war-time political economies. These epistemological roots and a concern with how power relations produce possible and desirable options for action places the study quite firmly in the post-structuralist field. This is especially the case in my reading of the DSRP as a project in implementing a new type of governmentality in the industry – that is, a new style of governing the industry which has its own rationality of government. For this reading I owe credit to Michel Foucault (2000), of course, but also to Watts (2003) and Dean (1999).

In a very practical way, it is hoped that the thesis will contribute to studies and practices in post-conflict recovery and development (e.g. Fanthorpe 2002, Newman & Schnabel 2002), especially relating to resource management. Together, the various components of the DSRP offer new possibilities for the management of highly lootable, alluvial minerals in post-conflict settings (e.g. Le Billon 2001, 2003b, Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore 2004, Snyder & Bhavani 2004). The DSRP is serving as a model for post-conflict resource management and lessons learned are hoped to influence similar efforts in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and elsewhere. This transference of the DSRP to other mining communities makes a critique of its motivations, objectives and techniques all the more important.

This thesis aims to test the DSRP's assumption that diamonds can be made to work for peace and prosperity through the formalisation and decriminalisation of diamond production and marketing by analysing the programme itself (chapter 3) and its object of intervention – the diamond industry (chapter 5) and considering the possibility that the best way of achieving peace and prosperity may *not* be through innovation in industry governance, but through some other route. Thus chapters 4, 6 and 7 investigate the causes of war and poverty and what diamonds have to do with either in order to critique the problems the DSRP has identified for amelioration and its techniques for achieving this.

Since the late 1990s, diamonds have been understood as a curse both inside and outside of Sierra Leone but, as Cunningham-Reid (2002) noted in his documentary on Sierra Leonean 'blood' diamonds, "the diamond is always loyal to the intent of its owner". For all those involved in trying to make diamonds work for peace and not war, it is worth remembering that a diamond is not bad, beautiful or bloody until we make it so. Thus diamonds can work for peace as well as for war; it is just up to those whose hands they pass through to want and make it that way.

## **2. Methodology and Research Methods**

This thesis is an evaluation of the assumptions, objectives and strategies of the Diamond Sector Reform Programme (DSRP), in order to identify those which might be inappropriate or misdirected with respect to the programme's goals to prevent war and increase prosperity in the diamond regions. The critique is based on the perspectives and opinions of the diggers and miners the programme is supposed to be helping as well as informed sources' and my own observations.

Initially the purpose of the research was to assess whether and in what ways the Peace Diamond Alliance (PDA) is empowering artisanal diamond miners and contributing to community wellbeing, and therefore if the PDA is socially and economically sustainable. However, funding difficulties had delayed implementation of the integrated diamond management project and so there would be no effects to review<sup>6</sup>. Furthermore, the PDA is just one aspect of the DSRP and is intimately tied in with the other facets. It did not make sense to assess it independently of the remaining components. Whilst conceptually neater, this broadening of the research is empirically more challenging as it has required an analysis of the actors, motivations, objectives and strategies of the DSRP, how the DSRP has understood the 'problems' requiring amelioration (the causes of war and poverty and what the diamond industry has to do with these) and its space of intervention (the culture and structure of the diamond industry). Given the magnitude of the topic, the resources available, the size, availability and expertises of the research team, and the time-frame in which the research was to be conducted, it has not been possible to conduct a comprehensive livelihoods analysis or achieve much more than inferences of emergent patterns, tentative conclusions and possible directions for future research. This research project is therefore best understood as a pilot study to build a more nuanced understanding of artisanal diamond mining (ADM) as a livelihood and the miners and diggers in Kono who do it, as well as the links between ADM, the motivations for war and the creation and perpetuation of poverty in ADM communities, and possibilities for post-conflict resource governance in such a context.

### **2.1 The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework**

The desire to do activist research which would be meaningful to development practitioners and have real implications 'on the ground' encouraged me to use an established poverty assessment tool, the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF), to guide the research design. Farrington et al. (1999) neatly capture my motivations in their summary of the framework's utility for "coming to grips with the complexity of livelihoods, understanding influences on poverty and identifying where interventions can best be made". The framework offered a checklist of issues to explore in order to ensure I was investigating the key issues which determine what makes and keeps people poor in ADM communities and how people use ADM to cope with and remove themselves from poverty. The framework was used not to conduct a livelihoods analysis in toto, which would have required far more time, resources, and expertise than were available, but to help find "the right sort of questions" for understanding the causes of war and poverty in Kono society, and what diamonds have to do with these, if anything (Scoones 1998; also DFID 2001, Farrington et al. 1999).

DFID describes a livelihood as "the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintains or enhances its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base" (DFID 2001, section 1.1). The livelihoods approach interprets poverty as insecurity, where poverty is a function of resiliency (capacity to cope with, mitigate and eliminate risk) minus vulnerability (exposure to risk).

The livelihoods approach "is a way of thinking about the objectives, scope and priorities for development" (DFID 2001, section 1.2). It is "a conceptual and planning tool" (Singh & Wanmali 1998) and "an integrating device" (Farrington et al. 1999) which has at its core principles of participation,


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<sup>6</sup> Email from Mark Renzi, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2004.

holism (integration), dynamism (adaptability with change), sustainability, empowerment, and links between the macro and micro (DFID 2001, section 1.2; see also Chambers & Conway 1992). Most importantly, it places the individual, household or community and the issues of most concern to them at the centre of analysis.

With this centring of the human subject and his/her priorities in the analysis, the framework provides a far more nuanced and political reading of poverty than the traditionally econocentric and essentialist interpretations of the developmentalist school (cf. Francis 2002). Rather, it interprets poverty as a cause and an effect of political, social, ecological, physical, and economic relations and the processes, priorities and interests which structure them (cf. Yapa 1996). 'Poverty' is therefore a situated and dynamic state, a way of being and becoming. This conception valuably rejects some general state that is Poverty or some general population that is the Poor, and accepts that there are as many types of poverty and as many experiences of poverty as there are individuals or categories of individuals. In this way poverty is a manifestation of unequal power relations. The SLF analyses poverty as "a political and economic process, in terms, for instance, of neglect, exclusion or exploitation, in which a variety of groups and actors play a part" (Collinson 2003: 3). It takes seriously Yapa's view that deprivation is at the base of all poverty and so poverty is the product of unequal relations of power between actors and the intention or happenstance effect of the more powerful's actions (Yapa 1996). In this way the SLF is aligned with post-developmental thought and lends itself to feminist, postcolonial and poststructuralist approaches to understanding and doing development.

**Fig. 2.1 The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (DFID 2001, section 2.1)**



The framework is usefully summarised and critiqued by Cahn (2002) and more details are to be found in DFID's guidance sheets (2001). The framework comprises 5 components which have multiple links between them as figure 1 demonstrates. These components are the vulnerability context, assets profile, transforming structures and processes, livelihood strategies and livelihood outcomes. The social body, be it an individual or community, is situated within a context of risks (vulnerability context). The person has the potential to act to either cope with or change these risks (livelihood strategies) according to the assets they have at their disposal (asset profile) and the structures and processes which ascribe value and meaning to these assets. By deploying the assets and pursuing a certain livelihood strategy, the person can aim to achieve his/her desired livelihood outcomes. The framework thus allows the researcher to build a picture of how people are affected by their physical and social environment (how the world works), how they cope with this environment (getting by in the world), and how they endeavour to change it (changing the world). In what follows, I review each component of the framework from this perspective.

### **2.1.1 How the World Works - Vulnerability**

Individuals are situated in an environment of risk and opportunity. This environment incorporates an individual's vulnerability context and transforming structures and processes. These determine which livelihood options are preferable for people as they produce the risks to which people are exposed and the opportunities available to them for taking action to counter these risks.

#### ***Vulnerability Context***

Vulnerability "reflects the degree to which a system (or individual) may react adversely to the occurrence of a calamitous or hazardous event" (Watts & Bohle 1993: 45). Risk is the probability that a hazardous event will occur (Cutter et al. 2000; Turner et al. 2003). The vulnerability context is a *riskscape* or the "mosaic of risks" (Cutter et al. 2000: 716) produced by the social, political, economic and biophysical factors particular to a society and place to which an individual is vulnerable (cf. Fraser, Mabee & Slaymaker 2003, Adger 1999, 2000). The livelihoods framework identifies three types of risks: shocks, trends and seasonality.

Shocks are idiosyncratic risk events; they occur unexpectedly. They include sudden biophysical or climatic events such as earthquakes or volcanic eruptions, unemployment, morbidity, injury, harvest failure, spikes and troughs in food or fuel prices, violence (e.g. fights), and so on (Wood 2003). People cope with idiosyncratic risks by mobilising assets to counter them (see coping strategies, below). It is also possible to strategise on one's exposure to these shocks and so divert some attention to assuaging them.

Trends are chronic risks or 'stresses' (Turner et al. 2003) whose occurrence is more certain and so one is often able to anticipate and avoid them. People deal with trends by navigating around them. Some trends are caused by anthropogenic or naturally-occurring biophysical and climatologic events particular to certain places, such as desertification or the retreat or advance of a glacier. Others are socially produced through processes and practices of deprivation, exclusion, and prejudice. Trends are therefore differentially experienced according to identity and culture; they are politically constituted and sociologically variegated. Socially-produced trends include inflation, inequality, class relations, prejudice, unaccountable power, corruption, economic and political exclusion and exploitation, violence (e.g. domestic), and some health issues (Wood 2003).

Seasonal risks are those which follow rhythmic or cyclic patterns over time and so are far more predictable and certain in their occurrence than shocks or trends. With planning, seasonal risks can be transformed into opportunities as people anticipate their occurrence to take advantage of others' increased vulnerability at that time. For example, in Kono people store rice when it is plentiful in the dry season in order to sell in the wet season when demand and prices are higher. Examples of seasonal risks and opportunities include seasonality in climatic, agricultural, and cultural events.

#### ***Transforming Structures and Processes***


Structures and processes produce risks. They also give assets meaning and so determine the field of possible and impossible actions and livelihood choices available for coping with hazards and effecting change. Structures and processes therefore determine both vulnerability and resiliency; they are the core of security.

Structures are the "hardware" of a society (DFID 2001, section 2.4.1). They can be sub-divided into the state, private sector and civil society and include all the actors (e.g. organisations, households, individuals) which comprise society. Processes are the terms of interaction and exchange which exist between actors and through which the structures are produced and maintained. They are relational. Processes are the "software" (DFID 2001, section 2.4.2); they include legal and policy frameworks, institutions (e.g. markets, marriage), cultural norms and values, and power relations (i.e. hierarchies based on age, gender, class, ethnicity). The rules embedded in these processes constrain as well as create opportunities for action. They define the conditions of access to assets by allocating rights, responsibilities and entitlements. They determine the 'rules' of society.

**2.1.2 How to get by in the world - Resiliency**

Resiliency is the converse of vulnerability (Adger 2000). Where vulnerability is the potential for harm to happen and the likely magnitude of its impacts, resiliency is the ability to cope with and assuage harm. People build their resiliency through the pursuit of livelihood strategies. Livelihood strategies are “the range and combination of activities and choices that people make/undertake in order to achieve their livelihood goals” (DFID 2001, section 2.5). Livelihood strategies require the mobilisation of assets with the view to achieving either immediate relief from harm (coping strategies) or effecting change to a person’s security over time (mitigating and emancipatory strategies). A slogan for elucidating the process of change might be ‘agency, vision, assets, action’. Change begins with people having the will, skill and confidence to effect change (agency) and a vision of what needs to be different (desirable livelihood outcomes) before pursuing activities which will bring about the change (strategy). Coping, mitigating and emancipatory strategies all use assets in different ways. Figure 2.2 summarises these strategies and how they each use assets:

**Fig 2.2 Using Assets to Cope with, Mitigate and Eliminate Risks**




This schematic differs to the standard SLF (see figure 2.1) because it differentiates between the various types of strategies people might use in order to achieve their livelihood goals. Coping, mitigating and emancipatory strategies will be explained individually after an overview of assets.

**Assets**

Assets determine the livelihood and coping strategies people can pursue. Assets are “capital endowments” (DFID 2001; section 2.3). There are five: human, physical, financial, natural and social. These are explained theoretically and empirically in chapter 6. When depicted schematically these capitals form an asset pentagon (see figure 2.3), which can be used to represent changes in a person’s asset profile by lengthening or shortening the lines which denote each capital. An analysis of assets informs on what people

**Fig. 2.3 The Asset Pentagon (DFID 2001, section 2.3)**



have, not what they need. This fits with the framework's perception of the subject as an agent of change with "potential, competence, capacities and strengths, rather than weakness and need" (Kirkby, O'Keefe & Howarth. 2001: 201).

Assets only have value if they can be put to use and made productive. Structures and processes determine the utility and meaningfulness of assets because *access* to a resource is as important as the existence of the resource (see also Adger 1999, Sen 1999, Yapa 1996, Wood 2002). For example, if I am hungry and need food, the existence of rice in the shop means nothing unless I have money or a good relationship with the shopkeeper. Certain assets can therefore be used to gain access to another, more immediately relevant asset. These convertible assets are called passports (Wood 2003). In the Kono diamond industry, the principal passports for gaining access to the resources required for mining productively are identity, social position, violence and skills of persuasion (human capital), money (financial capital), relationships with powerful people (social capital) and diamonds themselves (natural capital). Passports work by enabling individuals to reframe needs as entitlements and establish the right of access. They operate through social relations and determine the terms of exchange. They can be used to compete or win a conflict, or to engender collaboration and cooperation. Either way, they are used to persuade a social contact who can access the resource, or who is gatekeeper of that resource, to facilitate you accessing it. The potential for certain assets to be passports is determined by the cultural relations that ascribe value to the asset and the political relations that structure the relationship between the actors doing the exchange. Passports can therefore be used to justify deprivation as well as entitlement.


A significant portion of the diggers' and miners' questionnaires was dedicated to profiling their assets. Unfortunately, time limitations did not allow us to investigate the dynamism of these assets and how people's asset stocks have changed since before, during and after the war<sup>7</sup>. This is a problem for the research in so far as whilst the people in Kono are still adjusting to peace and the new risks and opportunities which this brings, we were asking questions about regularity and frequency of events and conditions which presume stability, such as "how often do you get winnings?" and "how often is your family able to satisfy its basic needs?" In an environment of rapid change, it is surely challenging for someone to speak about their general state without talking in dynamic terms.

### ***Coping Strategies***

Coping strategies require the transformation of assets into whichever capital is necessary to provide relief from an immediate threat and prevent the threat from permanently reducing one's security. An individual's capacity to cope is therefore determined by their asset profile and the accessibility and convertibility of these assets. Coping capacity is improved by building assets which are either most convertible (e.g. cash) or most likely to be required (e.g. social contacts). This is what mitigating strategies endeavour to achieve.

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<sup>7</sup> This would have required more detailed questioning, the redesign of the questionnaire into a series of questionnaires (for practicability's sake), the establishment of more intensive relationships with research subjects (in order to set up a series of interviews and ensure availability) and a much longer time frame.

**Fig. 2.4 Coping Strategies – Using Assets to cope with Risk Events to Effect an Immediate Change**

### **2.1.3 How to Effect Change in the World**

Whereas coping strategies are adopted to protect an individual in the short-term from harm, mitigating and emancipatory strategies endeavour to achieve more long term change. Mitigating strategies work by building the individual's asset profile and increasing their livelihood options; emancipatory strategies alter the structures and processes which determine access to assets.


War can be both a mitigating and an emancipatory strategy as it creates opportunities for people to pursue certain livelihoods and seeks to redress injustice. The greed versus grievance debate around resource wars is largely a consideration of the prevalence of mitigation (war as an opportunity space for enhancing individual security through enrichment) or emancipation (war as an opportunity space for enhancing individual security through empowerment) as the primary motivation for conflict (cf. Berdal and Malone 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Keen 2002; ICIJ 2002; see also chapter 4).

#### ***Mitigating Strategies***

Mitigation is the alleviation of risk through preparedness and prevention. The strategies people adopt are determined by their assessment of the most likely shocks and the most chronic hazards, their personal vision for how they would like their life to be (livelihood outcomes) and their sense of agency.

Mitigating strategies mobilise assets to reduce vulnerability by building coping capacity and/or by increasing livelihood options. Coping capacity is built by expanding convertible and key assets (see above). Livelihood options are increased by developing those assets required for pursuing a preferred livelihood (e.g. using earnings from diamond mining to acquire the tools necessary for doing tailoring). Mitigation therefore positively reinforces one's resiliency by using assets to expand assets which in turns improves coping capacity and increases livelihood options. Figure 2.5 depicts how mitigating strategies increase resiliency by expanding assets and livelihood options.


**Fig 2.5 Mitigating Strategies - Building or Transforming Assets to Mitigate Against Risk Events to Effect a Change in the Mid-term**



**Emancipatory Strategies**

Coping strategies protect individuals from the symptoms whereas emancipatory strategies target the disease. Emancipatory strategies alter the structures and processes which produce risks and which determine the field of possible and desirable coping and mitigating strategies. They eliminate risks, create freedoms and challenge patterns of exclusion and prohibition. They redefine passports and entitlements by adjusting the political currency associated with certain identities and ways of being and doing in the world. They redefine government. They empower and emancipate. They seek justice.

**Fig 2.6 Emancipatory Strategies – Transforming Structures and Processes to Eliminate Risks, Redefine passports and alter the conditions of Access in order to effect a Long-term Change**



It was not possible to conduct a comprehensive livelihoods analysis. Furthermore, the livelihoods framework was only relevant to certain parts of the research problematique, most especially to understanding the links between diamonds and poverty and the structure of the industry. I therefore used the framework to investigate how diggers and miners use the existence of diamonds to try to remove themselves from poverty, and how the industry creates and perpetuates their poverty. The main lines of enquiry in this part of the investigation revolved around their asset profiles and livelihood strategies and the structures and processes which make strategies more or less possible and desirable. In short, I used the framework to assess what they wanted to change and why, and why these changes were not happening. Through this application of the framework therefore I could begin to build a more nuanced understanding of who mines, why they do it and what they get from it in order to explain the links between ADM, the motivations for war and the creation and perpetuation of poverty in ADM communities.

## **2.2 Designing the Methods**

The research was designed in partnership with Helen Temple, a consultant hired by MSI to conduct a livelihoods analysis of artisanal diamond miners. The first step was to compare and coordinate our research objectives and questions. We produced the following research aims to guide us:

1. Review the historical characteristics of mining in Sierra Leone to determine their relationship with current attitudes, activities and demographic trends in the mining industry in Kono;
2. Evaluate the livelihood assets and insurance mechanisms held by diggers, miners and their families;
3. Profile mining families'/households' livelihood portfolios and the mix of strategies used to make a living;
4. Review the power relations which constitute the artisanal diamond mining industry and in which the industry is embedded and so assess the influence of:
  - a.) Mining industry policies
  - b.) National, local and customary law
  - c.) Cultural institutions and norms
  - d.) Social impacts and opportunities
 on mining households and the community, and on the mining industry;
5. Assess how these power relations determine the field of (im)possible and (un)desirable livelihood strategies for miners and their families, as they understand it;
6. Assess where there are mismatches between miners' and families' desired and possible livelihoods, and what prevents them from achieving their desired livelihoods;
7. Evaluate the tradeoffs made in favour of mining; and
8. Based on these findings, critique the assumptions, objectives and strategies of the DSRP<sup>8</sup> in order to identify whether any of these are inappropriate or misdirected.

The next stage was to code the research objectives according to which part of the framework they sought to reveal or understand. For example:

<b>Research objective</b>	<b>Evaluate the livelihood assets and insurance mechanisms held by diggers, miners and their families.</b>	
<b>Framework Code</b>	Livelihood assets	Livelihood strategies / vulnerability context
<b>Sub-topics</b>	Natural capital (resources, land) Physical capital (infrastructure, technology) Human capital (health, education) Financial capital (savings, income) Social capital (networks, relationships, support, dependency, power relations)	Livelihood strategies – how livelihood resources are mixed together and used according to external pressures and internal desires.

<sup>8</sup> This incorporates the Peace Diamond Alliance, the Diamond Policy and Management Project, and the diamond governance model Integrated Diamond Management (see chapter 3).

This coding had two purposes: to ensure that we had considered every part of the framework which might be relevant and to help ensure that we would not miss out any pertinent issues relevant to each research objective. Then, based on the guidance sheets, I derived *broad* questions and issues for analysis according to all possible lines of enquiry in relation to ADM in Sierra Leone. For example, in order to assess miners' and diggers' human capital the following questions would need to be answered:

**HUMAN CAPITAL – body & mind: knowledge, labour and the ability to command labour**

- a.) What access do miners/diggers have to education (infrastructure, personnel? And as children?)
- b.) What access do they have to information (e.g. on education and training opportunities, on the PDA, on local governance restructuring, on DACDF etc.)?
- c.) What access do they have to technologies (e.g. to reduce their labour)?
- d.) What access do they have to training (e.g. in valuing, literacy, numerical and other professions)?
- e.) What access do they have to healthy nutrition (e.g. if they work sunrise to sunset, does their nutrition depend entirely on what the supporters provide)?
- f.) What access do they have to better health (e.g. if they work sunrise to sunset, how easy is it for them to get medical attention; is access an issue based on social and financial status or race)?
- g.) What access to labour do they have? (i.e. are they somebody's human capital?)
- h.) How important is human capital in determining their livelihood strategies?

Once these questions had been devised I cross-checked them and our emerging methods outline with the World Bank's report on profiling livelihoods in ASM (Noetstaller et al. 2004) to ensure we had covered all angles<sup>9</sup>. In fact, our sub-questions were strongly compatible with theirs.

The issues (e.g. human capital) and sub-questions were then discussed with three local industry experts<sup>10</sup> to distinguish priority issues for analysis, eliminate irrelevant issues, consider culturally appropriate ways of eliciting this information, and ascertain who might be well placed to answer the questions or if the information was likely already available elsewhere (e.g. educational infrastructure). It was only at this stage that we began to consider the most suitable methods and team for meeting our research objectives.

### **2.3 Research Team**

Funding for the research had not come before I had departed for Sierra Leone so it was not possible for Helen and me to collaborate on research design (i.e. objectives, methods and content) in advance of my arrival in Sierra Leone. The first few weeks of my stay were spent marrying our two research proposals, designing our methods, conducting protocols (e.g. introducing me to chiefs and people of position), and getting culturally acquainted with Kono society. The research was designed with the assistance of Ansumana Babar Turay, who performed the roles of research assistant, cultural advisor, community animator, and translator. Babar's participation in designing the research helped ensure that our research questions and activities were culturally appropriate, which was a vital part of ensuring research integrity.

The research was conducted principally by Babar and me. As Helen was recovering from poor health she could assist in the field occasionally up until she left Sierra Leone on July 22<sup>nd</sup>. After that point I took over management of the project, which required my attending not only to my own thesis research needs, but also to training and managing the 4 new team members. On July 12<sup>th</sup> Andrew Abdulai came on board followed by Ibrahim Sebba and Michael Conteh on July 22<sup>nd</sup>. Andrew, Ibrahim and Michael interviewed diggers and miners and gave assistance in the workshops. Andrew also played the role of community animator when required. Mahmoud created and populated the database and did four transcriptions<sup>11</sup> and map-making. I re-transcribed these tapes on my return to check for interpretive distortions or additions.

<sup>9</sup> I thank Jeffrey Davidson of CASM for introducing me to this report.


<sup>10</sup> Sahr Nyaama (PDA Spokesperson), Tamba Sandi (Kono PDA) and Daniel Samu (Tongo PDA)

<sup>11</sup> Mahmoud was a Kono. It would not have been appropriate for him to have transcribed interviews conducted under promise of confidentiality or anonymity with key members of Kono society, e.g. government officials. Therefore he transcribed some miners' and diggers' interviews and focus groups.

**2.4 Sample Population, Size and Technique**

Although the DSRP is operating in both Kono and Tongo fields, which is in Kenema District, my research focused on Kono for practicability’s sake. The research team travelled to Tongo the day I left to extend the research there for comparison’s sake. Within Kono the research was conducted in the northern, western and central chiefdoms as these are the traditional mining areas. The remaining chiefdoms are dependent on agriculture but diamond discoveries there have drawn many people into the bush to mine and buy diamonds<sup>12</sup>. Most mining activities in these eastern and southern chiefdoms will be illegal as more attention has been placed on establishing legislative and monitoring infrastructure in the traditional diamondiferous chiefdoms. The mining culture and the conditions of production and exchange are likely to be slightly different in these new areas. Any future research on ADM in Kono would be wise to incorporate these chiefdoms into their sample.

**Figure 2.7 Map of Kono District Showing Chiefdoms where the Research Was Conducted**



<sup>12</sup> Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop II, 7<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

There are an estimated 200,000<sup>13</sup> artisanal diamond miners in Sierra Leone (Pratt 2003: 8). Given that Kono has by far the largest diamond fields in the country (Hall 1968) one can assume that the majority of diggers and miners work there. In order to derive any meaningful statistics from our data we would have therefore needed to have interviewed, say, 1,000 diggers and miners, which would have been impossible given the time frame and resources available. Any numbers I have produced from the data can therefore only speak to our sample, not to the artisanal mining population as the sample is not representative. Short of doing more field work, a statistical analysis of our data-base cannot be rigorous, but only suggestive of possible patterns. Very importantly, this confines any quantitatively derived conclusions to the revelation of critical issues for further investigation and analysis rather than hard facts derived. This must especially be borne in mind when engaging with chapters 6 and 7.

Given the restrictions on possible sample size, it was clear that quantitative methods would be mostly unhelpful in our analysis of diggers' and miners' livelihoods and so I decided that the research objectives would be better achieved using qualitative methods. Nonetheless, Helen remained keen to be able to extract statistics from the data and so the diggers' and miners' questionnaires were developed with both our needs in mind. Ultimately this has left me a little dependent on the statistics in doing the analysis as the questionnaires were not as qualitatively rich as they might have been.

Our sample was selected purposively according to our criteria to interview as wide a range of diggers and miners as possible and, based on convenience, according to whom we were able to achieve access and choose between (cf. Laws et al. 2003). We used our team members' personal contacts and the PDA's contacts with mining cooperatives and community members to get access to potential interviewees. Without the affiliation to the PDA, people may have been more reluctant to talk to us. This dependency on PDA mining contacts may have skewed our data to have included less vulnerable diggers and miners, presuming that those who have relationships with organisations such as the PDA are better off than those who know nothing of or have any relationship to such organisations. Despite this potential bias, however, the majority of our interviewees did not know anything about the PDA, even when they belonged to a member cooperative, and those who knew something often showed a misunderstanding of the PDA's activities and objectives.

There were three main challenges to our selecting diggers or miners to interview. Firstly, individuals' availability and willingness to be interviewed limited our choice of research subjects. For example, when we conducted some of our first interviews at Gbongama Town, we resisted interviewing the diggers the miners suggested for fear that they were selecting people who they felt would speak most favourably about their mining activities. It was also likely that gangs put forward the person they felt most capable of acting as group spokesperson for participation, as they did not know much about the content of the interview before it began. However, when we attempted to select our own diggers to interview, all three we asked were pressed to return to Koidu to get their daily meal and were not willing to miss this. Or perhaps they did not wish to talk to us. We ended up interviewing the digger the miner had suggested. In most cases, therefore, we had to choose amongst those people who were available and willing to be interviewed.

Secondly, although we saw many youths working in the pits, the people most willing and/or available to be interviewed were usually gang leaders, who in most cases were older than 30. Out of the 46 diggers working in gangs, 33 were gang leaders, foremen, mines managers or supporters of the illegal gang (and therefore gang leader by default), 3 were second in command, and 10 were just ordinary diggers or worked in meritocratic groups. The sample therefore comprised a high proportion of authorities. Gang members with some position were more likely to be available and willing to be interviewed than ordinary workers. It was also culturally unlikely that younger diggers would propose themselves or be suggested as interviewees in the presence of their superiors. Not until we made a point of trying to avoid interviewing any gang leaders did we begin to get the opinions of less experienced, younger diggers into our sample.

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<sup>13</sup> It is not clear if this figure includes all diggers as well as those who manage the mining operations. For example, Dominic Cunningham-Reid (2002) estimated that there were up to a million "miners" in Sierra Leone.

Lastly, we conducted our research during the rainy season. In the rainy season many diggers abandon mining because there is less work available as financiers are reluctant to pay the extra costs brought on by the rains<sup>14</sup>. Those who do work during the rains have to work much harder in order to extract and wash as much gravel as possible before the rains and rivers become strong enough to wash the gravel away. These conditions meant that there were fewer migrant diggers in the mining areas, and that those diggers who continued to work throughout the rains were working doubly hard. Had we done our research in the dry season, we may have found that there were more migrants to interview and a greater number of miners and diggers to choose from.

The conclusions derived from these semi-structured questionnaires, therefore, must be understood contextually based on the time of year that they were conducted and a likely bias towards diggers and miners local to Kono, diggers with some position of authority (who are likely to have a greater overall resiliency), and older people.

## **2.5 Methods used**

A wide variety of methods were used, including document analysis, semi-structured questionnaires, semi-structured interviews with informed sources, focus groups, workshops, participatory observation, and ethnography. The research process is summarised in appendix 1.

*Document analysis* – Academic, development and industry documents, including literature produced by the DSRP, NGOs and the Sierra Leonean Government, were used to derive historical and explanatory information on artisanal production, marketing and exporting, industry governance and industry culture in Kono; reports from local and national NGOs were used to garner Sierra Leonean opinions on mining-related issues.

*Semi-structured questionnaires* were used to compile quantitative and qualitative information from miners (meaning licence-holders, mines managers, & foremen) and diggers (including foremen, mines managers, gang leaders, and divers as well as ordinary diggers) on the structure of the industry and their livelihoods. The questionnaires were completed by hand. The twenty-four conducted by Estelle and Babar (Helen was present for 7 of these) were also recorded on tape and eleven were transcribed<sup>15</sup>. Data from the questionnaires were compiled into a database for analysis.

**Table 2.1 Questionnaires organised by Chiefdom**

<b><u>Chiefdom</u></b>	<b><u>Divers</u></b>	<b><u>Diggers</u></b>	<b><u>Miners</u></b>
Sandor	3	5	5
Kamara	0	5	1
Nimi Yema	0	8	1
Nimikoro	0	14	5
Gbense	0	2	0
Tankoro	0	10	2
unidentified	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>14</b>

After the interviews were first piloted on July 1<sup>st</sup>, 3 further drafts of the questionnaires were made in accordance with developments in our understanding, with the emergence of new, relevant lines of enquiry, and with the satisfaction of some general questions. Copies of the final drafts of these questionnaires are attached as appendices 2a and 2b. The 3 divers were interviewed using the digger's questionnaire though in retrospect a focus group with them would have been more informative.

The questionnaires were designed with tick-box and open questions to allow people to share their views and experiences more freely. The need to incorporate both quantitative and qualitative questions to satisfy

<sup>14</sup> This issue and seasonality of mining costs were explored in the first Mining Cooperatives Focus Group, held on 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>15</sup> Transcribing is a lengthy procedure. The majority of the informed sources were transcribed word for word, but interviews with the diggers and miners that were transcribed were done less formally with transcribing word for word only those parts that were relevant to the thesis and taking notes of the less pertinent parts.

Helen and my respective needs meant that the interviews took up to 2 hours each, which had various implications:

- It limited the number of interviews we could do in a day – 4 was optimistic.
- It made the interview process tedious and tiring for all of us involved – subject, interviewer and translator. After about an hour, the interviewees became distracted and the quality of the interview deteriorated rapidly.
- It restricted me to a level of generalisation with which I was highly uncomfortable. The attempt to reconcile our divergent needs meant that Helen would not get enough subjects to make the statistics meaningful, and I could not get enough depth in the interview to explore issues as I wished.

The lengthiness of the interview led us to experiment with better ways of conducting it. On a few occasions we operated by splitting the interview in 2 so that Babar and I would do half the interview with each interviewee and Andrew would do the other half. This allowed me to enquire on those issues I was most interested in. Whilst this re-energised the interview as the interviewee moved between 2 different interviewers, it also meant that the questions, which the other interviewers had not thoroughly understood, were repeatedly asked and answered inadequately, which made them less reliable in analysis.

*Semi-structured interviews* were conducted with informed sources, including government officials at the Ministry of Mineral Resources and the Government Gold and Diamond Office, NGOs, social issues experts, industry experts, dealers, exporters and community members. A total of 24 people were interviewed in this way. The majority of the interviews were taped. Only 5 were not; 3 because they were with dealers who were suspicious of my motives and 2 with the Chairwoman of the Brave Heart Mining Cooperative and the Chairman of the Kono Dealers' Association, who I had expected only to be introduced to, and not to interview.

**Table 2.2 Number of Formal Interviews Conducted**

Questionnaires				Informed Sources						
Diggers <sup>16</sup> (women)	Miners (women)	Divers	Total (women)	Government officials <sup>17</sup>	NGOs <sup>18</sup>	Social issues experts <sup>19</sup>	Industry experts	Dealers <sup>20</sup> / Exporters	Other <sup>21</sup>	Total (women)
45 (7)	14 (3)	3	62 (10)	5 (1)	4	5 (2)	3 (1)	6	3	25 (3)

The purpose of these interviews was to explore key issues, especially in relation to the structures and processes of the industry and local culture, such as banking practices, policy & legislation, corruption, patronage and patrimony in the industry, health and education opportunities in mining communities, competition and collaboration between dealers, cultural hierarchies and issues of access, and so on (see appendices 3a to 3f). Many of these interviewees were asked similar questions.

*Focus Groups and Workshops* were used to generate information on the views of community members on mining and its related issues, on the actors, relationships and processes which structure the mining industry, and on the livelihood strategies and seasonal calendars of mining households. The workshop agendas are attached as appendices 4a, b and c.

<sup>16</sup> Includes overkickers, waterboys, ordinary diggers, gang leaders, foremen

<sup>17</sup> Chief Mining Engineer & Mines Monitoring Officer (Koidu) and Assistant Director of Mines (Freetown), Ministry of Mineral Resources; Chairwoman of Tankoro District Council (Koidu); General Manager / Valuer & Buyer, Government Gold and Diamond Office (Freetown).

<sup>18</sup> Movement of Concerned Kono Youth, Network Movement for Justice and Democracy, and the PDA.

<sup>19</sup> Health practitioners, teacher, gender issues expert, journalist.

<sup>20</sup> Lebanese (2 brothers), Maraka & Kono dealers, 1 international buyer & 1 Kono exporter.

<sup>21</sup> Brother of digger (a housekeeper) interviewed with the digger, the chairwoman of Brave Heart Mining Cooperative, and a Bank Manager.

**Table 2.3 Focus Group and Workshop Participants**

Peiyima Mining & Agriculture Cooperative Focus Group 14 <sup>th</sup> July 2004	Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop 1 24 <sup>th</sup> July 2004	Household Livelihood Strategies Workshop 30 <sup>th</sup> July 2004	Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop 2 7 <sup>th</sup> August 2004
7 (3 women)	11 (2 women)	8 (4 women)	9 (4 women)

**Mapping.** Three maps of Koidu town were made showing a.) street names and land use, b.) diamond industry services and actors, and c.) social services. I used a draft map drawn up by UNAMSIL as the basis of our maps. Unfortunately I was not able to do any of the mapping myself owing to time restrictions and so I instructed the research team to do it. Where I was dubious as to the accuracy of their depictions, Babar double-checked the information provided on the map. With the help of Eric Leinberger, I have since discovered a street map of Koidu produced by UNAMSIL<sup>22</sup>, which I have used to corroborate some of the information mapped by our research team. This triangulation has been particularly necessary as none of the team had had experience mapping before so the accuracy of the maps is definitely questionable. Furthermore the maps cannot be expected to be comprehensive. Whilst accepting the inevitable partiality of the maps given how and by whom they were planned and produced, their utility is not intended to be as tools for analysis but rather as illustrations of what life in Koidu town is like, in the same way as a photograph might provide an insight. Only map b. (showing the information from map a. as well) is used in the thesis (see map 5.2).

**Participant Observation** was a core part of the research. I documented all my activities using field notes and photographs whenever desirable and possible. I treated my stay in Sierra Leone ethnographically so that all of my experiences there should be relevant to the research. I kept a diary of field notes though it was very difficult to do this religiously. I endeavoured to reflect persistently on my interactions with all the people I encountered and on my own emotional and intellectual responses to troubling, confusing or enjoyable situations. I made myself part of the analysis.

## **2.6 Procedural and Methodological Considerations.**

In this section I consider challenges to doing research of high quality and integrity.

### **2.6.1 Process**

#### *Punctuality*

One of the biggest challenges to doing research in Sierra Leone is inefficiency and lack of punctuality. It was extremely rare for us to leave the house or the office on schedule to go into the field, despite us having been allocated our own vehicle. Problems with punctuality usually revolved around team members arriving late for work, the vehicle being used for some other activity, vehicle breakdowns (which were frequent, especially for the last 2 weeks of my stay, after Paul Temple had left for the UK), fuelling requirements, or misunderstandings between team members. The difficulty of coordinating research activities compromised our ability to conduct as many interviews as we had originally planned.

#### *Protocols*

Kono is a highly stratified society and so in order to gain access to diggers and miners for interview it was necessary for us to get permission from the chiefs of the communities where we wished to conduct the interviews. The procedure began with one of the research team (usually Babar or Andrew) visiting the community in advance in order to advise them that a researcher from Canada wished to visit them and perhaps interview a few diggers and miners as part of her research on the PDA. If the chief sanctioned it we could return. On our return, I would be introduced to the chief and anyone else he wished. Usually this happened publicly and a crowd would be quick to gather, curious as to what business I might have with them. I would then explain, with Babar translating, who I was, what the research was about, why I wanted

<sup>22</sup> See [http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia2004/2\\_data/2\\_3b3\\_t.htm](http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia2004/2_data/2_3b3_t.htm).

to talk to them, and what they could expect to gain from the interviews. This happened each time we went to a new community to do research, that is, every day we went to interview diggers and miners. This protocol could take an hour or even more, which was a substantial chunk of our day. On one occasion we had to meet 3 chiefs before we could even go to the mining site. On this day we only managed to conduct 2 interviews.

### *Consent forms*

Consent forms (see appendices 5a, b and c) are required to satisfy the University's ethics requirements. Interviewees usually gave their consent verbally on the tape. Where they could, they also signed the form.

Although I thoroughly accept the ethical purpose of consent forms, they were a significant drawback in the interview process. Given that most of the diggers we interviewed were illiterate or could not read English<sup>23</sup>, it was necessary for Babar to translate the form verbally, and explain what it was for. Sometimes this could take as long as fifteen minutes. Many diggers were also uneducated, and so rather than making people comfortable to talk more freely, the form usually had the opposite effect as its bureaucratic tone made people suspicious and nervous. For example, field notes from my journal record the following: "we interviewed 2 miners and one lady digger. They all wanted their names on paper; they did not want confidentiality. Sahr said that the confidentiality clause made him uncomfortable."<sup>24</sup> Our efforts to reassure participants of the researchers' ethical commitments to their rights proved to be more intimidating than fortifying. It did however act as a passport to get an interview with one dealer who suspected I was a journalist.

### *Time limitations*

When your livelihood depends on chance, and the probability of finding a diamond increases with each pound of earth washed, then taking a digger away from his work for 2 hours was going to be hard work. This was especially so because we first began doing interviews at the beginning of the rainy season when diggers were frantically extracting and washing as much gravel as possible – at times working double shifts – before the rains began full force. People wanted compensation, such as a tip, food or a drink, for giving their time. Some of this expectation was based on having heard rumours that we had done this before. Unfortunately, those interviewees interviewed by the research team on trips where I did not accompany the team did not get any type of compensation. Wherever possible, I thanked interviewees by giving them a drink or, in the case of the women's group at Bandafayie, rice.

### *Access to interviewees*

The diggers and miners said they were and seemed to be comfortable to talk openly with us about the structure of the mining industry and their experiences in it. Babar believed that the strong rapport we had with most interviewees was a consequence of our affiliation with the PDA and our introducing ourselves to communities through the cooperatives. In the many cases where people did not know what the PDA was, their willingness to talk to us probably had more to do with their relationship to the person who introduced us than with the PDA itself. Furthermore, it is most likely that people were happy to talk to us because they believed that by doing so they might help better their position, either by receiving compensation, by establishing social capital (see chapter 6), or by learning something from the interviews. This was made apparent by interviewees requesting compensation after their interviews, even though they had consented to the conditions of the interview, which included them accepting that the interview would take between one and two hours and that they would "receive no money or benefits for participation"<sup>25</sup>.

Generally speaking, the miners and diggers were willing to be interviewed but we had a lot of difficulty accessing dealers. There were various reasons for this. Firstly, we were not able to persuade the chairman

<sup>23</sup> We considered translating the form into Krio and Kono but Babar believed that those who could read at all would be better able to read English than either of the other two languages as these were principally spoken, not written.

<sup>24</sup> My field notes, 1<sup>st</sup> July 2004.

<sup>25</sup> See appendix 5a, Interview Consent Form. Also interviews 5b and c.

of the Kono Dealers' Association (KDA) to help us get access to other dealers. Despite our protestations to the contrary he believed that we were journalists and would not be told otherwise. Unless we could nurture his trust, he was not going to risk damaging his own reputation (and people's trust in him) by enabling two white women make enquiries into dealers' affairs. He told us that dealers would not want to talk to white people. In fact, there had been an FBI investigation into the activities of Kono dealers the previous year, which had led to difficulties for some local dealers and so his caution was understandable but his persistence in fobbing us off became frustrating. In the end I only got access to interview him through the involvement of Frank Karefa-Smart, who is a widely known and well-respected figure in the Sierra Leonean diamond world and a consultant to DIPAM. Only through Frank's personal investment in my integrity did I get an opportunity to prove my real intentions to the chairman. At the beginning of this interview he revealed that, besides his fundamental suspicion as to our intentions, his unwillingness to assist us in our investigations related to his wish to distance himself from the PDA at that point, owing to the fact that they had appointed somebody else to the position of dealers' representative on the Executive Committee<sup>26</sup>.

It was surprising to us also that even some of our PDA colleagues were unwilling to help us interview dealers. When we explained our difficulties with the chairman of the dealers' association to the PDA spokesperson and asked him if he could introduce us to some of his own dealing contacts he told us he would also have to go through the chairman of the dealers' association; another blank refusal in the guise of incapacity. These people's reluctance to assist us is testimony to the culture of secrecy and distrust which is characteristic in the marketing community, especially towards outsiders, and the associated fear of aligning oneself with someone who might prove to be untrustworthy.

Frank Karefa-Smart intervened once again and managed to arrange an interview with André T. Hope, an exporter in Freetown, and a legal dealer in Koidu, who buys and exports on behalf of an American company. The dealer was not comfortable to be interviewed formally but he kindly gave me my first instruction in valuing rough diamonds, entertained a few of my questions (answering mostly in perplexing riddles and suggestive statements) and passed several hours in our company, drinking beer, eating lunch and providing me with an opportunity to do some participant observation. He in fact gave me some valuable advice, which was to stop asking questions and let the conversation lead itself. When left to speak freely amongst themselves, diamantaires reveal all kinds of juicy tit-bits for the attentive researcher. Unfortunately, the concomitant and forced requirement to keep pace with their Heineken consumption and the difficulty of escaping somewhere to write any notes, meant that a lot of information was left unremembered and unrecorded. Perhaps another lesson then is if one is to research diamond dealers, one must prepare with some anticipatory heavy drinking to increase one's quotient of level of lucidity to number of units consumed!

It was only in the last week of my stay in Sierra Leone that I had the opportunity to interview Lebanese and Maraka dealers. An interview with a local NGO got me an introduction to a local journalist who has close connections with the dealing community. Once I had interviewed him, he offered to assist me in getting access to a dealer and arranged for me to interview the chairman of the Five Country Committee, who was a legal Maraka dealer, and two Lebanese brothers who also ran a legal diamond dealership. My own experiences in trying to gain access to the dealing community testify the importance of social capital in Kono culture (see also chapter 6).

#### *Access to Information on the DSRP*

Whilst in Kono, I was so busy conducting my research on ADM and sustainable livelihoods that there was little opportunity for me to do any research on the programme itself. Although I conducted official interviews with the spokesperson of the Peace Diamond Alliance, with the team leader of MSI's PDA support project, and with Frank Karefa-Smart, who is a diamond industry consultant working for DIPAM, most of my understanding of the work of the DSRP has come from the information and reports published

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<sup>26</sup> In fact, 2 days later when I asked the spokesperson of the PDA who the dealers' representative was, he told me that the chairman of the KDA had been elected just the day before.

on the PDA's website, and from telephone conversations and email communications with MSI's technical advisor, Mark Renzi. My interpretation of the DSRP in chapter 3 was reviewed by Mr. Renzi, who confirmed that my understanding was largely correct. In his book "Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed" James C. Scott recommends that "we must never assume that local practice conforms with state theory" (1998: 49). In line with this advice, I am aware that my interpretation of the DSRP is based on how it has been presented to me by its principal guides – Mark Renzi, Paul Temple, Frank Karefa-Smart and other MSI employees – either in conversation or publications and so my reading of it is probably a little ideal. Furthermore, there is bound to be more happening either 'on the ground' or in the managers' heads than is reported in public documents and so some of my critiques may be irrelevant or based on out-dated information. It is for this reason that I shared my final draft with Mark Renzi and Paul Temple in order to give them an opportunity to respond to some of my observations and correct any factual errors.

### **2.6.2 Methodological Considerations**

#### *Participatory vs. extractive research methods*

Given the time available to plan and conduct the research, the methods used were principally extractive though there were some participatory activities in the workshops which participants said contributed to their understanding of the industry. This is regrettable. I would very much have liked to have been able to build greater capacity among our research team, but time pressures and the need for productive research made this unfeasible, especially in the workshops.

#### *Collaboration and Independence*

The conditions of my pursuing this research opportunity were that the research be relevant to the needs of the DSRP and that I collaborate closely with Helen Temple, who was to be directly employed by MSI. I was extremely aware of the importance of protecting my autonomy in the design, conduct, analysis and presentation of the research in order to protect the academic integrity of the final product. Frankly, this has been difficult owing to the technical advisor's enthusiasm to both assist me and protect the project as best he could. My ability to manage (and safeguard) my position as an independent researcher was further complicated by my dependence on Helen and her husband, Paul, for accommodation, food, and assistance whilst in Sierra Leone. Paul Temple is the team leader of MSI's PDA support project. There were no possible alternatives, however, as the lodging possibilities in Koidu are extremely limited. This has been an obvious conflict of interests, and one which I have been acutely aware of from the start. My efforts to circumvent this issue have relied on an elevated self-awareness and persistent questioning of why I choose to include and exclude what I have in writing the thesis, and how I have chosen to write about it.

#### *Comprehension*

At most times the miners and diggers were unfamiliar with the concepts we used in the interviews. Often the interviews were tedious and frustrating as it required a lot of talking on the part of Babar to get people to understand and speak specifically to the question. As Babar said in our debriefing session, "even when you translate in their own languages, you have to take your time". It was difficult for me to really conceive of the challenges facing those whose lack of education made it hard for them to understand our questions or some of the issues we were trying to explore. Generally speaking, the richest and most informative interviews were with people who were better educated or who spoke English. This leads me to believe that some of our questions were too complicated. Certainly if I were to repeat the interviews, I would attempt to simplify the questions further. Simplification may require improved cultural framing of concepts which, though familiar to me, may have been alien to the interviewees and some of the research assistants.

#### *Trust and Truthfulness*

"You will not find another industry that has developed over the years from absolute trust to almost absolute suspicion of the next man."<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Interview with Frank Karefa-Smart, DIPAM consultant, 21<sup>st</sup> July 2004.

The diamond industry is renowned for its caginess. The industry's culture is thick with deceit, exaggeration, manipulation, and duping. This is what makes trust such a vital part of some relationships within the industry (see chapters 5 and 6). It also made assessing truthfulness a challenge, to the point where the only way to proceed was to believe everything and nothing at the same time, and hope for the truer meaning to be revealed with consequential revelations and deeper cultural understanding. An aversion to frank conversation taught me a lesson in interviewing technique. In an email to one of my supervisors I commented, "you can't ask questions directly (as I've been taught thus far) but have to couch your question in very open ways with insinuations based on cultural understanding. This is very hard for me, which is why Babar's and Helen's input are vital."<sup>28</sup> It also worked the other way round, when trying to interpret and understand someone's response: "everything said is nuanced so you must know the culture to know the insinuations. This, however, requires you to make assumptions about meaning based on general cultural norms and stereotypes (as you anticipate them). However people don't behave entirely true to their culture when they talk to a white woman from Canada/UK – they answer with their own assumptions on either what you want to hear, or what you'll believe and then act on which would be useful to them."<sup>29</sup> The potential for conversations to work at various levels of meaning made some interviews incredibly complicated. This was especially the case with all the dealers I met. In fact, in my first such interview I had to sit down with Babar and Helen for an hour afterwards to get them to elucidate what the Chairman of the Kono Dealers' Association had actually meant for most of the things he said. Indeed, he need not have been so worried about revealing too much to me!

#### *Translation and layers of interpretation*

Very few of the people I interviewed spoke English as a first language. The educated diggers and miners, and most of my informed sources spoke English very well. However with it not being their first language, there were some miscomprehensions and it may be that some could not communicate their opinions, experiences, and knowledge with me as well as they might have liked. Most Sierra Leoneans speak a pidgin English called Krio and by the end of my trip I could understand it quite well, though I could not speak it. Some people were more comfortable speaking in their tribal tongue, such as Kono or Madingo. The language barrier meant that I needed a translator for the majority of my interviews. For this reason I was very dependent on Babar, who was fluent in English and Krio and could speak 5 native languages. Whilst Babar did a truly stoic and competent job in acting as translator, he did have a propensity to explain rather than translate what someone had said. In other words, he would sometimes add in his own thoughts or additional information to help clarify what was said for me and sometimes omitted to say everything a person had said. This is fine for general comprehension, but not for academic analysis. With my skills in Krio having advanced slightly, I have been able to pick out some of these amendments in my transcriptions of the interviews and focus groups so as to ensure my basic data is as true to the speaker's intended meaning as my, Babar's, and sometimes Mahmoud's translations would allow. That said, I have still had to rely heavily on Babar's and Mahmoud's translations. This has compromised the integrity of some of my qualitative data.

#### *The trials of working with and managing an international team*

"If you employ research assistants, the validity of the research project hinges substantially on the quality of their work. You must screen, train, and supervise carefully and provide the appropriate incentives, both positive and negative, if you want to complete the project satisfactorily ... Many scholars identified the management of research assistants as one of the greatest challenges they faced in the field." (Barrett & Cason 1997: 82).

Managing the research team was certainly the biggest challenge for me in the field. Indeed, I would say that the requirement to train up, supervise, and manage the team diverted me from possibly more useful and relevant data collection opportunities. I had faith in the ability of only two of the five assistants to do their job well. Of the other three, one was committed but insufficiently experienced, and two were rather apathetic to the work as well as proud and so did not accept happily my correcting their mistakes. In all

<sup>28</sup> Email to Philippe Le Billon, 27<sup>th</sup> June 2004.

<sup>29</sup> My field notes, 25<sup>th</sup> June 2004.

fairness, the team was pulled together rather last-minute as the funding for our research was not approved until I had been in Sierra Leone for 4 weeks. This meant that Andrew and Mahmoud had only 1 week working with us before Helen left, and that Helen did not meet Ibrahim or Michael at all. They were therefore plunged straight into the work with only a few days of preparation before having to conduct their own interviews. With Helen away, I had to deal with logistical problems relating to per diem allowances and salaries, though I had not authority to make decisions. I also had to coordinate and supervise the rest of the team's activities whilst pursuing my own with Babar; frankly and unfortunately, it was not possible to adequately train and supervise them whilst attending to my remaining research needs.

Research quality was also compromised by language difficulties. Whilst all the assistants spoke English, two of them had a lot of difficulty writing it well. This affected the quality of the interview transcriptions and some of the completed questionnaires. One assistant had trouble asking the questions appropriately and conveying the real meaning of the question in Krio. Furthermore, the questionnaires were written and completed in English. This meant that the interviewer had to read in English, speak in Krio, listen in Krio, and write in English. Altogether, this made one interviewer's set of questionnaires of dubious reliability in analysis.

The quality of the research produced by the assistants is also compromised by various other suspicious patterns, repetitions, omissions, or superficiality in the questionnaires. An example of superficiality would be where two assistants entered 'poverty' as the answer to the question "what happened so that one day you decided to mine?" For some questions there are distinct patterns for answers according to who the interviewer was. For example, in the miners' database, when people are asked if they believe there is any extra way they can ask God to help them get winnings, when I was asking the question with Babar as translator, people spoke of doing sacrifices, speaking to the oracle, and praying but when Andrew or Ibrahim were asking, the interviewees seemingly just answered 'prayers'. In these cases, the assistants probably did not probe deeply enough because they did not know what the question was really investigating. Another concern is the existence of inconsistent and contradictory answers within the same questionnaire. For example, when asked the question "Does anyone regularly support you?" 5 interviewees who had said previously that they received daily support in their mining activities answered no, according to Andrew's completion of the questionnaire. There were also cases where it seems as if the interviewers may have led the interviewee in their answers. For example, once, when supervising Andrew, he preceded the question "if you were to get some smallish winnings today, what would you do with the money" with the query, "Now you're a family man, no?" There are even instances where it appears as if the answers may have been fabricated according to what the interviewer believed was the most 'correct' answer according to their own suppositions or experience. For example, when asked to consider whether miner or some other occupation they would prefer to do brings them more or less money, *all* the assistants' respondents answered more, whereas only 8 out of the 17 diggers I asked (about half) answered the same.

Altogether then I am suspicious of the integrity of some of the assistants' data. Their work is partly unreliable because either:

- they did not understand what the research purpose of the question was (i.e. why we needed the information, how it would be used, and what it *really* told us),
- they did not understand the English questions,
- they did not understand how to ask the question in Krio / Kono or asked a *different* question,
- they asked the questions in a biased way,
- they made up the answers according to what they believed to be true,
- they made up the answers randomly, or
- people were more or less likely to be honest with them than me.

Unfortunately I am not able to contact the assistants to validate answers or to question them about these things so that I can make my own assessment of levels of comprehension, bias or fabrication in the data. Thus I have had to be selective about which answers to use when conducting the analysis. I also accept

some responsibility in the inadequacy of their work as some of the errors are undoubtedly due to poor explication on my part.

### *Prejudice and Positionality*

Prior to embarking on the research project I had anxieties regarding how to negotiate my research subjects', associates' and my own presuppositions and embedded prejudices associated with my and their cultural or embodied signifiers. I went to Sierra Leone conscious that my identity as a white, western, educated, British woman would confer on me particular advantages and disadvantages and attempted to prepare myself for the experience by reading accounts of racial and feminist methodologies (e.g. Twine 2000, Warren 2000, Wolf 1996). It has been my concern throughout the research that firstly, I do not let these presuppositions and prejudices influence how I conduct or analyse the research, secondly, that I could still get the best out of my interviewees and other people upon whom the research depended (such as chiefs) despite their prejudices toward me or fears of my own toward them, and, thirdly, that I could negotiate well those cultural moments which would make me feel uncomfortable based on my cultural signifiers.

Awareness of my own situatedness (cf. Rose 1997) did not prevent me from reacting to these prejudices once they arose. By far the biggest challenge was dealing with the issue of race. I could not get away from it. It was an issue for almost everyone I met, both ex-pats and Sierra Leoneans, although many people did not seem conscious of their racism or of how their own behaviour might reinforce the racism of others.

In many cases this racism was manifested benignly in its intentions, such as when my Namibian friend gave a local man 10,000 Leones (US\$4) for taking 10 minutes to pick us some oranges. The orange-picker rolled his eyes, slapped his hand to his brow, and frowned curiously. This was more money than he might hope to make in a couple of days. Through his generosity, my friend had actually done the man a disservice because he had unconsciously reified the distance between him and the orange-picker – what was small change for him was a tidy sum for the local man. As we drove away in our white truck, we most possibly left the orange-picker prickling with awareness of his relative inferiority as he continued his walk home.

It became apparent to me that racism is a means of coping with cultural frustration or incomprehension. Racist jokes, though infrequent, did occur among some NGO workers. Sometimes the local people were referred to as being 'P.D.', meaning phosphate-deficient. "He's a P.D." was the comment made when a driver went to the wrong place, for example. The insinuation was the driver was being stupid because he had a phosphate deficiency in his diet. I always wondered if the driver went to the wrong place as an act of defiance.

I found myself extremely irritated by local people's racism towards me. The irritation was brought on partly by a sense of being categorised and misunderstood, but more because I was forced to make a decision as to how to respond appropriately on an intellectual, ethical, and emotional level. For example, one day I was at the Koidu tennis court, which the Pakistani Battalion of peacekeepers and some ex-pats had built. Racial difference is inscribed in space and time at the tennis court. On the court were the Pakistani officers and NGO workers; on the other side of the fence were the local people who came in the evening to watch the players battle it out. Further, the court had been built on the promise that it would become property of the local youth club when the peacekeepers withdrew. However, it was of such poor quality that within the year it was already fractured with holes and cracks and would soon be unusable as a tennis court. On this occasion I was sat on a bench inside the fence, petting Helen's large, black (and admittedly very handsome) dog. One boy stood with a basket of bread on his head. He asked me if I wanted some. I had already bought some that day. He retorted bitterly that I would not buy the bread because I would not eat "African chop". In fact, I had developed quite a taste for "African chop" and that day had eaten cassava leaves and river fish with the women of Bandafayie. I also lived on the local bread as I often missed meals in the house doing fieldwork. I tried to explain, but he said I was lying. All white

men lie. Frustrated, obscurely feeling guilty, and confused as to whether he was simply playing with me for some fun, I told him to go away.

Another example of people's racist stereotyping was the frequency with which I had small children greet me with "Whitee man! Whitee man! Give me chop!" An excerpt from my journal illustrates my thoughts on the daily dilemma I faced with people asking me for assistance: "I spend so much effort being nice to people, polite – perhaps to compensate for my whiteness (which Babar says is usually associated with arrogance, brusqueness and rudeness) but it's so artificial when, after saying "good evening, how are you?" to our neighbours who live in a rubblesome, decimated crevice of a building with a roof covering one third of the house and made of patchy tarpaulins held down with stones, when they ask you to help them because they need tarpaulin and it's raining and they're really suffering and can you please get them a tarpaulin, and what do you do? Where do you draw the line? I said no. But they DID need it and they don't appear to have much and everyone here is understandably out to get something – who do you help and how? Is it enough my doing the research I'm doing? Do I resist the temptation to give 5,000 to the boy assisting his blind mother so as not to reinforce the view that the 'whitee' man' is the benevolent provider upon whom he can depend, even if their need and my wealth are so apparent? I can't reconcile this yet.<sup>30</sup>" In fact, although I did not help them, the next day the family had a new tarpaulin on their roof, but this still does not make me comfortable with my decision.

My awareness of issues which might surround my race, gender, class, age, or nationality forced me to consistently question my own behaviour, feelings, and reactions to events. I endeavoured hard to be aware of how my cultural markings might situate me in the social imaginations of Kono people and how my own prejudices might condition my own interpretations of people's words and behaviour, whilst trying to remain true to the fundamental fact that we were both human. In other words, whilst recognising the differences between us, both imagined and real, I sought out the similarities to try to keep our interaction as genuine as possible. Nonetheless, I found myself descending into racist thinking and patriarchal behaviour in order to cope with my increasing frustration with always being asked for help and with the occasional incompetence of those I depended on. I discovered that asking nicely did not get things done and the only way to get the car to come on time, for example, was to raise my voice or rebuke those responsible. Despite my discomfort with these types of aggressive, patriarchal interactions, it seemed my only option for getting the research done at the time. The truth may be that I simply did not have the management skills to get the results I needed any other way. This I regret.

Lastly, I am conscientiously using the first person in this thesis to emphasise my own responsibility for the data and conclusions produced and to distance myself from any claims of false objectivity in my analysis. I wish to be held to account so that the research can have *greater* objectivity owing to its contextualisation as a product of my situated efforts and interpretations (Harding 2004). I am also using the first person in order to deal with my anxiety of representation. Whilst creating a window for Kono's artisanal diamond diggers and miners to be heard, their voices are re-channelled and re-interpreted through my own. In an attempt to stay true to their own words, I have included some lengthy excerpts of interviews and focus groups in the chapters which follow. There are of course more imaginative and forthright ways for me to give voice to Kono's artisanal diamond diggers and miners, but the scope of this project has prevented me from exploring these.

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<sup>30</sup> My field notes, 25<sup>th</sup> June 2004.

### **3. Overview of the Diamond Sector Reform Programme**<sup>31</sup>

The Diamond Sector Reform Programme (DSRP) is best understood as a process, whose sub-objectives and strategies are evolving in response to new knowledge, to deeper understanding of the problems to be tackled, and to the changing capacities, commitments and priorities of its 'owners'. This dynamism is typical of those development programmes, which, owing to a variable political environment, must adopt strategies of adaptive management. However, it complicates the objective of this thesis which is to evaluate the programme's objectives, accepted truths, and techniques because the DSRP is never entirely fixed. I deal with this transience by focusing on its rationale and macro-objectives, which are largely constant. Though specific projects, strategies and sub-objectives are consistently developing and changing, I have fixed these down by focusing on the strategic themes which underlie them.

#### **3.1 Actors**

Delineating the structure of the DSRP is complicated, principally because it is not organised around a command-and-control philosophy but is owned and directed by a variety of actors, each with different motivations for being involved, and each able or willing to commit to different facets of the programme to different extents at different times. The principal organisations involved in the DSRP are the US Government through USAID, Management Systems International (MSI), the Government of Sierra Leone, and the Peace Diamond Alliance (PDA). The British Department for International Development (DFID)<sup>32</sup> has its own diamond policy project, which is closely coordinated with the DSRP and the Community and Small Scale Mining Division of the World Bank has recently given \$50,000 to the Executive Committee of the PDA (MSI 2004d).

The US Government (USG) is the primary donor to the DSRP<sup>33</sup>. The USG's involvement in the Sierra Leonean diamond industry began after the Lomé Accord was signed in May 1999. In September 1999 the Office of Transition Initiatives contracted MSI, a Washington D.C.-based private development consultancy, to implement the provision of the Peace Accord which called for the establishment of the Strategic Minerals Committee, which was to be chaired by the leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh. Since then, MSI has entered into 3 cooperative<sup>34</sup> agreements and received a total of just over US\$4.8million from both USAID (\$1.8m) and the Department of State (\$3m) for implementing the DSRP<sup>35</sup>.

While the USG funds the intervention, its role in planning it has been reasonably marginal except in so far as it dictates what it will and will not fund. Primary responsibility for programme planning and implementation has rested with MSI<sup>36</sup>. Really, therefore, it is the decisions, actions and priorities of MSI,

<sup>31</sup> The information presented here has been gleaned from a variety of reports and internet publications produced by MSI and from interviews and email correspondence with MSI employees.

<sup>32</sup> The British government provided over £100m in aid to Sierra Leone from 2000 to 2003 and has committed another £120m in aid from 2003 to 2006. In 2002 the Governments of Sierra Leone and the UK signed a memorandum of understanding for a ten year development programme, focusing on strengthening the state and improving public governance. DFID's own diamond policy project has been focused on this wider objective of state building. DFID's main contributions to industry reform have been hosting of a Diamond Sector Workshop in March 2003, providing a suitable building for the Koidu offices of the Peace Diamond Alliance, commissioning a diamond policy study by AMCO-Robertson Mineral Services, assisting in legal reform and revision of the Core Mineral Policy, providing technical guidance to the President's office, and conducting a cadastral survey of Kono. (DFID 2003, 2004; AMCO-Robertson 2002, email from MSI technical adviser to author, 4<sup>th</sup> November 2004, and email from Tim Shorten, DFID Programme Officer for Sierra Leone, 16<sup>th</sup> November 2004).

<sup>33</sup> Besides its commitment to the diamond industry, the USG has also covered 25% of the peacekeeping costs of UNAMSIL (Government of Sierra Leone 2003c).

<sup>34</sup> A 'cooperative agreement' is specific type of USAID contract. This should not be confused with the mining cooperatives which are part of the DSRP's Integrated Diamond Management project.

<sup>35</sup> Where MSI and USAID have cooperative agreements to achieve certain results, MSI operates in a non-profit capacity. For example, DIPAM (see below) is a cooperative agreement. Email correspondence from MSI technical adviser to author, 4<sup>th</sup> November 2004.

<sup>36</sup> MSI is also operating a Nation Building programme which is funded by USAID (MSI 2003a).

as determined by the funding agenda of the USG, which are the focus of this evaluation although the research also critiques the other organisations which, through their support for the programme, have sanctioned its motivations, objectives, strategies and ideology or have directly participated in their formulation.

The Government of Sierra Leone is both an object of intervention and a partner in the DSRP. Most intimately involved are the Ministry of Mineral Resources, the Gold and Diamond Department<sup>37</sup>, the Police, and the Executive Branch. Reforming the diamond sector has required the assessment and revision of existing laws and policies which pertain to industry government as well as the devising of new laws and policies as deemed appropriate. Furthermore, for any reform to be meaningful, the apparatus of Government must endorse this reform and be committed to promoting and enforcing it. Certainly one of the challenges of the Programme has been the enablement of Government to do this since the state was essentially incapacitated by the war. A facet of the DSRP therefore has been the requirement to build state capacity to govern the industry.

The Peace Diamond Alliance (PDA) is both a programme and a partner in the DSRP. PDA members include international donors, national and local government officials, community-based organisations, international non-governmental organisations, and industry actors (see appendix 6). The PDA is explored in greater depth below. The PDA serves many functions in the DSRP, but most important perhaps is its role in nurturing a style of governance which incorporates industry and community in the formulation of law and policy, and in monitoring and disciplining the industry.

### **3.2 Motivations**

There are five agendas driving national and international political and economic support for the project:

#### **1. National Security – the Government’s agenda**

Diamonds played a central role in the civil war in Sierra Leone. A key strategy of the RUF was to control the diamond mining areas in order to fund their campaign. Furthermore, although the civil war in Sierra Leone descended into a scramble for personal enrichment in its latter years, the RUF’s original disgruntlement with the Government centred on the direction of wealth derived from the diamond trade into the pockets of government officials and favoured elites<sup>38</sup>. Appropriate management of the diamond industry is therefore seen to be central to ensuring peace by raising the revenue and public opinion necessary for protecting the authority and legitimacy of the state.

#### **2. Regional Security – the donors’ agenda**

According to MSI’s technical advisor, regional security is a key priority of the US Department of State and a motivation for their funding the programme. Building peace in Sierra Leone and having closer control of the diamonds and diamond revenue is believed to reduce the chances of former combatants offering their services to regional belligerent groups, for example in Cote d’Ivoire.

#### **3. The International War on Terror – the donors’ other agenda**

The DSRP is part of the US and British governments’ ‘war on terror’: “the Peace Diamond Alliance ... (is) designed to ensure that revenues from Sierra Leone’s diamond mines would never again fall into the hands of drug lords, terrorists, money launderers or the various warring factions in Western Africa’s civil wars” (MSI 2004c). In a report published in 2003, Global Witness stated that Al Qaeda and other

<sup>37</sup> This used to be the Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO) but was made part of the National Revenue Authority in August 2003.

<sup>38</sup> Though now effectively nullified, a key aspect of the Lomé Accord, dated 18<sup>th</sup> May, 1999, and signed by the Government and the RUF, was that diamonds be subjected “to special treatment and control by the Government ... and that all government revenues from diamonds should be dedicated ‘to be spent exclusively on the development of the people of Sierra Leone, with appropriations for public education, public health, infrastructural development, and compensation for incapacitated war victims as well as post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction. Priority spending shall go to rural areas.’” AMCO-Robertson Mineral Services, 2002, p. 8.

“terrorist, rebel and criminal organizations such as the RUF in Sierra Leone, UNITA in Angola, various armed factions in the DRC, organised crime networks from the Former Soviet Union (FSU), South American drug cartels, global Mafia members, and convicted arms smugglers are all using rough diamonds as a form of international currency for transferring assets and raising funds” (Global Witness 2003: 62-3; see also Smillie, Gberie & Hazelton 2000 and UN 2000)<sup>39</sup>. By funding efforts to increase the legality and transparency of the trade, the US and British governments will help reduce the potential for diamonds to be used for money laundering and as currency to fund international crime, terrorism and rebel wars (cf. DIB 2004).

#### **4. Reducing Poverty in the Diamond Regions – the community’s and NGOs’ agenda**

A prime objective of the DSRP is that diamonds should benefit the communities from whose land they are produced and the individuals by whose labour the diamonds are extracted from the ground. Traditionally this has not been the case and the sense of injustice which derived thereby was one cause of the war (see chapter 5). Another objective of the DSRP, and one advocated by the PDA, is the diversification of livelihood options in alluvial mining communities.

#### **5. From “blood diamonds” to “peace diamonds” or “prosperity diamonds” – the Kimberley Process’s Members’ agenda**

“Blood diamonds” received a lot of international attention in 2000 sparking consumer protests and the withdrawal of some diamond companies from the Sierra Leonean diamond industry. In response, Governments, businesses and NGOs established the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, an international effort to limit the trade in “blood diamonds”. The 43 participating countries, who comprise nearly 98% of the trade in rough diamonds, must certify that their shipments are free of conflict diamonds (Kimberley Process 2004). Sierra Leone was the first country to institute processes and programmes for tracking, certifying and monitoring its diamonds from production to export following UN sanctions. Besides satisfying Kimberley protocols, certification confers a peripheral advantage. If it can be proven that Sierra Leonean diamonds are bringing tangible benefits to the communities who produced them and are not fuelling war and perpetuating poverty, then these diamonds can be branded as “development diamonds” or “peace diamonds” and so might sell for a premium. Within the industry, Sierra Leonean diamonds have lost their status as the world’s best gems; this accolade is now given to Angola. The brand of “development diamonds” helpfully replaces this old premium with a new one.

### **3.3 Objectives**

The strategic objective of the DSRP is that the “Sierra Leone diamond trade contributes positively to peace and prosperity” (Moyers 2003: 22). The DSRP is therefore trying to turn the diamond industry into a force for development, not impoverishment, and to prevent diamonds from creating the social conditions which make war both desirable and possible<sup>40</sup>. Informally, it also aims to prevent diamonds from being used to enable international crime and terrorism<sup>41</sup>. The DSRP is attempting to achieve all of these objectives by improving industry management through the development and implementation of a new model of resource governance, as Figure 1 shows.


### **Fig. 3.1: MSI’s Diamond Sector Reform Programme**<sup>42</sup>

<sup>39</sup> According to MSI’s technical adviser, the FBI denies the link between Sierra Leonean diamonds and Al Qaeda. This is puzzling in light of Global Witness’s investigations.

<sup>40</sup> According to the technical adviser to the programme, however, the DSRP should not be understood as a project in economic development but as a peace project; peace is its primary aim. From the perspective of USAID, the alleviation of poverty is therefore pursued as a means of securing peace, although its own desirability is acknowledged. (Email correspondence from technical adviser to author, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2004.)

<sup>41</sup> Several times programme members have cited the importance of keeping diamonds out of the ‘wrong’ hands. (Field notes and communications with the technical adviser. See also PDA website.)

<sup>42</sup> From Moyers 2003.



### **3.4 Method**

The essence of the DSRP is the formulation and development of a new model for managing the diamond resource. It is trying to institute a new style of resource governance and, as such, it is a project in governmentality. This new governmentality is supported by a particular set of ethics (i.e. the existence of poverty and war and their relationship to the diamond industry obliges intervention), a particular rationale of intervention (i.e. market-led development will induce the desired changes) and a particular perception of state legitimacy (i.e. the state-society relationship is one founded on democracy, freedom and the protection of human rights). The DSRP perceives the diamond industry as a ‘governable space’, a space to be intervened in, manipulated and reformed according to the motivations of its various associates (cf. Watts 2004). This way of seeing the industry reveals it to be a complex composed of “men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those things that are wealth, resources, means of subsistence ...; men in their relation to those other things that are customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking and so on” (Foucault 2000: 201-22). These relations between diamond actors, the resource, and the wealth derived thereby and the cultures, attitudes and behaviours which produce and are produced by these relations are exactly what the DSRP is attempting to change.


The formulation and implementation of this new governmentality has involved an “analytics” of the current system of industry management in order to identify that which needs to change and how (cf. Dean 1999: 23; also Watts 2003). This analytics involves processes of *subjectification* (ways of classifying and identifying), *objectification* (ways of seeing), *knowledge accumulation* (ways of thinking, questioning and monitoring), and *ameliorative modification* (ways of acting, intervening and directing). Although this process is not explicitly or systematically pursued by development interventions, it nonetheless frames how programmes are generally designed and implemented.

Government requires the identification of the actors whose opportunities or behaviours need to change. The actors directly involved in the Sierra Leonean diamond industry have been categorised by a consultant to the DSRP as diggers, miners, dealers/supporters, and exporters (Moyers 2003). These categories are ambiguous and over-simplistic because they do not differentiate *amongst* miners or diggers, for example, and other actors in the chain, such as dealers’ agents, coaxers, mines managers and

watchers, have been overlooked (see figures 3.2a and 3.2b)<sup>43</sup>. Other relevant actors include dealers' associations, miners' unions, government agencies involved in collecting revenues, monitoring the resource, and disciplining actors, as well as people who provide support services to the industry. Furthermore, within all these roles, actors are sub-categorised according to their tribe, religion, gender, nationality and so on.

Once actors are categorised and inscribed with identities, then one makes visible the relative social positions of these actors and the hierarchies which structure the relationships between them. The same MSI consultant schematised the Sierra Leonean diamond industry as follows:

**Figure 3.2a: Relations in the Sierra Leonean Artisanal Diamond Industry according to Moyers<sup>44</sup>**




My own analysis produces a rather different schematic of the actors involved in the production, marketing, export and legislation of artisanal diamond activities. This schematic also details the terms of exchange and the variety of routes a single diamond might follow within the country's industry. Some aspects of this schematic are explored in more detail in chapter 5.

<sup>43</sup> One diamond dealer spoke of the assignation of 'dealer' as a label the Government bestows so you can trade legally. As far as he was concerned, he was a businessman. Interview with Lebanese dealers, August 5th 2004.

<sup>44</sup> From Moyers 2003: 15.

**Figure 3.2b: Relations in the Sierra Leonean Artisanal Diamond Industry**



Once the links between the actors are established, one attempts to understand the priorities of the actors, the hierarchies between them, the power relations which produce these hierarchies, and the processes that operate through them. By building a picture of these priorities, positions, power relations, and processes, one can distinguish the impediments and incentives which structure the field of possible/impossible and desirable/undesirable behaviours. For example, MSI contracted an international consultant to investigate the miner-supporter relationship. He concluded that the relationship was one of dependency and

exploitation, tantamount to debt bondage, and that it existed because of an absence of credit options available to miners (Moyers 2003). This report led to the formulation of the financing component of Integrated Diamond Management model, which is explained below. Other investigations, including my own, have been commissioned to understand the artisanal diamond industry better. These have been conducted by international consultants (e.g. Even-Zohar 2003), local NGOs (e.g. Network Movement for Justice and Democracy and the National Forum for Human Rights), international NGOs (e.g. Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada 2004), and other donors (e.g. DFID's cadastral survey).

Through these studies, as well as workshops and extensive field work, the DSRP has identified specific 'issues' in Sierra Leonean society and the diamond industry which need to be understood and changed in order to bring peace and prosperity to the people of Sierra Leone. My own analysis of these 'problems' is conducted in the next 4 chapters. The social problems identified for intervention by the DSRP are severe poverty and economic inequality in the diamond communities, the potential for war to reignite, limited state capacity to govern, endemic corruption, and a warped understanding of governance in Sierra Leonean culture. The industry areas identified are smuggling, corruption, environmental degradation, miner exploitation and debt bondage, and the prevalence of illegal mining and marketing.

Once one understands better the problem issues, one can set about changing them. This is done by designing and enforcing regulatory and disciplinary systems which will induce and reinforce desirable behaviours and disincentivise or proscribe undesirable behaviours<sup>45</sup>. To do this, one can change three things: 1.) who or what manages the industry, 2.) how the industry is managed (i.e. the techniques of intervention), or 3.) facets of the industry itself to make it more manageable. The DSRP attempts to do all three:

**Table 3.1 Strategic themes, Techniques and Actions of the DSRP**

<b>Strategic theme for intervention</b>	<b>Technique of Ameliorative Intervention</b>	<b>DSRP component actions</b>
<b>Object of intervention:</b>		
<b>1.) Who or what manages the industry</b>		
<i>State-building</i>	Build State Capacity to Govern	DIPAM PDA
<i>Participatory governance</i>	Formulate Law and Policy	Expert advice on revising regulations (DIPAM) Participatory policy review with central and local government (PDA) More transparent and business-friendly policy regime.
<b>Object of intervention:</b>		
<b>2.) How the industry is managed:</b>		
<i>Market liberalisation</i>	Integrate private sector influences into the reform programme	Participatory Governance (PDA) IDM (buying scheme & finance scheme)
<i>Discipline</i>	Enforce Law and Policy (discipline)	Nurturing a climate of stewardship through instituting systems of transparency, accountability and responsibility (PDA) Encouraging self-discipline (IDM – cooperatives)
<i>Discipline</i>	Reduce corruption	Anti-corruption drive (DIPAM) Increasing transparency (DACDF Coalition; work with GOSL on DACDF distributions amounts and monitoring; reviewing valuations – DIPAM).

<sup>45</sup> Desirability is determined by s/he who is to govern. In the case of the Sierra Leonean diamond industry, from the DSRP's perspective desirable = legal and undesirable = illegal.

<i>Surveillance</i>	Institute resource surveillance	IDM (earth-to-export)
<i>Surveillance</i>	Improve Industry surveillance	Improving state monitoring systems (DIPAM) Encouraging a climate of stewardship (PDA)
<i>Empowerment</i>	Reward those who operate legally	Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DIPAM) IDM (all components) Freedom of and dissemination of information (DIPAM, PDA, IDM)
<b>Object of intervention:</b>		
<b>3.) Industry manageability</b>		
<i>Simplification</i>	Streamline the industry	IDM (buying scheme & cooperatives)

### **3.5 Programme Components and Strategic Themes**

The DSRP has been organised into three projects: Diamond Policy and Management (DIPAM), the PDA and Integrated Diamond Management (IDM). The projects serve as vehicles for attracting funding to push the DSRP's objectives forward. DIPAM was the first major diamond sector programme which MSI undertook on behalf of the USG. The project received US \$960,000 from the Economic Support Fund of the Department of State, though the funds were disbursed through USAID. The PDA was given US\$1,270,525 from USAID's Africa Bureau as part of its Public/Private Partnership Program, consistent with the Agency's Global Development Alliance which supports public-private partnerships in development. The IDM project is funded under a similar arrangement to DIPAM having recently been granted US\$2million from funds allocated by the US Congress to implement the Kimberley Process. Although DIPAM and the PDA Cooperative Agreements ended in September 2004, a month after I finished my field research, their aims and activities are carried forward by the IDM project<sup>46</sup>.

Spread across the DSRP's various projects are strategic themes formulated for modifying the target issues. These themes have already been referred to in the table above. They are state-building, participatory governance, instituting systems of discipline and surveillance, market liberalisation, miner and community empowerment, and industry simplification. DIPAM, the PDA and IDM all incorporate these themes to different extents.

#### **The Diamond Policy and Management Project (DIPAM)**

The purpose of DIPAM was to build state, community and industry capacity and commitment to decriminalise the industry, to improve industry management and to maximise benefits to mining communities. DIPAM was really concerned with improving the structures and processes which determine the quality of industry governance. DIPAM focused on changing who or what governs and the techniques of government. Its strategies included building state capacity, reducing state corruption, reforming diamond policies and legislation, institutionalising systems of surveillance and discipline, and overseeing the implementation of related projects, such as the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (Fortune & James 2001, SCG & TDS 2003).

The policy foci of DIPAM were to increase competition in the mining credit and diamond marketing sectors; increase transparency in the DACDF distributions; link lessons learned in Kono with other diamond areas in Sierra Leone; streamline and improve diamond export regimes; develop an effective pilot chain of custody systems for diamond mining; improve linkages with the Kimberley Process; and tackle corruption (MSI 2003a & c). In every way, the PDA and IDM grew out of DIPAM: the PDA to provide an actor for implementing change, and IDM as the technical project for bringing about change.

<sup>46</sup> Information provided from MSI's technical adviser and technical associate to the DSRP on telephone and by email, 5<sup>th</sup> November 2004 and by email 10<sup>th</sup> November 2004.

### **The Peace Diamond Alliance (PDA)**

The PDA is an alliance of organisations which have an interest in the diamond sector (see appendix 6 for a list of current members)<sup>47</sup>. It was formed using DIPAM funds, but is intended to become self-sufficient as soon as possible (MSI 2004e). For the time being, it continues to receive support from MSI, who acts as its secretariat.



The purpose of the alliance is to make industry governance and surveillance a multi-stakeholder, multi-spatial, participatory endeavour involving industry, community and government. It also provides the vehicle for achieving many things. It should (cf. Moyers 2003, MSI 2002a, b, c, 2003b, 2004c, d)<sup>48</sup>:

- enable industry governance to be participatory;
- empower communities to play a greater role in managing their resource;
- enable government to formulate more effective and politically acceptable industry policies by providing the opportunity for communication between those who write and enforce the laws, and those who are affected by them;
- provide a forum for discussion, decision-making and dispute settlement in all matters related to the industry – it is a ‘communication tool’<sup>49</sup>;
- promote a climate of transparency, responsibility and accountability in the diamond industry and Sierra Leonean society;
- establish a precedent of local self regulation through the Alliance’s Code of Conduct;
- influence “Sierra Leoneans’ inner maps of governance” (Moyers 2003: 22) by raising expectations of authorities and normalising community participation in government;
- aim to increase community and traditional rights in formal mining concession awards;
- improve the capacity of all actors to improve management practices;
- make industry surveillance easier by bringing together people diversely associated with the industry to raise issues of concern and share information about what is happening on the ground;
- help build institutional approaches to sustaining improvements in sectoral reform (Moyers 2003: 22);
- be a vehicle for the implementation of facets of IDM such as training for cooperatives in small stones valuation and financial management; and
- be a mechanism for conflict management.

### **Integrated Diamond Management (IDM) - the techne of the DSRP**

The IDM cooperative agreement takes forward what DIPAM began: the development of “new paradigms for extractive resource management in Sierra Leone” (MSI 2003a). IDM is both paradigm and project. It is the techne of the new governmentality which the DSRP has been trying to make real, being mostly concerned with the techniques of government and making the industry more governable. The basic tenet of IDM is that “communities must benefit from legal diamond mining and marketing if there is to be any chance of controlling illegal mining and smuggling” (MSI 2004a: 12). Besides continuing the policy and governance priorities of DIPAM and the PDA, its main schemes are finance provision, cooperatives, fair markets (international buyers) and earth-to-export monitoring certification but it also covers issues relating to environmental damage (land reclamation), worker rights, and access to technology (MSI 2004b). MSI emphasises that these schemes are mutually reinforcing and so the success of this new model of resource management depends on their simultaneous implementation. Furthermore, MSI is

<sup>47</sup> The Mission of the PDA is “Bringing private industry, community, NGOs, and government together to ensure that the Sierra Leone diamond industry contributes positively to peace and prosperity through increasing benefits to the people of Kono from the diamond industry and by helping the government improve its ability to manage diamonds” (MSI 2004c).

<sup>48</sup> Also email from technical adviser to author, November 4<sup>th</sup> 2004.

<sup>49</sup> Conversation between Paul Temple, Helen Temple and the author, 20<sup>th</sup> June 2004.

using IDM in Sierra Leone as the pilot study for developing this model of resource governance for application in other post-conflict diamond communities, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo or Angola.

### *The Finance Scheme*

The finance scheme emerged from recommendations by the Ministry of Mineral Resources that the establishment of a formal credit scheme would enable miners to make more money and reduce the incentive to smuggle (Moyers 2003: 23). In May 2003, MSI commissioned an investigation into the credit arrangements of diamond miners and the desirability and feasibility of a credit scheme. The consultant concluded that the miner-supporter relationship is exploitative and responsible for the miners' poverty and thus the provision of another option for accessing credit would free miners from the constraints of this relationship (Moyers 2003).

The finance scheme attends to 2 of the DSRP's strategic themes:

- **Market Liberalisation:** it aims to make the market for credit more competitive;
- **Miner Empowerment:** it increases the choices the miners have for accessing credit.

The Alluvial Mining Finance Scheme proposed by MSI comprises two parallel streams of financing – a revolving loan fund (RLF) and direct financing – which are to compete with the current system of credit provision by 'supporters', usually dealers, to miners. The revolving loan fund is a cooperative loan scheme, under which miners will be held jointly accountable for repayments. The Koidu branch of the Rokel Bank has agreed to manage all financial transactions relating to the loan and to provide a safe deposit for all diamonds produced under the scheme. The initiation of the revolving loan fund has been postponed until an environmental assessment has been completed.

The direct financing scheme is in line with the programme's desire to use the private sector to inspire change. It too involves the Rokel Bank as a conduit for the Investor's funds. The Rapaport Group has agreed to act as the Investor and Global Witness has agreed to monitor the programme on the ground and ensure that Rapaport is paying the cooperatives "top dollar"<sup>50</sup>. The direct financing scheme has been pushed forward in response to the retardation of the Revolving Loan Fund by the need for an environmental impact assessment and the imperative to start demonstrating on-the-ground progress to participants in the PDA. There is some fear that participants' commitment to the Alliance may have waned slightly after a year of bureaucratic and organisational advances, which are less affirming than the more tangible and visible developments IDM should produce<sup>51</sup>. Thus the direct financing scheme is to begin immediately.

### *The Cooperative Scheme*

In order for the revolving loan fund and direct financing scheme to work, the creditworthiness and productivity of the potential borrowers needs to be improved. By forming cooperatives miners will be able to pool their risks, scale up their operations and share responsibility collectively for repaying the loans. Their capacity to work as cooperatives is being tackled through training in financial management and how to be a cooperative through the PDA<sup>52</sup>. They are also being trained in valuing small stones<sup>53</sup>. The cooperative scheme has also been given strength by the establishment of a national Union of Mining Cooperatives in October 2004 under the initiative of the Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry (MSI 2004d).

<sup>50</sup> Email from technical adviser to author, November 4<sup>th</sup> 2004.

<sup>51</sup> Email from technical adviser to author, November 4<sup>th</sup> 2004.

<sup>52</sup> Whilst I was in Koidu, two international consultants were involved in training local people to be trainers in the functioning of a cooperative. The Ministry of Trade and Industry has also provided training (Email from technical adviser, 10<sup>th</sup> November 2004).

<sup>53</sup> Interviewees spoke very favourably about this training and how they felt it had helped them already. (PDA Spokesperson, interview with author 6<sup>th</sup> August 2004 and Braveheart Cooperative, interview with author 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2004.)

The establishment of cooperatives serves three strategic themes.

- **Industry streamlining:** the organisation of miners into cooperatives reduces the number of operating units which need to be monitored. This limits the resources needed for industry surveillance.
- **Institutionalisation of systems of surveillance and discipline:** the cooperatives will be monitored in their activities by three bodies. An international NGO, Global Witness, has agreed to oversee the credit and earth-to-export scheme; the PDA provides a venue for sharing information about the activities of the member cooperatives; and the cooperatives themselves, in line with existing practices to minimise theft and given the added incentive of communal responsibility for loans, will institute their own systems of surveillance and discipline.
- **Miner and Digger Empowerment:** the cooperative scheme will empower miners and diggers by increasing their access to capital, by enabling them to earn more money, by giving them greater social security through their common interest and relations with each other, and by helping them to gain knowledge and skills through the cooperative training schemes. Cooperatives also serve the broader objective of reducing the desirability of war in so far as they are intended to provide a way for youth and former combatants, many of whom are eking a living in the mining pits, to take control of and improve their livelihoods.

Cooperatives are not a new institution in alluvial mining in Sierra Leone. In the 1960s groups of miners organised themselves into Native Firms, the function of which, from the Government's perspective, was "to encourage members to pool resources together in order to mine systematically and efficiently, by using mechanical devices" as well as to attract some Lebanese capital away from illicit mining (Zack-Williams 1995: 158). The scheme proved successful in the early 60s but became far less significant with under 5 licences a year being granted under this scheme between 1965 and 1977 (Zack-Williams 1995: 159). In December 1973 the Co-operative Contract Mining Scheme (CCMS) was established (Zack-Williams 1995: 164), under which the government was to allow private mining of NDMC land in Kono. In fact the CCMS was a tool for granting favours to loyal clients and party members. It also provided a canopy for illegal activities within the lease by allowing access to it (Reno 1995: Zack-Williams 1995). The CCMS therefore contravenes IDM's vision for miner empowerment and the decriminalisation of the trade (Zack-Williams 1995: 164-66). Altogether, this old cooperatives scheme provides cautionary lessons in how cooperatives can become part of the very methods which produce the relations of patronage, and thus corruption, which produced the grievances that cause the war (see chapter 5).

#### *The Buying Scheme*

The buying scheme is working to attract international buyers to set up legitimate buying operations in Sierra Leone. The purpose is to make the legal buying market more competitive. The existence of a more competitive purchasing system will enable miners to bypass the cartel of dealers and all the other 'middle-men' – the brokers, agents and coaxers – who reduce the margins and prevent their receiving a fair price. This has 3 benefits. It should decrease smuggling, as it is mostly these middlemen who are believed to be engaged in smuggling<sup>54</sup>; it should ensure that diamond profits remain in the local economy rather than leaving the country; and it will streamline the industry, so making it more manageable and easier to monitor.

The buying scheme could be said to drive IDM. It is designed on the premise that diamond miners are motivated by a desire to make as much money as possible<sup>55</sup>. If the buying scheme takes off, the miners could receive as much as 8 times what they receive currently as the prices offered to them will be fixed to Antwerp prices<sup>56</sup>. This potential to increase financial productivity will increase their creditworthiness in the eyes of the RLF Lender. It also provides them with a positive incentive to export legally. It should also stimulate economic growth and combat poverty as the miners will be able to pay their diggers more

<sup>54</sup> Interviews with Official from the Ministry of Mines, 12<sup>th</sup> July 2004, and Frank Karefa-Smart, 21<sup>st</sup> July 2004.

<sup>55</sup> Technical adviser, email to the author, November 4<sup>th</sup> 2004.

<sup>56</sup> Technical adviser, email to the author, November 4<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> 2004.

and it is hoped that they will invest their profits in other businesses outside of the diamond industry, so creating economic opportunities for other members of Kono society<sup>57</sup>.

For all these reasons, the buying scheme supports the strategic themes of market liberalisation, community empowerment, miner empowerment, industry simplification and the institutionalisation of systems of discipline and surveillance.

#### *The Earth-To-Export Scheme*

The Earth-to-Export component of IDM is “the last mile” of the Kimberley Process as it deals with the local intricacies of monitoring and certification (MSI 2004a: 9). It is in fact the priority of IDM because it is absolutely essential in the fight against smuggling. Without the buying scheme, however, the Earth-to-Export scheme would be totally unfeasible as it is believed that miners need to be given an economic incentive to mine and market their diamonds transparently.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

The DSRP is mostly concerned with effecting changes in the structures and processes of Kono’s diamond industry and the society in which it is embedded. MSI is using the legality of actions to determine access to resources and to benefits from the resources. People’s ability to access the benefits from participating in the diamond industry is to be determined by the extent to which they operate within the formal sphere. Operating legally is therefore a passport to gaining access to money (through the financing scheme), social capital (as membership in a cooperative), physical capital (access to tools), natural capital (secure access to land), and human capital (access to information), all key assets for increasing the productivity of mining operations and improving the security of miners.

There is much that is good about the DSRP – its efforts at participatory governance, decriminalisation, state building, and miner and community empowerment are all commendable. There are, however, some issues of concern with its priorities and presumptions in trying to apply these and the other strategies, and thus meet its objectives:

1. The programme puts decriminalisation before development. Poverty is treated as the means to maintain peace, and not an end in itself. Which poor groups are being unwittingly marginalised or overlooked?
2. The programme assumes that IDM will increase local prosperity. How will it do this and whose prosperity will it increase?
3. The programme assumes that improving industry governance will make conflict less possible as it will be harder to sell uncertified stones within the nation and internationally. Will improving industry governance as they plan to do also make conflict less *desirable* for those who could most comfortably resort once again to war?
4. The programme must work with a simplistic model of the diamond industry for the sake of practicability. Has this restricted their attendance to the causes of war and poverty? Has it also limited their ability to help the most vulnerable members of Kono society?

These are some of the questions that will be answered in the following chapters.

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<sup>57</sup> As soon as the cooperatives become sufficiently productive, MSI intends to train miners in financial management. In the first year training is going to focus on training in how to be a cooperative and to hammer home the view that stealing from the cooperative is not acceptable or beneficial. (Telephone conversation with technical adviser, 5<sup>th</sup> November 2004.)

## **4. War and Diamonds**

The DSRP is profiled as a peacebuilding intervention and so a detailed understanding of the causes of war and the role diamonds played in the war is paramount. This chapter reviews why the war happened and what diamonds had to do with it. I provide an overview of the war and the role diamonds had in causing and facilitating it before interrogating the principal narratives which have been relied upon to explain the motivations for war. I then consider how the emergence of the ‘shadow state’ and the ‘lumpenisation’ of youth created the conditions for war before reviewing the motivations of domestic, regional and international actors for facilitating, funding and fighting in the war. I conclude by considering the role diamonds played in making conflict once again desirable and feasible and by critiquing the DSRP’s approach to building peace based on the analysis conducted in this chapter.

### **4.1 Chronology of the War**

On 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1991 rebel soldiers launched their first attacks in the districts of Bomaru and Kailahun in eastern Sierra Leone from their bases in western Liberia (Ndumbe 2001; Abdullah 1998). Liberia had been at war for two years already owing to a rebellion by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, led by Charles Taylor, against the tyrannical rule of President Samuel Doe. The Sierra Leonean war began with just 300<sup>58</sup> rebel fighters (comprised of Burkinabe mercenaries, on-loan fighters from the NPFL, the original junta of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and Sierra Leonean migrant diamond miners who had jumped to the cause) and a Government army of 3,000 (Alao 1999). By 2004, two years after the war had officially concluded, 72,000 combatants from the RUF, Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and Sierra Leonean army had been demobilised (Pugh & Cooper 2004).

The rebels called themselves the Revolutionary United Front. Their stated motivation for war was the removal of the corrupt and corpulent regime of the All Peoples Congress (APC) and the instatement of a democratically elected Government who would serve “a new Sierra Leone of freedom, justice and equal opportunity for all” (RUF 1995). The APC had ruled the country for 23 years and at that time was under the leadership of a puppet president and former general, Joseph Momoh. Momoh fled the country on 29th April 1992 when he mistook for a coup a protest by Government soldiers protesting against lack of pay and poor conditions at the front. The protesting soldiers grasped this opportunity and set up the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), under the leadership of Valentine Strasser, a young army captain who had served with ECOMOG<sup>59</sup> against the NPFL in Liberia.

Against his original inclination, Strasser decided not to negotiate a peace deal with the RUF but to fight on. With Momoh having recruited another 9,000 soldiers to the army’s ranks the state made successful military advances against the rebels in 1992 and 1993 forcing them to relinquish control of the diamondiferous district of Kono in 1992 (Reno 1998; Gberie 2002). Unfortunately for the citizens of Sierra Leone, these advances began to be compromised as poorly paid soldiers resorted to banditry and officers mobilised their troops to mine diamonds instead of fighting the enemy. Government soldiers soon began to resemble the rebels in their behaviour and activities, including human rights abuses, and even began to collude with them, which led to their being branding as *sobel*s, or soldier-rebels (Reno 1998; Alao 1999; Kandeh 2002).

By 1994, the rebels moved away from strategies of conventional warfare to guerrilla and terror tactics. With the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) distracted by diamonds and factional disputes, the RUF made concerted territorial and economic advances (Reno 1998). In late 1994 they kidnapped workers from foreign-owned rutile and bauxite mines. Both companies shut down operations in response, depriving the Government of 15% of its already paltry GNP (Reno 1998). By this stage the state was practically barren economically. Military expenditure was consuming 75% of state spending and domestic revenues totalled a measly \$60million in 1994-4. Structural reforms imposed by IMF and

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<sup>58</sup> Conflicting numbers. J. L. Hirsh (2001) says 300 fighters; Richards (2001) says 100.

<sup>59</sup> Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group

World Bank loan conditions and years of kleptocracy and corruption had whittled away state capacity to defend and serve the basic needs of the people. Sierra Leone was a failed state (cf. Reno 1995).

By 1995 the RUF had once again taken Kono and was threatening the seat of Government, having approached to within 20 miles of the capital. In early 1995 the NPRC employed Gurkha Security Guards Ltd. to recapture the key sites of resource (and revenue) production. With their leader killed, the Gurkhas left and were replaced in May 1995 by Executive Outcomes (EO), a private security company derived from an anti-apartheid division of South Africa's army (cf. Reno 1998, Smillie et. al 2000, Cilliers & Mason 1999). In exchange for this service the Government entered into an \$80 million joint venture project which allowed Branch Energy, a company affiliated with EO, to begin kimberlite mining operations in areas conquered and policed by EO<sup>60</sup> (Reno 1998). With just a couple of hundred men, EO worked swiftly and effectively, pushing back the rebels from the capital within the first week, taking control of the rutile and bauxite mines by April and reconquering the diamond mining areas in July and August (Adebajo 2002; Reno 1998). EO also helped train up the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), which had begun providing local defence in the earliest days of the war and who proved a formidable enemy against the RUF (Muana 1997). They had emerged out of the *poro* secret societies and thus were organised ethnically, mostly comprising Mende hunter-warriors - *Kamajois*<sup>61</sup> - from the southern and eastern provinces, though Konos formed similar groups<sup>62</sup>.

In January 1996 Brigadier-General Julius Maada Bio orchestrated a palace coup to overthrow Strasser who had reneged on a pledge not to run for president in the forthcoming elections, even though he was constitutionally ineligible (Pugh & Cooper 2004). The RUF was invited to participate in the elections though they refused. They launched a campaign of terrorism and mutilation against rural villages, amputating people and symbolically sending bags of hands to State House in Freetown to protest against the election. Despite these atrocities, elections were held in February even though parts of the north and east were too unstable to participate (Adebajo 2002). The Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) was instated under the leadership of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah<sup>63</sup>. Kabbah inherited a state devoid of revenue, financial reserves and a loyal army. In his first 10 months in office there were three coup attempts (Adebajo 2002). Despite these severe setbacks and although the RUF did not recognise the newly elected Government, Cote d'Ivoire managed to broker a peace deal between the RUF and the state of Sierra Leone (Abdullah 1998).

Signed on 30<sup>th</sup> November 1996, the Abidjan Accord called for the establishment of neutral peacekeeping forces, the withdrawal of EO and the repatriation of all foreign troops from Sierra Leone (Adebajo 2002). The UN peacekeeping force did not materialise as member states were more willing to fund peacekeeping in the Balkans than in West Africa. Instead the Nigerian contingent and the *Kamajois* took on more prominent roles in state defence once EO was expelled in January 1997. This left the RSLMF sidelined and bitter. At the same time there was a split within the RUF between the educated and war-weary who were ready for peace, and those battle-group commanders and *lumpens* (see below) for whom peace had less purchase than war (Abdullah 1998). On 12<sup>th</sup> March 1997 Foday Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria where he had reportedly gone to negotiate an arms deal (Sierra Leone News Archives 1997; Adebajo 2002). Three days later he was expelled from the RUF and a press statement was released accusing him of obstructing the peace process (Abdullah 1998). On the 29<sup>th</sup> March the members of the RUF who had issued this statement were abducted by a faction still loyal to Sankoh; they are presumed dead (Sierra Leone News Archives 1997; Abdullah 1998).

<sup>60</sup> Though these operations were interrupted later on in the war, Branch Energy is now operating as Koidu Holdings, a subsidiary of DiamondWorks, which is a Canadian mining company. Their concessions in Koidu and Tongo are estimated to total over 10 million carats (Gberie 2003).

<sup>61</sup> *Kamajoi* is the Mende word for 'expert hunter' (Archibald & Richards 2002). Cf. Patrick Muana for a detailed cultural description of the *Kamajois* and their role in the Sierra Leonean conflict (1997).

<sup>62</sup> Interview with Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004.

<sup>63</sup> Traditionally the SLPP is the more right wing of the country's principal parties, tending to represent the interests of the predominantly Mende South and of the middle classes.

In September 1996 a captured RUF commander stated that the rebels were then at peace with the army, their joint enemy being the CDF, ECOMOG and EO. After the bloody coup of 25th May 1997, the RSLMF invited the RUF to join them in government as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) with Sankoh as second man to Major Johnny Paul Koroma (Abdullah 1998). The CDF and ECOMOG became the official enemies of the state, as they maintained loyalty to the exiled Government. It was at this stage that the war really began, according to some miners and diggers interviewed in Kono, many of whom, like their exiled president, fled to Guinea at this stage.

The AFRC was condemned domestically and internationally (Adebajo 2002; Abdullah 1998). On top of their political illegitimacy, they wreaked havoc within the country committing widespread atrocities, including murder, torture, looting, and rape (Smillie et al. 2000). On 8<sup>th</sup> August 1997 the UN imposed an oil, arms, and travel embargo on Sierra Leone (Ndumbe 2001). Pressure by ECOWAS resulted in the Conakry Agreement of 23<sup>rd</sup> October 1997, which decreed that Kabbah would be reinstated by 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1998 (Adebajo 2002). The AFRC showed no will to enforce this, however. In February 1998, fierce fighting broke out between the Nigerian contingent of the newly-named ECOMOG II and the AFRC (cf. Adebajo 2002). The sobels and rebels were forced out of Freetown, but not without significant losses on both sides as well as a large number of civilian casualties and general widespread destruction (Campbell 2004). The elected Government was restored on March 10<sup>th</sup> 1998 and the war continued in the countryside with the RUF and AFRC following a programme of systematic violence under the protocols of 'Operation No Living Thing' and 'Operation Pay Yourself' (Adebajo 2002; Human Rights Watch 1998).

In March 1998 the UN embargo was lifted and in July the UN Security Council committed sixty-one independent observers to the peacekeeping effort as the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) (cf. Ndumbe 2001). On 6 January 1999 the rebels invaded Freetown and held the city for six weeks until they were forced to withdraw by concerted action by Nigerian troops. More than 3,000 civilians died. Tense from the high level of casualties amongst their own ranks, some Nigerian forces committed human rights abuses against rebel suspects and sympathizers (Adebajo 2002).

In May 1999 a cease-fire agreement was signed followed by the controversial Lomé Accord in July. In September 1999 Management Systems International was invited by USAID to help establish the Strategic Mineral Resources Commission, of which Sankoh was to be chairman<sup>64</sup>. The accord also stipulated that Sankoh should be vice-president, that another 13,000 peacekeepers would be deployed as the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and that an amnesty was to be provided for war crimes, despite the horrific abuses that had been committed during the war<sup>65</sup> (Pugh & Cooper 2004; cf. Adebajo 2002). Despite these political and economic advances and the fact that demobilisation had begun in 1998, the RUF was unwilling to relinquish control of the diamondiferous areas to the Government (Fanthorpe 2003; Pugh & Cooper 2004). Following the kidnapping of 500 peacekeepers by the RUF in May 2000, the British Government committed 700 combat forces to Freetown (J. L. Hirsch 2001). The presence of the British and the build-up of UNAMSIL troops created the pressure necessary to push the RUF towards a more consolidated peace. In November 2000 the Abuja cease-fire agreement was signed, followed by a more formal agreement in May 2001. In June 2001 a large Pakistani force was deployed in Kono, making it possible for many displaced people to at last return home. On 18<sup>th</sup> January 2002 the President formally declared peace. Elections were held in May, reinstating Kabbah's SLPP Government for four more years.

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<sup>64</sup> Email from and telephone conversation with Mark Renzi, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> November 2004.

<sup>65</sup> Over the course of the war over 75,000 people were killed, over 10,000 suffered amputations, over 5,000 children were forced into combat, forced labour or sexual slavery, up to 2 million people were displaced internally or forced into refuge in Guinea and Liberia, and thousands of 1000s women and girls suffered widespread and systematic sexual violence. Additionally, the RUF used civilians as 'mules' for transporting the ammunition and supplies they traded for diamonds and as slaves in the diamond mines ('manpower') and on rice farms. Many of these people died of starvation and exhaustion (Muana 1997). Besides these human rights abuses inflicted on the civilian populations, numerous war crimes were committed between the various factions (crimesofwar.org, reliefweb.org)

## **4.2 The rationale behind the Sierra Leonean war**

The principal debates which have circulated in reference to the rationales behind the Sierra Leonean war have revolved around the issues of barbarism (Kaplan 1994; Bangura 1997, Kandeh 2002, Opala 1998, Richards 2002), greed versus grievance (Berdal & Malone 2000, Collier & Hoeffler 2002, Smillie et al. 2000, Keen 2002, Archibald & Richards 2002), and ethnic hatred (Ndumbe 2001, Alao 1999). These explanations are inadequate to capture the full meaning of what went on in Sierra Leone because they obfuscate more nuanced explanations of people's motivations according to their rank and role in the war and are insensitive to and dismissive of people's real motivations for putting their lives on the line and hurting other people (cf. Pugh & Cooper 2004; Abdullah 2004; Archibald & Richards 2002). Furthermore, the accusations of greed and barbarism impute 'bad character' and so situate the motivations for violence inside the character of the African and outside of geography and history. Such essentialism and intimation of African exceptionality serves to continue the long history of othering African experiences of violence. It also tends to ignore European and western responsibility in these crises and omits the West's own internal history of greed and barbarism. Of most relevance, though, to peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone, is that such allegations make it harder for former combatants to find an unbiased and listening ear into which they might protest their own truths and be taken seriously. These theories silence dissenting voices. Many joined the RUF so that at last they might have political and economic inclusion and the possibility of improving their lives. If we do not give credence to the motivations for war as enunciated by the very people who took up arms and those who suffered their anger then we are committing the same crime of exclusion as the authorities who gave them cause to fight in the first place.

Besides these essentialist explanations there are several far more plausible analyses of the rationale behind the war (cf. Richards 1996, Reno 1998, Abdullah 1998, 2004, Kandeh 2002, Bangura 1997). Here I review how domestic actors' motivations to wage war were produced by changes in the political economy and sociology of Sierra Leone by processes of economic and political informalisation and social lumpenisation.

### **4.2.1 The informalisation of politics and economy in Sierra Leone: the emergence of the 'shadow state'**

Political scientist Will Reno has done the most comprehensive study of the political and economic forces which led to state collapse and war in Sierra Leone in his detailed work *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* (1995; see also Opala 1998). In this seminal work he describes and explains how, since the achievement of independence in 1961, changes in Sierra Leone's political economy have involved the gradual displacement of political authority and sovereignty<sup>66</sup> from the formal state to what he terms the 'shadow state'. Based on further analysis in his book *Warlord Politics and African states*, this transition could be described typologically as a transformation from postcolonial state to quasi-state to weak-state to failed-state and warlord political economies (Reno 1998)<sup>67</sup>.

When the British handed over authority of Sierra Leone to the postcolonial Government of Milton Margai in 1961, Sierra Leone was one of the most developed nations in Africa. Within just 30 years the state had collapsed and the country was at war. The attrition of the state escalated to near completion under the rule of Siaka Stevens (1968 – 1985). Stevens pursued political entrenchment through the manipulation of state

<sup>66</sup> Sovereignty is the monopoly over violence and social discipline. See also Sidaway 2003.

<sup>67</sup> Reno uses a Weberian typology to help explain the collapse of the state and emergence of the shadow state (1995, 1998). During the Cold War and especially in the 1960s and 70s Sierra Leone had the status of the 'quasi-state', as its state capacity was maintained through external patronage from other states in return for political and economic allegiance. In the 1980s Sierra Leone became a 'weak state' as its capacity to govern was maintained by investment from international donors and foreign companies through the privatisation of state functions. Like the quasi-state, the weak state has de jure sovereignty but cannot exercise this sovereignty. Sierra Leone became a failed state during the war in the 1990s because it could not protect itself from internal challenges without enlisting external help in the form of foreign military intervention (ECOMOG, UK), foreign firms (privatisation of security and other state functions) and foreign aid and loans.

functions, the exploitation of state resources, and the pursuit of economic accumulation. He set the trend for elites to defend their authority using techniques of patronage and patrimony rather than through the solicitation of popular approval (Reno 1998)<sup>68</sup>. Access to state resources brought money and money brought power as with money one could elicit favours from superiors (bribery) and loyalty from dependents.

In the early years of his reign, Stevens centralised power in Freetown and restructured the state to increase the dependency of local authorities on State House. His patronage networks ran all the way from Freetown to the tiniest villages throughout Sierra Leone. Although Sierra Leone has rich deposits of bauxite, rutile and gold, the diamond industry came to be central to Stevens' patronage system (see chapter 5). In 1971 he announced the formation of the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC), which effectively nationalised the De Beers-owned Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) and allowed the Prime Minister greater control over the direction of the company as well as its revenues (Smillie et. al. 2000). In the early 1970s he seized the opportunity to wrest control of the illicit diamond economy from rival officials and strongmen, in order to deprive them of "a major source of revenue and influence" and quell the potential for populism and political competition in Kono (Reno 1995). In this way power was further centralised in Freetown as he and his cronies became the "landlords" providing protection to miners and dealers and thus the recipients of diamond profits in return. Significantly, just as his colonial predecessors had done, Stevens purposefully sought to disempower an emerging class of African entrepreneurs who he feared might have used their growing wealth to "give voice to popular anger" (Reno 1995: 132). For this reason he consolidated control of the diamond industry in the hands of the Lebanese and encouraged discrimination against indigenes in the allocation of dealing licences. An increasingly impoverished and frustrated population was kept politically silenced by economic exclusion and oppression.

Stevens' kleptocratic elite bled the state dry and crippled its capacity to perform its duties to the population. Social security became informalised as the state became an instrument of personal accumulation for a repressive and corrupt elite rather than a means of protection for the citizenry, who came to depend even more on patrimony and patronage for support and security. With money increasingly at the centre of political influence, rival strongmen competed for political position through the manipulation of markets in order to prevent their competitors from accumulating capital (Reno 1995; 1998). As competition became fiercer, the unpredictability of "informal costs" ('hand-shakes', 'palm-greasing') and the risk of confiscation of property by "unruly politicians" heightened the stakes (Reno 1998: 24). Uncertainty compelled strongmen to invest in private militias of youth thugs to protect their commercial interests, discipline the competition and pursue their ambitions (Reno 1995; 1998). The economy became grafted to political ends as the market replaced the ballot box as the site of political contestation<sup>69</sup>. With the locus of economic opportunity and political contestation removed from the formal state to the market, that which was to be ruled was commerce, not territory. It was with this attrition of the formal state and the transfer of sovereignty to the informal political economy through processes of patronage, the privatisation of violence, and the militarisation of commerce that Reno's 'shadow state' emerged. As the formal state crumbled and the shadow state became entrenched, the political elites of Sierra Leone compromised long term social interests in order to handle immediate, personal, political crisis. Social development was removed from the political agenda and society became increasingly disenfranchised from the state. By the time Stevens handed over formal power to Joseph Momoh in 1985 his personal fortune amounted to US\$500million (Reno 1998) whilst about just 60,000 of the country's 3.5 million people were in paid employment (Abdullah 1998).

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<sup>68</sup> Indeed, Stevens' government actively discouraged social mobilisation and popular participation in politics through the use of brute force and economic marginalisation and the creation of a one-party state (Adebajo 2002; Reno 1995; Abdullah 1998).

<sup>69</sup> This logic of market intervention and manipulation for political ends is not unique to Africa, as Reno shows in his depiction of anti-competitive behaviour in Japan and the US. This counters the view that African politics is a "theatre of the absurd" (Watts 2003) to be held up as askew of the norm, but is a rational manifestation of peripheral elites' strategies for coping with and taking advantage of changes in national and international political economies.

For the first ten years or so of Stevens' reign, the country's patronage networks were kept lubricated by the diversion of money from state coffers into private hands and increasing private revenue from diamond mining, marketing and exportation (see chapter 5). This system of patronage and patrimony was sustained so long as external revenues could be brought into the system. By the 1980s, however, state resources were beginning to shrivel up in response to shrinking aid budgets as the Cold War dwindled, declining revenues from legal diamond mining and other formal economic activities, the incapacitation of ordinary state functions, and economic homogenisation around informal diamond production and marketing (Archibald & Richards 2002, Reno 1995). Civil servants began to be paid in rice in 1982 and rice became the currency of influence where cash was scarce. The system became bottom-heavy with more people needing support than those able to give support. The local elite (chiefs, elders, and Government officials) resorted to rent-seeking as a matter of political survival. Whereas money had brought power previously, now power was used to extort money. The authorities began their predation of the increasingly impoverished and expanding masses. Instead of flowing from top to bottom, money now flowed up the chain. Cash-strapped chiefs and local authorities laid arbitrary charges against youths in return for fines (Archibald & Richards 2002). Government positions "came to be structured by the requirements of a tribute mode of expropriation" as Government officials paid for the privilege of political position which they could use to extort bribes and rents (Kandeh 2002: 181). Society became elusive to the state in response to its increasing predation and diminishing capacity to offer social security and the provision of justice (Reno 1998: 37). Economic contraction, political alienation, and a lack of educational opportunities increased people's exposure to risk and extinguished the opportunities of youth to improve their lot. Put simply, the poor became poorer and more people became poor. The system began to crumble, culminating in a general crisis of social security and the creation of mass dissatisfaction and desire for change (Archibald & Richards 2002).

In this climate of intensifying insecurity, patrimonial dependency, escalating violence, political alienation and economic decline some people began seeking political alternatives. But alternatives were not permitted. The All Peoples Congress created a de facto one party state by 1973 and de jure one party state by 1978 and violently oppressed any political opposition (Adebajo 2002; Abdullah 1998; Reno 1995; Kandeh 2002). By the time the war began in 1991 the APC had headed the country for 23 years. It was this rotten Government and the "glaring absence of a radical post-colonial alternative" which led some to believe that war was the best option for change (Abdullah 1998: 204).

#### **4.2.2 The Lumpenisation and radicalisation of youth**

Sierra Leonean scholars Ibrahim Abdullah (1998) and Jimmy Kandeh (2002) set out how the consolidation of sovereignty in the informal political economy led to the massification and lumpenisation of youths in Sierra Leonean society. Abdullah credits the "'revolution' in the hinterland (i.e. the RUF) and the one in the city (i.e. the NPRC and later AFRC)" to this "lumpen culture and youth resistance" (1998: 204). Kandeh argues that it was the lumpenisation of youth which gave the war its multiple logics of political violence, banditry, hedonism and brutality as "lumpenised youth are inherently prone to criminal adventurism" given their status as "socially uprooted, chronically impoverished and politically alienated" (2002: 179).

Lumpenisation is the process by which mass society takes on the character of the lumpenproletariat, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as "the lowest and most degraded section" of society; "the 'down and outs'" (OED online). In Sierra Leone in the 1980s, to be lumpen meant to be 'footloose', to be a sub-citizen, excluded from the networks of patronage which provide social security and economic opportunity and convicted to a life of opportunism eking a meagre existence either in the diamond pits or exploiting the legal and illegal possibilities presented by a life on the streets (Richards 1999). According to Abdullah, Sierra Leone's "lumpens" are "largely unemployed and unemployable youths, mostly male, who live by their wits or who have one foot in what is generally referred to as the informal or underground economy. They are prone to criminal behaviour, petty theft, drugs, drunkenness and gross indiscipline." (1998: 207-8) Lumpens are not particular to Sierra Leone but are present in many African

countries, such as Uganda, Algeria and Nigeria, where they also form an “oppositional culture” prone to violence (p. 208).

In Sierra Leone lumpenisation was a product of political alienation and the exclusion of the majority from the means of social improvement – access to education and employment. The worst affected were women and youth (Archibald & Richards 2002) but it was youth who eventually pursued change through armed rebellion. Abdullah (1998) gives an overview of the political context which led to youth lumpenisation and radicalisation in Freetown and the provincial towns and the eventual talk of armed rebellion and formation of the leading junta of the RUF. Richards reviews how youth alienation led to lumpenisation in the provinces and created a suite of “lost souls” who ended up as diamond diggers and eventually jumped to the cause of the rebel forces (1999, 2001; also Archibald and Richards 2002). Jimmy Kandeh (2002) explores how the lumpenisation of youth led to the criminalisation of government (NPRC and AFRC) and the ‘sobelisation’ of the army in the 1990s. In all cases the causes of lumpenisation were the same. Firstly youths came to equate political domination with violence and thuggery as their principal role in politics had been to do the dirty work for politicians during elections and other crises (Kandeh 2002, Abdullah 1998, Reno 1995). Secondly, youths were alienated from the centre of political decision-making in line with customary tradition of deference to elders and purposeful exclusion by the party (Abdullah 1998; Archibald & Richards 2002). Thirdly, chiefs and elders exploited this hierarchy to arbitrarily expropriate money and resources from youths who had no recourse to protest except through a local system of customary justice which many considered to be “expensive, unpredictable and open to bribery” (Archibald & Richards 2002: 344). Often youths chose to flee the village preferring to be excommunicated than the victim of injustice (Archibald & Richards 2002). Fourthly, rights, including access to education and employment, were afforded only to those with contacts or money<sup>70</sup>. Kandeh sums the situation up: “It was quite common ... for students who were admitted to Fourah Bay College to be denied scholarships while those receiving Government scholarships failed to gain admission. This anomaly ... expressed precisely the sort of injustices that alienated the vast majority of Sierra Leonean youth, many of whom lacked the means and political connections to pursue their education. Worse still was the fact that those who made it through college could not find employment after graduation and those who found jobs were seldom paid, if at all” (2002: 185).

Lumpen youths found unity in their exclusion in illegal diamond mining camps in the bush and in the *potes* of Freetown and the provincial towns. The *pote* was a site “of relaxation for unemployed youths” as well as “a cultural/leisure space constructed around the *odelay* (masquerade)” (Abdullah 1998: 208). Abdullah goes on: “They were known for their anti-social culture: gambling, drugs ..., petty theft and violence ... they were seen as a good-for-nothing bunch, best avoided” (p. 208). The *potes* soon began to attract middle-class teenagers “who transformed the culture as well as the nature of the *pote* from an area for social misfits into one of political socialisation” (p. 209). Soon a veritable counter-culture had emerged, moulded around drugs, reggae, and radical politics and with the courage to mount protests against an increasingly authoritarian Government. By the 1980s the *potes* involved university students who were well respected by their younger ‘brothers’. In time these students had become “the most articulate group to oppose the APC ... and call for radical change” (Abdullah 1998: 209-210). With economic recession the lumpenproletariat swelled and subaltern leftist discourse in the *potes* turned to talk of revolution and armed insurgency. It was at this time that Sierra Leonean youths developed an interest in Colonel Mummar Qadaffi’s Green Book and his ideology of pan-Africanism. Students travelled to Libya to attend the annual Green Book celebration, to participate in the Libyan Arab Jama’riyya and eventually, in 1987 and 1988 to engage in military training. Amongst those who went to Benghazi were Foday Sankoh, Abu Kanu and Rashid Mansaray, who came to be the triumvirate leaders of the RUF (Abdullah 1998).

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<sup>70</sup> In the late 1980s, Momoh even declared that education is a privilege, not a right (Kandeh 2002, Richards 1996b)

### **4.3 Motivations for War**

Here I review the motivations of the main protagonists and facilitators to war; I shall only touch on the motivations of the defence forces.

#### **4.3.1 ‘From Mats to Mattresses’<sup>71</sup>: Motivations of the domestic Fighters**

The most in-depth accounts as to the motivations of the leaders and conscripts of recruits to the various factions which fought in the war are provided by Richards (1996, 1996, 2001, 2002), Archibald & Richards (2002), Peters and Richards (1998), Abdullah (1998, 2004), and Kandeh (2002). I deal principally with the motives behind the RUF invasion as they were the main protagonists in the war.

#### ***Motivations of the RUF***

When the RUF invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1991 it comprised about 300 people, including Burkinabe mercenaries, members of Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) (P. Hirsch 2001). The Sierra Leoneans who took part were mostly lumpens, who had been trained in Libya or were resident in Liberia (Abdullah 1998, Richards 1999). Some already had military experience fighting with the NPFL. Many of the original revolutionaries who had gone to Libya for military and ideological training did not form part of the RUF although Sankoh, Mansaray and Kanu came to them in a recruitment drive a week prior to the invasion (Abdullah 1998). According to Alie Kabba, a long-time Sierra Leonean revolutionary, a split in opinion whilst in Libya meant that “the wrong individuals” led the movement to battle, meaning those individuals who were motivated more by a vengeful and prejudicially-determined militarism than by an aspiration for democratic revolution (Abdullah 1998: 19).

Foday Sankoh began as spokesperson of the RUF and soon emerged as its leader. Kanu and Mansaray were executed by the RUF in 1992 for trumped-up charges of “failure to follow instructions” and “conniving with the enemy”, and “failure to defend a strategic position against the enemy” (Abdullah 1998: 226). Both leaders were opposed to the random violence being committed by RUF forces and were dedicated to popularising the movement’s ideology and political purpose (Abdullah 1998). According to John Hirsch Sankoh was “thirsting for revenge” against the APC Government in reaction to his imprisonment for treason in 1977 (2001: 150). Although revenge was one factor impelling Sankoh towards armed rebellion, once he did obtain a government seat in 1997, his behaviour mimicked that of the corrupt Government officials he had set out to remove. This allegation comes from the UN Expert Panel who, based on evidence from a correspondence file from his office, characterised Sankoh as “a double dealing Leader, clutching at financial opportunities for personal and political gain, outside of the governmental framework in which he was ostensibly working. Much of this related to the diamond trade” (UN 2000, see also Perez 2000).

It seems then that Sankoh was driven more by self-interest than revolutionary spirit. Certainly the RUF’s ideology was crude (Ndumbe 2001) and the movement rid itself of its intellectual elements when it executed Kanu and Mansaray (Abdullah 1998). Abdullah rightly begs the question “How revolutionary is a revolutionary movement which slaughters and terrorises the very people it claims to be liberating?” (1998: 222). Ndumbe argues that the atrocities committed by the RUF were “tactics” intended “to terrorize civilians to demonstrate the failure of the national government to protect its citizens” (2001: 94). Richards (1996b) similarly asserts that the intended programme of the RUF was rural destabilisation as a strategy to delegitimise central Government. It appears, therefore, that the RUF junta were inspired to take up arms against the APC kleptocracy more in pursuit of revenge for social exploitation and alienation than for liberation. To some degree, they were simply motivated by hatred.

Some conscripts also saw the RUF as an opportunity for revenge against those who had treated them unjustly in the past. In the early days of the war the rebels hunted down and killed chiefs, court chairmen

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<sup>71</sup> This phrase was given to me as an explanation for the war by a long-standing and well-respected member of the diamond community, who now acts as a consultant to USAID’s DIPAM project in Sierra Leone.

and other Government officials (Archibald & Richards 2002; Muana 1997). Some, who conscripted to the RUF voluntarily, or who embraced the ideals of the movement once they had been abducted into it, did so for ideological reasons. Still others joined in the spirit of opportunism. Ultimately, for most fighting for the RUF was a way out of a sorry existence. It offered a chance to improve their lot either immediately, by having access to education and basic consumables in the RUF camps (Richards 1996: 28-9), or in the long-term, by fighting for a more just system which would offer them greater political and economic inclusion.

Many of those who chose to join the RUF were lumpens had worked as illegal diamond miners in the bush. The mining camps offered a chance of re-inclusion with the possibility of social reacceptance embodied in that big diamond hidden somewhere in the earth. These lumpen diamond diggers existed outside of society and yet were central to that society's order. Their labour produced the money which their 'supporters', often political figures or their clients, used to maintain the very patronage system which had brought about their alienation and insecurity (Richards 1996, 1999, 2001). They were the victims and the creators of their own victimisation, doubly alienated from society as well as their own labour. The irony of this 'inclusion by exclusion' was not lost on them and gave some cause to join the RUF when they first raised their banners (Richards 1999, 2001).

Besides these 'footloose' youths, who had become aggrieved at having been "recategorised by society-at-large as lumpens, monsters, lost souls" (Archibald & Richards 2002: 351), the RUF was also populated with abductees. Some of these abductees were used as 'manpower' to mine diamonds or as mules to transport diamonds to the Liberian border and arms back (Campbell 2004) Others were children who were abducted to fight. Their allegiance was induced by imposing drug addictions or homelessness upon them<sup>72</sup> (Muana 1997; Richards 2001). Children and youths were made homeless and lumpen the moment they chose to amputate or kill a member of their family or village rather than being mutilated or executed themselves<sup>73</sup>. This "shared legacy of 'homelessness'" was a unifying feature in the RUF as those with families and villages were always eager to escape (Richards 2001: 79).

### ***The role of 'lumpens' in other factions***

After the RUF invasion, the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) swelled its ranks so that by 1994 it had increased from 3,000 soldiers to 14,000 (Reno 1998). Some of these recruits were motivated to join more by feelings of revenge or patriotism (to village or country) than economic gain (Peters & Richards 1998; Muana 1997). For others joining the fight was sheer survivalism in the face of extremely limited options (Peters & Richards 1998). Many of these new cadres were lumpens with backgrounds similar to those in the RUF. The military provided opportunities for economic gain when combatants were sent to liberate the diamond mining areas or to conduct mining on behalf of superior officers (Alao 1999). It also provided a measly (and just occasional) salary of \$12/month, inferior weapons and inadequate ammunition (Alao 1999; Opala 1998). Unsurprisingly their priorities did not always put 'the cause' first. An AK47 and a uniform could go a long way to command respect, food and cash (Peters & Richards 2000). Soon it transpired that Government soldiers were using their resources to engage in personal artisanal mining projects. Child soldiers were terrorising civilians, high on drugs and the thrill of looting and raping (Peters & Richards 2000). Others were colluding with the RUF to exchange their uniforms and weapons for diamonds and food (Alao 1999). They came to be called 'sobels': soldiers by day, rebels by night, changing their allegiance as it suited them (Adebajo 2002; Kandeh 2002). It was just such 'sobels' who led the 1997 coup against the new, democratically-elected Government, and invited the RUF to share power as part of the AFRC.

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<sup>72</sup> Drug abuse was commonplace (and occasionally compulsory) amongst the various factions. One boy I met in Koidu had served as a child soldier. He is now about 8 years old and habitually uses 'brown-brown' (crack-cocaine) and marijuana. He had been living on the streets until he was recently taken in, along with about 30 other boys, by Braveheart Mining Cooperative.

<sup>73</sup> This "inductive violence" was a tactic of RENAMO in Mozambique.

The Sobel coup was partly the response of a dejected military to the transfer of responsibility for the state's defence from the corrupted Government army to the newly formed Civil Defence Forces (CDF). Disillusioned with the Sobelisation of the army, this "semi-official 'ethnic' militia" had emerged as the principal defenders of the rural provinces, especially in the South and East. They adapted the hunting and warrior techniques traditional to their male secret societies to the task of rural defence (Archibald & Richards 2002; cf. Muana 1997). Civil defence began in the very earliest stages of the war with the emergence of local vigilantes, who defended the Segbwema sector (eastern province) in 1991-2, and the Tamaboro of Koinadugu District (northern province), who proved significant in defending Kailahun district (Muana 1997). By far the largest and most important contingent came to be the *Kamajoi*, who hail from the South of the country (Human Rights Watch 2000). Many who joined their ranks were rural youths, who had suffered similar experiences of exclusion and alienation as their RUF enemy. The CDF offered social status, opportunities for economic gain and potential for revenge for those who had suffered family losses and abuses at the hands of the RUF. Despite their popular position as 'the good guys' in the civil war, the CDF committed atrocities and war crimes similar to those of the RSLMF and the RUF. Like these other factions, they had thousands of child soldiers in their ranks, they conducted looting raids and retaliatory raids in which civilians were killed, they committed acts of cannibalism, torture and rape, they prevented aid from reaching civilians, and they routinely executed RUF and AFRC prisoners, as well as suspected collaborators and sympathisers (Human Rights Watch 1998; 2004c; Muana 1997).

#### 4.3.2 Regional and International Actors: Motivations of the facilitators

Charles Taylor was central to the feasibility of war in Sierra Leone (Reno 1998, Alao 1999, Gberie 2002, 2003, Pugh & Cooper 2004, Smillie et al. 2000, Silberfein 2004). Taylor's principal role was in the provision of military and financial support to the RUF. He provided the RUF with fighting experience in his rebellion in Liberia from 1989 onwards. He then provided a team of Liberian mercenaries who helped the RUF in their initial invasion of Sierra Leone on the 23<sup>rd</sup> March, 1991. He allowed the RUF refuge in the western forests of Liberia. Most importantly, however, he bought diamonds from the RUF in exchange for much needed arms and supplies (Smillie et al. 2000)<sup>74</sup>. Indeed, Gberie goes so far as to say that "the RUF was little more than a murderous diamond mining machine, managed at a distance by Charles Taylor" (2002, p.3).

His motivations for supporting the RUF included the desire to:

1. force the withdrawal of Sierra Leonean troops from the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping forces in Liberia (Pugh & Cooper 2004);
2. force the withdrawal of Sierra Leonean support for the Nigerian contingent of ECOMOG and avenge this support<sup>75</sup> (Alao 1999, Pugh & Cooper 2004);
3. avenge Momoh for having prohibited him (Taylor) the use of the country to launch his rebellion in Liberia in 1989 (Alao 1999);
4. repay the RUF for their assistance in fighting his battles in Liberia in 1990;
5. install his RUF allies in power (Pugh & Cooper 2004);
6. capture revenue from the Sierra Leonean diamond industry in order to widen and fund his own patronage networks (Alao 1999; Reno 1995); and
7. "pander to the historical sentiments strong among most Liberians that (Sierra Leonean) territories lost during colonialism should be reincorporated into what they saw as 'Greater Liberia'" (Alao 1999: 49; cf. Reno 1995, Gberie 2002, 2003)

<sup>74</sup> An artisanal diamond digger interviewee told me he had witnessed Taylor receiving diamonds in Tombodu, Kono district. According to him Taylor made frequent visits to this area in the late 1990s. Interview 23, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>75</sup> Momoh had allowed Nigeria to use Sierra Leone as its staging post for intervention in the Liberian conflict in 1990 and thenceforth as its rear base for its soldiers in Nigeria (Pugh & Cooper 2004, :94)

Charles Taylor has been indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone on 17 counts for crimes against humanity “and other serious violations of international humanitarian law” (Human Rights Watch 2004a: 11) including his role in “contributing to the death, rape, abduction, and mutilation of thousands of civilians during Sierra Leone’s civil war” (Human Rights Watch 2004b). He remains in exile in Nigeria despite calls by numerous Sierra Leonean and international individuals and organisations, including the Special Court, for Odeabajo, the Nigerian president, to hand him over to the Sierra Leonean authorities (Human Rights Watch 2004a).

Other facilitators of the war include Colonel Mummar Qaddafi of Libya who provided training, arms and ammunition for Taylor and Sankoh in the 1980s as part of his pan-African resistance to western domination (Abdullah 1998, Richards 1996, J.L. Hirsch 2001). Other heads of state implicated include Blaise Campaore, president of Burkina Faso, who met with Charles Taylor and RUF members on 5<sup>th</sup> June 2000 (BBC 2000). During the war Burkina Faso had acted as a staging post for RUF weapons supply into Sierra Leone and diamond smuggling out (Traynor 2001). In one incident on 13<sup>th</sup> March 1999 a shipment of 68 tons of weapons arrived at Ougadougou from the Ukraine and were later shipped to Sierra Leone through Liberia (UN 2000 § 21). Soldiers and mercenaries from Burkina Faso had also fought alongside the RUF (Smillie et al. 2000). Also implicated in facilitating the RUF were international criminals (Leonid Minin of Ukraine, Yair Klein of Israel, Colonel Fred Rindle of South Africa, and Nico Shefer of Ecuador), mercenaries from Ukraine, and international terrorists involved in Al Qaeda (Smillie et al. 2000, Global Witness 2003).

#### **4.4 What did the war have to do with diamonds?**

The existence of high amounts of high quality, easily-accessible diamonds in Sierra Leone helped create the conditions for war. The diamond industry was a central aspect of political elites’ ability to maintain their social position. In the 1960s and early 1970s diamonds provided substantial state revenues which were mostly used to satisfy the personal ambitions and patrimonial obligations of corrupt Government officials and politicians rather than the needs of the country. The diamond industry was also crucial in the attraction of foreign investors, development aid, and loans from international financial institutions. These investments were used as political and economic weapons to disempower competing big-men (Reno 1995, 1998; Pugh & Cooper 2004). Over time the kleptocracy of the elite, the pervasiveness of state corruption, and the privatisation of violence and social security led to the delegitimation of the state and collapse of state sovereignty. Through these processes sovereignty passed to the informal political economy. Since the 1950s diamonds had been mined illegally by tens of thousands of artisanal miners and then smuggled into neighbouring Liberia where a dollar economy and lower export taxes made it a more favourable market. Once the APC came into power in 1968 these gangs came to be funded by political elites and Lebanese merchants under their authority. Diamonds were used to raise the capital with which the elites could ensure the loyalty of their clients and the favour of their superiors. These relationships between the diamond industry, corruption, patronage systems, the entrenchment of the ‘shadow state’ and the collapse of the formal state are explored in greater detail in the next chapter.

Besides this indirect role in making war desirable, diamonds were the principal means by which the rebels obtained the funds, arms and supplies to fight and continue their war. Unpaid Government soldiers also used diamonds as a currency to buy food and other supplies of which they were deprived. In these ways diamonds facilitated the occurrence and continuance of the war. Furthermore, diamonds provided opportunities for personal gain for members of all factions, including the CDF and ECOMOG. This provided motivation for belligerents and counter-insurgents alike to continue the violence in order to protect their access to the resource, which explains why the diamond fields were the last areas to be relinquished by the rebels. For these reasons the war was played out heavily in the diamond areas as factions fought for control of the diamond fields (Ndumbe 2001). People in these areas, especially in Kono, suffered very heavily with rebels and sobels either terrorising people to force them to leave or abducting them into forced labour and sexual slavery (Human Rights Watch 1998).

## **4.5 Conclusion**

*“Conflict in the current context of Africa is not aberrant or irrational, but rather a functional response to the imperatives of underdevelopment, international norms and structures, and neoliberal forces of globalization”*  
(Grant, MacLean & Shaw 2003: 124).

There were multiple factors at work to create the conditions for war. People were motivated to fight by notions of revenge and rebellion, grievance and to some extent greed, and mostly opportunism in the face of impoverishment and political and economic alienation that had bestowed upon many the status of lumpens. These motivations were nurtured by a political system which had induced immense, widespread vulnerability which had required people to seek social security through patronage, patrimony, corruption, and violence. The institutionalisation and normalisation of patronage was made possible by the existence of diamonds. Besides offering opportunities to earn profits through ordinary business, diamonds furnished state coffers and the political elite with money from taxes, international investors and foreign lenders, and provided traditional leaders and bureaucrats the means to manipulate dependents into doing their bidding in order to gain access to the resource or its proceeds. Diamonds enabled these people to lubricate the networks of favours and dependency upon which they built their authority. Furthermore, beyond making the war desirable in these ways, diamonds also made it possible because they could be traded for the military hardware and supplies necessary for fighting and maintaining control of the diamond resource.

Through its schemes to build state capacity, decriminalise the diamond industry, and improve industry surveillance and discipline, the DSRP is designed mainly to make it less possible for diamonds to fuel the war by addressing those “local issues that promote smuggling and inhibit enforcement” (MSI 2004a: 2). Since it is a diamond-centred project, the programme does not engage comprehensively with the factors which made war desirable in the first place though it has recognised that the disgruntlement of youth in many ways caused the war. The cooperative scheme was originally conceived to provide gainful opportunities for youth in the diamond industry<sup>76</sup> and the PDA is actively inclusive of youth groups and other community-based organisations. The DSRP has also recognised the importance of combating poverty as the means of maintaining peace, and of fighting corruption in order to even out the playing field and make the industry less discriminatory. But, at least in its public documents and explicit strategies, it has not engaged substantially with the culture of patronage which, firstly, has traditionally structured relationships in Sierra Leone’s political economy towards the interests of the elite, secondly, on the one hand has made many people poor whilst, on the other, offering them the main means of protection from the vagaries of poverty, and which, lastly, was sustained in the 1970s and 1980s by monies invested by international aid organisations. On the other hand, members of the MSI team advising and guiding the project have extensive experience operating in West African society and so no doubt take the issue of patronage and patrimony into account in their everyday decision-making. However, at the risk of promoting cultural imperialism, there may be room for all owners of the DSRP to engage more forthrightly with the potential damage traditional systems of patronage, and the consequential hyper-dependency and even parasitism which it nurtures in Sierra Leonean society, have done, and indeed with the potential for the institutions of the DSRP, including the PDA, to be used by Kono’s political elite to furnish and expand their own ‘big-man’ networks of patronage and dependency<sup>77</sup>.

After the war there is a move towards individualism in Sierra Leone (Archibald and Richards 2002), which offers an opportunity to promote values of accountability and responsibility in a non-discriminatory society based on principles of democracy and, most importantly, equal opportunity. Whilst no democracy is perfectly equitable, the explicit pursuit of these ideals in the DSRP’s endeavours to decriminalise the industry and make diamonds work for peace and prosperity will at least demonstrate to those who may find cause to fight again that there are other, non-violent ways of fighting for one’s rights.

<sup>76</sup> Interview with Paul Temple, 20<sup>th</sup> June 2004.

<sup>77</sup> The one PDA employee who was found to be doing this was dealt with appropriately by MSI, but the potential for others to use the institution in this way remains.

## **5. The Kono Artisanal Diamond Industry**

An aim of the Diamond Sector Reform Programme (DSRP) is to restructure the relationships which constitute the industry in order to empower diggers and miners and end criminal activities. This chapter provides an overview of the artisanal diamond mining industry in Kono in order to assess how the DSRP has understood its object of intervention and whether its programme is appropriately designed to achieve its objective of building peace and prosperity in Sierra Leone. It focuses especially on IDM as this is the main project for restructuring and formalising the industry.

The chapter begins with a short contextualisation of the alluvial diamond industry in Sierra Leone by outlining its geology, geography and history. The heart of the chapter assesses how the industry works today, referring strongly to the transforming structures and processes and risks which structure artisanal diamond production. Whilst the research involved investigations into diamond mining, marketing and production, this thesis has paid greatest attention to mining. This is partly for practicability's sake – the DSRP is an extensive project and it was easier to access diggers and miners than dealers and exporters. It is also because reducing poverty is as important for maintaining peace as formalising and decriminalising the industry, and it is in the production end of the supply chain that the poorest people are involved.

### **5.1 Geology, Geography and History – A Short Background to Today's Diamond Industry in Kono**

Diamonds are transported to the surface of the earth when a fast-moving elevator of kimberlite moves through the diamond stability field of the earth's mantle and explodes volcanically at the Earth's surface, jettisoning boulders, lava, diamonds and minerals forth to be deposited around the site of rupture. Over time the soft kimberlite weathers, hidden and dispersed by processes of subsidence, compaction, erosion and integumentation, and the diamonds are carried away by the movement of soil and water (cf. Hart 2000: 22-7; also Campbell 2004). Diamonds are mined either directly from these kimberlite pipes or from eluvial or alluvial diamondiferous deposits<sup>78</sup>. Although there is kimberlite mining in Sierra Leone, alluvial deposits provide hope of 'the big find' for the country's 200,000 artisanal miners. Alluvial diamonds are found in swamps and the gravels of river channels, flood-plains, and terraces (Hall 1968). Most Sierra Leonean gravels yield 0.2 to 1.5 carats per cubic yard. One carat is equivalent to 200 mg.

Diamonds are mined in 20 countries and cut in about 30 (Smillie, Gberie & Hazelton 2000, Global Witness 2000). The KPCS involves the 43 countries which comprise 98% of the world's global diamond trade. The trade is worth over \$7 billion per annum (Smillie, Gberie & Hazelton 2000). Table 1.1 shows the principal sites in the global diamond supply chain.

#### **T5.1 The Global Diamond Supply Chain**<sup>79</sup>


<b>Mining</b>	<b>Marketing Rough</b>	<b>Cutting and Polishing</b>	<b>Marketing Industrial</b>	<b>Marketing Polished</b>
Russia	Antwerp, Belgium	India	US	USA
Australia	London, England	Israel	Japan	Japan
Canada	New York, USA	Belgium	Russia	Europe
Brazil	Tel Aviv, Israel	CIS	Korea	India
Botswana	Mumbai, India	USA		Japan
Namibia		Thailand		Saudi Arabia
South Africa		South Africa		United Arab Emirates
Angola				
DRC				
Sierra Leone				

<sup>78</sup> Eluvial deposits are those which have been transported by the lateral or vertical movement of the soil. Alluvial deposits are those which have been transported by the movement of water. Henceforth I shall bracket both these deposits under the term 'alluvial' (Oxford English Dictionary online).

<sup>79</sup> Adapted from Government of Canada 1998. Also Global Witness 2000.

The distribution of diamonds in Sierra Leone is concentrated in the South and East of the country covering an area of about 7,700 square miles (see map 5.1 below). Within this area only 80 square miles (~1%) of the ground is diamondiferous. The most important alluvial fields are those of Kono, Tongo and the Sewa Valley, which are serviced by the towns of Koidu, Kenema and Bo respectively. The DSRP is concentrating its efforts in Kono and Tongo where there are also kimberlite pipes to be found (Hall 1968).


**Map 5.1 Mineral Map of Sierra Leone (Government of Sierra Leone 2003b)**



Graphics: ACA Howe. Provided by Mano River Resources Inc.



The first diamond to be discovered as such in Sierra Leone was found in the Gbobora stream near the village of Fotingaia in 1930 (Hall 1968; see photo). The Consolidated African Selection Trust (CAST), a subsidiary of De Beers, began prospecting the area in March 1931. Mining began in 1932 and Kono, and especially the Koidu vicinity, was defined as a location rich in alluvial diamonds (Hall 1968). In 1934 the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) was formed as a subsidiary of CAST. The colonial Government granted SLST a 99-year monopoly on prospecting for and mining diamonds in the entire country in return for a 27.5% tax on net profits (Hall 1968; Reno 1995). In 1935 the company built a permanent settlement in Yengema. This was followed by a second settlement in Tongo twenty years later (Hall 1968).



*Plate 1: The Gbobora Stream today*

Illicit diamond mining began as soon as the first diamonds were discovered, the motivation being a few bad harvests (Greenhalgh 1985; Fairbairn 1965). Not only were diamonds purloined as a matter of course from SLST's mining camp in Yengema, but artisanal pits sprang up wherever there were diamonds. Soon Guineans joined Sierra Leoneans to dig in Kono. The district's population further swelled with the arrival of Marakas, Mandingoes and Fullahs from francophone West Africa and the Lebanese and indigenes from Freetown who, having been excluded from legitimate trade by discriminatory colonial policies, came to try their luck in diamonds (Reno 1995; interview 43). By the late 1930s they were successfully dealing in diamonds and directly financing illegal mining operations (Reno 1995). The conviction of SLST to protect their resource and the Government their revenues led to efforts to limit illegal mining. SLST's Diamond Protection Force was established in 1945 and later supplemented by the stationing of a detachment of the Sierra Leonean Police Force in Yengema in 1952<sup>80</sup>. Alongside these attempts at direct enforcement of the law, both SLST and the Government adopted indirect strategies to try to win the local chiefs over to their cause. However, whilst SLST paid off the chiefs to withhold settler rights, the chiefs accepted rent from 'strangers' (i.e. non-Konos) in exchange for protection and 'consideration' for access to land for mining (Reno 1995; Greenhalgh 1985: 165)<sup>81</sup>. Likewise, the Native Authority Scheme, whose purpose was to curtail the chiefs' interests in illicit mining and marketing, was used by the chiefs to further their own ends, including the expansion of their diamond interests (Reno 1995). This 'big-man' agenda not only deepened the crisis of illegal activities, but also accelerated the wheels of corruption which normalised the utilisation of state resources and exercise of political authority for personal gain (see Reno 1995). By the 1970s the political economy of the diamond industry was characterised by 'big-man politics' (cf. Jackson 1982, Bayart 1993).

By the early 1950s illicit mining and marketing had become rampant (Hall 1968; Reno 1995). The diamond rush in Sierra Leone became international news (Greenhalgh 1985). It became apparent that the suppression of illegal digging and dealing was impossible and so in January 1955 the Government and SLST began talks. In that year there was a riot in Freetown and a strike at SLST. SLST agreed to

<sup>80</sup> SLST's private security force was increased from 85 in 1950 to 662 in 1957, then to 1313 (plus 245 auxiliary police on their payroll) in 1971. (Greenhalgh 1985: 172)

<sup>81</sup> This practice dates back to protection of itinerant traders in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

surrender its country-wide monopoly but maintained exclusive access in defined areas in Yengema and Tongo and compensation from the Government of £1.57 million (Greenhalgh 1985; Hall 1968).

By the time the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme (ADMS) came into being in February 1956 there were nigh on 60,000 diggers operating in Kono (Greenhalgh 1985). Under the ADMS all mining and marketing of diamonds was to be conducted by licensed individuals and 'native firms' only. Within a few months thousands of mining licenses had been granted and nearly all mining activities had been legalised (Greenhalgh 1985). Though the scheme successfully decriminalised production, it did not significantly quell the sense of injustice felt by some Konos, and embodied in the Kono Progressive Movement<sup>82</sup>. Many indigenes were aware that they had been granted access to marginally productive lands. More unrest in 1957-8 led to the beginning of contract mining within the SLST zone in 1959, whereby the company sub-leased plots for 6 month periods and offered equipment hire and diamond valuation services for a fee (Zack-Williams 1995: 138; Greenhalgh 1985: 167). Whilst this allowed some legitimate access to the SLST resource, albeit the less accessible plots for industrial extraction within the company's lease (Hall 1968), it also increased the feasibility of illegal activities therein.

Prior to 1956 any trading or exporting of diamonds was illegal. With the creation of the ADMS all diamonds were to be marketed through the Diamond Corporation (DICORP), which, like SLST, was owned wholly by De Beers. DICORP opened offices in Bo, Kenema, Boajibu and Sewafe (Koidu) and sent buyers to the actual sites of production (Greenhalgh 1985; Hall 1968). For De Beers it proved more beneficial to have a monopoly on marketing than on production in Sierra Leone because it ensured that industrially unpayable deposits were made productive through artisanal endeavours, it made them the only legal exporter, and it gave them control of the export price. This helped them maximise profits and maintain their international monopoly. From the Government's perspective this arrangement somewhat satisfied popular demands and ensured greater diamond export revenue. They protected their interests by stressing that the agreement with De Beers was just for 5 years and by instating independent valuers to verify DICORP's shipments (Greenhalgh 1985). They also adopted a series of counter-smuggling measures, including the exclusion of dealers from some production sites, the revocation of dealers' licences, the expulsion of 'strangers' (i.e. non-Konos), and increased law enforcement expenditure and penalties (Greenhalgh 1985). By 1959 the smuggling rate had dropped to below half of total caratage (Hall 1968). In terms of value, however, over two thirds was being smuggled; people were selling their smaller stones to the Diamond Corporation but smuggling out the larger and better quality gems (Hall 1968). This practice is still common today. The destination for the smuggled stones was Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, where a dollar economy and competitive export costs provided inducements for those seeking bigger profits (Greenhalgh 1985; Van der Laan 1965 cited in Hall 1968).

The government reassessed the marketing system and replaced DICORP with the Government Diamond Office (GDO) in 1959 (Zack-Williams 1995). Whilst DICORP was owned by De Beers, the GDO was owned by Government and managed by De Beers. Instead of a 7.5% export duty and DICORP's 12% trading margins<sup>83</sup>, export duty was reduced to 4%<sup>84</sup> and DICORP received a 1% commission of sales as well as the privilege of being the final buyer and sole exporter of Sierra Leonean diamonds (Greenhalgh 1985). This enabled the GDO to offer higher prices (Greenhalgh 1985). According to Hall, smuggling was reduced dramatically and in the 1960s it had become negligible (Hall 1968). The winners were the dealers, who received better prices, and the Government, which earned more revenue. DICORP, however, suffered reduced profits from artisanal production (Greenhalgh 1985).

By 1961 the country had achieved its independence. During the 1960s the All Peoples Congress (APC), who stood in opposition to the instated Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), took advantage of increasing

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<sup>82</sup> Cf. Reno 1995 and Minikin 1971 as cited in Zack-Williams 1995.

<sup>83</sup> The trading margin was 12% between what DICORP paid for diamonds and what the Central Selling Office in London would sell the diamonds for on the international market. Like DICORP the CSO was also De Beer-owned.

<sup>84</sup> According to Hall (1968: 19) export duty stood at 5% before being increased to 7.5% in 1966. From 1975 – 78 large stones (>14.8 cts) had an export levy of 2.5% and small stones bore a levy of 7% (Zack-Williams 1995).

competition in the diamond trade and official discrimination against the Lebanese to build economic and political backing. The Lebanese had emerged as the most significant financiers and dealers in the trade, and were accustomed to paying off SLPP-aligned elites in order to protect their businesses. Vulnerable as they were to predation and official harassment, it made sense to shift their support to whoever would secure their interests (Reno 1995). Through the Lebanese the APC gained access to the myriad of legal and illegal mining gangs the Lebanese dealers financed. The APC, which at that time sat towards the populist side of the political spectrum, found in these mining gangs leftist youths who were willing to resist the SLPP Government and the elites it privileged. Young diggers formed APC Youth Wings (Reno 1995). APC popularity spread and in 1967 the APC were elected to Government<sup>85</sup>.

The inauguration of Siaka Stevens's Government in 1968 was a turning point for both the country and the industry. Stevens's regime adopted a politics of elitism, which was a slap in the face for the radicals who helped bring the APC to government (Reno 1995: 107-8). With regard to the diamond industry, in 1968 P.K. Hall reported the following: "The picture now ... is one of stability and predominately legitimate operations. Alluvial diamond mining has become an established and accepted feature of the economy of the country, and provides a living for about 25,000 miners, now mostly Sierra Leoneans. Smuggling is no longer a serious problem, and the miners now receive a reasonable proportion of the export value of their diamonds" (Hall 1968: 7). Within only a few years of his statement, the rules of the game had changed and the legal gains of the previous decade had been lost.

Kono was important politically as it provided a large proportion of Government revenue. In the first few years of his reign political turbulence and local challenges by wealthy chiefs and their privileged clients threatened Stevens's authority in Kono. The APC took measures to disempower potential political rivals by centralising government, manipulating local elections, and discriminating against indigenous elites and SLPP supporters in favour of the politically-ostracised<sup>86</sup> Lebanese community. APC patrons attempted to cut off their clients' sources of independent wealth and increase their dependency on Freetown for the protection of their interests. The chiefs' established revenue streams were severed when the Government stopped paying them the local development funds and when SLST was effectively nationalised with the formation of the National Diamond Mining Corporation (NDMC) in 1971. Through the realignment and reconstitution of the patronage networks, Stevens harnessed control of diamond revenues and established greater political security, if not popular support, for his Government in Kono (Reno 1995).



*Plate 2: The NDMC plant as it stands today, stripped of materials, on the outskirts of the village of Bandafayie.*

<sup>85</sup> The APC did not take office until 1968 owing to a military coup.

<sup>86</sup> There was constitutional (and popular) prohibitions against the involvement of ethnic non-Africans in politics. This included a 1960 Constitutional decree which denied citizenship to those of non-African parentage (Reno 1995).

During this time the GDO had begun to undervalue stones again and paid higher prices to the Lebanese dealers than to miners. The undervaluation and discrimination gave miners an incentive to sell their diamonds outside official channels. Many sold their stones to the Lebanese dealers, who generally were able to pay higher prices than the GDO because they were better suited to taking risks than officials bound by the rules and regulations of a large bureaucratic organisation. Undervaluation and discrimination therefore increased the rate of smuggling. It also encouraged those mines managers and supporters who did sell their stones to the GDO, to transfer the costs down the chain; diggers were paid less. This in turn encouraged the diggers to seek their profits independently and so illicit mining activities increased to become the norm once again (Zack-Williams 1995: 179-180).

The APC's diamond policies made it clear that, in contrast to their pre-election pretensions, 'power to the people' was certainly not their intention. Large areas of small-scale mining land were rezoned for cooperative mining. This effectively increased APC clients' access to diamonds at the expense of the ordinary miner, who could not afford the increasingly prohibitive expense of mining legally. At the same time, the Government toughened its position on illegal digging, instituting a paramilitary Internal Security Unit in 1975, whose purpose was to suppress diamond poaching. Caught between a rock and a hard place, diggers and miners had little choice but to slot themselves into the patronage networks by aligning themselves with APC-affiliated operations, or to maintain independence by protecting their illicit activities using force.


In the 1970s then, the logic of the state bureaucracy shifted from serving the interests of the nation to maintaining the authority and wealth of those who had access to its assets. It is this logic which led to the emergence of the shadow state and the collapse of the formal state, as will be outlined in chapter 5. The parasitism, corruption and kleptocracy of elites also led to the almost complete informalisation of alluvial diamond production and marketing (Reno 1995) and eventually to war.

## **5.2 The Artisanal Supply Chain: The Production and Marketing of Rough diamonds**

The heart of this chapter involves a descriptive analysis of the political economy (i.e. the structures and processes) of contemporary artisanal diamond production in Kono. Specifically I examine those actors who perform standard roles in production and the procedures, routines, and relations which structure their activities and relationships with each other. I describe how diamonds are mined, and consider who is involved, how the various actors manage the risks and opportunities which frame their business decisions, and what the terms of exchange are, which frame the passage of a diamond from one pair of hands to another. I then touch on diamond marketing and dedicate my examination thereof to those aspects which are of relevance to the ability of miners and diggers to get a fair price for their diamonds.

Artisanal mining is "all non mechanised, low output extraction of minerals carried out by individuals and small groups, frequently on intermittent (sic.) basis, and employing essentially traditional manual techniques" (Keili 2003). In the workshop of August 7<sup>th</sup> 2004, participants agreed that the standard arrangement for artisanal diamond production in Kono is one in which the mining costs are covered by a supporter who is in business with a licensed miner. These parties both employ mines managers (foremen) to protect their interests at the mine. The diamonds are then sold on to a dealer or his agent with the assistance of a coaxer before being sold to an exporter in a similar fashion. Figure 5.1 shows this typical legal artisanal supply chain from production to export.

**Figure 5.1 Typical Kono Artisanal Diamond Industry Supply Chain<sup>87</sup>**



There are in reality many variations of the actors and relations within this chain. For example, the supporter may also be a dealer who sells directly to an exporter; he may even be an exporter himself<sup>88</sup>. Or the licence-holder may be financially independent and support his own operations. Or the miner might not be licensed himself but will be affiliated with a licence-holder to provide legal security for his operations<sup>89</sup>.

The illegal chain is very similar to that shown in figure 5.1; it differs only in so far as there will not be a licence-holder. The other possible combinations described above may still apply. In addition, there may be a land-owner (e.g. a farmer) who is compensated with a share of the proceeds for allowing mining to be conducted on his/her land.

There are also other beneficiaries from the trade. They are shown in figure 5.2 (see below in monitoring and disciplining the industry) and map 5.2.

<sup>87</sup> Based on Structure of the Mining Industry workshop II, conducted 7<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

<sup>88</sup> This was the case for one miner, whose Spanish supporter held an exporting licence. The miner believed that this enabled him to get a better price for his diamonds compared to others. Interview 18, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>89</sup> This happens when the miner is not Sierra Leonean and so is not permitted to hold a licence, or is not a Kono and so finds it harder to get a licence himself. See chapter 6, ability to labour and tribal identity.



This map also illustrates some of the economic spin-offs the diamond industry generates in Koidu. Diamond mining produces livelihood options outside of the industry (and so generates peripheral economic activity) and makes other existing ones more viable (e.g. trading food produce) by increasing demand for its product. These other livelihoods which depend on the existence of the industry include mining services (e.g. tool making, mending, selling and rentals, mechanics, petrol traders), commerce (e.g. rice sellers, supermarkets, electronic shops and stalls selling consumables such as sunglasses, watches, cassettes) and general services (e.g. construction, prostitution, restaurants, bar, and night-clubs)

### **5.2.1 Productivity**

There is decreasing productivity of artisanal mining in the traditional mining areas of Gbense, Nimi Yema, Tankoro, and Nimikoro<sup>90</sup>. Miners are finding they need to mine deeper gravels to yield satisfactory returns. Going deeper, however, involves greater risk and greater investment. This will squeeze the smaller, poorer players out of the market. In time the alluvial mining which happens in traditional mining chiefdoms in Kono will be increasingly consolidated into small-scale and mechanised operations as artisanal mining becomes decreasingly viable. Some people may, however, persist at overkicking or other artisanal activities despite the diminishing returns. In a country with limited feasible and desirable livelihood options available to the poor (see chapter 7), this decline of the artisanal diamond industry in traditional mining areas in Kono could cause further social disgruntlement unless this transition is well managed. On the other hand mining is apparently on the increase in the eastern provinces of Kono and elsewhere in Sierra Leone and people are flocking to exploit these ‘virgin’ lands where the diamonds are closer to the surface and where less sophisticated (and illegal) operations can bring satisfactory returns<sup>91</sup>. To my knowledge, there have not been investigations into the likely impacts of this transition on the chiefdoms suffering decline and those suffering growth in artisanal mining to help these chiefdoms adjust to the changing livelihood and revenue opportunities and the externalities which arise with these socio-environmental changes.

This changing geography of opportunity and risk in the industry is further complicated by inadequate and dated knowledge of diamond deposits in the country. The diamond reserve in Sierra Leone is very much imagined as it cannot be accurately quantified and there has been no widespread prospecting since P.K. Hall led the Geological Survey in their attempts to map out the reserves in the 1960s (Hall 1968). Nearly 40 years on and today the payability of ground is ascertained more by experience, knowledge of the geography of historical, local mining, the existence of indicator minerals, instinct, and guesswork than by any scientific prospecting. This lack of accurate knowledge makes mining particularly risky, especially after the war when people were away from Kono and unaware of exactly where the RUF and AFRC concentrated their mining. People know productivity is declining but they do not know *where*. According to one miner, this heightened uncertainty of returns has discouraged some traditional supporters from supporting too readily after the war and they are instead concentrating on buying only<sup>92</sup>.

### **5.2.2 Mining Procedure and the associated Tools and Technologies**

Alluvial mining requires exposing, extracting and washing diamond-bearing gravel. This gravel is found on riverbeds, in swamps, and under a lateritic overburden in terraces and alluvial flats (Fairbairn 1965; Hall 1968). Although unheard of today, diamonds were so abundant in Kono that historically people are said to have been able to pick them up off the streets<sup>93</sup>.

The mining procedure represented here as standard was developed by miners in the Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop I, on 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004. The procedure is the same for illegal mining, except step 3 would be omitted and possibly replaced by something like ‘ensure protection in cases of harassment by authorities or other parties’ (see chapter 6).

<sup>90</sup> Interview 22, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004 and Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop II.

<sup>91</sup> Interview 22, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004, interview with the chairman of the Kono Dealers’ Association, 24<sup>th</sup> June 2004 and Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop II.

<sup>92</sup> Structure of the Mining Industry workshop II, 7<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

<sup>93</sup> Structure of the Mining Industry workshop II, 7<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

- |     |   |  |
|-----|---|--|
| 1.  | Raise funds to get licence (and perhaps for the rest of your operations)              |  |
| 2.  | Identify the land you wish to mine  |  |
| 3.  | Get licence.  |  |
| 4.  | Find a supporter (if necessary).  |  |
| 5.  | Arrange logistics, i.e. employ and house diggers, buy tools.                          |  |
|     | <u>SMALL-SCALE</u>  | <u>ARTISANAL</u>                       |
| 6.  | Bulldozing (caterpillar)  | Brush Land (machetes)                  |
| 7.  | Bulldozing (caterpillar)  | Stripping (removing the mud – shovels) |
| 8.  | Excavate gravel (caterpillar w. diff. parts)  | Extract gravel (manually - shovels)    |
| 9.  | Wash gravel (the plant, the rocker)   | Wash gravel (the rocker, shakers)      |
| 10. | Restart 6 – 9 in different part of plot OR Pack up tools and land left to government. |  |

Typically, the distinction between small-scale and artisanal mining is not precise as miners use small-scale equipment in their artisanal operations whenever it is possible or desirable. For example, at point 9 when they are washing the gravel, they may invest in the plant to reduce the risk of theft, whilst having had all the gravel extracted manually.

#### Artisanal and Small-Scale Tools for Stripping and Extraction



*Plate 3: Tools for Stripping and Extraction for Sale at Babukeh Market in Tankoro*

In manual (artisanal) mining, diggers use machetes to 'brush' the ground (i.e. to remove the overgrowth), shovels to strip it (i.e. to remove the overburden) and to extract the gravel, and picks to break up any boulders or rocks which get in their way. This manual brushing, stripping and extracting can take 2 or 3 months (presuming 50 diggers), whereas with the use of a bulldozer it takes about a week<sup>94</sup>. To rent and fuel a bulldozer for 6 days can cost between \$8200 and \$10,000, whereas to get diggers to do the same work would cost on average \$7,900<sup>95</sup>. This suggests that mechanisation is approaching being as affordable as manual labour.

During extraction a water-pump may be necessary if the rains have begun or if groundwater is high. A 4" and an 8" diesel water-pump cost \$70 and \$142 respectively in the wet season, and \$55 and \$124 in the dry season<sup>96</sup>. Sometimes the youngest member of the gang will be given the job of 'water-boy', meaning that it is his responsibility to use a bucket to remove the excess water that makes the digger's labour harder. Plate 4 shows a mining gang extracting gravel (and water) in Gbongoma Town using this method.



*Plate 4: Digger at Bakundu extracting gravel for washing, 21<sup>st</sup> June 2004.*



*Plate 5: Mining gang using a bucket to extract gravel in Gbongoma Town, 7<sup>th</sup> July 2004.*


<sup>94</sup> Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop I, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>95</sup> Presuming a gang of fifty diggers doing the work for 2.5 months (10 6-day weeks) at a cost of \$2.64 (Le 7,000) per digger per day. See appendix 7 for comparative Equipment and Labour Costs.

<sup>96</sup> See Appendix 7.

Artisanal and Small-Scale Tools for Washing

Once the gravel has been extracted, it is stockpiled for washing later or is washed contemporaneously. It may be washed where it is found or is transported elsewhere if there is no immediate water source.



*Plate 6: Transporting the gravel to the washing pit at Bakundu, 21<sup>st</sup> June 2004*



*Plate 9: Tool for sorting gravel - The Rocker*



*Plate 7: Washing gravel with a shaker at Small Sefadu, 21<sup>st</sup> June 2004*



*Plate 8: Making Shakers in Babukeh Market*



*Plate 10: Tool for sorting gravel - The Plant*

Rice sacks are used to transport the gravel elsewhere (see Plate 6 above). Washing is done using a simple shaker, the rocker and/or the plant. Water-pumps are required for the rocker and the plant. The plant requires a small generator to work. Both therefore use fuel: the rocker uses 5 gallons a day and the plant

uses double this. The plant costs \$71 a day compared to \$28 for the rocker and \$0.14 for the shaker<sup>97</sup>. The advantages of the plant are that no further washing is required, it makes it harder for people to steal diamonds and it will produce a higher yield of diamonds than the other artisanal washing methods. When operations use the rocker and shaker, sometimes women are employed to sift the smallest grains for the ‘number 10s’ and any gold dust which might be present.

### **5.2.3 Licensing Procedure and Access to Land**

The number of artisanal mining licences issued in Kono has vastly increased since licensing began after the war (see T5.2). The licensing procedure usually takes about two weeks “because there is some go and come, go and come, go and come”<sup>99</sup>, as the following summary outlines:

1. Apply to the town chief by letter or in person (to get and complete the application forms)<sup>100</sup>;
2. Chief recommends application to the Chiefdom Mining Committee (CMC);
3. CMC approves application;
4. Miner pays surface fees and chiefdom development fund fees to CMC;
5. Miner goes to the MMR mines warden with CMC receipt to apply for government approval;
6. Miner and warden go to allocated site to demarcate the boundaries<sup>101</sup>;
7. A plan is drawn of the site;
8. The plan is taken to the town and paramount chiefs for signature;
9. The mines engineer signs the plan;
10. The miner pays the government fees;
11. The miner is licensed.

### **T5.2 Number of Mining licences Issued in Kono Dec 2001 to Aug 2004**

<b>Date</b>	<b>No. of licences issued</b>
Dec – 01	0
Jun – 02	87
Dec – 02	457
Jun – 03	952
Aug – 04	>1500 <sup>98</sup>

This procedure is supposed to be simple enough to encourage people to get licences. A major impediment however is the uncertainty which still surrounds the actual cost of a licence. Although the Government has established and publicised that a mining licence should cost no more than Le410,000 to acquire<sup>102</sup>, people still pay more because of the various ‘handshakes’ they must give to speed the process along or to maintain or generate good favour with the authorities<sup>103</sup>. In one case a female licence-holder paid Le710,000 for her licence which was cheaper than others would have to have paid, in her view<sup>104</sup>.

These costs make it differentially possible for people to acquire a licence. Those who have the advantage when applying for licences are men, people native to the village, people from Kono, people with money, local people who do not already have access to mining land, and people who are close to the chiefs or some other person involved in the process<sup>105</sup>. According to Mary Musa, the Chairwoman of the District Council, if diamonds are to work for peace and prosperity, then “people should have access to land (and) there should be no discrimination as to who gets what.”<sup>106</sup> There is still discrimination in who gets access to land and on what terms. Whilst MSI aims not to discriminate in terms of ethnicity or gender in how it

<sup>97</sup> See Appendix 7.

<sup>98</sup> Estimate provided by official from the Ministry of Mineral Resources, interview 13, 12<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>99</sup> Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop I, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>100</sup> In Sandor chiefdom, you cannot make your application by letter but must go in person.

<sup>101</sup> Licensed plots used to be 400 x 400 feet before the war but now the plot size is 210 x 210 feet. Interview 14, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>102</sup> A photocopy of this policy is stapled to the notice board at the front entrance of the PDA.

<sup>103</sup> Interview 36, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004; Interview with Amienatta Conteh, 5<sup>th</sup> August 2004, and Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop II, 7<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

<sup>104</sup> Interview 36, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>105</sup> Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop II, 7<sup>th</sup> August 2004, interview with Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004, and interview 36, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004. See also chapter 6.

<sup>106</sup> Interview with Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004.

has designed and led the programme<sup>107</sup>, I am not aware of whether it has worked with the traditional and national authorities to prevent discrimination in access to land for mining. If the programme is not attending to this, then this is of concern if social injustice and unequal access to opportunity is accepted as a cause of the war.

#### **5.2.4 The Mining Calendar and the Implications of seasonality**

Mining activities are planned around the coming of the rains and how the rains affect the costs of mining. Investors undertake more mining in the dry season than in the rains because of the associated hazards and costs (see table 5.2 below). Some mining does occur in the rainy season, but principally where there is black mud<sup>108</sup>, where the gravel has already been extracted and removed to a drier location, or where the water levels do not threaten to wash gravel away or cover it completely (e.g. in river bed mining). The seasonality of mining costs and activities has implications for how people use opportunities in mining as part of their livelihoods (see chapter 7).

#### **T5.3 Variations in Mining Costs Between the Wet and Dry Seasons**

	<b>WET season (end May to early September)</b>	<b>DRY season (mid-September to mid-May)</b>
Labour supply	↓	↑
Labour costs	↑	↓
Crime rates	↑	↓
Food Costs	↑	↓
	(bag of rice 70,000Le <sup>109</sup> )	(bag of rice 60,000Le)
Fuel Costs	↑	↓
Shelter costs	↑	↓
Equipment costs	↑	↓

In the rainy season there are fewer diggers available for work because many return to their villages to work on their farms. The miners believed that only those who have found diamonds can afford to go home. If the diggers have made no money “they’ll stick around, loitering and committing crimes”<sup>110</sup>. The cost of labour increases in the rainy season, less because of supply shortages, but because the cost of supporting the diggers increases: food costs increase, the work is harder, diggers are more vulnerable to getting sick, and shelter is more easily damaged or needs to be made secure (e.g. the purchasing of tarpaulin for the roof) to ensure that diggers stay healthy.

Food costs increase because of supply shortages and because the diggers are hungrier because of the cold and the harder work. The miners said the diggers try to encourage them to give up to 4 cups of rice a day (that is 33% - 50% more than usual) or will ask for more ‘dashes’ to buy extra food (see below). Miners do this reluctantly as rice is in short supply in the wet season because it is harvested at the end of the season. It is also more difficult to import rice into the region during the rainy season owing to the poor quality of the roads. There is almost a 15% difference in the price of rice between the two seasons.

Fuel costs are most vulnerable to international fluctuations in the price of gasoline and diesel, but costs also increase in the wet season owing to the poor state of the roads, which creates supply shortages. Also, the greater need for water pumps and the use of machines to wash the gravel increase fuel consumption,

<sup>107</sup> Email from technical director, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2005.

<sup>108</sup> Black mud is “the layer of soil on the gravel that sometimes is removed and put aside and is something you go back to in the rain”, miner in Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop I, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>109</sup> This is the figure the miners told me in the workshop, but when my research assistant bought a bag of rice on my behalf in early August, it cost just Le56,000.

<sup>110</sup> Structure of the Industry Workshop, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

tightening local stocks. Equipment costs increase partly owing to the higher fuel costs, but also because of the greater demand for water pumps in the wet season<sup>111</sup>.

### **5.2.5 Risks and Dilemmas Facing Miners in Planning their Operations**

Table 5.3 is the product of a discussion amongst the miners in the Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop II on what are the main risks they face as miners. I have included it to demonstrate what the doing of mining actually involves in order to emphasise the method and complexity of mining as a livelihood option and the fact that the miner is a businessperson.

#### **T5.4 The Risks Miners must Consider when Planning their Operations**

<b>Dilemma</b>	<b>Risks</b>
<b>How to get money (support)</b>	<i>No support, no mining</i> <i>Trustworthiness</i> risk of going into an arrangement with a dishonest supporter
<b>How many people to engage</b>	<i>Price changes</i> risk of underestimating the cost of support per person, e.g. vulnerability to seasonal changes in costs (see table 5.2) <i>Overemployment</i> according to what work is possible at each stage - it is expensive if workers are idle <i>Underemployment</i> increases the duration of mining
<b>Where shall I mine? (what kind of mining)</b>	<i>Occurrence of boulders or ballop in the overburden</i> increase costs or can be impassable. Their existence is generally unpredictable. <i>Productivity</i> risk of low yield <i>Water level</i> places with higher water level are more expensive to mine; risk of water level rising with the rains. lack of water means gravel must be transported to a washing pit.
<b>Which tools and machines should I use? (what kind of mining)</b>	<i>Poor quality</i> if the machines are badly manufactured or not maintained there is a risk they might blow up or not work so well <i>Poor judgement</i> use of wrong machines or too few machines, or delays in hiring machines can prolong the work
<b>Where shall I house my workers?</b>	<i>Location</i> proximity affects transport <i>Quality</i> affects health
<b>How much food to give each day</b>	<i>Over- or underfeeding</i> cause laziness. Overfeeding makes them lazier than underfeeding.
<b>How to keep my workers healthy</b>	<i>Contagious diseases</i>
<b>Duration of the work</b>	<i>Uncertainty</i> If the work takes too long it costs more <i>Bad weather</i> can make the work last longer
<b>Who do I sell to?</b>	<i>Duping</i> risk that the person you sell to will cheat you of a fair price or switch stones on you <i>Theft</i> risk that buyer will steal it <i>Smuggling</i> risk that buyer will smuggle the stone <i>Criminals</i> risk of selling to an unlicensed buyer
<b>How much to sell for</b>	<i>Ignorance</i> risk of not knowing the value of your diamond
<b>Financial Security</b>	<i>Theft</i> risk that other members of the production team have a criminal attitude or are disloyal
<b>Physical Security</b>	<i>Violence</i> exposure to people who might want to harm you.
<b>Who to employ</b>	<i>Risk of criminal or violent dispositions</i>

<sup>111</sup> See appendix 7 for comparative equipment costs between the two seasons.

	<i>Risk of disloyalty</i>
<b>Which contract terms to use</b>	<i>Winnings Allocation Systems</i> Choice of winnings allocation system depends on the expected productivity of the mine and the knowledge and wishes of partners and employees
<b>Who handles the diamonds</b>	<i>Risk of theft</i>

These risks give an idea of the dilemmas miners have when planning their operations. By far the biggest risk they face is theft. They therefore choose supporters and dealers based on friends' recommendations on who is most trustworthy and fair<sup>112</sup>. They look for the same traits in their diggers and mines managers, as well as loyalty and industriousness. For this reason, some miners prefer to employ particular tribes who they associate with being loyal, hard-working, and experienced. Others will purposefully employ family or people of the same tribe as themselves<sup>113</sup>. Trust is therefore one of the most important assets in a diamond business relationships, albeit something very hard to come by.

### **5.2.6 Roles and Responsibilities in the Industry**

The role someone will take in diamond production differs according to his/her knowledge, ability, contacts, and investment capacity. In some roles tribe and gender also determine participation (see chapter 6). The arrangements entered into will depend on the degree of trust and dependency which exists between the business partners.

#### ***The Diver (River-Bed Mining Only)***

The role of divers is to extract the gravel from the bottom of the river-bed. Divers usually spend about 3 hours underwater. Diving is the most dangerous form of gravel extraction and so divers tend to be much better recompensed than ordinary diggers<sup>114</sup>. Divers are very vulnerable in terms of their health. Blindness, deafness and chills are common as is poisoning and pulmonary damage owing to the level of diesel fumes and carbon monoxide divers inhale. One person told me that the typical life expectancy of a diver is about 3 years; yet the three I interviewed had been diving for 10, 19 and 21 years. Of them, 2 were from the same gang and worked for a substantial wage of 1,000,000 Leones per month, although they did not then get a share of the winnings. The other diver, however, earned 3 cups of rice and 2,000 Leones a day, had his health needs attended to, and received a share of any winnings. In his gang the divers get three times as much of the winnings per person as the washers because their risk is far greater<sup>115</sup>. Whilst less secure physically, divers are more secure financially. In its attempts to determine a "fair living wage" for diggers, the PDA does not consider the exceptional circumstances of divers.

#### ***The Digger – doing production***

The diggers are all those people employed by the miners to do the hard labour (see photos 9, 10, 11 and 12 above). They include all those who strip, extract and wash the gravel. Sometimes diggers work alone or in pairs and do all three tasks if the location requires it. Otherwise diggers that work alone tend to do overkicking (see below). In a mining gang the diggers will sometimes have specialised functions within the gang (e.g. washing) owing to their skill level or the extent to which the financier trusts them<sup>116</sup>.

Out of all the actors in the supply chain, the diggers are the most vulnerable (see chapter 6). They are at greater risk of suffering poor health, physical violence and economic exploitation whilst they also receive minimal and usually uncertain benefits (see support and winnings allocation systems below). Within the digger category, the exposure to risk and resiliency is further variegated according to one's position in the hierarchy of the gang which determines one's role, participation in decision-making, and entitlement to

<sup>112</sup> Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop II, 7<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

<sup>113</sup> Half of the miners asked had a preference for employing people of particular tribes, either Temne, Koranko or other Konos.

<sup>114</sup> Divers were the only interviewees in the digger category who stated that their supporter covered funeral expenses. Interviews 32, 33 and 34, 26<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>115</sup> Interview 33, 26<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>116</sup> It is at the washing stage that it is easiest for diggers to steal diamonds.

the winnings. The gang usually has three levels in its hierarchy. At the top is the gang leader. He reconciles internal disputes and disciplines diggers who break the gang's code of conduct<sup>117</sup>. Gang leaders usually negotiate with the licence-holder on behalf of the gang in the post-negotiated pricing system (see below). They also allocate tasks and the winnings within the gang. Usually the gang leader will receive a 'tip' from the other diggers in recognition of his authority. In between are the ordinary diggers. At the bottom of the pile are the youngest members of the gangs, who do the chores, such as fetching food and water, or else are assigned the tedious job of waterboy<sup>118</sup> (see above). As one digger said, in Babar's words, "the elder ones, normally their pride doesn't allow them to do certain work. They feel they are too big to do such work. So the younger boys, or among them the young one in the group can be sent to do anything and he will not refuse because elders are telling him and he will respect the elders to do that<sup>119</sup>". Often the youngest person will be given a smaller share of the winnings<sup>120</sup>. It is just this type of bias which some say inspired the war (Peters and Richards 1998, Archibald and Richards 2002; see also chapter 5). This digger's comments, as well as comments made in the Peiyima Focus Group (see chapter 6), suggest that the cultural institution of gerontocracy has not been absolutely overthrown. The DSRP's cooperative scheme which promotes meritocracy of responsibility between miners, at least in loan repayment, will help promote such principles of meritocracy and reciprocity; it may also be undermined by people's predisposition to hierarchical social organisation based on wealth, age, gender and tribe.

#### Permanently Employed Labour

Some diggers will be employed for the whole mining season. If the miner is pleased with them s/he might support them over the wet season even when there is no mining to be done in order to keep them for the upcoming season<sup>121</sup>. Diggers supported by a licensed miner to work their plot will typically work 7.5 hours a day, 6 days a week, although during gravel extraction and washing they may work continuously, day and night, in order to get their winnings as soon as possible as well as to reduce the risk of theft<sup>122</sup>.

#### Independent Labour – Gado Gangs and Overkickers

Gado is illegal mining conducted by an unsupported gang of diggers who share their winnings equally between them. They generally receive less formal support than permanently employed labour (see below). This gives them greater flexibility once they do find a diamond as their obligation to their supporter is weak. Thus they are often free to sell to whoever they please for whatever price they can get.

Gado gangs and other individual diggers will sometimes seek contract work with licence-holders (called *jagaja*)<sup>123</sup>. In return they may be paid in cash and food for the day or they will do *kongoma* (see below). Some diggers even offer their labour in exchange for sexual acts<sup>124</sup>.

Overkicking is a common type of mining conducted by people independently or in pairs. 11 of the diggers interviewed were overkicking. Overkickers wash the tailings of gravel that has already been washed. The only tools they need are shakers and buckets and perhaps picks and shovels. It is conducted in legal mining operations to ensure that nothing is overlooked and is also done illegally at mining sites or anywhere where the gravel is easily accessible. Overkicking is often pursued seasonally by diggers who have been involved in riverbed mining in the dry season and so are without work in the wet season. Sometimes they do overkicking on behalf of their previous supporter (e.g. interview 17) or they operate independently (e.g. interview 12). The DSRP does not engage with the occurrence of this type of mining. Its significance lies in it being pursued extensively as a livelihood, commonly by the very vulnerable.

<sup>117</sup> One gang leader explained to me that it is his responsibility to fire people who break the rules of the gang, for example, if they are violent or start a fight. Interview 10, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>118</sup> In one case a woman digger was employed as a waterwoman and cook. Interview MC-7, 6<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

<sup>119</sup> Interview 10, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>120</sup> Interview 23, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>121</sup> Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop I, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>122</sup> Interview 10, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2004 and Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop I, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>123</sup> Focus group with industry experts, 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2004.

<sup>124</sup> Interview 3, 1<sup>st</sup> July 2004.

Both gado and overkicking are tactics which improve the probability of getting winnings. In overkicking the digger spends most of his time washing without having to do 3 months of stripping and extraction beforehand<sup>125</sup>. In gado, the diggers do not have a boss with whom they have to share their winnings. In most cases, however, they are done without the benefit (or restrictions) of daily support, although in some cases gado gangs and overkickers were given occasional support by their ‘customers’, a previous supporter, a village elder, or a wealthier member of the gang (such as one with a family farm).

Gado and overkicking can only be legal if the individual or gang do them in a licensed plot and sell the diamonds to the license-holder. Where they do it in unlicensed land or sell the diamonds to anyone but the license-holder, they are operating illegally. In fact, the majority of people mining illegally do gado or overkicking. Reducing illegal mining therefore requires more engagement with the role these types of mining have in increasing people’s security by assessing the particular benefits and disadvantages they bring compared to the alternative the DSRP is suggesting – the mining cooperatives. It may prove problematic to persuade those doing gado or overkicking to cease their illegal activities because they prefer the independence it brings them. Also, some overkickers would not be welcomed into cooperatives because their productivity or contribution to the group may be perceived to be compromised owing to their age, gender, or health (see human capital in chapter 6). This raises the question of what else can be done to encourage overkickers and gado gangs to mine legally. One solution may be the designation of certain areas which are no longer payable for usual mining activities as legal sites for overkicking. This would give those people, who are not welcomed in gangs, a legal option. It would also protect them from official harassment. This type of land use designation could be a zoning stage in between land being suitable and unsuitable for smallscale or artisanal mining activities, which typically involve about 50 diggers per acre.

### Migrants

Migrants supposedly constitute 20 to 40% of the rural population (Richards, Bah & Vincent 2004: 41). Out of the 48 diggers 11 were permanent immigrants, 6 of whom had migrated to the diamond area from elsewhere in Kono. 4 were seasonal migrants but spent at least 10 months of the year in Kono. It was not possible to ascertain exactly how many of the diggers seasonally migrate *within* Kono between their settled home and the mining sites where they find work. All the miners were native to Kono. Three had permanently migrated from agricultural to mining chiefdoms and 2 migrated seasonally to work elsewhere: one to Freetown and the other to Tonkolili. This research suggests that more investigations need to be made into others’ claims that most diggers are migrants (for example Richards 1996a). However, it is very likely that we did not get the opportunity to interview many migrants given our sampling technique and the timing of the research (see chapter 2).

### ***Watchers and Security Guards – securing production***

Theft of gravel or equipment is very likely in artisanal mining. Watchers are therefore used to prevent theft. Most watchers are only necessary once the gravel has begun to be extracted and when washing is occurring. Often the watcher will be a trusted relative<sup>126</sup>. One miner employed a security guard to secure his gravel. He paid him 100,000 Leones and a bag of rice (equivalent to 60,000 Leones) a month<sup>127</sup>. In one diving operation investigated, the supporter employed guards to protect the fuel and diving equipment. In most cases, however, the diggers do the watching themselves. They may take it in turns or else the whole gang will spend the night at the site because “if you send one person, the gangs that come to wash the gravel at night and they will hurt the person so for that the group goes”<sup>128</sup>. During extraction and washing therefore, the gang may live 24-7 at the pit (see chapter 6 for health implications).

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<sup>125</sup> Interview 12, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>126</sup> Interviews 5 and AA-19, 7<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>127</sup> Interview 18, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>128</sup> Interview 18, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

***The Miner – managing production***

In this research I made the assumption that all miners were synonymous with licence-holders but this is not so. The miner is the person who manages production. S/he may also finance the operations and be the licence-holder. This is not always the case. Thus the miner may be the gang leader (illegal operations), the mines manager or foreman (the licence-holder's or supporter's representative at the mine), or the licence-holder himself (a miner with a licence). 10 diggers interviewed were actually miners: 8 diggers were foremen and 2 were gang leaders in illegal operations.

The mines manager (also called the foreman) is usually employed by the supporter or licence-holder to represent them at the pit and to manage the operations on their behalves. He supervises, directs and organises activities. In some situations he will be the one to buy the diamonds from the diggers on behalf of the licence-holder or supporter. He also acts as the supervisor when the gravel is being washed. Mines managers never own the diamonds; they are paid a percentage of the licence-holder's or supporter's share of the diamond sales<sup>129</sup>. There is usually a good degree of trust between the foreman and his boss. Often licence-holders will use a family member (husband, brother, son, nephew) as their foreman.

Sometimes a licence-holder allows another miner to mine a portion of his/her land for a pre-negotiated share of the gravel or winnings as rent. This arrangement enables a licence-holder to exploit his/her plot at a greater rate than s/he might otherwise be able given available capital and/or the desire to mine independently, i.e. without a supporter. Sub-leasing reduces the licence-holder's capital investment whilst enabling him/her to maximise exploitation of the land, which s/he otherwise might not be able to mine within the year. It is a way of maximising returns and spreading risk and bringing benefits to both the licence-holder and the tenant miner. One miner and one digger we interviewed had this type of arrangement together<sup>130</sup>.

***The Licence-holder – legalising production***

Licence-holders must be Sierra Leonean. They may also perform the roles of financier and mines manager as well. When this is the case a mines manager is not necessary so long as the licence-holder is prepared to manage the mine full time. In some situations the licence-holder will perform no other role but provide the title to the land. In this situation s/he may go into business with a self-supported miner, or else with a supporter. In the case of the latter, the licence-holder will employ his/her own miner to manage (and supervise) the operations and protect his/her interests and the supporter will do the same, just as figure 5.1 shows.

***The Supporter – financing production***

By the early 1960s, surface deposits had begun to become exhausted. The requirement to remove greater volumes of overburden to access the diamond-bearing soil increased the costs (and altered the methods) of artisanal production. This encouraged miners to turn to their buyers and local businessmen for financial support. This is how the supporter system was born (Zack-Williams 1995: 147-154).

Not all mining supporters are dealers, but all established dealers, legal and illegal, are supporters. By supporting they hope to obligate miners and diggers to bring their diamonds to them for sale<sup>131</sup>. The logic of supporting is that "it's supposed to give you (the supporter) the first option to buy."<sup>132</sup> However, there is no guarantee people *will* be loyal to the supporter unless the arrangements are formal and prosecutable by law. An exporter explained to me that "it's not a structured relationship, it's a risky relationship. I sometimes wonder the extent to which people are ahead in supporting."<sup>133</sup>

<sup>129</sup> One miner paid his mines manager 10% of his 40% share of the winnings (i.e. 4% of the overall winnings). Interview 18, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>130</sup> Interviews 5 and 6, 7<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>131</sup> Interview with André T. Hope, 20<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>132</sup> Interview with André T. Hope, 20<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>133</sup> Interview with André T. Hope, 20<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

A consultant commissioned by the DSRP characterises the supporter-client relationship as one of exploitation and debt bondage (Moyers 2003, MSI 2004b). There are in reality many different types of supporter-client relationships between various actors in the artisanal mining industry. Support may be formal or informal, substantial or piecemeal, occasional or regular. It may exist between diggers and a financier, miners and a financier, or between diggers themselves. These different arrangements produce different risks and obligations between the parties and different potentials for exploitation. A brief exploration of supportive relationships should help elucidate the scope of their diversity.

Some supporters enter into formal arrangements with their ‘clients’, with the conditions of their agreement written, witnessed, signed and lodged with the Ministry of Mines<sup>134</sup>. This type of support is usually substantial and intended principally for mining-related activities, although the supporter may also offer the client relief as and when they require it. This is the support system used mostly by Lebanese dealers and international investors to support licensed miners and, by extension, their diggers, and the one which the DSRP is trying to alter. It is a business arrangement. One miner explained how his relationship with his Spanish supporter works:

*“He does all the logistics of the work, all the financing, and then after all the exercise, we go and sit down in his office and he’ll bring out the document of his expenditure and he will calculate his expenditure and my manager will produce his own document and they will do a comparison. After that we come to business. After the business he will tell me that this diamond is so-so-so-so-so, and out of that we will divide it between us. He will get his own 60% and I will also take my own 40 %. He’ll remove the expenditure before we go into the share. This means that if the diamond cost one million Leones and that you have spent two hundred thousand Leones on expenditures, you should deduct the amount spent and go into proportional share with the 800,000 left by 60% - 40% shares<sup>135</sup>.”*

If the miner has not kept a careful tab of expenditures and if he does not have the skills to value the diamond, the supporter can argue that the cost of the operations exceeded the value of the diamond and give him nothing. This is a very common strategy for cheating miners and diggers and is supposedly the principle route by which miners end up in a state of debt bondage (Moyers 2003; MSI 2004b). The same miner explains how this happened with his previous supporter:

*“Last year I got diamonds but I was cheated. The financier told me that all his expenditure was twenty six million Leones and then all the winnings cost twenty two million Leones, so I took him to the Mines office. The Mines engineer interfered in the issue. Later on he paid my money. From there the agreement was over.<sup>136</sup>”*

Although this is a singular experience, this miner’s ability to achieve a just outcome and to move on to a new supporter suggests that the bonds of debt may not be as tight as Moyers’s overview would imply. It also suggests that either the authorities are beginning to do their job better or that the miner in question was already sufficiently secure to be able to persuade the authorities to rule on his side.

It can actually happen that the mining expenditures are at a deficit and the diamonds discovered are not likely to bring any gains. In this case, the miner might cheat the supporter. For example:

*“You have a situation sometimes arising where ...you may be in their hold for 30 million leones to a supporter, you find a stone worth 25. You’re not going to be inclined to want to go to that guy because you still owe him 5 million after you’ve given him the stone. So what happens is you then go somewhere else, you try and liquidate, get your 25 million and you continue your operation with that 25 million and in the meantime you say to your supporter, hang on, something good will come.<sup>137</sup>”*

<sup>134</sup> Informal interview with international buyer, 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2004. Also interview 18, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>135</sup> Interview 18, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>136</sup> Interview 18, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>137</sup> Interview with André T. Hope, 20<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

This is a risky play for a miner. If a supporter feels a digger or miner has cheated him, he will involve the police and most likely get his way because “it is the person who has the money who gets their way”<sup>138</sup>.

Similar supporting arrangements can be entered into for mining operations but without the formality of a written agreement. This type of informal but committed support may be regular or piecemeal according to the supporter’s liquidity or the supported’s needs. These relationships are based more on trust and good will or a pre-established sense of reciprocity, for example, amongst family members<sup>139</sup>. Some diggers provide this type of support to their gang. Diggers only acted as supporters where they operated as a gado gang (see above) or had a sub-contract arrangement with a licence-holder to mine in his licensed plot in exchange for a share of the gravel (i.e. they were actually miners)<sup>140</sup>. They depended on other personal or household livelihood activities (for example farming, petty trading, gold-panning) to provide the cash and food to support their gang, or else had a relationship of support with a wealthier person, either on a fully committed or occasional basis.

Lastly, there is the type of support which is irregular and without commitment. This type of arrangement exists mostly between the small-time illegal dealers or local patrons and the most vulnerable diggers we interviewed, but the Lebanese dealers I interviewed admitted offering occasional relief to certain community members<sup>141</sup>. Although the obligation therein is small on either side, there is still some expectation that the diggers and miners will bring their winnings to the supporter. Since the commitment is weak, it is common for the diggers to seek support from more than one person<sup>142</sup>. This may lead to problems once a diamond is discovered. For example, “Sometimes somebody has a supporter, the supporter gets sick and fed up of him, says “I’m not going to give you anything else” so he has to go to somebody else. So eventually sometimes you can have somebody who has three different supporters, and all of a sudden when he finds a stone, all hell breaks loose.<sup>143</sup>” This lack of structure and obligation may lead to conflict but it also gives the digger or miner options as to whom they would prefer to sell the stone.

Altogether then, the supporter is a type of patron. Supporting mining activities is one of many options for a patron, in a society where patronage is both a coping and livelihood strategy and has historically been the principle means of social protection and promotion (see chapters 5 and 6). Supporters serve similar roles in society as the state and the bank does, say, in Europe. People rely on wealthier community members to provide them with welfare relief and investment capital. They are instrumental in the redistribution of wealth and provide the fuel for economic growth. In Sierra Leone, the state and the banks are incapable of providing these services. And just as the western nation-state expects the person receiving welfare to be loyal to the state and meet their civic responsibilities, so supporters expect the person receiving support to be loyal to them and to meet their responsibilities as a client (cf. Wood 2002).

One facet of IDM is to provide an alternative source of credit for licence-holders, miners, and diggers to do their mining so that they no longer have to rely on traditional supporters if they do not want to. Certainly we did hear some stories from diggers and miners about how they had been cheated by a supporter in the past<sup>144</sup>, but over half of diggers and 5 out of 7 miners said they trusted their current ‘boss’ (i.e. supporter) 100% to treat them fairly. Only 15% of diggers said they did not trust them at all and all miners trusted them at least 50%. This casts some doubt on the view that supporter-client relationships are deeply exploitative or at least *understood to be so*. Some diggers and miners are certainly aware that they are being taken advantage of, but perhaps they accept this exploitation as a

<sup>138</sup> Interview with Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004.

<sup>139</sup> Interview with Kono licensed dealer, 3<sup>rd</sup> August 2004, and interview 22, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>140</sup> Licence-holders will only go into this arrangement where they cannot afford to support a sufficient number of diggers to get the job done.

<sup>141</sup> Interview with Lebanese dealers, 5<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

<sup>142</sup> Interview 23, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>143</sup> Interview with André T. Hope, 20<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>144</sup> e.g. Interview 18, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

necessary exchange for the security of knowing that their supporter(s) will protect them whenever need be. For miners and diggers in Sierra Leone dependence (and its associated obligations) may be preferable to independence, as it brings greater security even if it dampens one's potential for promotion (cf. Wood 2003).

This security in dependency may not be a fixed aspect of Sierra Leonean culture but purely symptomatic of the limited options people have had available to them for accessing the credit necessary to improve their security in a post-conflict recovery economy. It is a necessary trade-off. The DSRP's credit scheme will test this by providing new options for protection and promotion. A low participation rate would suggest that people do not have the confidence to risk greater independence from their traditional supporters or the desire to be more independent. One miner was wary that if he joined a PDA cooperative which failed, he would not be able to re-establish a relationship with his current supporter<sup>145</sup>. MSI is aware that some miners may have this fear<sup>146</sup>. If the rate or participation is high then it would suggest that miners are electing to depend on reciprocal rather than hierarchical relations of protection. In the direct investment project, cooperative members will be unable to elicit occasional relief from foreign investors to pay off their children's school fees or attend to the ailing health of a relative. The terms of exchange within the financier-miner(s) relationship will shift from clientelism (i.e. protection without promotion) to empowerment (i.e. promotion without protection), whilst cooperative members will depend on each other to provide protection and relief. In this way then the direct financing scheme offers miners the possibility of protection *and* promotion, albeit with the risk of relying on peers for protection rather than more powerful patrons, which is something some people may not be willing to do (see also chapter 6).

In summary, then, miners and diggers are not *all* as bound to their supporters as Moyers's (2003) version of the supporter-client relationship would have us believe and nor are they always oppressed within this relationship. In recognition of this, MSI's technical director says he hopes that traditional supporters will actually be able to participate in the credit scheme within the next couple of years and that the programme has "no intention of ruining financial ties that work for both sides"<sup>147</sup>. The programme's coordinators are therefore mindful of the complexity and variety of these supporter-client relationships.

### **5.2.7 Entitlements and Terms of Exchange**

The previous section considered the principle actors in the mining industry. Next I set out the terms of exchange which exist between them. I look at the levels of support given to diggers and how winnings are shared between the various actors.

#### Regular Support

Supporters give miners what they need to extract diamonds, that is, rice, tools, machines, and cash. In turn, the miners provide subsistence to the diggers. It is usual for the miner or supporter to provide diggers with at least some rice (between 2 and 3 cups a day) and some money to buy other foodstuffs for making 'soup' (i.e. sauce or stew). This daily cash payment varies geographically: some of the worst supported diggers we interviewed lived in Kamara chiefdom. They received Le 500 ( $\approx$  \$0.20) a day. In other parts, people were paid as much as Le 5,000 ( $\approx$  \$2.00) plus further support. The average amount received by the diggers interviewed was Le1,900. One commitment of the PDA is to establish a minimum "fair living wage" for diggers but no consensus had yet been reached on what this would be when I was in the field (MSI 2003b: 11). Paul Temple explains why

*"We worked with the committee and sub-committees on how they should put it, we got it to vote and at the end of it they disagreed and they said, no, we can't have it. ... I said, why not? They said, well on one side, you know, we buy, ... we don't agree that we want to give them that share ... The second thing, when we looked at it, we also said, well we can't sign up to this either... because it's below the accepted poverty level."<sup>148</sup>*

<sup>145</sup> Interview 2, 1<sup>st</sup> July 2004.

<sup>146</sup> Email from technical advisor, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2005.

<sup>147</sup> Email from technical advisor, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2005.

<sup>148</sup> Interview with Paul Temple, 20<sup>th</sup> June 2004.

This divergence of opinions on an ‘acceptable’ wage for diggers reflects two things. Firstly, international standards, such as the poverty line, can impede progress in societies where poverty is so extreme and so far below it in the first place, as in Sierra Leone. Secondly, that miners are either exploiting diggers willingly – “we don’t agree we want to give them that share” – or because they are concerned that by having to meet a minimum standard of payment, they increase their own insecurity owing to the uncertainty of returns at each mining site (cf. Global Witness & PAC 2004). Given that miners in the workshop admitted that they purposefully pay diggers in small notes so it looks like they are getting a lot of money, it seems more likely that miners are knowingly exploiting their diggers<sup>149</sup>. Fortunately, the PDA has now agreed that the minimum wage for diggers in the IDM cooperatives will be \$2 per day, which is apparently approximately double the norm, as well as a share in the cooperative’s profits<sup>150</sup>.

Apart from rice and money diggers might also be supported in their health, shelter, transport and funeral expenses, and even their children’s education and family welfare. Supported diggers usually receive enough to tend to their own needs only. Some supporters make allowances for diggers who are married by providing them with their own room, for example<sup>151</sup>, but it is unusual for a supporter to provide for diggers’ families’ daily needs. Diggers depend on other household members to do this (see chapter 6).

The support received by the diggers we interviewed is shown in table 5.3. Not all of these diggers were permanently supported. Just over half of those mining illegally did so without support.

#### **T5.5 Diggers’ Regular ‘Income’ as Provided by the Supporter of their Mining Activities**

No. of diggers	Legal	Illegal	Rice	Money	Health	Shelter	Family welfare	Transport	Children’s education	Death expenses
8	7	1	✓	✓	✓	✓				
7	4	3	✓	✓						
4	2	2	✓	✓	✓					
2	2	-	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓
2	2	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
1	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
1	1	-	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		
1	1	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			
1	-	-	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	
1	1	-	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	
1	1	-		✓		✓	✓			
1	1	-	✓	✓	✓		✓			
1	1	-	✓		✓	✓				
1	1	-		✓	✓					
1	-	1	✓							
<b>TOTAL</b>	24	7	30	28	23	17	8	4	3	2
32	Receive regular support									
11	Do not receive regular support									
7	Support the gang themselves									

All diggers but 2 received rice from their supporter and all but 3 received money and health. Shelter was provided less commonly, most probably because the diggers employed were local. The only people who

<sup>149</sup> Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop I, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>150</sup> Email from technical advisor, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2005.

<sup>151</sup> Interview 36, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

had their death expenses covered were the divers, which suggests that supporters recognise the elevated risk of fatalities in diving operations.

### Winnings Allocation Systems

Different allocation systems are used in different relationships and in accordance with the type of mining being conducted. Here I review 2 principle relationships of exchange – within the mining gang and between the gang and the financier; the relationship between the financier and the licence-holder has already been considered. I then consider who benefits from the most common arrangements. Before this I set out a typology of the various systems used today.

#### *Wage Labour*

Diggers are sometimes employed seasonally and paid cash only, meaning that those contracted do not get any share of the winnings and do not get other benefits such as food and shelter. The amount paid is usually 5,000 Leones a day. Occasional labour is often paid this way too.

#### *Pre-negotiated percentage of the cash winnings*

Prior to beginning work, the parties agree on the percentage share of the winnings once it has been converted into cash. Whatever quality of diamonds they find, they split the winnings according to this pre-negotiated percentage. This system is used today between supporters and licensed miners. The usual split is 60:40 or 70:30. It is also used to allocate winnings amongst the diggers, many of whom share winnings equally amongst themselves. It used to be the system used between the diggers and the miner in the 1960s. From the miner's perspective it is the optimum system if the diggers know how to value diamonds (see below). From the digger's perspective, it should be the preferable system if they do not know how to value diamonds.

#### *Pre-negotiated percentage of the gravel (Pile and bucket systems)*

Prior to beginning work, the parties agree on a percentage share of the gravel. This generally happens when diggers are unsupported or where a miner has sub-leased a portion of licensed land and pays the license-holder in gravel rather than winnings. This was the system used by the rebels and government forces during the war because it required no capital input other than the purchase of tools: half the gravel was to be washed for the commander, and half to be washed and shared among the junior soldiers who were digging. It is a high risk arrangement because there is no guarantee that your pile contains a diamond and even when your colleague finds one, you have no claim on it (unlike in the other systems). This system entails the biggest gamble.

The bucket system is practically identical to the pile system. Instead of paying diggers in one big 'pile' wherefrom the winnings of the pile will be split amongst the whole gang (i.e. up to 50 men), the diggers are divided into teams of maybe 4 and each team receives a bucket of extracted gravel to wash for the boss and a bucket to wash for themselves. If they find any diamonds in their bucket, their little team gets to keep the winnings in their entirety so none will get shared with the other diggers or with the boss. In practice, however, the gang will usually either sell the diamonds to the 'boss' (who can then sell them under his licence) or will sell the diamonds under the boss's licence and give him a 'tip' or commission for assisting them in selling it.

#### *Kongoma*

In *kongoma* the diggers contract their labour on a short-term basis in exchange for a portion of the gravel. This system is used when the supporter is no longer able to give support for the required work. Thus he gets no share of the winnings. For example, the 30 diggers he has employed cannot get the gravel extracted before the rains begin. In this situation the employed diggers or mines manager will call on contract diggers, maybe a gado gang, who will help out with the work and receive payment in the form of share of the extracted gravel at the end of the day. The agreement is made at the mine between the contract diggers and either the other diggers or the mines manager. Another scenario might be that the supporter has no liquidity and can no longer afford to pay his employed diggers. In this case the diggers might agree to exchange their labour for a bucket of gravel at the end of the day, which is theirs entirely.

In *kongoma* the licence-holder and the supporter lose nothing if the gravel proves to be unproductive because they are getting free labour.

#### *Post-negotiated price*

In this situation, diggers ‘sell’ each winning to the mines manager or directly to the licence-holder - supporter team. Where the diamond is small the diggers are more likely to get a fair price because they know better the value of smaller stones and because the miners are happy to sacrifice small amounts of money to keep the diggers satisfied<sup>152</sup>. If, however, winnings have been scarce up until that point and the supporter is in deficit, then they are likely to get nothing for small finds. This may encourage some diggers to steal. Diggers are far less likely to know the value of big winnings and often sell for too low a price. A knowledgeable miner can make a sizable sum from ignorant diggers with this system. And yet, according to one miner, this agreement is the best way to “really satisfy the diggers. They get satisfied when you agree on the price, and they know that is what you have to pay them, wherever you want to sell your diamond, you can go and sell it and bring their money<sup>153</sup>”. Supposedly, then, this is the system the diggers prefer, even if it lays them bare to being duped. This is the system most commonly used today.

The following table shows the systems used within each relationship of exchange<sup>154</sup>.

**T5.6 Table Winnings Allocation Systems in Different Relationships**

	Legality		Actors Between whom winnings are to be shared				
	Legal	Illegal	Amongst Gado gang	Amongst Employed Diggers	Diggers + financier (LH and/or S*)	LH + S	LH + lessee
Wage only	✓	(✓)	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
Pre-negotiated % winnings	✓	(✓)	✓	✓	✓	☑	✓
Pre-negotiated % gravel 2 pile 3 pile (5:5:2)	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	☑
Bucket system	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✓
Post-negotiated price	✓	(✓)	✗	☑	☑	✓	✗
Kongoma	✓	✓		✓	✓	✗	✗
Gado / Kabudu	✗	✓					

(✓) - it is not ordinarily used in this system

☑ - it is the predominant system used to allocate winnings between these actors today

\* LH is licence-holder, S is supporter.

#### *Within the Mining Gang*

Amongst the interviewees, in the majority of cases gangs allocated winnings equally amongst themselves. This was especially the case in gado gangs. In the remaining gangs, winnings are distributed either according to productivity (based on effort and skill) or according to age and position in the hierarchy. For example, “the diggers have their own society because they know how to shovel, they know who does and

<sup>152</sup> Interview 10, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>153</sup> Interview 5, 7<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>154</sup> Based on exercise conducted in Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop I, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004, and the interviews.

doesn't do it well or for passing the bucket. From there they pay you according to your work"<sup>155</sup>. The gang leader decides who should get what. Usually he will also receive a tip from the remaining diggers. In two cases, winnings were allocated differently according to the value of the gem: equally when the gem was of low value, and unequally when it was of high value with the gang leader taking a bigger share<sup>156</sup>.

***Between the Diggers and the Financier*** (i.e. miner or supporter)

The most common system used to allocate winnings between the diggers and the financier is post-negotiated pricing, according to the workshop participants, and pre-negotiated share of the winnings, according to interviewees. In fact, it is common for the parties to use both systems simultaneously. In other words, the parties agree on percentages and then renegotiate these once winnings are found according to expenditure and winnings to date<sup>157</sup>.

In one of the workshops, miners created the following table outlining the benefits and disadvantages of using the different systems within the digger – miner – supporter arrangement which is most typical of artisanal production.

**Table 5.7 Win-Lose Table For Winning Allocation Systems used between Digger and Miner or between Digger and Miner/Supporter Partnership**

System	Productivity of gravel	Digger	Miner	Supporter
<b>Tributors</b> (wage only)	Productive	-	+	+
	Unproductive	+	-	-
<b>Pre-negotiated % of winnings</b>	unimportant	+	+	- (if he is using his share to support the diggers)
<b>Pre-negotiated % of gravel</b> 2 pile 3 pile (5:5:2) bucket system	Productive	+	+	+
	Unproductive	-	+(diggers sell to him so the diamonds can be sold under his licence)	-
<b>Kongoma</b> (contract work in exchange for gravel)	Productive	+	-	-
	Unproductive	-	+	+
<b>Post-negotiated price</b>	Unimportant	- (unless the digger can value a diamond)	+(buys diamond cheaply)	+

✓ = win ✗ = lose

The table reveals that the system used most commonly today between diggers and the miner/supporter partnership – that of post-negotiated pricing – benefits the miner and supporter more than it does the diggers when the miner has superior valuing skills than the diggers. One aspect of the DSRP is to provide

<sup>155</sup> Interview 5, 7<sup>th</sup> July 2004. Note, when winnings are allocated unequally, it is also dependent on the position in the hierarchy according to age and role, and the amount of winnings. They are more likely to share winnings unequally when the winnings are significant.

<sup>156</sup> Interviews 10 and AA-14, 9<sup>th</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> July, 2004.

<sup>157</sup> Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop I, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

training to mining cooperatives in valuing diamonds. By October 2004, 38 people had received training and, according to the programme's technical advisor, "all of them had promised, as a condition of receiving the training, to hop on motorcycles and go to the pits to teach this information to the diggers"<sup>158</sup>. However, all the diggers I interviewed who were working for PDA-member cooperatives knew very little about the PDA and certainly had not received any training in valuing from their employers by that time in August. Besides access to capital, the most important asset anyone can have in the diamond industry is knowledge – where is the land productive, who should you trust, and how much is that diamond worth? And in a society where knowledge is power, it takes a lot more than encouragement to get licence-holders to transfer their valuing knowledge to their workers. It is good news that in December 2004 the PDA trained master trainers who will be going to the mines in March 2005 to teach valuing skills to diggers<sup>159</sup>.

### **5.2.8 Illegal mining**

Illegal mining happens wherever somebody mines land which is unlicensed, or wherever somebody who does not have a claim to the license, mines licensed land, for example if someone steals gravel from a licensed plot for washing. A lot of illegal mining happens in the bush in Kono, increasingly in the east where diamonds have not yet been significantly exploited and where the chiefdoms do not have the same level of experience in issuing licences and monitoring the industry as in the chiefdoms I studied.

Of the 48 diggers we interviewed, 28 were legal, 16 were illegal and four were of unknown status. All the miners were licensed except one, who was the land-owner. This proportion is likely to be unrealistically skewed towards the legal side because illegal miners would have been more reluctant to be interviewed and because our access to diggers was usually made possible through our contacts with PDA cooperatives, all of whose members are supposed to work in legal operations.

The DSRP is designed to help the Government of Sierra Leone legalise the artisanal diamond supply chain. The DSRP therefore principally provides the opportunity for empowerment and enrichment for diggers and miners who mine and sell their diamonds legally. Legality or membership in a PDA cooperative is the passport for accessing the resources and the eventual benefits the DSRP is trying to make possible, although illegal operators benefit as "free riders" from the Diamond Area Community Development Fund<sup>160</sup>. But is legal mining a simple choice for all miners? Do people mine illegally because they just do not care to be licensed, or are there other forces at work?

The choice of whether to mine legally or not is framed by the strength of a person's protection networks, whether they can finance themselves, what other livelihood options are available to them, and the relative attractiveness of these other options. Legal mining is the optimum choice for someone who can afford to obtain the licence and conduct the mining without support. Independent legal miners have explicit and enforceable rights and greater freedom to sell to whomever they please<sup>161</sup>. This reduces their chance of theft and enables them to get better prices locally. For others, the legal option requires that they go into a supported arrangement in order to afford the licence and/or the costs of production. If the mine is unproductive, the miner might find himself with no earnings at the end of the year, or worse still, in debt: "When you get a license, you are under pressure always how to change this license when the year rounds. And you are working without getting a winning so that at the end you can get renew this license definitely you have to go into debt. And then you face the problem of worrying how to pay back these debts."<sup>162</sup> With general productivity falling, the risk of more people going into debt is increasing. For this reason the DSRP is timely in its efforts to help increase their returns as well as to provide an alternative lender to whom they may prefer to be indebted.

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<sup>158</sup> Email from technical advisor, 4<sup>th</sup> November 2004.

<sup>159</sup> Email from technical advisor, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2005.

<sup>160</sup> Email from technical advisor, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2005.

<sup>161</sup> Interview 5, 7<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>162</sup> Interview 5, 7<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

Illegal mining, gado and overkicking offer people greater independence and a higher share of the winnings. Working for a licence-holder greatly reduces a digger's returns and also binds the digger to his authority. This means less flexibility in choosing which days he mines, and when he starts and finishes for the day. For diggers who mine to supplement another, principal livelihood therefore, illegal operations (i.e. gado or overkicking) are more feasible than working in a legal gang. One digger mined illegally although his brothers had licensed plots. He would rather work independently because then, if he finds anything, the money is all for him, and also because his brothers, like other licence-holders, do not support their workers satisfactorily in his opinion. He does, however, use his brothers' licences to sell his diamonds and gives them a tip for allowing him to do this<sup>163</sup>. Access to a licence-holder who will buy your diamonds from you or allow you to sell to a licensed dealer under her licence gives illegal diggers a greater choice of buyers beyond the network of illegal dealers and makes illegal mining more possible. And with illegal mining more possible, the greater flexibility and independence it offers also makes it more attractive. The DSRP imagined style of mining is well-structured and very formal. A diversity of mining styles amongst cooperatives seems unlikely. Will the DSRP really lure illegal miners away from the freedoms illegal activities offer them?

One miner stated that those who mine illegally either do not have the money to pay for a licence or are related to the authorities and so effectively have indemnity<sup>164</sup>. Interviewee 19 was the nephew of a Paramount Chief and yet he mines without a licence. Interviewee 20 was the brother of a section chief who lives in the village where the digger does unlicensed surface mining. Interviewee 17 was supported by the town chief to do overkicking during the rainy season. Interviewee 8, whose father is a chief, mined in a gado gang in Yengema. Four out of 12 interviewees who were related to chiefs in some way mined illegally. This lends some support to interviewee 14's statement that "for other people like sons of paramount and town chiefs, they exercise their father's authorities to mine without license. They only look out for mines warden to demarcate lands and from that point, straight away they start to mine"<sup>165</sup>. If illegal mining is to be properly discouraged, the chiefs need to be further sensitised and/or suitably reprimanded for facilitating or ignoring illegal mining among family members. If they do not respect their own laws, how can they expect people in an increasingly individualistic society (Archibald and Richards 2002) to respect them too?

Mining illegally increases the risk of persecution by the authorities, theft or duping. Without money to pay bribes or the protection of a 'big man', it is a risky business:

Estelle: *So in your opinion, why do some miners work without a licence?*

...

Miner: *Because they don't have the funds and there is no opportunity for them. There is no opportunity for them to get the licence.*

Estelle: *Why is there no opportunity?*

Miner: *Well the opportunity is there – either you don't have the money for yourself or you don't have any family who is a big man among you to help you in any circumstances*<sup>166</sup>.

For some people, however, mining legally is just not an option. Either they cannot afford the licence or they are excluded from participating in a legal gang because of their gender or age<sup>167</sup>. On the other hand, where people have strong social contacts, illegal mining is the optimum choice because it offers greater profitability and greater independence. In other words, illegal mining is the strong person's preferable option and the poor person's fate. As the Government proceeds in developing its capacity to eliminate illegal mining, these different motivations need to be taken into consideration to ensure that the powerful do not continue to bear indemnity, whilst the vulnerable are pushed even further to the margins of survival.

<sup>163</sup> Interview 20, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>164</sup> Interview 14, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>165</sup> Interview 14, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>166</sup> Interview 36, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>167</sup> Interview 36, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

### **5.2.9 Diamond Marketing**

If IDM proves successful in making the market more competitive and transparent, it may marginalise current dealers from the market unless they raise their standards (and prices) to compete with the buying scheme and operate more legally and transparently. It is believed that these dealers are exploitative and corrupt, often cheating diggers and miners of a fair price. It is also believed that they, along with the exporters, are the principle smugglers<sup>168</sup>. Bypassing them is seemingly simpler than trying to discipline them. Lastly, it is widely believed, especially amongst the locals, that through their smuggling and legitimate trading enterprises and because their roots are elsewhere (in West Africa and the Lebanon), they invest most of their diamond profits outside of the country, which debilitates the Kono economy. As one digger put it “we are left empty”<sup>169</sup>.

In what follows I investigate how those involved in buying diamonds affect the ability of diggers and miners to receive a fair price for their diamonds as this is one objective of IDM. Specifically I examine the roles of the dealing cartel and coaxers. I then briefly consider how diamonds are marketed illegally. I conclude by considering whether it is indeed in the interests of the people of Sierra Leone to marginalise these people from the diamond trade for the sake of peace and prosperity.

#### ***Getting a Fair Price for the Diamond***

Valuing a diamond requires a complex understanding of what yield and type of cut diamond the rough diamond can produce as well as the relative importance of how the quality and rarity of colour, the weight, and the demand for the resultant shape will affect the price of the feasible cut diamond. As each diamond is unique and the value of a diamond is based largely on its relative beauty, pricing is a highly subjective skill. Furthermore, value per carat increases exponentially as the size of the diamond increases. Thus it was very difficult to map how the value of a diamond changes up the supply chain. In very approximate terms, a good quality rough gem weighing one carat will bring a dealer \$600, an exporter \$700 and an international buyer would sell to a jeweller for \$900<sup>170</sup>.

#### **The Dealing Cartel**

Often a miner will take his/her diamond to several potential buyers before settling on the price. A common activity amongst dealers, especially the Lebanese ones apparently, is ‘putting the passport’ (see Fithen 1999 for a detailed account of the Lebanese dealing community). A dealer ‘puts the passport’ on a diamond if he wants to buy it but does not want to pay the miner’s asking price. The dealer will call around other dealers telling them what price he offered the miner. The next dealer the miner visits will likely offer him a little less than this original price, and the third dealer will offer less than this price and so on. At some point the miner will realise what is happening and either sell his stone there and then, try his luck with the original dealer or sell it out of town. One miner described how it happened to her:

Estelle: *So what do you do? Do you just sell to the next one or do you go back to the first?*

Miner: *Oh, well you go back to the first. You find out that his price has gone down. He will tell you, oh no I’m sorry. I had some money but now I have used the money, euh, I can’t do this now. And then he will pretend as if he doesn’t want it because he knows now you don’t have a choice. You see? ... No matter if you’re close to them. And especially when it comes to the Lebanese. There was a time I was going to sell one diamond to Bunguman. We are close, you know he is my friend, and he insisted he would pay me, he will pay me 900,000 for the diamond I thought he was going to pay me a million for. I beg him, I say, well just give me a million now, he said no! You know, he refused! And then by the time you go to somebody else it would be 800 and when you come back to him he say, ah, no, I don’t have money. The only money I have here is 800.*

<sup>168</sup> Interviews with Mines Monitoring Officer, 12<sup>th</sup> July 2004, local journalist, 5<sup>th</sup> August 2004, and official of the Network Movement for Justice and Development, 4<sup>th</sup> August 2004. Despite its obvious fascination, I am not revealing my findings on smuggling as this is not directly relevant to diggers’ and miners’ ability to reduce their poverty, although it certainly affects the Government’s ability to assist them by depriving it of revenues.

<sup>169</sup> Interview 16, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>170</sup> Interview with Lawrence Ndola-Myers, General Manager of the Gold and Diamond Office, 20<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

Estelle: *And he's your friend?*

Miner: *Yes! No matter how friendly you are with him, when it comes to business ... they'll play the game*<sup>171</sup>.

### Coaxers

Some dealers, especially the Lebanese, employ West Africans to encourage miners to sell to them. Coaxers are usually Marakas or Fullahs, both of whom are known for their salesmanship. The Kono dealer suggested that the Lebanese would not employ Kono people as coaxers because “the Lebanese don't want us knowing their secrets”<sup>172</sup>. In fact the coaxers are vital to the success of the Lebanese.

A coxer is “just somebody who knows everybody in the mining business”<sup>173</sup>. There are two types of coxer. There are those who are based in the dealers' office and who work primarily for the dealer. They act as a receptionist to encourage miners to stay or return with their parcel if the dealer is busy with another client<sup>174</sup>. They also act as a cultural bridge between the Lebanese and the Sierra Leonean miners or diggers who come to them with diamonds to sell. The coaxers chat up their Sierra Leonean ‘brothers’ in the dealers' office to make them feel comfortable, welcome and secure, and in this way they coax them to sell to someone who they come to believe is trustworthy and who will give them a fair price. If the deal is struck, the coxer receives a commission from the dealer. The other type of coxer is a free agent who finds miners with stones to sell and convinces the miner he knows a fair dealer to whom he will introduce him for a small tip. The coxer takes the miner to the dealer's office and will appear to barter on the side of the miner. Generally speaking coaxers have superior knowledge of diamond valuing than the miner and so will often be negotiating to seem to benefit the miner whilst really benefiting the dealer. In this way the independent coxer will get a commission from both the dealer and the miner.

### ***Illegal Marketing Activities***

First and foremost, diamond dealers and exporters are businesspeople. Nearly all people involved in dealing and exporting diamonds in Sierra Leone have one foot in both the formal and informal spheres. Traditionally dealers worked between these spheres to maximise on profits and minimise risks. This practice continues today with dealers and exporters known to buy and sell or export legally the smaller, less valuable stones, and smuggle out the larger, more valuable ones. Since the introduction of the Kimberley Certification Scheme in Sierra Leone, however, this is slowly changing as the average value per carat being exported out the country is increasing, indicating a greater proportion of valuable stones moving through legal channels. The sphere most renowned for their illegal activities in both marketing and exporting diamonds, however, is the Opun-Yai.

### The Opun-Yai<sup>175</sup>

“Opun-Yai” is a condition of being, of general astuteness and awareness of those in the diamond industry to the goings on in the industry and amongst their colleagues. You have to open your eyes to see everything going on where you are because where there are diamonds involved, there is generally little trust and lots of swindling. The Opun-Yai is also a group of illegal dealers who meet at a recognised place which changes now and again. It comprises ECOWAS citizens as well as Sierra Leoneans. The principle tribes involved are the Marakas and the Fullahs, although the shared language is Mandingo. These dealers are known locally as ‘banabana’ and ‘ñikoñiko’<sup>176</sup>. They might sell the stones to dealers' or exporters' agents as they are able to buy without certificates. The agents then pass them to their employer, who will

<sup>171</sup> Interview with Amienatta Conteh, 5<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

<sup>172</sup> Interview 39, 3<sup>rd</sup> August 2004.

<sup>173</sup> Interview with Frank Karefa-Smart, 21<sup>st</sup> July 2004.

<sup>174</sup> Interview with Frank Karefa-Smart, 21<sup>st</sup> July 2004.

<sup>175</sup> I take the word ‘Opun-Yai’ from Moyers's account of the supporter-client relationships (2003) for consistency's sake. This spelling is phonetically more accurate than the perhaps more semantically-suggestive spelling ‘Openeye’.

<sup>176</sup> Spelt phonetically

market the illegally bought stones as legal wares<sup>177</sup>. In other cases licensed miners might go to the Opun-Yai to improve their parcel to meet a legal dealer's preferences<sup>178</sup>. Otherwise, the Opun-Yai's diamonds are smuggled out of the country, usually through Guinea, and will often be sold in one of the ECOWAS states, where Sierra Leonean diamonds fetch better prices<sup>179</sup>. It is perfectly feasible that a member of the Opun-Yai might be buying on behalf of someone who wished to launder money or convert cash into transportable and internationally tradable commodity for other purposes. In other words it is as feasible that members of the Opun-Yai have connections with just the sorts of people the DSRP does not want getting their hands onto diamonds. This raises questions about the absence of international attention on the activities of the tribes who are part of the Opun-Yai and their comparative emphatic scrutiny of the Lebanese community (e.g. Smillie, Gberie & Hazelton 2000, Gberie 2002).



*Plate 11: The Opun Yai meeting at Babukeh Market on a Friday*  
mostly left alone except for the odd rustle and shake up.

The Opun-Yai apparently provides two positive services. It provides a space of learning for those Sierra Leoneans who want to learn how to deal or value diamonds and may not otherwise get the opportunity. We came to refer to its members as 'aspiring' dealers who learn the trade at the 'University of the Opun-Yai'. The Chairman of the Kono Dealers' Association (KDA) and an employee of the Ministry of Mines told us that they had managed to pressurise certain members of the Opun-Yai, who they felt had the capital and knowledge to become legal, to get themselves licences<sup>180</sup>. For this reason the Opun-Yai is tolerated by the government and

The second positive service is that it increases competition in the buying market. Miners who are unconcerned about the legality of their deal have a greater choice of buyers than those who prefer to sell legally. The Ministry of Mines and the Chairman of the KDA claimed that suggestions had been made to legalise the Opun-Yai through the creation of brokering licences which could be paid for on a monthly or quarterly basis to enable those with limited capital but sufficient desire to deal legally. This scheme would help increase competition in the legal market without marginalising those who deal diamonds on a smaller scale. Despite the suggested cost of such a broker's licence being a tiny \$50 per quarter instead of the \$1200 per annum a dealer must pay, many members of the Opun Yai protested that they cannot even afford this amount<sup>181</sup>. This is unlikely<sup>182</sup>. According to the chairman of the KDA this would bring the government some revenue and enable those who wanted to carry on with their learning to avoid hassle from corrupt officials. He stated that people are motivated to legalise their activities when it is cheaper to deal legally than illegally. Illegal activities attract attention from officials who either demand payments to 'turn a blind eye' or confiscate the diamonds. Ironically, in this situation corruption is actually encouraging people to operate legally.

<sup>177</sup> Dealers' and exporters' agents are allowed to buy on behalf of their dealer without the requirement of certificates or licences. One dealer told me that dealers regularly falsify certificates to enable this practice.

<sup>178</sup> I witnessed one such negotiation and the dealer told me this was commonplace.

<sup>179</sup> Interview with Amienatta Conteh, 5<sup>th</sup> August, 2004; interview with Chairman of the Kono Dealers' Association, 24<sup>th</sup> June 2004.

<sup>180</sup> Interview with the Chairman of the Kono Dealers' Association, 24<sup>th</sup> June 2004, and interview with Mines Monitoring Officer, 12<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>181</sup> Interview with the Chairman of the Kono Dealers' Association, 24<sup>th</sup> June 2004.

<sup>182</sup> Interviews with Amienatta, Kabia, Saquee CHECK.

One digger told me he sells to a Temne man (a Sierra Leonean) who is part of the Opun-Yai. Yet he believes that for diamonds to do good things for the people of Kono the answer “is for them to find ways of how to control the land, of giving licences so that when they give licences, the chiefs have their eyes so that whenever they extract gravel, the big diamonds will not escape ... We have to control the diamonds so that they cannot go out of hands”<sup>183</sup>. Then I asked him why, if he believes this, does he sell to the Opun-Yai and how does he know that these people are not taking the stones away and selling them to people who might cause problems. He went on to explain that so long as you sell to a Sierra Leonean, it does not matter if the trade is legal or not, because the buyer, as a Sierra Leonean, will use his profits to support his relatives and other Sierra Leoneans. Thus the priority is not to control the industry to prevent illegal trade, but to prevent capital flight. This priority of nationality before legality was confirmed by those other diggers and miners who stated they would prefer to sell to a Sierra Leonean or the Government than the Lebanese or Maraka dealers. On several occasions, this investment of diamond wealth outside of the country was given as a reason why people in Kono are so poor.

### *Summary*

Introducing buyers into the market who are bound to prices at “90% of the actual price ultimately received in ... Antwerp” is intended to offer licensed miners an attractive, alternative and *legal* buyer who is categorically different to dealers operating in the Opun Yai and the Lebanese ‘cartel’. Currently the only real alternative is to take the diamond to Freetown to sell directly to an exporter (MSI 2004b). Some diggers and miners spoke about preferring to sell their diamonds to the Government, but I could not ascertain exactly how this worked. Increasing competition in the buying market as the DSRP is doing will empower diggers and miners by bringing them higher prices for their diamonds, but more investigations need to be made into the feasibility and possible benefits and costs of legalising the activities of the Opun Yai and preventing legal dealers and exporters from smuggling. Creating competition in the market will not necessarily exclude the current dealing communities, but may make it harder for those who do not wish to operate more transparently and legitimately to maintain their market share. Also, not enough is understood about the possible fallout associated with disempowering the Lebanese and Maraka communities through this increased competition. Dealers are important economic actors in the Kono community. They provide support and relief to both miners and the needy, they own and operate most of the larger shops in Koidu (e.g. selling building supplies, auto parts, and imported food and housewares), and they give donations for community development<sup>184</sup>. The Lebanese spoke about their community as the ‘thread’ that keeps the shirt (Sierra Leonean society) together<sup>185</sup>. Much resentment is shown towards them and yet they say they are part of the community and Kono is home. More concerted efforts to work with these two communities and to encourage them to participate more meaningfully with the PDA and the social and economic progress it is trying to achieve would be wise, as would research into the likely effects of the DSRP’s policies on the Lebanese and ECOWAS communities and their contemporary roles within and relations with Sierra Leonean and, in particular, Kono society.

### **5.2.10 Monitoring and Disciplining the Industry**

Improved industry monitoring is a key strategy of the DSRP. The Kimberley Process requires it. The Earth to Export scheme of the IDM project is designed to help improve the Government’s industry monitoring capacity. Streamlining the industry by bypassing the traditional marketing and exporting community is seen to be a way of simplifying the certification process.

The Government bodies involved in monitoring diamond marketing and export are the Ministry of Mines, the police, the Government Gold and Diamond Office, and Customs and Excise. The ability of these state authorities to perform their duties is vastly inhibited by extremely restricted resources, a paucity of competent middle management, and pervasive corruption. All were accused of corruption over the course

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<sup>183</sup> Interview 23, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>184</sup> Interviews with Lebanese dealers and the Chairman of the Five Country Committee (Marakas), 6<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

<sup>185</sup> Interview with Lebanese dealers, 6<sup>th</sup> August 2004.


of the interviews and workshop participants individually ranked the relative profit making potential and corrupt gains of a variety of people in the industry.

**Table 5.8 Profit making and Corrupt Gains in the Industry**

	<b>PROFIT making Total rankings</b>	<b>PROFIT making Overall Rank</b>	<b>CORRUPT GAINS Total rankings</b>	<b>CORRUPT GAINS Overall Rank</b>
Exporters	81	<b>10</b>	80	<b>10</b>
Dealers	78	<b>9</b>	78	<b>9</b>
Supporters	72	<b>8</b>	62	<b>8</b>
Mines monitors	52	<b>7</b>	56	<b>7</b>
Paramount chiefs	47	<b>6</b>	38	<b>3</b>
Freetown (national) politicians	42	<b>5</b>	49	<b>5</b>
Police	34	<b>4</b>	54	<b>6</b>
Section chiefs	30	<b>3</b>	19	<b>2</b>
local politicians	28	<b>2</b>	39	<b>4</b>
Town chiefs	26	<b>1</b>	15	<b>1</b>

These findings show that people had the most faith in their chiefs to *not* be corrupt, whereas they trusted less the honesty of government officials and industry actors. Figure 5.2 shows all the people who directly benefit from the artisanal diamond supply chain, even if they are not supposed to.

**Fig. 5.2 Primary, secondary, and tertiary beneficiaries in the Artisanal Diamond Supply Chain<sup>186</sup>**



The underpayment and inadequate provision of resources to officials means that they are continuing to facilitate smuggling and illegal mining and dealing rather than preventing it. Police officers continue to use their monopoly of violence and the distribution of justice to extort bribes in order to allow diamonds to slip through<sup>187</sup>. Mines wardens continue to take bribes to ‘turn a blind eye’ and misreport caratage<sup>188</sup>.

<sup>186</sup> Based on Structure of the Mining Industry workshop II , conducted 7<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

<sup>187</sup> Interview with the Chairman of the Kono Dealers’ Association, 24<sup>th</sup> June 2004.

Mines wardens will also ask miners for the cost of their transport in coming to the mining site to settle a dispute or to demarcate boundaries. Miners noted that mines wardens have expectations based on historic privileges that came with the job and that it is likely that officials will be corrupt when they are dealing with diamonds because “with diamonds [*inaudible*] everybody thinks you just get rich overnight. You don’t expect to be a poor man when you’re in the diamond industry. So no matter how much money somebody gives to you, you just consider it small money compared to what he gets in the diamonds”<sup>189</sup>.

In order to encourage industry officials to be less corrupt, it was suggested by workshop participants that a structure be put in place to give them incentives to do their job appropriately. For example, the more fines mines wardens collect, the more illegal activities they prevent and the more legal activities they encourage, the more benefits they should get in their job (e.g. motorbikes) and as individuals (e.g. cash or rice bonuses). One miner suggested that rotating the wardens between places would make it harder for them to extort ‘tips’ because they would not know all the winnings. Another suggested the opposite. He believed monitors should be local to the mining communities as then they would have a greater loyalty to the community and a personal stake in increasing the community’s revenues through the DACDF by encouraging legal mining and marketing.

According to multiple sources the Police are in the payment of the chiefs, the Lebanese and the Marakas. I could not ascertain the veracity of these statements. A member of the Ministry of Mineral Resources told me that the relationship between the Ministry and the Police is very poor because the police have their own division concerned with mining-related crime, and do not coordinate their efforts with the Ministry<sup>190</sup>. This is a waste of resources and leads to incomplete knowledge on either side. Furthermore, sources who act as arbitrators for disputes between dealers, miners and diggers claimed that they prefer not to call the police in such instances as the police will tend to intervene on the side of whoever can pay the most, be it cash or a sheet of zinc, regardless of whose rights have been violated<sup>191</sup>. More needs to be done to help the police, and other officials, use their authority appropriately, act in the interest of the Law (and not the dollar) and protect the rights of all Sierra Leoneans, not just those who can grease their palms. Whilst the DSRP is making efforts in this regard through its involvement with the anti-corruption commission, there is still much room for improvement. Perhaps the best place to start would be for institutions whose interventions are dealing explicitly with general governance, such as DFID, to help clean up the Sierra Leonean justice system in order to enable it to fairly prosecute and bring to account government officials who abuse their positions at all levels of national and local government.

An opportunity for countering corruption amongst state officials lies in making explicit the importance of effective legal enforcement in preventing smuggling as a strategy of avoiding war in the future for the sake of whichever community they most identify with. Whilst most interviewees identified most strongly with their tribe, there is also a nascent nationalism sparked by the war which could be exploited to encourage officials to perform their roles responsibly. In his article on the imbrications between oil and community in Nigeria, Watts notes that “Nation-building ... rests in its modern form on a sort of calculation, integration, and state and bureaucratic rationality which the logic of rent-seeking, petro-corruption, ethnic spoils and state multiplication works to systematically undermine” (2004: 211). Could the nurturing of a sense of community, be it based on nation or chiefdom, not therefore be used to undermine the allure of corruption in the surveillance and disciplining of the diamond complex? One Mines Monitoring Officer said this is exactly what is happening in Kono. According to him, the training and logistical support provided by the DSRP, including the Sierra Leonean government, has encouraged

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<sup>188</sup> A South African diving company who had just begun work in Sandor chiefdom told me of their experience with the mines wardens who were to be monitoring their activities. In paraphrase, the mines warden told them, “we don’t earn enough money to keep our families, so if you give us something we’ll turn a blind eye, and when you find 40 carats, we’ll report 0.4 carats”. (Field notes of an informal conversation with South African mining company, 4<sup>th</sup> August 2004.)

<sup>189</sup> Interview with Official from the Ministry of Mines, 12<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>190</sup> Interview with Femi Kamara, 20<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>191</sup> Interview with Chairman of the Kono Dealers’ Association; June 2004.

monitors to be “more nationalistic in their approach to the job” and, because of this “the monitoring (has) improved”<sup>192</sup>.

### 5.3 **Conclusion: How does this analysis inform the DSRP?**

Based on the above analysis it is possible to identify the principal issues of concern in the political economy of the industry and what the DSRP is and is not doing about these. These issues are:

#### ***Production***

- *Productivity is declining.* This means artisanal mining is becoming decreasingly viable in traditional areas. The worst affected people will be those who are already most vulnerable, that is those who are less welcome in gangs or scaled-up operations (e.g. women, old people, sick people) but who mine nonetheless and ‘strangers’ (non-Konos). To my knowledge the DSRP has not given adequate attention to the likely impacts of this transition on the chiefdoms suffering decline and those suffering growth in artisanal mining to help these chiefdoms, and the people who live and work there, adjust to the changing livelihood and revenue opportunities and the externalities which arise with these socio-environmental changes.
- *Corruption is still pervasive in the licensing procedure* with chiefs and other officials continuing to accept ‘handshakes’, otherwise called bribes.
- *Access to land is not equitable* but is still determined by identity, wealth and social capital. Women, strangers, and poorer people are discriminated against in the licensing procedure partly because of the traditions of ‘handshakes’, patrimony and patriarchy which continue today. This discrimination denies certain people opportunities in the industry and is likely to generate grievances in the new political economy, which is supposed to offer fairer opportunities for everyone.
- *The stereotype of the typical digger or miner as an immigrant to Kono is disputed by this research.* In fact, a majority of the diggers (54%) and all the miners we interviewed but one were Kono.
- *Miners are businessmen.* Their operations are not erratic and simplistic, but require skill and a good sense for business. MSI recognises that mining is conducted as a rational enterprise, not some ‘casino’ mentality<sup>193</sup>. Furthermore, diggers require skill to do their jobs productively. This challenges the view that mining is an unskilled occupation and one to be discouraged<sup>194</sup>. This prejudice may unhelpfully impede efforts to transform the image of diamonds into a force for prosperity and not war.
- *Miners knowingly exploit their diggers.* They are able to do this because the current winnings allocation system favoured between diggers and miners is post-negotiated price. The DSRP is hoping to challenge this by training up diggers in how to value diamonds.
- *The DSRP works with a standard understanding of the organisation of production.* I am not aware of whether it considers the different types of production (e.g. gado and overkicking) and ways of legalising these activities or helping people who do these activities get involved in legal activities. Yet those conducting overkicking are generally the most vulnerable and excluded. Nor does it entirely consider differentiation between types of miners and types of diggers according to their role in production. This limits its potential to help all miners and diggers except those who are already well-placed to join a cooperative.
- *People’s motivations for mining illegally extend beyond the fulcrum of relative profitability* to considerations of possibility (some people are just not welcome in legal operations) and flexibility (some people do not wish to mine full-time but on an occasional basis in combination with their other, principal livelihood). The people most likely to mine illegally are those who have some indemnity (e.g. they are protected by ‘big-men’ such as chiefs), those who seek flexibility (e.g. Konos who wish to combine overkicking, say, with their farming or tailoring), those who seek independence (e.g. they wish to have a greater share of the winnings but find it hard to get a licence or to be included in licensed operations, such as women), and those who have limited alternatives (e.g. war widows). The DSRP does not sufficiently tackle the different motivations people have for mining illegally in the design of

<sup>192</sup> Mines Monitoring Officer, 12<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>193</sup> Email from technical advisor, 4<sup>th</sup> November 2004.

<sup>194</sup> Interview with Official from the Ministry of Mines, 12<sup>th</sup> July 2004, and with Chairwoman of the Tankoro District Council, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004.

its programme for preventing illegal mining. It may be of great utility for future research to move past common assumptions on the reasons why people mine illegally (or, rather, why they do not mine legally), on what are the trade-offs in choosing between the spheres, and on what, therefore, are these diggers' and miners' priorities.

### ***Financing production***

This analysis challenges the assumption that the supporter-miner relationship is one based on exploitation in which the miner will often find himself in a position of debt bondage:

- The supporter-miner relationship enjoys reasonably high levels of trust compared to other relationships in the industry so long as the supporter treats the miner fairly (or at least appears to do so) and offers relief as and when the miner requires. For the majority of our interviewees, their relationship with their supporter was good. In fact diggers and miners trusted their supporters more than they trusted other diggers.
- Miners are not as bound to their supporters as the literature implies; miners sometimes move between supporters, and some may do business with several at once.
- Miners can cheat supporters, just as supporters cheat miners.
- The supporter-miner relationship is more than just a business strategy; it is also a livelihood strategy which enables vulnerable people to cope with idiosyncratic risk events by establishing social relations with a more powerful community member who will provide relief when required (see chapter 6). Only those individuals willing to deprioritise relief and dependency in favour of higher returns and greater independence are likely to participate in the IDM scheme. Unless something else is devised to incorporate the more vulnerable into the legal system, then those who are not able or willing to join a cooperative are likely to continue to mine. This is where the suggestion of legalising land for gado and overkicking activities would create a legal option for such people.
- Diggers are more likely to be exploited by supporters than miners, owing to their poorer education, poorer wealth, weaker social contacts, and greater overall vulnerability (see chapter 6 and 7). The cooperatives are apparently comprised of a majority (80%) of diggers and so the DSRP is attempting to attend to this inequality<sup>195</sup>.

### ***Marketing***

- Local people believe *capital flight* by the foreigners who market diamonds, that is the Lebanese and Maraka communities, is at least partly responsible for local economic stagnation. This assertion needs to be properly substantiated, but it is worth investigating further as it currently helps justify prejudices against these communities.
- Comparatively, the Lebanese community have been more demonised by external observers than the Marakas in their participation in smuggling, miner exploitation, and links to terrorists (e.g Gberie 2002, Global Witness 2002). Some attention should be given to the role of the Marakas in these regards. This excessive focus on the supposed malignancy of Lebanese involvement in the industry is perhaps more acceptable in an international arena obsessed with Islamic fundamentalism (especially amongst Arabic peoples), terrorism and supposed links between the Lebanese diaspora, Hizb'Allah and Al Qaeda (Global Witness 2002, Rapaport News 2004, Fithen 1999).

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<sup>195</sup> Email from technical advisor, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2005.

## **6. Poverty & Diamonds I: Assets and Capabilities**

The Diamond Sector Reform Programme (DSRP) aims to remove the motivation for war by decreasing poverty in diamond mining communities. Its strategies involve market liberalisation, training miners in diamond valuation, the formation of cooperatives, and the provision of credit and financing options for scaling up production. These strategies are intended to empower miners by increasing their income-earning potential and reducing their reliance on the Lebanese and West African dealers, both legal and illegal, on whom they depend for support and for selling their diamonds. It is presumed that this empowerment will bring miners and consequently their families and communities out of poverty.

An assessment of the DSRP's strategy for alleviating poverty in Kono requires an understanding of what diamonds have to do with making or keeping people poor and in helping them reduce their poverty. Following a postcolonial agenda, it is vital to understand these links between diamonds and poverty / prosperity as they are perceived by the diggers and miners who experience them<sup>196</sup>. Through the use of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (see Chapter 2 for a methodological overview), this study attempts to combine the opinions of diggers and miners with my own analysis to present how poverty and participation in the diamond industry are differentially experienced and produced so as to postulate whose poverty the DSRP is most likely to help eliminate, and whose they might perpetuate or deepen.

In these next two chapters I examine how people are poor (chapter 6) and what they try to do about it (chapter 7). My objective is to provide a perspective on what life is like for diamond diggers and miners in Kono in order to understand better the restrictions, prohibitions and opportunities which structure their realities. The forces which cause and maintain poverty are explored in the conclusion to chapter 7. In these next two chapters the vulnerability context and the structures and processes which frame risks as threats or opportunities are not explicitly investigated. These were covered in some detail in chapter 5. They are also implicit in this analysis of the assets, livelihood options, and livelihood strategies available to and utilised by artisanal diamond miners and diggers.

An individual's capacity to cope with, mitigate and eliminate risks is determined by their asset profile. Assets, or 'capitals', determine possible courses of action depending on the ends to which they are put: they are the means by which people make a living, they give meaning to a person's existence, and they determine people's capabilities to cope, adapt and change. Assets are therefore vehicles for instrumental, hermeneutic and emancipatory action (Bebbington 1999: 2022).

This chapter's purpose is to understand who mines and to begin to consider why people mine. People's assets are profiled in order to understand the capabilities one must have to be a digger or miner, the products of mining as a livelihood, the priority assets they wish to build, and how assets can determine who gets to participate in the industry productively and at all.

### **6.1 Human capital**

"Human capital represents the skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good health that together enable people to pursue different livelihood strategies and achieve their livelihood objectives" (DFID 2001, § 2.3.1). Some aspects of human capital, such as the desire to be educated or to keep good health, are also central to a sense of wellbeing and so are ends in themselves. Human capital therefore has hermeneutic value; it gives life meaning. It also has instrumental value as knowledge, skills and the ability to command labour are all necessary to make use of any of the other four capitals.

Human capital includes those aspects of our bodies which work to our advantage or disadvantage in achieving our livelihood objectives and according to cultural norms and hierarchies. These bodily characteristics include those which make up our identities, such as race, ethnicity, gender, and age, and which determine our 'attractiveness'. These aspects of human capital cannot be 'built' or altered as

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<sup>196</sup> Investigations within diggers' and miners' families, households and communities were not possible in the time available.

education or health can and so they are not objects of transformation<sup>197</sup>. They are, however, important determinants of access to assets, livelihood options and livelihood strategies. Sharing a feature of identity with another brings membership in a community (e.g. kin, tribe, household, ‘mining gang’), which bestows on individuals certain rights within that community. With these rights come entitlements to protection, security and promotion (i.e. increasing one’s resiliency). Where there is belonging, however, there is also exclusion. Belonging to the ‘wrong’ group or not belonging to the right one can deny an individual access and expose them to particular risks. Thus identity is a primary factor in determining people’s possible actions for coping with, mitigating and eliminating risks.

The implications of identity are explored at the end of the section where I look at how they determine a person’s ability to command labour. Before this is an exploration of the instrumental status of other facets of diggers’ and miners’ human capital: education, skills, health, and hunger.

### Education

#### **T6.1 School Attendance of Diggers, Miners and their Parents**

	<b>Diggers (48 asked)</b>			<b>Miners<sup>198</sup> (14 asked)</b>			<b>Total</b>
	Self *	Mother	Father	Self*	Mother	Father	Self
<b>No school</b>	15 (3)	45	39	3 (1)	14	12	<b>29%</b>
<b>Some primary</b>	12 (1)	2	2	1 (1)			<b>21%</b>
<b>Completed primary</b>	1 (1)		1	3 (1)			<b>6%</b>
<b>Some secondary</b>	14 (2)	1	3	4		1	<b>29%</b>
<b>Completed secondary</b>	6			3			<b>15%</b>
<b>Other</b>			1 (Koranic school) 2 (n/a)			1 (Polytechnic)	

\* Total given. Number of female diggers/miners in brackets.

The majority of diggers and miners interviewed had had some formal education in their lifetime<sup>199</sup>. Half had no education or had only completed part of primary school. A person’s ability to participate in the industry is thus not determined by their level of education, which is why digging is a viable option for those who are illiterate, innumerate or who did not have the option of schooling: 20% of diggers said that inadequate education was the reason they chose to do mining as a livelihood. Nor is there a direct relationship between level of education and the role taken in the mining gang. Out of 14 diggers with no education, six had some position of authority in the gang as foreman, gang leader, supporter, or second in command. Actual experience in the industry or the decision to mine independently, such as doing gado, enables those without formal education to take a role of responsibility in a gang and to reap the extra benefits this brings.

Out of all the children the diggers and miners care for who are eligible, 83% attend school<sup>200</sup>. This is a high proportion. Of those who are eligible but are not in school, in most cases this is because the children are still very young (under 7) or married but there were at least two cases where the caregiver simply could not afford to send the children to school<sup>201</sup>. Although primary education is now free of charge for everyone and secondary education is free to girls<sup>202</sup>, attendance requires the purchase of a uniform and

<sup>197</sup> Obviously this is different in societies, such as North America or Europe where surgical facilities exist that can permanently alter the physical determinants of identity and ‘attractiveness’.

<sup>198</sup> The two miners interviewed as informed sources had both had further education in the United States.

<sup>199</sup> We did not attempt to ascertain literacy or numeracy.

<sup>200</sup> Eligibility is determined by a child being 18 or under. However, because of the war young adults – some in their early twenties – attend primary school. Unfortunately I did not categorise interviewees’ children according to their dependence on the interviewees. This would have been more meaningful than assuming the universal standard that adulthood begins at 18.

<sup>201</sup> Interviewees 37, 27<sup>th</sup> July 2004, and 23, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>202</sup> Interview with Mines Monitoring Officer, 12<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

supplies, such as pencils and exercise books. Two diggers told me it costs them Le12,000 (US\$4.62) per year to send one child to school. Educating their children is obviously a priority among diggers.

*Health (the ability to command labour)*

Miners and diggers suffer from wounds to the feet and legs from the shovel and pick, wire cuts to the hands from the shaker, cold and fever, vomiting, body aches and pains especially in the back, sides and bones, torn muscles, itchy skin, malaria, fatigue and exhaustion, dysentery, ear pain from diving, and headaches from dehydration<sup>203</sup>. Of these, malaria, dysentery, fatigue, feeling cold and body pains were chronic conditions for some of the diggers and miners interviewed. They were also prone to leaches and snake bites; one interviewee was off work having been bitten by a black mamba just a few days before<sup>204</sup>! Four of the eighteen diggers I interviewed were unable to work because of poor health<sup>205</sup>. One had just had an operation; another had injured his toes with a shovel and was suffering from bad body pains; and another had stopped working in a supported gang to do overkicking during the rains so as to stay out of the cold water and prevent his fever and body pains from worsening<sup>206</sup>. This suggests that generally speaking gang work is less preferable for those suffering poor health, unless access to medicine or treatment depends on continued membership in the gang.

Table 6.2 shows the morbidity and mortality rankings for Kono district. In Kono mining communities the most common diseases, according to local health officials, are dysentery, malaria and sexually transmitted diseases and respiratory infections in the dry season. Dysentery is caused by a worm found in unpurified water sources; its treatment will cost an adult of average weight (60kg) Le7000. This is equivalent to 4 days' pay for a digger receiving average support<sup>208</sup>.

**T6.2 Morbidity and Mortality Rankings of Diseases in Kono<sup>207</sup>**

Disease/Condition	Morbidity Rank	Mortality Rank
Malaria	1	1
Acute Respiratory Infections	2	3
Diarrhoea	3	12
Sexually Transmitted Diseases	4	12
Pneumonia	5	12
Intestinal Worms	6	12
Anaemia	10	2
Lassa Fever	10	12
Scabies	10	12
Tuberculosis	10	12
Manutrition	11	11
Measles	12	12

Malaria is common because of the stagnant water in mining pits and the necessity for diggers and watchmen to spend the night at the mining site once they have begun to extract and wash the gravel or when there is more work than expected in stripping away the overburden<sup>209</sup>. Sexually transmitted diseases are apparently more common in mining communities because many of the diggers are believed to be migrants who come without their wives and so tend to move between partners<sup>210</sup>. The most common STDs are gonorrhoea, trachoma (a parasite infection), and candidiasis ('thrush')<sup>211</sup>. The incidence of

<sup>203</sup> Comments from 11 diggers, 1 miner and a nurse (Interview with Braveheart Mining Cooperative, 22 June 2004).

<sup>204</sup> Survival from a black mamba bite is extremely rare. Fortunately for this gentleman, his life was saved by the application of a special black stone which is said to draw the poison of scorpions and snakes.

<sup>205</sup> Poor health may have made them more available to be interviewed. The chairperson of Braveheart estimated that in one week 1 or 2 out of 50 diggers might be sick. Interview with Braveheart Mining Cooperative, 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2004.

<sup>206</sup> Interviews 21(16<sup>th</sup> July 2004), 8 (8<sup>th</sup> July 2004), 12 (9<sup>th</sup> July 2004).

<sup>207</sup> From the District Recovery Committee (2003), p. 126; data collection period May 2003. Morbidity is the rate of disease, or a specific disease, in a given population; mortality is the rate of death in a given population.

<sup>208</sup> The government is supposed to cover a portion of the cost of medicine for people in the vulnerable category (pregnant women, suckling women, children under 5). However, the Ministry of Health had not supplied the Health Centre with drugs for treating dysentery since October so all people, vulnerable or not, have had to go the pharmacy.

<sup>209</sup> One miner said that if he could change any thing out of a list of 9 options, he would improve his health. He often suffers from malaria which prevents him from improving other aspects of his life. Interview 18, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>210</sup> Interview with health professionals, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>211</sup> Interview with health professionals, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

HIV/AIDS is unknown and 13 out of 59 diggers and miners asked did not believe it occurs in their communities; six admitted they did not know.

### Hunger and Malnutrition



Plate 6.1 Digger's average daily rice consumption

*"I don't feed them too much otherwise they won't be able to dig because their belly will be full and they'll be tired. But the work is a tedious work and so they get properly fed in the evening."*<sup>212</sup>

Diggers usually receive two meals from their supporter – *koi Jeh* (bulgur wheat or leftover rice for breakfast) and dinner (usually rice with 'sauce', i.e. cassava or potato leaves and river fish, or groundnut stew). 30/48 diggers receive rice from a supporter<sup>213</sup>. The photo to the left shows the average portion of rice (2 cups) each digger will receive a day from his supporter. Usually they will receive some money as well (between Le500 and Le5000) to buy ingredients for making 'sauce'. The average amount given is Le 1,900. For some diggers, this is all the food they can rely on getting during the day. Supporters may occasionally give food as perks to encourage the diggers when the work is tedious or money for them to buy corn-on-the-cob or cassava from the women and children traders who frequent the mining sites.

Out of 41 diggers asked, only 22% said that they and their families do not ever go hungry. Of the 78% who do suffer hungry periods, the most cited causes were lack of available cash or a dearth in winnings, though the absence of support, financial mismanagement (competing priorities, e.g. school fees) and the rainy season were also mentioned. According to the health professionals I interviewed, malnutrition is a serious problem in mining communities owing to elevated food prices. This is why the nurse in Tombody believed increasing local agriculture would vastly improve local health<sup>214</sup>. Given that half of the interviewees said they would prefer to farm rather than mine, this increase is possible but remains unlikely without external assistance to make farming a more competitive option compared to mining (see table 6.21 and preferable livelihoods below)<sup>215</sup>.

### Strength & the use of Violence

Conflict is common in the mines. The most common types of conflict are boundary disputes. Where disputes become physical, diggers will use their picks and shovels as weapons. People also use violence to access productive gravel, even gravel on the riverbed in diving operations<sup>216</sup>. In these cases, personal strength is an asset which enables people to physically intimidate or prevent others accessing something they claim for their own. Strength therefore provides protection for whoever is stronger and produces risk for whoever is weaker. One digger said he has had people try to hurt him to get access to productive areas as "everybody wants to get access to that licensed place there and therefore if you're not physically strong and able to protect such areas, you're always exposed to danger."<sup>217</sup> The conversation continued:

<sup>212</sup> Interview 5, 7<sup>th</sup> July 2004; comment repeated in Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop I, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>213</sup> 7 support their gang themselves and the remaining 11 support themselves

<sup>214</sup> Interview with health professionals, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>215</sup> The Government has an Agricultural Development Fund to which mining companies must contribute, but I did not investigate how these monies are being used. See the Government of Sierra Leone 2003a.

<sup>216</sup> Interview 32, 26<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>217</sup> Babar's translation, #23 (16<sup>th</sup> July 2004).

Estelle: *So what happens when you find a productive area? What happens that other people try to get it and what would you do to try to stop them?*

Digger: *They would use physical violence. They would come there and say, I don't want you here. And then they will use violence. If it is my own place, I would take my case to the chiefs and they would decide whose place it is ... When you're overkicking it's not your own place and at that time you have no rights because it's not your place. So to protect our tailings, I wouldn't allow people to come there. I would use my head to stop them. I wouldn't fight, but I'd tell them, I'd advise them not to come there. And if they want to fight me, I would also fight against them.*

This digger's comments suggest that for those who mine illegally, violence is the principle means of protecting or accessing diamondiferous soils. People use violence to steal diamonds or to steal the proceeds from selling a diamond. As one miner put it, "It is not easy to put somebody under gunpoint for farm produce. But in the case of mining it is very common"<sup>218</sup>. This elevated risk of physical harm compels some people to flee when they find a diamond for fear of their and their family's wellbeing. This culture of violence led nine out of sixteen diggers to say they are less physically secure mining than they would be in another profession.

### Ability to Labour- Tribe

Ethnicity remains an important cultural marker for the majority of Sierra Leoneans. Belonging to a particular tribe can bring advantages or disadvantages<sup>219</sup>. Any Sierra Leonean can legally hold a mining licence, but getting permission from the local Chiefdom Mining Committee to mine in a Kono chiefdom when one is of another tribe may be difficult, especially if a Kono applies for a licence for the same piece of land or if one does not have enough dollars to give the official a satisfactory 'handshake'<sup>220</sup>.

### **T6.3 Implications of Tribal Identity on the Legality of Mining and the Role Performed by Diggers**

	Total number of diggers belonging to this tribe	Illegal mining		Legal Mining		Legal mining in a productive position*		Legal mining in a non-productive position*	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Kono	27	13	48%	14	52%	7	50%	7	50%
Non-Kono	21	7	33%	14	67%	12	86%	2	14%
<b>Total</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>58%</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>68%</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>32%</b>

\* *Productive position means supporting a gang, managing a mine, acting as foreman to a mine, sub-leasing part of a licensed plot, being gang leader; unproductive positions means ordinary digger or water-person.*

Less non-Konos mine illegally because illegal miners require protection as they are more prone to theft, duping, physical violence, arrest, and predation by corrupt authorities. Protection comes from having strong local contacts or enough money to bribe your way into indemnity. According to local culture, anyone who is not a Kono does not belong in the local community and so is a 'stranger' (see also Richards 1996 and Reno 1995). This status prevents non-Konos from having any recourse to the chief or other local authorities should they encounter threats, unless they can claim some special status in the community or right of belonging.

The risk of official harassment associated with mining illegally encourage people belonging to other tribes to mine legally unless they are willing to protect their efforts using violence or regular bribes. Besides the chances of finding a sizeable diamond (and not being cheated of a fair price or having it stolen from you), substantial returns are only possible in legal mining if one is a licence-holder or if one can take on some productive position within the mining gang<sup>221</sup>. It is more possible for non-Konos to do

<sup>218</sup> Interview 14, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>219</sup> I refer to 'tribe' rather than 'ethnicity' in line with how Sierra Leoneans refer to their ethnic identity.

<sup>220</sup> Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop I, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>221</sup> Different roles in a mining gang bring different entitlements to benefits or a share of the winnings. See chapter 4.

the latter than to become a licensed miner or to mine illegally. For this reason 86% of non-Konos mining legally worked in a productive position, compared to 50% of Konos. This higher proportion could also be partly attributed to the motivations people have for doing mining. Non-Konos come to Kono explicitly to mine: they want to make a fast buck and then go home. For Konos, however, mining is just there on the doorstep, an option to mix in with other livelihoods or to experiment with for a short time. For non-Konos, the costs of getting to Kono, of being away from family and familiar protection networks, and of having to depend on someone locally for support may make engagement in mining a riskier and less enjoyable experiment, so compelling them to make as much as possible in a short time.

Further investigation into the tribal demographics of opportunity in the artisanal mining industry is important because non-Konos are more vulnerable than Konos as they enjoy less local protection (poorer social capital). The DSRP states that the PDA is designed to bring benefits to “the people of Kono”. This wording was chosen especially to be inclusive of all tribes who live and work in Kono, not just Konos, in the face of pressure from Konos who wanted diamond benefits to be restricted to their tribe<sup>222</sup>. Since the 1950s, however, Kono has not just been the bowl of opportunity for Konos and nor was it just Konos who suffered during the war. MSI recognises this and aims to ensure that “the PDA cannot discriminate based on ethnicity” and claims that “the project is 100% inflexibly opposed to any effort to exclude non-Konos from benefits under our program or government policies”<sup>223</sup>. Despite these worthy intentions, however, it is possible that discrimination against non-Konos will persist in the allocation of licences and within the PDA as both are local institutions driven by local interests. This tradeoff between the values of the community and of the facilitator is a dilemma familiar to participatory interventions.

#### Ability to Labour - Gender

Diamond mining is understood to be principally the domain of men<sup>224</sup>. According to Paul Richards, women were not allowed in certain bush mining camps at the end of the 1980s “for fear of spoiling the diggers’ luck” (Richards 2001: 73). I was given no evidence that this superstition persists in Kono, but that does not mean that women are now welcome in the mines (see chapter 6). Women’s ability to adopt certain roles in the industry is determined less by their physical make-up and actual capabilities than by patriarchal prohibitions and sexist beliefs about these capabilities. According to the Chairwoman of Tankoro District Council, women usually need a man in their household who is close to the authorities for them to get a licence<sup>225</sup>. Certainly the one female miner I interviewed myself had relied on her husband, the town chief, to get her licence<sup>226</sup>. He also had the responsibility of selling her diamonds. She, however, acted as the financial supporter for both their operations.

Male diggers only admitted having women in their gangs in the gold-producing parts of Kono, such as Sandor, where women were employed to pan the diamond tailings for gold. Time and again diggers either chuckled or looked bemused when I asked them how many women they had in their gang. Their general response was that women are “are not actually fit to hold shovel”<sup>227</sup> meaning they are not capable of doing the work: “The work is very tedious. They have to dig down to 50 feet. Women would take a shovel and wouldn’t be able to send the mud 50 feet in the air because they’re not strong enough”<sup>228</sup>.

Men showed a similar attitude to women’s contributions on the farms. In the livelihood strategies workshop tensions became very high over the issue of who does most of the ‘work’ in the different types of farming being discussed<sup>229</sup>. Whilst it had been made clear that ‘work’ should be considered in terms of hours dedicated to farming activities, the men and women could not agree on who did most work because

<sup>222</sup> Email from technical advisor, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2005.

<sup>223</sup> Email from technical advisor, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2005.

<sup>224</sup> Interview with Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004.

<sup>225</sup> Interview with Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004.

<sup>226</sup> Interview 36, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>227</sup> Interview 14 (13<sup>th</sup> July 2004).

<sup>228</sup> Interview 5 (7<sup>th</sup> July 2004).

<sup>229</sup> Livelihood Strategies Workshop, 30<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

the men insisted that productivity is a more suitable measure of work than time spent on the job, and, according to them, women were simply not as productive as men on the farm. They also insisted that women do not plough, deaf to the protests of a female participant that she, like other women she knows, ploughs her own rice farm because she does not have a man to help her. Traditional gender roles have been disrupted by war that has stripped many people of their marital security, leaving many women widowed or burdened as single mothers with children produced from sexual abuse during the war<sup>230</sup>.



Plate 6.2: Woman miner in Down Bollo



Plate 6.3: Woman passing gravel for washing

#### **T6.4 Implications of Gender on Legality of Mining and Role Performed for Diggers and Miners**

	Total number	Illegal mining		Legal Mining		Legal mining in a productive position*		Legal mining in an unproductive position*		n/a
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
Women	10	4	44%	5 <sup>231</sup>	56%	4	80%	1	20%	-
Men	52 <sup>232</sup>	12	25%	36	75%	29	88%	4	12%	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>29%</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>71%</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>87%</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>3</b>

\* See table 6.3.

These statistics say nothing about the actual proportion of the mining population which women comprise because our sample was far too small and women miners were selected purposefully in order to investigate the differences between their and men's mining realities. They do, however, confirm that women mine diamonds. Today, women do every type of job within the diamond supply chain except digging in a mining gang. Women also conduct supportive activities, such as growing, providing or cooking the food for the mining gang or bringing in the daily bread<sup>233</sup>. Their labour makes it possible for the men to mine in the face of unreliable mining income<sup>234</sup>. In the legal trade women do licence-holding,

<sup>230</sup> Interview 16 (13<sup>th</sup> July 2004). Rape was a common strategy of war and many girls were abducted as 'bush wives'.

<sup>231</sup> One female miner said she was a land-owner, not a licence-holder. As far as I am aware land-owners must still get a licence to mine their own land so it is possible that she is mining illegally. I cannot be sure.

<sup>232</sup> The legality of four men's mining operations was not indicated clearly by the team member who completed the questionnaire. That is, he did not tick the box to indicate whether or not there was a licence-holder; one can assume, perhaps, that these 4 men are mining illegally because the box was not ticked.

<sup>233</sup> Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004, field observations and interviews 5, 7<sup>th</sup> July 2004, and 14, 7<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>234</sup> Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

supporting, and dealing, though the latter is very rare<sup>235</sup>. They also act as gang leaders or water-women. Two of the three miners we interviewed were licensed and self-supported. The other female miner was a land-owner. We interviewed one woman as a digger, but in fact she was an unlicensed miner who supported a gang of 3 diamond diggers using the gold she panned from their diamond tailings. Another two women worked as gang leaders for legal operations. One woman was a water-woman for a legal gang, 1 dug individually (and so illegally) and 2 were overkickers (illegal). In total 5 of the women we interviewed worked for or ran legal operations, 4 worked illegally and one's legal status was ambiguous. Just as women are now taking on traditionally male roles in farming, they are also mining diamonds.

MSI is keen for the programme to expand its attention to women's interests and so far achievements have been made with regard to stopping child mining (a top concern for local women), reclaiming agricultural land in town, creating women's mining cooperatives, improving representation of women in the PDA Executive Committee, returning mining revenues to local communities through DACDF, and investigating ways of assisting women in gold mining<sup>236</sup>. The technical advisor is also investigating the possibility of working with a gender systems research project to improve understanding of how gender and mining issues intersect<sup>237</sup>. So on a project level the issue is being taken seriously. Within the PDA, however, getting gender issues meaningfully incorporated has been a bigger challenge. For example, the PDA has not yet established a formal gender policy though it is endeavouring to do so (MSI 2004d). It does not acknowledge that women may have special reasons for doing mining or particular needs within the industry. Its principal effort to deal with gender issues has been to ensure that the Executive Committee included one woman, though nothing was said about who this woman should be representing. Without stating that there should be one person representing women's issues, the presumption is that any woman standing on the committee would attend to women's issues. This is misguided in light of Richards, Bah & Vincent's assertion that women representatives may serve other interests over and above women's rights, such as those relating to their lineage (2004: 47). Thus the PDA's policy for gender inclusiveness is flawed for three reasons: it disregards the possibility that women might transparently serve on the committee to protect interests other than women's rights; it discounts the possibility that men are able to defend women's rights, and it presumes that all women will put the interests of their gender before other aspects of their identity. Fortunately the PDA has agreed to "encourage, pursue and increase female participation" in the Executive Committee, but it is not yet clear exactly how they will do this and what guidelines there will be for ensuring that vulnerable females participating in mining or mining-related fields will be represented (MSI 2004d). Nonetheless, given the extent of patriarchy which exists in Kono society, it is encouraging that women's rights are even on the agenda.

#### *Ability to Labour - Age*

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<sup>235</sup> Only 2 out of the 50 legal dealers in Kono are women. This figure was given to me by the chairman of the Kono Dealers' Association. Frank Karefa-Smart also corroborated this paucity, 21<sup>st</sup> July 2004.

<sup>236</sup> Email from technical advisor, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2005.

<sup>237</sup> Email from technical advisor, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2005.

Age is another factor which can determine someone's role in the mining gang. Of the 8 diggers who were the youngest in their gang, only one had a position of authority. He was the second-in-command at 27; the eldest in his gang was just three years older. Amongst the other youngest diggers were a waterboy, a 'tool carrier', and ordinary diggers. Almost half of the diggers who answered the question (20/43) were the oldest in their gang. 5 gangs employed boys under the age of 18, 4 had the youngest person older than 35, and 5 had the oldest person older than 55. As the table below shows, the average age of the diggers was thirty-seven. This is much higher than one would expect from the many reports which speak about diggers as principally young men (Richards 1996a & b, AMCO-Robertson 2002).



*Plate6. 4: An older man overkicking*

### **T6.5 Age distribution of diggers and miners**

Age bracket	Age at time of interview		Age when started mining	
	No. of Diggers	No. of Miners	No. of Diggers	No. of Miners
0-9	-	-	2	-
10-19	2	-	22	5
20-29	9	-	18	5
30-39	19	3	4	2
40-49	15	5	-	1
50-59	1	3	-	1
60-69	1	3	-	-
70-79	1	-	-	-
<b>Average age</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>Youngest</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Oldest</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>57</b>

Mining is an occupation for people of all ages, with even people in their sixties and seventies getting their hands and feet dirty in the pit. Even so, it may well be that most diggers are young men under 30, especially in the dry season<sup>238</sup>. Nonetheless, the involvement of people in their 60s and 70s shows again that mining is perhaps the optimal choice for the most vulnerable, who choose to compromise their long-term wellbeing for the satisfaction of immediate need (through support) and the chance of a quick gain.

Children have been involved in artisanal mining since it first began. 40% of the diggers began mining when they were 17 or under and 20% of these (or 8% of the total) began when they were under 10 years old. Today, five of the diggers who worked in gangs employed people under the age of 18. In the mines children do the menial jobs, such as the task of waterboy, and chores. People use children because "it's easier to satisfy children than adults. As long as they have food to eat, they will go and work for you and not insist on giving me this or giving me that. Or even when you have diamonds, they don't know what it is. Whatever you give to them, they do not question ... and they work harder than older people."<sup>239</sup> Children also do supportive activities, such as growing and cooking the food for the diggers and then carrying the daily meals to the mining site, as well as selling drinks and cooked foods at the mining sites.

In line with the international treaty on the rights of the child and with local campaigns by women's groups in tandem with World Vision, the Government has committed itself to "develop and strictly

<sup>238</sup> Our sample is probably biased towards older diggers. See chapter 2.

<sup>239</sup> Interview with Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004.

enforce regulations that will prevent the employment of children in mining activities” (Government of Sierra Leone 2003a). The PDA has adopted the same policy. There are three problems with this. Firstly it is not clear at what point a child stops being a child. In Sierra Leone the classification of people as ‘children’ is highly subjective. For example, a small-sized person who is over 18 may be considered a child, whereas a boy of 13 is an adult if he has been initiated into manhood by either the *poro* secret society or marriage<sup>240</sup>.

Secondly, after the war there are many children who live on the streets. I met some such children in Koidu, who are being cared for by Brave Heart Mining Cooperative, a PDA member. The members of Brave Heart had jointly paid for food and a room for the 30 or so boys so that they might have shelter during the rainy season. They were also trying to get them into school, but the prohibitive cost of school materials was making this unlikely, even with the Government’s promise of free primary education to all. Some of these children are former child soldiers and regular drug abusers; others were sold by their parents to miners who brought them to the mines to work. With the war over and in light of the new law on child mining, these children can no longer work in the mines which vastly limits their livelihood options. Some do raise money to feed themselves by sweeping shop fronts for a few hundred leones at a time (2600Le = US\$1). However, they are repeatedly victims of theft and physical and sexual abuse. Until Brave Heart extended help, these particular children slept on the streets<sup>241</sup>.

There are inevitably many others in a similar predicament who are not as fortunate as Brave Heart’s community of children<sup>242</sup>. Ideally all children should have homes and the chance of an education or a different livelihood, but this is unlikely to happen any time soon in a community that is struggling to recover from a brutal war. Provisions must be made for this fact. As part of a mining gang, these lost children had the protection of belonging to a community and, whilst they would be cheated of a fair share of the winnings based on their age, at the very least they would usually have been given shelter and food each day. This new law on child mining increases their vulnerability by denying them this opportunity. Unless the Government, NGOs and the community can guarantee that no child will be left on the streets, the law banning child mining needs to be carefully enforced and even more carefully rethought.

Thirdly, some very vulnerable families rely upon children’s labour to secure the family. Two of the diggers, both mining illegally and both war widows, said their children helped them on weekends or after school in the mines<sup>243</sup>. The adopted 15 year old son of one acts as her supervisor, and the 7 year-old daughter of another helps her put mud in her shaker. So long as the children are still attending school and so long as they are not doing work that is physically damaging for them, it would seem more harmful to proscribe these children from assisting their families by doing mining-related activities. What is so different between farming and selling cassava and helping Mum wash her gravel? These distinctions have not been made, at least instrumentally, when applying the blanket rule that children should not be mining. This may be for practicability’s sake. After all, nuance increases the expense and inconvenience of law enforcement. Some children of course are genuinely exploited in the mines and thereby prevented or discouraged from attending school, but not allowing children to contribute to the household productively reduces the family’s short-term ability to cope even if it may have positive long-term consequences by increasing the child’s potential for greater productivity later in life. Sierra Leoneans are making these trade-offs every day. Some war widows rely on their children’s labour to help buffer the family against shocks and some kind of allowance needs to be made for their particular struggles by the PDA and the Government.

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<sup>240</sup> Interview with PDA Spokesperson, 6<sup>th</sup> August 2004, Interview with Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004 and field notes of informal conversations.

<sup>241</sup> Interviews with Chairwoman of Brave Heart Mining Cooperative, 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2004 and with Amienatta Conteh, 5<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

<sup>242</sup> Interview with Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004.

<sup>243</sup> Interviews 3 and 37, 1<sup>st</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> July, 2004.

## **6.2 Social capital**

After the war, many people have found their stocks of social capital radically altered. The war took many lives and displaced the majority from their homes, radically mixing up the population, splitting apart communities and families and forging new solidarities between the displaced in refugee camps, the fighters in the various factions, or the victims of war crimes. Now the war is over some people have been able to return to their homes and begin to patch up their communities. For others the cost of the journey is too much, the shame or fear of return is too great, or they simply have no idea where they came from<sup>245</sup>. These people have had to establish themselves in communities where they will always be a stranger so they will always be disadvantaged by their identity<sup>246</sup>.

## **T6.6 Diggers' and Miners' Dependence on Others**

<b>Does someone regularly support you?</b>	<b>Diggers</b>	<b>Miners</b>	<b>Total</b>
No	8	6	14
sometimes	4	1	5
Yes	28	4	32
ambiguous <sup>244</sup>	7	-	7
Not asked	1	3	4
<b>Who?</b>			
official supporter	10	3	13
Siblings	7	-	7
Spouse	5	1	6
Other family	4	-	4
Dealer	4	1	5
Chief	3	1	4
Friends	2	-	2
Parents	2	-	2
Children	1	-	1
n/a	1	-	1

The question "does someone regularly support you?" was designed to assess the degree to which people were dependent on others to help them provide for their basic and cultural needs. Nearly two thirds of interviewees (31% of miners and 86% of diggers) receive support *regularly*, according to them. Another 5 (10%) receive occasional support besides their mining support. This demonstrates interviewees' inability to cope independently on a daily basis, especially diggers.

## **Marriage**

### **T6.7 Marital Status of Diggers and Miners Interviewed**

<b>Marital Status</b>	<b>Diggers</b>				<b>Miners</b>				<b>TOTAL</b>
	<b>Muslim</b>	<b>Christian</b>	<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Muslim</b>	<b>Christian</b>	<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>%</b>	
Single	6	4	10	21%	-	-	0	0	<b>10</b>
widowed	4	-	4	8%	1	-	1	7%	<b>5</b>
Married (monogamous)	13	15	28	58%	2	4	6	43%	<b>34</b>
Married (polygamous)	6	-	6	13%	7	-	7	50%	<b>13</b>

Thirteen of the nineteen diggers who were Muslim and married were married monogamously. Amongst the miners, the comparative figure was two out of nine. In Sierra Leone a man will take on another wife when he has the money to pay another dowry and the income to keep her<sup>247</sup>. Polygamy is therefore an

<sup>244</sup> 5 are diggers and 1 is a diver who, when asked the question directly, said they did not have someone who supports them regularly and yet they all work in supported mining operations (interviews AA-1, AA-2 & AA-3, 3<sup>rd</sup> August 2004, AA14-17, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004, AA-25 & IS-5, 27<sup>th</sup> July 2004).

<sup>245</sup> This is the case for some of the street children I met in Koidu. Also spoken of by Interviewee 12, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>246</sup> In Kono, one belongs to the community where one was born or where one has family ties. Those individuals who have found themselves in Kono after the war will therefore always be regarded as outsiders and so will be denied certain rights which belonging affords.

<sup>247</sup> In other situations he must have some obligation to the family to marry the woman or girl, for example, if it is discovered that he has raped or sexually abused her. Interview with a specialist in gender issues and women's rights, 27<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

indicator of wealth. Based on my data, miners are more financially secure than diggers because a far greater proportion of those whose religion allows it (78% to 32%) are married polygamously.

### Children

#### **T6.8 Number of Children for Whom the Digger or Miner has some Responsibility**

	Proportion of interviewees asked who care for a child	Average no. of children born of each interviewee <sup>248</sup>	Average no. of children living with interviewee	Average no. of other children they care for	Total average number of children cared for by interviewees on a daily basis
Diggers	100%	3.8	2.6 (81%)	2.9	<b>5.4</b>
Miners	100%	7.1, 5.5 <sup>249</sup>	5.1 (92%)	2.9	<b>8.0</b>
Overall	100%	4.7	3.9	2.9	<b>6.7</b>

Licence-holders care for more children than diggers (8 to 5.4). This could be a function of age or of wealth. Those not cared for in their homes were either older than 20 or were being cared for by a female relative or wife living elsewhere. The extra children they cared for are children of relatives or friends who were killed in the war or who cannot afford to keep the children themselves. One digger, a war widow with 5 children, spoke bitterly about her 12 year old daughter acting as a “slave” for a friend in Freetown because she cannot afford to bring her back to Kono<sup>250</sup>. In the meantime she cares for a thirteen year old boy, who is the child of a friend who died in the war. This boy goes to school and helps her in the mine as a supervisor. He is the only male in her household. In the same village lives another woman who is a license-holder. Her husband, the town chief, has 2 other wives who care for 11 children between them. She herself has three children and cares for another two. She mines so that she can educate her children. In Babar’s words, “the major thing she would want in her life that would change her life would be somebody helping her kids to be educated, the quality of education she’s referring to. And they in turn would be a kind of investment for her.”<sup>251</sup>

Children provide security in another way. In survivalist cultures where the mortality and morbidity rates are high, having more children increases one’s capacity to cope because children act as social and human capital (productive labour – see above). An extra life improves a family’s resiliency, particularly in societies where children work from an early age. This instrumental value to life is demonstrated by the frankness of the community health officer in Tombudu, “It’s cheaper for the family to pay for treatment than for the person to die”<sup>252</sup>.

For others, having children makes them less secure:

Digger: *I have wives and my children are going to school and so I had to buy clothes for them and settle some bills. My wife is pregnant and we’re expecting twins.*

Estelle: *Congratulations!*

Digger: *Not congratulations!* [laughs]

Estelle: *Ok, I’m sorry to hear that then!* [chuckles]<sup>253</sup>

The digger’s reaction can be understood when one considers that one in six women die in childbirth in Sierra Leone<sup>254</sup>. Besides the emotional trauma of losing a partner, a wife’s death exposes the family to

<sup>248</sup> The number is skewed by men in polygamous marriages. Whilst male miners with more than one wife have responsibility to all children from the marriage, this is not always the case for polygamous wives; e.g. miner #36 has responsibility only to her own children (5) and not to the remaining 11 cared for by the other two wives.

<sup>249</sup> The figure of 7.1 is obtained by including one miner who had 24 children, but was not questioned on how many lived with him. For the remaining miners, the average number of children was therefore 5.5.

<sup>250</sup> Interview 37, 27<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>251</sup> Interview 36, 27<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>252</sup> Interview 24, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>253</sup> Interview 16, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

many risks because the wife is the ‘safekeeper’ and the daily provider<sup>255</sup>. This threat and the expectation of having two other dependents (at least in the immediate future) make a wife’s pregnancy an unwelcome event for a man who already has ten children to provide for and who depends on diamond mining alone as his source of income.

### Family

The average household size is 9 people for diggers and 17 for miners. Some miners accommodate their diggers and their wives in their own home. Other diggers will be put up in accommodation which they share with their gang members and their respective wives and children.

<b>T6.9 Daily responsibility for Children</b>			
<b>Place</b>	<b>Number of Interviewees</b>	<b>Number of children elsewhere</b>	<b>Number of children staying with interviewee</b>
<b>Guinea</b>	2	5	3
<b>Gambia</b>	1	5	2
<b>Sierra Leone</b>			
Freetown	5	9	9
Bo	1	2	0
Bombali	1	1	0
Tonkolili	2	2	4
Kambia	1	1	3
Other Kono	1	1	0
<b>Unspecified</b>	3	5	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>29</b>

14 diggers (39%) and 3 out of 11 miners had some or all of their children living elsewhere. Miners were therefore more able to care for their children on a daily basis because they are more financially secure or because they are more local to Kono.

Besides their distant children, 7 diggers supported local relatives from outside their household, and 8 had family they supported elsewhere; 29 supported their household only, and one supported no-one but himself. 20 diggers out of 38 received regular support themselves from a

household member. And yet, out of 43, 32 considered themselves the principle earner in their household. None of the miners supported people outside of Kono, suggesting that their family obligations were more localised than the diggers’. In Sierra Leone, the number of people you support regularly is a proxy for wealth. On average, diggers had 8 dependents and miners had 15 (including themselves). Again miners are more able to cope than diggers.

People’s responsibilities toward their larger families prevent them from investing to advance their own livelihoods<sup>256</sup>. Whilst the extended family can provide a safety net therefore, it too can drain diggers and miners of their winnings and prevent them from securing themselves beyond making these investments in social capital.

### The Mining Gang

Diggers who work in gangs are generally less vulnerable than those who work alone because of the social capital their membership in the group affords them. Sometimes gang members lend each other money, share food, or cover another digger’s health costs. Some gangs had funds to which they each contributed for drawing on “when the going gets tough”<sup>257</sup>. They also look for contract work together. Some spoke of doing car washing, ‘brushing’ (clearing farms), fetching wood, making charcoal, and planting flowers for money. Mining in a gang provides contacts for getting assistance when problems arise and for seeking extra employment when required. Mining in a gang increases one’s resiliency. With this the case, one would expect diggers to prefer to work in gangs. However, one digger who worked alone did so out of choice because she did not trust anybody else enough to mine with her<sup>258</sup>. Other women said they would

<sup>254</sup> Compared to 1 in 8,700 in Canada. Only Afghanistan has as high a risk of maternal mortality as Sierra Leone. See [http://www.who.int/reproductive-health/publications/maternal\\_mortality\\_2000/tables.html](http://www.who.int/reproductive-health/publications/maternal_mortality_2000/tables.html), annexe table G, accessed 1<sup>st</sup> December 2004.

<sup>255</sup> Interview 14, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004. Also see below: household strategies.

<sup>256</sup> Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004. Also Interview with Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004.

<sup>257</sup> This is a common phrase in Sierra Leone.

<sup>258</sup> Interview 3, 1<sup>st</sup> July 2004.

like to work with more people, but they had not had the opportunity to do so. Diggers who mine alone or in pairs usually operate illegally. There may be a role for mining community information centres where people could find out about mining cooperatives or legal gangs which they could join if they were available for work. This would empower those looking for work in a gang. For the time being, the DSRP does not attend to the issue of access to membership in a gang or cooperative.

#### Clubs, Societies and Community Membership

Diggers and miners were asked if they belonged to any kind of social group or a network like a youth group of a cooperative. 42 out of 51 asked belong to a club, society or cooperative (see table 6.10). All those asked said they got benefits from being a member, such as financial assistance or loans, skills training (e.g. tailoring or gara tie-dyeing), powerful contacts, “moral assistance”<sup>259</sup>, developing friendships, access to agricultural tools, assistance in farming needs, access to information, social status and respect, and the satisfaction of knowing “you have made history”<sup>260</sup>. Given that community groups usually spring up in response to social problems, it is safe to assume that these benefits identified by the interviewees reveal some of the key issues which they feel need to change to help them improve their lives, such as lack of skills, credit, contacts, tools, information, dignity and so on. This corroborates the same findings derived from different aspects of the questionnaire (see also Richards, Bah & Vincent 2004).

<b>T6.10 Membership in a Formal Group or Society</b>			
	<b>Diggers</b>	<b>Miners</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>yes</b>	33	9	<b>42</b>
<b>No</b>	7	2	<b>9</b>
<b>n/a</b>	8	5	<b>13</b>
<b>Issues the group attends to:</b>			
<b>Community welfare &amp; development</b>	10	2	<b>12</b>
<b>Financial assistance</b>	10	0	<b>10</b>
<b>Youth issues</b>	7	3	<b>10</b>
<b>Mining issues</b>	8	1	<b>9</b>
<b>Agricultural issues</b>	7	1	<b>8</b>
<b>Women’s issues</b>	4	2	<b>6</b>
<b>Other</b>	4	1	<b>5</b>
<b>Skills training</b>	3	2	<b>5</b>

#### ‘Big Men’

Relationships with ‘big men’ are the linchpin of success in Kono. An affiliation with somebody powerful can bring protection, investment opportunities and financial support. It also makes it easier for you to get a licence, or to mine illegally if that is the preferable choice<sup>261</sup>.

Estelle: *So when you have a ‘big man’ in your family it is easier to get a licence?*

Miner: *Yes.*

Estelle: *Why is that?*

Miner: [talks Krio]

Babar: *In other words, when you have a big man he can link with the other big men who control access to land, and so it’s easier for you to get a licence?*

Miner: *Yes. And the other way is if you have money and you go meet the chiefs, then they assist you.*

Babar: *So it’s two ways. Either by patronage or financial wealth in some way.*

Estelle: *But when you have a big man in the family, you still have to pay?*

...

Miner: *Yes.*

Estelle: *If you do not have a big man, do you have to pay more?*

...

Miner: *Yes! [speaks Krio]*

Babar: *You have to pay more because you are meeting people with whom you have no link and you do not understand them and so by doing so, you have to lose money to really get yourself acquainted with them.*

Estelle: *How do you use the money to get acquainted with them?*

Miner: [speaks Krio]

<sup>259</sup> Interview IS-5, 27<sup>th</sup> July 2004. In the Peiyima focus group one woman spoke about the value of social contacts being one of social discipline: “Contacts we make with people can help refine you. Sometimes we will be going with some attitude that will not be good for society but because of your contacts some people will help you, advise you and so on”; 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>260</sup> Interview AA-5, 4<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

<sup>261</sup> Interviews 14, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004, and 36, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

Babar: *There is no diplomacy really, calling it bribery. But you have to bribe your way through. That is what she is really saying*<sup>262</sup>.

Connections with a big man can also bring physical security:

Estelle: *Do you have any relationships which can offer you protection, for example, if you are threatened?*

Digger: *Well everybody knows the person who sent me so they won't attempt anything.*

Estelle: *How does that work?*

Digger: *My boss has his younger brother here by the name of Chief \_\_\_\_\_ who is taking care of me, so if anybody attempts to do anything bad to us, he can sort out the matter*<sup>263</sup>.

The above digger not only lives with a town chief, but his supporter is a businessman in Koidu who has family connections and close friendships with several Kono chiefs, including paramount chiefs. Twelve of the diggers and miners interviewed mentioned that they were either related to a chief or supported by one. Of the miners, one was a town chief himself, another was married to a town chief, and another was best friends with a town chief. Amongst the diggers, four were related to chiefs (1 paramount chief, 1 section chief, 1 chieftom speaker) and another three were supported by the town or paramount chief. In all cases but one, a relationship with the chief brought distinct advantages<sup>264</sup>:

Miner: *The town chief is my best friend.*

Estelle: *What kind of privileges does that bring you?*

Miner: *Well, I have access to land, that is one. And I am more secure. Because the people view me like I am the ADC [?] to the chief, I am more friendly to the chief.*

Estelle: *So you are the aid?*

Miner: *Yes!*

Estelle: *So does that mean get you more respect?*

Miner: *More respect, yes.*

Estelle: *Does it also mean you can influence the chief's decisions sometimes? When he's deliberating about something to do in the community, do you sit down together and talk about it?*

Miner: *Oh, yes!*

Estelle: *And what about contacts to other networks, to other important people in Kono? Does that friendship bring you other contacts?*

Miner: *Yes.*

Estelle: *So does that mean that they treat you with more respect?*

Miner: *Yes.*

Estelle: *And does that ever bring you any other types of privilege?*

Miner: *Yes.*

Estelle: *What kinds of things?*

Miner: *When I have access to land, I will get access to more investors through him*<sup>265</sup>.

For one digger, however, his supporter's status as his paramount chief did not bring him any benefits. In fact, it seems that he was so badly exploited *because* his supporter was a chief who knew he would probably not be challenged for exploiting his subjects<sup>266</sup>. My notes transcribed from the interview read:

*"The supporter lives in Koidu ... He's the Paramount Chief of \_\_\_\_\_. The supporter gives them 2 cups of rice and 500 Leones. He won't pay for anything else ... When he was sick the supporter did nothing. He had to look after himself ... The supporter or foreman doesn't give them any extra thing, even if they've worked hard ... He doesn't think the amount the supporter gives them is fair. He would rather have a bag of rice a month (i.e. 6 cups of rice a day) and 2,000 Leones a day. He would prefer to be paid a wage rather than according to winnings ... He doesn't*

<sup>262</sup> Interview 36, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>263</sup> Interview 16, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>264</sup> Also interview with Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004.

<sup>265</sup> Interview 18 (14<sup>th</sup> July 2004).

<sup>266</sup> One interviewee said that people do not challenge their chiefs for fear of being thrown into jail. Interview 12, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

*feel his supporter gives them a fair price when they find diamonds. (He immediately answered this question with gusto “It’s not a fair price!”) He thinks the supporter is being wicked with them. He doesn’t trust him at all.”*<sup>267</sup>

In this situation, the chief was both supporter and miner. This incident of exploitation is particularly serious given that the man interviewed at 45 was the youngest in his gang (the oldest was 65) and yet, presuming the same standard of support is applied to all his gang members, the supporter does not attend to his workers’ health needs. Economically this makes sense – diggers are easy to come by in Kono and older people require more health care, which increases costs – but from a perspective of social justice, it is neglectful.

The digger went on to compare his current quality of support with support he received in the past:

*“If he had diamonds to sell, he’d sell them to a Lebanese man he worked with once and he has seen and knows what he did for him. He was a good man ... (T)his Lebanese man looked after him when he was sick; he was automatically taken care of and taken to the hospital ... but when you work for “your black brother”, a Kono man, for example, he says that ... they just go out for some cheap tablets ... Generally speaking, he would agree with the statement that Lebanese people support people better than fellow Sierra Leoneans ... He gives an example. (Babar’s words follow) “Last year they worked for their black brothers in the dry season; now the rains are around, mining has been stopped, people have just left them and gone ... without saying anything to them. But if you were working for a Lebanese, or any of the coloured people like he puts it, he says they must call you and tell you that we are leaving, but have this. Or sometimes when you are broke, you get to meet them, if it is 100,000 Leones or whatever, they must give it to you, or a bag of rice. They will help you.”*<sup>268</sup>

After 28 years of mining, this man had decided to stop digging altogether because he was so badly jaded by the parsimony and “wickedness” of his supporter. His experience suggests that indigenous patronage is not necessarily preferable to dependency on a Lebanese supporter and that the chiefs do not always have their subjects’ best interests at heart. This is especially the case at a time when chiefs, whose social legitimacy to some extent depends on their wealth (or at least the impression of wealth), have found themselves ruined financially after the war<sup>269</sup>. This is a difficult situation for them. In order to justify their position, they are to a certain extent compelled by societal expectations to rebuild their own bank balances so that they can continue to hand out 1,000 Leone notes to vulnerable subjects and buy all the beers for their cronies, even if it means exploiting a few subjects to do so<sup>270</sup>.

### Strangers

Whilst I was in Kono, I too became people’s social capital. Sometimes I could help, other times I chose not to. One case was especially startling. One of our very first interviewees was a war widow who did overkicking to support her two youngest children. She was supported by her 15 year-old daughter and lived with the family of a friend who was sick. In return, she cared for her friend’s children. This woman was one of the most vulnerable people we interviewed. Helen was ill that day so we conducted the interview in our home<sup>271</sup>. Two days later I heard people outside the house. Alone and absorbed in my work I did not notice Sia<sup>272</sup> enter with her youngest daughter. They stood quietly in the hallway waiting for me to notice them. When I did, I offered them both a drink. They shared a can of coca-cola and kept a vimto for later<sup>273</sup>. Sia introduced me to her daughter and pointed out her misshapen leg. Sia wanted me to take her daughter to “oosay you born”, to where I come from. I asked the daughter why she wanted to leave her mother and go to another country. “Because we are always hungry since my father died.” I told her I was sorry, very sorry, but I could not take her home with me.

<sup>267</sup> Interview 21, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>268</sup> Interview 21, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>269</sup> Interview with Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004.

<sup>270</sup> Field notes, 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2004.

<sup>271</sup> Throughout the research Helen was recovering from pneumonia and a serious bout of malaria.

<sup>272</sup> I have given the digger a pseudonym.

<sup>273</sup> The cost of a can of coca-cola would buy enough rice to feed someone for three days in Kono.

The next day the little girl came back to our house and told our housekeeper I had told her to come. I had not. He sent her away. She came back the next day and this time he told her not to return. Two days later he told me that Sia had come to the house with a gang of four diggers. She had told these men that she knew a ‘Lebanese’ who would support them and that she would manage the operations. This ‘Lebanese’ was me! Indeed, it could be said that I physically resemble a Lebanese, but in Kono I was also culturally similar. Not only was I asking questions about her mining activities, but I lived in a big, white house on a hill, was driven around in a big car, had a housekeeper and a cook, and had the privilege of a local man assisting me (as the Lebanese dealers have their local ‘coaxers’). I thought we had made it clear that I was a researcher from Canada, and that our relationship with her was for research purposes only. Whether or not she had understood this, Sia saw her new relationship with me, transient as I had intended it to be, as an opportunity to educate her child and for her to take on a more productive position as a mines manager rather than a solo overkicker.

### **6.3 Financial capital**

Financial capital is “the financial resources that people use to achieve their livelihood objectives”, including flows and stocks which contribute to both consumption and production<sup>274</sup>. Winnings allocations systems and support were covered in chapter 4. Here I look at 3 key issues relating to financing – income security, options for saving money, and access to credit or loans.

#### *Income Security and Savings*

Generally speaking diggers are not *financially* secure, but they do have some sort of income security because they know they should at least get their basic daily needs attended to (see chapter 3 for more details on support). Even so, regular support is usually given for the digger only, not his family, and support is commonly inconsistent according to the supporter’s own cycles of stocks and cash liquidity, especially when the supporter is a fellow digger<sup>275</sup>. Thus diggers often rely on other household members, usually the women, to bring more consistent income security for the rest of the family (see below on household strategies) and their irregular income will usually be used to pay off debts, invest in the wife’s livelihood (e.g. buy stocks for petty trading) or improve their home. Yet, in most cases interviewees could not say what other members brought to the home on a regular basis. Furthermore only about 50% of diggers and miners manage to put money aside for ‘safekeeping’ (see table 6.11 below). These statistics suggest that a good proportion of our interviewees live hand-to-mouth and/or in debt, using up whatever they get whenever they get it. This financial insecurity is one reason why social capital is so central to people’s coping capacities.

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<sup>274</sup> DFID 2001, §2.3.5.

<sup>275</sup> Interview 10, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

**T6.11 Mining Families' Savings and Investment Practices**

There are a variety of forms of safekeeping pursued by people in mining communities. Individuals buy market produce, such as palm oil, rice, or bananas, when it is abundant and cheap and then sell it in the rainy season when general stocks are low and demand and prices are high<sup>276</sup>. Women spoke about selling vegetables and fruit in the dry season to buy rice cheaply, thus ensuring that they can store some of their own rice for the rains when the prices are elevated<sup>277</sup>. Others take gold to a goldsmith and have it converted into jewellery which they sell when they need cash<sup>278</sup>. Gold is today preferred to diamonds because it is more easily traded internationally owing to the Kimberley Process<sup>279</sup>. The ideal form of safekeeping people expressed was building homes or improving their shelter, and especially in Freetown<sup>280</sup>.

<b>Do you ever manage to spend any income or winnings on safekeeping?</b>	<b>Diggers</b>	<b>Miners</b>
Yes	24	5
No	22	4
n/a	2	5
Number with diverse investment strategies	3	1
Invests in <b>house</b>	5	1
Invests in <b>land or livestock</b>	3	1
Invests in <b>tools or equipment for business</b>	2	1
Invests in <b>family business</b>	7	1
<b>Saves cash themselves</b>	2	1
<b>Saves cash in the bank</b>	2	1
<b>Gives cash to a family member for saving</b>	6	-

The biggest risk associated with safekeeping is theft. Amongst the diggers and miners interviewed, theft most often occurred within the family. One woman had been stripped bare of her relatively substantial assets by her family when she returned from the USA in the final years of the war. It is not especially surprising that people were taking whatever they could get at that time. Yet this type of parasitism is not exceptional in Sierra Leone. Altogether four interviewees – two miners, one digger, and one housekeeper – gave me other examples of how family members or guardians had forsaken them for their own gain<sup>281</sup>. Only one was asked explicitly to talk about an instance when their family had abused their trust. Parasitism is driven by a form of hyper-individualism inspired by the prerogatives of chronic survivalism. It is an example of how social capital can actually prevent graduation from poverty as the perpetual “pinch-pinch”<sup>282</sup> and the occasional raid by family members drains diggers and miners of the resources they might use to improve their own quality of life or pursue an alternative livelihood.

**Loans, Support and Access to Credit**

Access to credit for non-mining livelihoods is the linchpin for increasing the viability of alternative and preferable livelihoods to mining. 17 out of 39 diggers asked said the reason they mined was because they did not have the money (9) or the land, tools, skills, or shelter (8) they needed to pursue their preferred livelihood (see table 7.6). For the majority of Sierra Leoneans, obtaining a loan from a bank is out of the question because they do not have sufficient collateral to guarantee the loan. It is also suggested that the bank is predisposed against lending to nationals, especially those involved in mining, because historically the rate of repayment by them is very low<sup>283</sup>. For the ordinary person, the only other recourse to credit is through supporters or membership in a club. Club funds are used mostly for occasional relief and tend to be too informal or unsubstantial to offer members adequate credit to pursue their preferred livelihood. Only wealthy individuals can therefore provide the type of assistance necessary for someone to develop a

<sup>276</sup> Interview 12, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2004, Interview with Amienatta Conteh, 5<sup>th</sup> August 2004, Peiyima focus group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>277</sup> Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>278</sup> Interview with Amienatta Conteh, 5<sup>th</sup> August 2004 and Interview 23, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>279</sup> Interview with Amienatta Conteh, 5<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

<sup>280</sup> See physical capital below; also Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004 and various interviews.

<sup>281</sup> Interviews 11 and 12, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2004, Interview 36, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004 and interview with Amienatta Conteh, 5<sup>th</sup> August 2004. Extracts from these interviews are given in appendix 8.

<sup>282</sup> Interview 16, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>283</sup> Interview with businessman / miner, 7<sup>th</sup> August 2004. See also Smillie, Gberie & Hazelton. 2000.

non-mining livelihood. But capitalists are not willing to invest outside of the mining industry. One digger explained why:

*“For farmers out there, you come in from a village, you are not well known, you come in to see somebody here who is rich, who has got his stores and so on, and you are telling him, give me such an amount of money, I am going to farm and so on, they look at you and say “how long are you going to take to farm to get that money to come back?” And the man here who is mining, the supporter will just think, if I supply him all that I need to supply him, come tomorrow, possibly he can get me diamonds.”<sup>284</sup>*

For investors mining offers greater certainty of some return and greater potential for fast and high returns<sup>285</sup>. Mining is thus the industry of choice for capital gain. Indeed some investors come to Kono purely with the intention of investing in diamonds and so have no other interest in the local economy<sup>286</sup>. This short-termist and homogenous investment culture greatly impedes the diversification of Kono’s economy and the potential for building local prosperity because it prevents alternative livelihoods from becoming viable.

#### **6.4 Natural capital**

Natural capital signifies the “natural resource stocks from which resource flows and services ... useful for livelihoods are derived”<sup>287</sup>. Natural capital, along with human capital, is at the basis of survival: without food one cannot survive. It is also at the basis of production, providing the bare materials required to produce other capitals. Access to land is thus the starting point for the exploitation of natural capital and the basis of security and prosperity in Kono (see also chart 6. below).

Diamonds are obviously a type of natural capital. Their geology and geography have been reviewed in chapter 5. They are also a passport to other types of capital, principally social and financial capital. Because of their financial value, finding a big diamond brings social standing, increases social capital and enhances one’s influence within the community. According to one digger, if you find a big diamond, the chief will want to know you: “He will say “I want to see this person. Let’s go and call him” because they know that you already have a big diamond and will have a big money so from that you have contacts with people for them just to see you or to have a talk with you *so that you can solve their problem.*<sup>288”</sup> Big diamonds make ‘big men’ and provide the desirable transformation from the needy to the needed. This possibility of social status and its associated freedoms and empowerment is one reason diamond mining is an attractive livelihood for people who are severely impoverished. Diamonds offer a fast-track to dignity.

Besides selling them for cash, diamonds are a passport to financial capital as they are the key to getting permanent or occasional support. When someone has a diamond to sell, if she believes that today or in the future she might need support, the diamond is her evidence to the supporter that she is able to find diamonds. The implicit suggestion is that if the supporter helps her today, then tomorrow she will repay him by selling all future discoveries to him. Of course, this is not guaranteed unless a formal agreement is effected. Informal supporters, such as members of the Opun Yai, take this risk in order to increase the number of people who owe them a favour and so increase the probability they will be brought diamonds.

Gold is another mineral of significance in certain parts of Kono (Sandor, Nimikoro, Nimiyama and Kamara chiefdoms) and elsewhere in Sierra Leone. Gold is mined, principally by women, to bring in daily income. One digger said she pans gold on a daily basis and usually finds 1.5 to 2 carats; she gets 6,000 Leones per carat. She uses this money to support her diamond mining gang (3 men) and to invest in her kola nut trading and gara tie-dyeing. Gold panning is seen as women’s work. It is perceived as the lesser of the two minerals both locally and internationally (Sierra Leonean gold has received far less

<sup>284</sup> Interview 12, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>285</sup> Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>286</sup> Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>287</sup> DFID 2001, §2.3.3.

<sup>288</sup> Interview 23, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

attention from NGOs and donors) and yet it is the basis of many people's daily income, it is relied upon as a method of safekeeping<sup>289</sup>, it is of very high quality, and the vast majority of it is smuggled out of the country every year.

Other than these mineral reserves there are multiple types of natural capital which people exploit in diamond communities<sup>290</sup>. The principle ones are wood, wild animals, farm animals, and plants. Wood is used for carpentry, masonry, and making charcoal for cooking. Wild animals such as chimpanzees are used for meat. They are also kept or sold to mining companies as pets<sup>291</sup>. The most common livestock are goats, cows, chicken and ducks<sup>292</sup>. People keep dogs as security or for hunting. Cats are kept as pets. Plants are exploited on the farm and also from the forest. Wild plants are used in traditional medicine. The most common agricultural plants grown are rice, cassava, and corn (maize). There are some cash crop plantations growing cacao and coffee and fruit plantations growing banana, mangoes and oranges. African palm is grown to make *poyo*, or palm wine, which is the local alcohol.

### **6.5 Physical capital**

Physical capital includes the infrastructure, tools and technologies which offer people protection and enable them to take advantage of the other capitals as productively as possible. The tools and technologies used to exploit and sell the diamond resource have been covered in chapter 5.

#### **T6.12 Diggers' and Miners' Access to Amenities**

	Which of the following don't you have access to?		Of these you've said you don't have, if you could have any one, which would it be?	
	Diggers	Miners	Diggers	Miners
<b>Good shelter</b>	27	1	25	3
<b>Clean water</b>	17	5	1	3
<b>transport</b>	36	6	4	3
<b>Good tools</b>	23	1	3	0
<b>Information</b>	26	5	3	1
<b>Land</b>	18	3	9	0
Not asked	3	4	3	4

Interviewees were asked to identify all the amenities they did not have and then to select, out of these, which they would choose if they could have any<sup>293</sup>. Although most people did not have transport, good shelter was the most important amenity for them. Amongst the miners, a similar proportion said they did not have transport and half of these desired it. Only one said he did not have good shelter, the reason being all his family had to share one room; and yet he had a zinc roof, which would be a luxury for many diggers.


<sup>289</sup> Interviews with various diggers and miners and with Amienatta Conteh, 5<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

<sup>290</sup> Paul Richards give a fascinating account of the socioeconomic opportunities and 'cultural capital' afforded by the rain forest in Sierra Leone (1996).

<sup>291</sup> On several occasions I encountered monkeys on strings at gas stations or shops, as well as at mining companies.

<sup>292</sup> There is a powerful superstition that if you run over a duck with your car, you yourself will die in a car accident. This is a sensible superstition given that there are ducks everywhere, including on the motorway! Our cars' brakes were probably used more to avoid ducks than to stop for any other reason!

<sup>293</sup> Land was added amongst these amenities because we wanted to understand its relative importance. Also, in retrospect, it would have been informative to have asked interviewees to rank the amenities in terms of how important they felt they were to their wellbeing or lack of wellbeing.



Shelter

**T6.13 Interviewees’ Access to Accommodation**

Accommodation Kono	Diggers	Miners
<b>Rented</b>	<b>13</b>	-
Average rent per month	<b>Le8,800</b> (US\$3.38)	-
average rent per room per month	<b>Le5,800</b> (US\$2.23)	-
<b>Owned</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Provided</b>	<b>19</b>	-
Provided by:		
Supporter	7	-
Parents	2	-
Siblings	5	-
Friends	1	-
Family	4	-
Chiefdom	1	-
<b>Not asked</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>
Owns houses elsewhere	5	n/a

All the miners asked owned their property whereas only a quarter of diggers (all foremen, gang leaders or second in command) owned theirs. Again this is evidence of the greater security of miners compared to diggers.

In the Peiyima Focus Group, the women participants agreed that the reason their husbands mine is to enable them to improve their shelter<sup>294</sup>. As the above chart shows, shelter was the most desired improvement amongst diggers<sup>295</sup>. When asked what they would do if they found a 10 carat stone (miners) or what they would do if they got winnings of 3 million Leones<sup>296</sup> (diggers), 6 out of 10 miners and 21 out of 46 diggers said they would invest in their current home, or build or buy another house.

Although shelter is considered part of physical capital, it is also a form of safekeeping. It also has strong implications for physical security and human capital. Poor quality shelter can create bad health and increase people’s exposure to physical harm. In fact, poor shelter and poor health were the two things diggers said made it hardest for them to cope (see chart 7.1). As one digger said, “At times we go sleep in the bush if the gravel is productive. We go inside the swamp there and we sleep there all together ... And here [pointing to a half-built house made of mud, wood and thatch] the quality of the shelter is poor so creatures can come and pass by you in the night”<sup>297</sup>.

<sup>294</sup> Peiyima focus group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>295</sup> Peiyima focus group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>296</sup> Equivalent to US\$1153.

<sup>297</sup> Interview 16, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004.



*Plate 6.5 makeshift shelter at the mining site*



*Plate 6.6 bombed out building in Koidu*

The quality of houses in Koidu is generally better than in the surrounding villages – they are made of more solid materials – but many houses remain derelict after the war with families having been able to roof only one room so far for their entire household. Even then, many roofs are makeshift, being sheeted with sacks held in place with stones. Zinc roofing and even tarpaulin are too expensive for some. In fact, zinc roofing is so desired in Koidu that a corrupt police officer asked for this, not money, to let a diamond smuggler go free<sup>298</sup>.

#### Roads, Bridges and Transportation

James Ferguson (1990) noted sardonically that development projects are usually obsessed with infrastructure, especially roads. Lack of maintenance and the mining of roads during the war (see photo below) has left the Kono road system badly pot-holed and dangerous. Ducks waddling across to drink and bathe in puddles, pedestrians carrying wood and wares on their heads, the necessity to ignore lanes in order to optimally handle the terrain, and a culture of fast driving make accidents common. Since the end of the war, and even during my visit, UNAMSIL had done much to improve the quality of the main motorway between Freetown and Koidu.



*Plate 6.7 Down Bollo portion of the road to Masingbi which has been mined.*

<sup>298</sup> Interview with Chairman of the Kono Dealers' Association, 24<sup>th</sup> June 2004.

There is still a lot to be done to make the local roads adequately passable, especially during the rainy season. Improving local roads would enable the diversification of feasible livelihoods in Kono. Poor roads prevent people in agricultural areas from taking advantage of the high demand for produce in Koidu and smaller mining towns<sup>299</sup>. Better roads will make marketing farm produce in larger centres more viable (and therefore reduce the cost of staples). Although a drop in prices might damage the income of those who already manage to convey their produce to Koidu for sale, on the whole it should benefit traders by enabling a larger proportion of the population to pay with cash and not on credit. It should also benefit the district by making farming more feasible and food more affordable<sup>300</sup>.

Besides the SUVs of NGOs, the 1980s Mercedes of local well-to-dos, and the odd taxi, there are not many other vehicles on the roads. Options for transportation for the ordinary person are very limited. Public transportation is minimal. In some cases people have to wait several days to get a vehicle to convey a sick person to hospital<sup>301</sup>. There are military trucks which owners use to move people and produce, as well as minibuses, brightly painted with religious and ethical pronouncements across their bumpers and sides, which make regular trips to Freetown or between local centres. For many, however, the cost of passage is too much. The women of the Basama group in Bandafayie told me they could not sell their gara tie-dyed cloth in Koidu because the 10 mile journey is too expensive. Some people have bicycles and there are a couple of market stalls which specialise in selling locally crafted decorations for saddles as well as lights and bells from China, but bicycles are certainly not generally affordable. Also I did not once see a woman on a bicycle. For most, the only viable form of transportation is by foot, even for significantly long distances<sup>302</sup>.

### **6.6 Summary Conclusion**

Artisanal diamond mining helps people build their assets. It is a popular livelihood because of its comparative potential for building social and financial capital. It also helps build physical capital; miners and diggers use the proceeds from mining to invest in land and tools for pursuing other livelihoods. A major motivation for many people to mine diamonds is to improve their shelter. This is what they say they need most at this stage. However, the mining industry increases people's exposure to violence and to poor health. Whilst it may bring financial windfalls, it does not bring financial security except perhaps in the long run for the lucky few who manage to get more out of it than they put in.

By exploring who mines and why they do it, it has been possible to humanise and dispute the stereotype of the artisanal diamond miner which the journalistic, academic and developmentalist accounts of ADM in Sierra Leone have not yet challenged (for example Richards 1996; Smillie, Gberie & Hazelton. 2000). The Sierra Leonean diamond miner is supposedly a young, male, economic migrant, most probably a former combatant, who has been inspired by greed and a 'casino mentality' to mine diamonds and is exploited by corrupt bureaucrats in alliance with foreign middlemen. This typecast did not apply to the majority of diggers and miners I interviewed (see also chapter 5).

People of all ages, tribes, nationalities, and both genders participate in the diamond industry, but not all people are capable of performing all roles in the industry. People's ability to perform the role they desire, and to do this productively, depends on the assets available to them to use and to convert into other assets. Different roles require different capitals for functionality's sake in the supply chain: a digger needs to be physically strong to do his job productively, whereas a miner does not; a miner needs knowledge to manage his operations, whereas a digger can be unschooled and inexperienced. Cumulatively, however, the assets required for a successful mining operation are productive land (natural capital), technology (physical capital), influential and supportive contacts (social capital), ability to command labour (human capital), and money (financial capital). Where people do not have all of these assets in the first place, then passports are vital to them accessing the ones they need. The principle passports in the Kono diamond

<sup>299</sup> Interview with Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004.

<sup>300</sup> Interview with Health Officials, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>301</sup> Interview with Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004.

<sup>302</sup> My research assistant told me that when he returns to his village, which is 90 miles away, he walks.

industry are identity, social position, violence and the skill of persuasion (human capital), money (financial capital), influential and supportive contacts (social capital) and diamonds themselves (natural capital). Thus the industry offers different opportunities to different people according to their asset profiles and the particular advantages and disadvantages conferred on the different capitals according to Kono culture and political economy. Unfortunately this differentiation of opportunity is not substantially considered within the DSRP's IDM project as the project works to assist the most *suitable* people who fit the programme, and not the most *vulnerable* people in the diamond communities. Of course the project cannot do everything for everyone and must pick its causes, but awareness of who might be left off the edge of opportunity might at least help the programme consider how to widen the net appropriately for achieving its goals of peace and prosperity. Examples of some issues for consideration by development practitioners and academics alike may be:

- It is vital that studies into artisanal diamond mining in Kono start to differentiate between diggers and miners because diggers are more vulnerable than miners. The two roles are regularly conflated and yet the resiliency profiles of diggers and miners differ substantially. Miners are more able to cope and to effect change than diggers. Miners have more free time, more capital and more contacts. They also have more resources to explore other options – land, farm, security of marriage and having older children, their own houses, more powerful contacts, and expertise are just a few examples. They are able to be miners and not diggers because they are more secure than diggers and so better equipped to take the risks which come with organising and managing rather than just 'doing' production.
- Special consideration needs to be given to people who fall into those categories who are not believed to be predominant in the mining industry, for example, old people and women.
- Since the majority of diggers interviewed and all miners but one were Konos, then further consideration must be given to how local people are now using mining as a recovery strategy to rebuild their lives after the war. Local people who never mined before are now mining because of the limited options for them in the post-war economy, and because of their acute needs during this period of recovery and reconstruction. Nonetheless, local people may be more secure than migrants. Migrants are possibly amongst the most vulnerable diggers and miners in Kono (see also Richards, Bah & Vincent 2004: 47). They are also the biggest risk-takers. Yet I am not aware of any programmes designed to understand and help improve their plight specifically.

## **7. Poverty & Diamonds II: Strategies for Change**

The previous chapter examined who mined and what they gained and lost in terms of their asset profiles by mining. In this chapter, I look at how and why people mine as a livelihood to consider how mining helps people reduce their poverty. The analysis begins with coping strategies, and then mitigating strategies where I go into some detail on the livelihood options available in Kono, as well as the actual, alternative and preferable livelihoods of diggers and miners. I touch on emancipatory strategies, which aim to change the structures and processes which make certain livelihood options (im)possible and (un)desirable. I conclude by considering what the findings of this and the previous chapter reveal about diamond mining and poverty.

### **7.1 Coping with risks**

Coping is a short-term strategy for dealing with immediate threats by using actions which will have immediate effects. People cope by converting between assets to effect whatever change is required. For example, if they are sick, they might ask a contact for money to be able to pay for treatment.

In Sierra Leone the use of contacts to provide permanent or temporary support is the most common coping strategy. According to Bebbington, “access to other actors is conceptually prior to access to material resources in the determination of livelihood strategies, for such relationships become almost *sine qua non* mechanisms through which resources are distributed and claimed and through which the broader social, political and market logics governing the control, use and transformation of resources are either reproduced or changed” (1999: 2023). This use of social capital is demonstrated by two diggers who use their social contacts to create a market for some product or to exact temporary credit. When Sia finds it hard to pay her seven year old daughter’s school fees, she uses her daughter’s attendance at school as an opportunity to earn income. The daughter borrows money from her late father’s relatives, buys butter, makes butterscotch and sells it to her school friends for a profit<sup>303</sup>. When another digger’s family goes hungry, he does the following: “There’s a girl trader selling in the market that I usually buy from, and if any breakdown comes my way, I can rush there to take some food items so that the breakdown cannot continue for the other days. She credits me and I pay them back later once I’ve got something from my boss”<sup>304</sup>. Such applications for credit are a common coping strategy in Kono and one reason why petty trading may not always be a profitable livelihood<sup>305</sup>.

In order to ascertain the strength of people’s social capital, we asked interviewees who they would go to first, second and third for help given certain scenarios. The scenarios included not being able to pay school fees, if they or someone in their family were sick or injured, if they or their family ever do not have enough food, if they needed credit to invest or reinvest in their business, and if they or their family had problems with the authorities. In most cases diggers depended on their families to help them with problems, but especially when the problems related to issues with school fees, health and food. Where their family could not help them with these problems, most diggers said they would approach a neighbour or their dealer/supporter for help. A couple of diggers said they would sell assets, such as land or property, to cope with some of these scenarios, or go to the ‘club fund’ for assistance. This was especially the case where people had problems with the authorities. Although the question asked about contacts, four people explicitly said they would sell property or go to the bank to raise funds if they had a problem with the authorities, implying that problems with the authorities are solved with money.

In the case of access to credit, 25% said they had no-one to go to for help, whereas people always had someone to go to if they had no food. All the miners, on the other hand, had someone to go to for credit. This reaffirms the conclusion in chapter 6 (see financial capital) that lack of access to credit is a fundamental impediment to prosperity in Kono. People can only become licence-holders if they have money to pay for the licence. Thus people can be licence-holders when they have access to credit.

<sup>303</sup> Interview 3, 1<sup>st</sup> July 2004

<sup>304</sup> Interview 16, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004

<sup>305</sup> Livelihood strategies Workshop, 30<sup>th</sup> July 2004; also see table 7.4 below.

Additionally, it is easier for people to get access to credit when they are licence-holders because they can use diamonds, or the likelihood of finding (and owning a large proportion of) diamonds as collateral<sup>306</sup>. Thus miners are more resilient than diggers.

Diggers were more likely to go to chiefs or elders when they had a problem with the authorities than for any other reason. Even in this scenario, however, diggers would rather approach a dealer or their supporter than go to the chief. This could be for four different reasons: their supporters are people with enough social standing to deal with the authorities effectively, they trust their supporters more than they trust the chiefs or elders, their supporters are more likely to help them than the chief or elders, or they would rather be indebted to someone they already have an allegiance to (i.e. their supporter) than carry a second obligation to a chief or elder. This dependence on supporters to handle problems with the authorities may make some people, especially those who are prone to difficulties, reluctant to abandon their traditional supporters in favour of the IDM scheme. One powerful contact may still be understood as more valuable than 50 equals (e.g. other cooperative members).

**T7.1 Ability to Satisfy Basic Needs and Enjoy Treats**


		Diggers		Miners	
How regularly is your household able to provide adequately for its basic needs?	Always	7	15%	4	44%
	Frequently	13	28%	2	22%
	Sometimes	21	46%	3	33%
	Rarely	5	11%	0	0%
	Never	0	0%	0	0%
How regularly is your household able to enjoy treats?	Always	0	0%	0	0%
	Frequently	0	0%	1	11%
	Sometimes	30	68%	8	89%
	Rarely	12	27%	0	0%
	Never	2	5%	0	0%

Other than this focus on social capital, interviewees' ability to cope was gauged in a couple of different ways. We asked interviewees how regularly their households could satisfy their basic needs and enjoy treats<sup>307</sup>. All interviewees were able to get by, but 85% of diggers were unable to satisfy their needs all the time, compared to 56% of miners. Furthermore, 32% of diggers were rarely or never able to enjoy treats whereas all miners could at least sometimes. Diggers are less

resilient.

Another question asked for assessing coping capacity was "Which of the following makes it hardest for you to cope?" Possible answers were a lack of land, contacts, transport or skills, poor shelter, health, tools, or literacy/numeracy, or something we had not suggested. They were then asked "And if you could have any one, but only one, which one would it be and why?"


**C7.1 What Diggers Need and Want Most**



<sup>306</sup> Interview 1, 1<sup>st</sup> July 2004;

<sup>307</sup> Basic needs were understood as food, health, shelter and educational requirements; treats were presented as meat, new clothes, improving the house, entertainment and the purchase of consumables, such as electronics or jewellery. Frequency was decided subjectively by the interviewee according to the five options given.

### **C7.2 Assessing Need: the Capitals Diggers Lack and Want**



\* scaled to the number of options in that category in the total selection

their security. Only one digger wanted something which we had not suggested; she wanted social respect<sup>308</sup>.

When asked what needed to change so they could have the asset they desired, ten said they need more income or support. Some specified using this support to invest in or scale up their mining or farming activities. Others gave more political responses including eliminating the middle man, fighting corruption, and the government taking a bigger responsibility in controlling the industry and providing support for people in mining areas<sup>309</sup>. Fortunately, the DSRP is attempting to do all these things through the IDM project.

### **7.2 Mitigating Risks – Livelihood Strategies**

Livelihood strategies are different from coping strategies in that they tend to require a greater commitment to repeatable sets of actions (i.e. livelihoods, profession) whose effects are unlikely to be of significance in the short-term but will be experienced cumulatively over time. Livelihood strategies work to improve a person's coping capacity by transforming or building the assets which s/he draws upon to cope with risk events. Improving assets also increases livelihood options, which expands the individual's range of possible livelihood strategies and increases people's capacity for effecting change (see chapter 2).

#### **7.2.1 Livelihood options in Kono society**

Participation in any livelihood is determined by the compatibility between an individual's human capital and the role they wish to play. The role a person is capable of adopting is determined by their ability to labour, whereas the role they are *allowed* to adopt rests in their identity and the formal laws and informal customs which give one's identity meaning and potency. In the Sierra Leonean diamond industry, tribe, gender, age, and nationality make people differently able to perform certain roles, to operate legally, to be part of a gang, to do certain types of mining, and to be entitled to a fair share of the winnings.

##### *i. Possible Livelihoods in Kono*

The principle livelihood options in mining communities in Kono are shown in the following table and illustrated in the photographs which follow.

<sup>308</sup> Interview 37, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004.


<sup>309</sup> It may well be that they answered in this vein because they knew I was affiliated with the PDA.

**T7.2 Possible Livelihoods in Mining Communities**<sup>310</sup>

<b>FARMING</b>	<b>MINING</b>	<b>COMMERCE &amp; TRADING</b>	<b>ARTISANAL &amp; SKILLED WORK</b>	<b>SERVICES</b>
<b>Vegetable gardening</b> <b>Upland rice farming</b> <b>Swamp rice farming</b> <b>Animal Husbandry</b> <b>Fruit Plantations</b> Fish Ponds Cash crops (e.g. coffee, cocoa) (e.g. banana, mango, oranges) (Palm wine tapper)	<b>Gold Mining</b> <b>Artisanal Diamond Mining:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· <b>stripping</b></li> <li>· <b>overkicking</b></li> <li>· <b>Dry ground mining (terracing)</b></li> </ul> Small-scale mining Industrial Diamond Mining	<b>Food stuffs</b> <b>Clothes (Used &amp; textiles)</b> <b>Cosmetics</b> <b>Petroleum Products</b> <b>Mining Tools</b> Stationery Medicines (Music cassettes) (Electronics) (clothing accessories, e.g. sunglasses, watches, jewellery) (cooking utensils)	<b>Gara tie-dying</b> <b>Soap Making</b> <b>Carpentry</b> <b>Hair dressing</b> <b>Driving</b> <b>Mechanics</b> Tailoring Mattress-making Weaving Masonry Plumbing Goldsmith Catering Tool Making (Baking)	<b>Teaching</b> <b>Health workers</b> <b>Labourers</b> <b>Civil Servants</b> <b>Chiefs</b> Lawyers Office workers Security Politicians (Prostitution) (Housekeeping) (Gardening)

<sup>310</sup> As identified by participants (9 members of mining communities) in the Livelihood Strategies workshop, 30<sup>th</sup> July 2004. Emboldened livelihoods are the ones most commonly pursued. (Bracketed submissions are based on my own observations).

**Fig. 1 Collage of Photos showing Alternative Livelihoods in Kono 1**



**Fig. 2 Collage of Photos showing Alternative Livelihoods in Kono 2**



In order to ascertain the criteria miners and diggers might have when deciding which other possible livelihood is preferable, workshop participants developed the following tables<sup>311</sup>.

<sup>311</sup> Table is based on participants' opinions in the Livelihood Strategies workshop, 30<sup>th</sup> July 2004 but supplemented with further information from interviews. Time limitations did not permit completion of the Artisanal and Services sections.

**T7.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Livelihoods Most Commonly Pursued by Mining Families**

<b>1. Farming</b>	<b>Advantages</b>	<b>Disadvantages</b>
Vegetable gardening	Short growing seasons Frequent harvests (2/3 per year) Income is fast. Productive labour for women & children. Brings financial and food security.	Income is small.
Upland rice farming	Mixed farming possible. Productive labour for the whole family.	One harvest per year (less food security).
Swamp rice farming	2 harvests per year (greater food security).	Monocropping (mixed farming impossible) High risk of poor health. Generally a male activity though other family members do contribute.
Animal Husbandry	Produces manure (fertiliser). Gesture to visitors (good gifts). Sold for sacrifices. Used for ceremonies. Used as pets. Used as investments.	Animals make the community dirty. Animals destroy crops. Animals bring health risks.
Fruit Plantations	Harvest is year round. Fast income.	Fruits are highly perishable. Fruit-based diet brings health problems.
<b>2. Mining</b>		
ADM – overkicking	Independence possible (miner keeps all winnings). Washing every day instead of every 3 months.	It encourages smuggling. The gravel has already been washed.
ADM – stripping	Possible to do it independently (miner keeps all winnings)	When independent, it encourages smuggling (diggers can sell to unlicensed dealers)
ADM – Dry ground mining (terracing)	Yields higher profits (requires less labour and less financial inputs) Higher expectation of returns.	More time is dedicated to watching during washing for fear of theft.
Gold Mining	Brings frequent income. The gold can be kept as an investment. Productive labour for women & children.	Health risk. Tendency for gold miners to be duped by dealers.
<b>3. Trading</b>		
Food stuffs	Brings fast, regular and reliable income. Can be eaten if no income made.	Profits are small. Food is perishable.
Clothes (Second-hand & textiles)	Brings higher income.	Income is slow. Bad debt is inevitable: people always want to buy on credit. High risk of creating enemies when the need arises to pursue outstanding debts.
Cosmetics	High income.	Income is slow.
Petroleum Products	Income is fast (high demand because of the mining sector).	Profits vulnerable to international market prices. High health risk. High risk of fire.
Mining Tools	Income is high and fast. Demand is regular. Little is sold on credit.	No disadvantages identified.

Participants were then asked to consider which of the most common activities within each category brought the most financial gain and the most financial security as well as what the obstacles were to pursuing these livelihoods:

**T7.4 Optimum Livelihoods for High Profitability and Financial Security in Mining Societies and Obstacles to Pursuing These**

<b>Livelihood</b>	<b>Overall Advantages</b>	<b>Profitability</b>	<b>Financial Security</b>	<b>Obstacles to Doing it Productively</b>
<b>Farming</b>	Brings regular income. Yield is expected year round. Food needed all the time.	Animal Husbandry	Gardening	Lack of veterinary care. Poor roads (poor maintenance) limits access to markets. Inadequate security (risk of people stealing produce). Lack of initial capital to set up. Lack of seeds / breeding animals.
<b>Mining</b>	Attractive to investors. High profitability when winnings come, though highly unpredictable. Creates employment for unskilled labour.	Supported Dry Ground (less costs)	Supported Stripping	Lack of initial capital to set up. Limited access to productive land. Lack of powerful contacts. Lack of reliable workers.
<b>Trading</b>	Brings fast income when goods are in high demand. Income is fairly predictable. Multiple investment opportunities. Brings exposure to better contacts. Creates employment for unskilled labour.	Petroleum Products	Food	Lack of initial capital to set up. Poor roads limit access to markets. Transport costs are unpredictable. Lack of stable markets. Seasonality in demand and supply.
<b>Skilled / Artisanal Work</b>	Creates ready income depending on the location. Exposure to better contacts. Income is highly predictable.	Carpentry	Soap making	Lack of initial capital to set up. Lack of tools. Lack of electricity. Limited demand Lack of labour (skilled and unskilled).

The most profitable livelihoods in each category are animal husbandry, petroleum sales, and carpentry whereas those livelihoods most suitably *matched* with these riskier but potentially more profitable activities are gardening, petty trading in food and soap making. None of the diggers and miners currently did any of these other profitable endeavours (animal husbandry, petroleum sales or carpentry) but 8 did vegetable gardening and 2 did soap making (see table 7.5 below)<sup>312</sup>. Mining households are more likely to combine financially secure than profitable livelihoods with mining (see below).

*ii. Preferable Livelihoods to ADM*

In order to assess why people might find other livelihoods preferable to mining, it is helpful to consider what made people decide to mine in the first place. We asked diggers and miners just this question (see table 7.5). The most common response was that they were inspired by their peers, who, having begun mining, had things to show for their endeavours. Others simply wanted money and mining offered the best chance of getting this in their opinion. For 24 out of 52 (nearly half), it was the lack of other options, including the possibility of getting an education, rather than a preference for mining as a livelihood which encouraged them to start mining. For example:

*“I was attending school at primary level. But because my father was sick, suffering from problems with his eye-sight – blindness - ... there was nobody to pay my school fees. People who were around gave me some advice that my*

<sup>312</sup> Unfortunately, those miners and diggers who traded or whose families did trading rarely specified what they traded. Of those who did tell what their family members traded, however, all of them (6) traded food stuffs.

*father had a licence for mining and I was wasting time because people were going away with the diamonds and so on, so why don't I go back home and do mining? That was the time I decided to mine.*<sup>313</sup>

<b>T7.5 What happened so that one day you decided to mine?</b>	<b>Diggers</b>	<b>Miners</b>
Saw people coming back from the mines with money	15	2
Lack of other options	10	2
Wanted money	10	1
No option for education	10	2
Family death or sickness (loss of support)	5	2
Influenced / forced by family male (father, brother, nephew)	5	1
Influenced by friends	3	-
Obligation to support family	3	1
Wanted family to eat rice not bulgur wheat when refugees	1	-
Easiest way of making money at the time	-	1
n/a	4	6

*“Here is Kono. We don't have any work here. We have some work to do but for me I don't know any other work. Either it's bush work or work in the house. Then I would see people cut an acre and I said to my husband, I said for me, I want a licence for myself ... (because) ... as a woman, if you get diamonds, you can do better things for your family. And if God gives me, I will support my children.”*<sup>314</sup>

For many diggers and miners mining is not the ideal livelihood; they would prefer to do something else altogether (see also Richards 1996b: 145). One wished to go back to school but his father would not allow him. For the rest, viability was the impediment (table 7.6). One digger said there was no demand for his preferred livelihood, masonry, at least not from people able to pay<sup>315</sup>. 3 diggers did not have the tools<sup>316</sup>, 3 did not have the training or qualifications<sup>317</sup>, 1

### **T7.6 The Reasons Interviewees Mine Today**

	<b>Diggers</b>	<b>Miners</b>
<b>MONEY</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>9</b>
To get fast money.	18	6
I haven't the money to start up the preferable livelihood.	9	-
I need money.	4	-
I need money to invest in my other livelihood(s).	3	1
To amass much money.	2	-
Long-term financial security.	2	-
I need money to support my parents / children	-	2
<b>OTHER CAPITAL</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>-</b>
I haven't the tools...	3	-
I haven't the qualifications or training...	3	-
I haven't the land...	1	-
I haven't the shelter... ...to start the preferable livelihood.	1	-
<b>STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-</b>
My father will not allow me to go to school – I have no choice.	1	-
There's no market for the preferable livelihood (masonry)	1	-
<b>OTHER (Hermeneutic reasons)</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>-</b>
To get social respect	2	-
It's my hobby	1	-
Mining is preferable to the alternative	1	-
<b>NOT ASKED</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>3</b>

did not have the land<sup>318</sup>, and 1 did not have the shelter<sup>319</sup> to pursue their preferred occupation. One digger spoke of a gang member who mines because he lacks the tools to do masonry. He himself mines because his job as a communications engineer in Freetown paid inadequately: “Only 150,000 (US\$53.57) a month

<sup>313</sup> Interview 14, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>314</sup> Interview 36, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>315</sup> Interview 9, 8<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>316</sup> Interviews 8, 22, 37, 8<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>317</sup> Interviews 12, 17, AA-3, 9<sup>th</sup> & 14<sup>th</sup> July and 3<sup>rd</sup> August 2004.

<sup>318</sup> Interview 3, 1<sup>st</sup> July 2004.

<sup>319</sup> Interview 20, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

– no! It is too small! ... And then you use transport. Just imagine, in Freetown.<sup>320</sup>” He said if he was not mining he would be doing farming because this other livelihood is not viable, but if he were to find a big diamond and get, say, 3 million Leones (>US\$1000) he would go back to Freetown: “I will try to engage into a better job like opening video and computer repairing shop, as I did hardware engineering. I would sponsor my wife to do trading”<sup>321</sup>. Six other diggers and one miner said that if they got that much money they would also abandon mining: one would farm, another would go back to school, one would go into supporting and four would go into business (3 in clothing or textiles). Some diggers and miners would rather not mine.

A housekeeper, whose brother is a digger, believed that mining is less preferable than his job because life is harder as a digger: “for me to eat 3 times a day, and him to eat 2 times a day, there’s a difference ... (and) every month I can expect to get something”<sup>322</sup>. The housekeeper was able to choose what job he did, whereas his brother had no option because he had not had an education. This digger would like to be a mechanic but he cannot do the training as there would be no-one to support his wife while he did it. Here the two brothers explain how they ended up pursuing their different livelihoods:

<b>Digger (27 years old)<sup>323</sup></b>	<b>Housekeeper (age)</b>
<p>“I did not have the chance to go to school. When I was 10, my elder brother went to the village to take me to stay with him to help him out with domestic work. He fed me, gave me money, bought clothes for me and then when he wanted to send money to the village, I would bring it to my family. I started working in the mines with the DUWA mining company, which my elder brother was involved with. But I was not a worker in that company; I was a small boy giving water to elders and so on. The DUWA mining company was a kind of partnership business where my brother was working with the white guy who had all the machines and the equipment. There came a time when there was a conflict problem between them, so the white guy just packed up his materials and equipment and decided to pull out of mining and to go abroad. So my brother also couldn’t withstand and he left for Monrovia or Liberia and when his left, I, alone in Kono, could not withstand this situation. And when I went back to my village, I had by then started eating money as my brother had given me pocket money and had been taking care of me, so I could not cope with the village situation there. And other friends of mine were coming downtown, mining, getting money, going up there, bluffing me and so on. So I first started mining as a washer. Back then, I could not join any gang or group. I started overkicking. I did this for 5 years and then I went to Freetown when the war broke out.”</p>	<p>“Well, for the first time when I left school, I thought I’d have another chance to still carry on with school but when there was no chance I decided to find something to do. I was in the village when I left school but I didn’t decide to do mining. Because I saw people doing the mining and sometimes even over a year, they cannot get the money. And for that, I cannot work for a year without getting anything so I decided to do something where every day or every week I would actually get something. I first went to a tailor that was here. I trained here, I did the tailoring for 1 year and 6 months. By then I was qualified. I left and bought a sewing machine and did tailoring here. When the war broke out I went to my village. From there, I went to Guinea. When I came back from Guinea, I came to the town here [Koidu]. I was here when NGOs started coming here. My first chance was I met with Eduardo, the first [inaudible] for IRC. I met with him, I explained myself to him and he told me that when they started the office he would consider me. So then every day I would go to the office when they were renovating the office. I went there every day, every day, every day. At one morning I was in the house when Eduardo came to me and told me they had a job for me. So they employed me.”</p>

Like this digger there are others who mine because it is the only feasible option: without the possibility of mining diamonds, their other assets are so poor that it would be even harder for them to survive<sup>324</sup>. For these people mining brings hope of improving their lives.

The majority of interviewees said that if there were no diamonds in Kono, their realistic alternative would be to farm (see table 7.7 below). However, a smaller proportion (half) said that they would *prefer* to farm

<sup>320</sup> Interview 16, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>321</sup> Interview 16, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>322</sup> Interview 12, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>323</sup> Interview 12, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>324</sup> For example, interview 3, 1<sup>st</sup> July 2004.

instead of mine. Thus though farming is the most viable alternative it is not necessarily the most preferable. The remaining fifty percent suggested 13 different livelihoods they would rather be doing. By far the most popular preferred alternative was business or petty trading. Twenty diggers said that if they had an extra 300,000 Leones they would do this, and an additional five said the same if they had an extra 3 million Leones. Only 4 said they would stop mining altogether to do this suggesting that the majority would prefer to combine their business activities with mining<sup>325</sup>. Thus some people, even if given the opportunity to quit mining, would prefer to continue.

The fact is, then that some people *prefer* to mine than not to. One digger said he mines as a hobby<sup>326</sup>. Another miner said that he would never stop mining, even if he was rich because it is a tradition to mine, because he enjoys it, and because it makes him rich<sup>327</sup>. Another miner admitted, “I’ve got used to the money. That’s why I continue mining”<sup>328</sup>. In the Peiyima focus group participants said that “they would have loved to continue the mining without really farming but because it is really difficult for you to be hundred percent certain that you will succeed in the mining, they continue with the farming<sup>329</sup>.” In order to be sufficiently profitable they said farming needs to be conducted on a large scale but it is far harder in Kono to access the capital to do farming (e.g. land, seeds, tools, machinery) than to access the capital to do mining (e.g. land and tools)<sup>330</sup>. For them, mining was the priority and farming was the security because mining was the more viable route to get money, improve their homes, and secure themselves, especially after the war.

The allure of mining compared to other livelihoods is strongly related to this belief in its greater potential for substantial returns. One focus group participant explained the logic behind doing mining instead of farming: “*some people will decide ... that this year I am going to do agriculture. I am going to cultivate sixty acres of land to plant cassava and so on. Sometimes they will be doing that work while another who has engaged in mining will just come up one morning and say I have got fifty carats of diamond. So you will start now comparing how long am I going to continue my farming to get money that will be worth to fifty carats of diamond? So you are also convinced to get into mining.*”<sup>331</sup>

Other diggers mine because they believe mining brings money more quickly than other options. “I do mining because it gives me quick money<sup>332</sup>” was the most common answer we received when we asked people why they mined. However, with productivity declining in the principal mining regions and with the cost of mining increasing, the likelihood of finding something substantial is less (see chapter 5). But the *possibility* still remains. After the war, people have returned to decimated homes and fractured communities. They want to rebuild their lives as quickly as possible. In their minds mining offers the best possibility of a fast recovery and the only hope for a substantial improvement in their quality of life in the near future. Mining brings the hope of a brighter tomorrow, as well as the money to invest in their farms, their homes and other individual and household activities<sup>333</sup>:

Estelle: *Earlier we spoke about the farming brings in the regular income, and the farming makes it possible to raise money to start mining. So am I right in understanding that farming is what keeps you alive, but mining gives you hope for better life?*

Man: *Yes, of course.*

Babar: *We want to understand really, though the farming can help to support in the mining field, but you still have hope for your husband to get more money from the mining, is that so?*

<sup>325</sup> Unfortunately we did not investigate what exactly people meant by business and trading and why they would prefer these.

<sup>326</sup> Interview IS-11, 6<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

<sup>327</sup> Interview 18, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>328</sup> Interview 14, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>329</sup> Babar’s words, Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>330</sup> See above. Also interview 22, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004 and Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>331</sup> Male participant, Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>332</sup> Interview 5, 7<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>333</sup> Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004. See also Interviews 18, 23, AA-4, IS-3, and IS-6.

Group: *Yes, that is true.*

Woman: *So we can get better shelter*<sup>334</sup>.

Mining is preferable to other livelihoods for other reasons as well. 11 out of 17 diggers believed that mining gives you access to more powerful contacts than other occupations and, as should be clear from the above review of social capital and coping strategies, contacts are supremely important to security and wellbeing in Kono society. But according to one digger, there is a condition attached: *“if you are the licence holder, the diamond comes to you, you take it to the dealers and so on. The contacts are directly with you. But if you are working under somebody, you don’t have those contacts; it’s the person who handles the diamonds who makes the contacts and the contacts are beneficial to him, not you down there. He’d have more powerful contacts as a farmer as he’d be working independently and not under somebody.*<sup>335</sup>” Thus mining brings more powerful contacts to licence-holders than it does to diggers.

Besides the possibilities of higher returns and more powerful contacts, mining also brings another valuable thing: social respect. These extracts from the Peiyima Focus Group illustrate in what ways mining brings social status and respect in Kono society:

Man: *Somebody can mine all the time, he can mine for one whole season and not get anything. People who do farming and at the end of the day eat good food while others that are involved in mining can go without eating food ... So in this case I think farmers will be more respected. In the other way round, miners also would get money and buy a fine motorcar, build a mansion and other items that the farmer cannot easily afford. In this case miners also would be highly respected.*

Man: [speaks Krio]

Babar: *In most cases miners are respected more than farmers ... (because) ... normally miners have got bigger contacts. You have a lot of big people in society, well, investors, who visit them because they want their land to mine or they need them for mining. ... and sometimes they come with tools or instruments which are used in the mining that are left with the miner ... And sometimes greases that they use in machines to reduce friction. However some farmers may come to them for such scrap metals to make their machetes for such greases to grease their tools and so on and these are some of the reasons why miners, even though some of them go without money, but they are still respected sometimes more than farmers.*

Woman: [speaks Krio]

Babar: *It depends on what you possess at that particular time, what you have in your possession that’s what respect is based on. Miners who have got cars, big vehicles and houses and so on are respected because, but some farmers who are also, they don’t have enough money are almost always in rag-tag materials and so on, you can’t be respected. You are only respected based on what you have in you possession at a particular time.*

Woman: *In the old days people could be respected based on names and title, but nowadays people can be respected based on what they have in their possessions. If you don’t have money but your sister who is a miner has money, even your child would abscond from you and to go to your sister that has money.*

The group went on to explain how people are also respected if they are an elder. This status comes with age, ancestry and, now, money. They also spoke of people who are respected because they devote themselves to the good of the community, or because they demonstrate certain talents or intelligence. This typology of respect encouraged one man to take a stand on *which* type of respect he would want: *“Like when you have two children, you put them in school then the one goes far in school, and the other, say, like in class 3, and the one that learns he becomes like a doctor, so, you see that type of respect, I want that one. I don’t know anything but how to dig diamonds. I didn’t learn anything! So say one went to a better school and the other went into the diamond industry and got money. So that type of respect, me I don’t want it, I want the respect where I’ve learned something.”* In Kono it is generally harder to get an education than it is to get a diamond, which perhaps explains his preference.

<sup>334</sup> Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>335</sup> My notes from interview 21, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

**T7.7 Actual, Alternative and Preferable Livelihoods for Miners and Diggers**

<b>Livelihood</b>	<b>Previous Livelihood</b>	<b>Previous Livelihood continuing today</b>	<b>Current Livelihoods</b>	<b>Alternative Livelihood (if there were no diamonds in Kono)</b>	<b>Preferred Livelihood</b>
<b>MINERS</b>					
Not asked the question	2	8	7	3	3
Supporting a mining gang	-	-	5	-	-
Farming	7	4	4	9	7
Community work	-	-	3	-	-
Trading / Business	3	2	2	2	4
Vegetable Gardening	-	-	1	-	-
Nothing (mining only)	1	-	1	-	-
Security / Soldier	1	-	-	-	-
Building / Masonry	1	-	-	-	-
Driving	-	-	-	1	1
<b>DIGGERS</b>					
Not asked the question	2	15	5	1	14
Farming	27	16	22	31	17
Supporting a mining gang	-	-	7	-	2
Vegetable Gardening	-	-	7	3	-
Trading / Business	7	4	6	6	3
Nothing (mining only)	3	-	4	-	-
Community work	-	-	4	-	-
Tailoring	3	2	3	2	3
Gara Tie-dying	1	-	3	2	2
Gold Panning	1	-	2	-	-
Mechanics/Engineering	1	1	1	3	2
Embroidery/Needlework	-	-	1	2	2
Soap making	-	-	1	1	1
Security / Soldier	2	-	-	-	-
Communications technology	1	-	-	-	-
Computer software and hardware	1	-	-	-	-
Teaching	1	-	-	2	1
Building / Masonry	1	-	-	3	3
Industrial Fishing (Sailor)	1	-	-	-	-
Palm Oil Processing	-	-	-	1	-
Clerical Work	-	-	-	-	1
Wage Labour	-	-	-	-	1
Driving	-	-	-	1	-
School	-	-	-	-	3
Hairdressing / Barber	-	-	-	1	-

As this table and the discussion above it show, not all Sierra Leoneans want to 'go back to their farms'. Any scheme designed to promote alternative livelihoods must engage with this fact. Given the opportunity, people say they would like to do activities as diverse as computer software, engine mechanics, masonry, tailoring, teaching, trading and so on. The desire to do something different does exist, therefore, and with it the potential to diversify and strengthen Kono's economy. But increasing the viability of people's preferred or alternative livelihoods will not necessarily reduce their compulsion to

mine. Some people mine, not because they must but because they want to. And this desire is not necessarily inspired by greed, but by the rationalisation of available options. Diamond mining is the preferred option for many because they believe it offers the best possibility of a fast escape from poverty and the achievement of social status and respect. This belief that diamonds bring money quick-quick is seemingly steadfast, despite the evidence of declining productivity in traditional mining areas and the requirement of scaling up operations to dig deeper for any reasonable chance of profit. Many people mining today are headed for disappointment. Some will hopefully realign their beliefs with the evidence before them; others will press on to chase the dream. As the industry adjusts to this new landscape of payability, it will not be the licence-holders who lose out, but the diggers. And yet to my knowledge no safety net is being designed to help them adjust to the narrowing of opportunities in this role.

For these people who have a variety of viable livelihoods to choose between and who still decide to mine, making their other desirable livelihoods more viable will empower them by increasing their choices further and providing them with realistic alternatives in the face of declining productivity. It should enable them to strengthen their resiliencies by creating options such as which livelihood should take precedence, new possibilities for combining and expanding the different livelihood options, and whether to abandon mining altogether. For those who have no option besides mining, increasing the viability of their preferred livelihoods would be a form of emancipation in even giving them the choice in the first place and would help ensure that when they are ready to abandon the dream, there is another occupation they can gainfully pursue to secure themselves and their families.

### 7.2.2 Individual Livelihood Strategies

Table 7.7 above shows the previous and current livelihoods of interviewees as well as the viable and preferred alternatives to diamond mining. Only one miner and 4 diggers do nothing but diamond mining today. For some diggers and miners doing anything else is out of the question as their financiers will not allow it: “(Some supporters) just feel that by doing mining at the same time as farming you are a kind of retarding (them) in their work. ... And therefore they just take you out of their groups.<sup>336</sup>” These diggers are more vulnerable than those who can pursue other livelihoods because they depend solely on their mining. In the rainy season, they are especially vulnerable as work in the mines is scarce. At this time some diggers resort to theft to cope with their hunger, much to the wrath of the farmers I interviewed<sup>337</sup>!

Apart from influencing crime rates, seasonality and routines also determines how and why people combine the different livelihood options.

### T7.8 Routines and Seasons in Diggers’ and Miners’ Current Livelihoods

Livelihood	Diggers					Miners				
	Current Livelihood	Seasonal	Weekly	Daily	N/A	Current Livelihood	Seasonal	Weekly	Daily	N/A
<b>MINING</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Number asked</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>
Farming	22	12	2	2	6	4	2	-	2	-
Supporting a mining gang	7	-	-	-	7	5 (11 asked)	-	-	-	-
Vegetable Gardening	7	-	3	3	1	1	-	1	-	-
Trading / Business	6	1	-	2	3	2	1	-	-	1

<sup>336</sup> Babar’s translation, Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>337</sup> Interview 18 and Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

Livelihood	Diggers					Miners				
	Current Livelihood	Seasonal	Weekly	Daily	N/A	Current Livelihood	Seasonal	Weekly	Daily	N/A
Nothing (mining only)	4	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Community work	4	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	2	1
Tailoring	3	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gara Tie-dyeing	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gold Panning	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mechanics / Engineering	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Embroidery / Needlework	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Soap making	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
No. doing 3 or more livelihoods (excluding supporting)	6	2	1	3		1	1	-	-	-

The most common combination for diggers is mining and farming. This is mostly possible because the optimum times for mining and farming are the dry and wet seasons respectively<sup>338</sup>. 29 diggers and 5 miners (over 50% of all interviewees) do farming or vegetable gardening alongside their mining. Of the diggers, 12 do farming seasonally as their main activity in the wet season, 5 do it one day a week, 4 do it after work every day and 8 did not say when they do it. Those who farm seasonally also attend to their farm during the mining season. If they are too busy in the mines, they employ contract labour or rely on their families to tend to the farm. Miners who see mining as their primary livelihood but do farming as well tend to belong to farming families. They are able to try their luck in the mines only because other household members make the farm their primary concern.

Some diggers and miners are actually farmers who have decided to exploit their land differently. This was the case for one digger from Tombudu. He and his family were mining in the swampy part of their banana and coffee plantation because they believed that diamonds gave the possibility of getting money quickly but their plantation was too small to have that potential. Up until that point, however, they had not found anything substantial and were still making more money from their plantation than they were from mining it. However, given the chance he would prefer to be doing 'business' rather than mining or farming<sup>339</sup>.

Mining is not always a miner's or digger's primary livelihood. Sometimes it is pursued as a supporting activity to raise credit to invest in the other activity either seasonally or as a long-term strategy. This was the case for miner 18 who mined in the dry season to invest in his plantation and his business in Freetown. This was also the case for three of the diggers in Tombudu, who all farm and mine according to the seasons. One of them mines in the dry season to raise the funds to invest in his cacao and banana plantation in the rainy season so that in 5 years time, when he is ready to retire from mining and for his children to be educated, the farm will be mature enough for him to rely on it alone<sup>340</sup>. Another digger from Tombudu told a similar story. He does rice, cassava and cacao farming throughout the year but during the dry season he can only tend to his farm once a week as mines on the other days<sup>341</sup>. The third

<sup>338</sup> Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004 and various interviews.

<sup>339</sup> Interview 22, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>340</sup> Interview 23, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>341</sup> Interview 21, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

digger does it differently. He combines swamp rice and cassava farming with his digging and overkicking throughout the year<sup>342</sup>.

For other diggers, mining was the main livelihood which they supported by doing other activities. Some miners do farming so they can afford the tools and workers for mining<sup>343</sup>. One digger, who acts as foreman for a licensed mining operation “used to run a shop which sold soft drinks and beer as well as other items... It was a small shop, and had seats where people could drink. ... He still does this but it’s on a smaller-scale, though it’s still in a shop and the shop is in Koidu. The shop is rented by a friend and he is given a part and can sell what he wants there; the others do photography. He pays a rent to his friend. They have a deep freezer to cool the drinks. He uses the profits to support his mining gang and his family (a cousin, his sister’s 6 year-old son and a female relative who looks after them).<sup>344</sup>” The symbiosis between these two activities was so obvious to this digger that he found it hard to separate them to compare them to each other.

Six diggers and one miner combined three or more livelihoods (excluding supporting). One digger and the miner combined mining with farming and trading on a daily and seasonal basis respectively. The only other man (four of those doing over 3 livelihoods were women) seasonally combined mining with farming and vegetable gardening. One woman did mining, needlework and farming seasonally. Two women did over five or six activities on a daily or weekly basis. One did overkicking, gold panning and tailoring every day, but also spoke of doing farming, gara tie dying, and soap making as well (though she did not say when)<sup>345</sup>. She had been a bush wife during the war and was now married polygamously with 4 children to care for. Another female digger, a war widow, supported her four children and her diamond mining gang by panning their tailings for gold and trading kola nuts at a stall in the evenings where she would also do her gara tie-dying<sup>346</sup>. Combining three or more livelihoods daily is probably more stressful and exhausting than combining them seasonally. These women may have been coping, but not without an extraordinary amount of effort. Their colossal efforts to get by indicate that they were especially vulnerable amongst the diggers.

### 7.2.3 Household Livelihood Strategies

Just as diggers and miners combine different types of mining throughout the year, so do mining families diversify their mining activities and locations between themselves. By mining in different places, members of the same household or family can decrease the risk of mining unproductive land<sup>347</sup>. And by doing different types of mining or mining under different conditions of support, families can build their resiliency<sup>348</sup>. On other occasions families decide to mine as a gang and not involve other people because “if you’re working with other people there’s a tendency for corruption and some cheating but when it is the same family, whatever they get, the benefits would come to the family”<sup>349</sup>.

In every mining household investigated with more than one adult in it, at least one other person did a different livelihood to mining.

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<sup>342</sup> Interview 20, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>343</sup> Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>344</sup> Interview 10, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2004. Babar’s translation.

<sup>345</sup> Interview IS-3, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>346</sup> Interview 37, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>347</sup> For example, interview 14, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>348</sup> Interview 21, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>349</sup> Interview 22, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

**T7.9 Other Mining Household Members' Livelihoods**

	FEMALES		MALES		Households with at least one other member engaged in this activity			% with at least one other member engaged in this activity		
	Diggers	Miners	Diggers	Miners	Diggers	Miners	Total	Diggers	Miners	Total
<b>Farming</b>	4	-	4	1	18	8	<b>26</b>	40%	67%	<b>46%</b>
<b>Mining</b>	-	1	7	2	19	6	<b>25</b>	42%	50%	<b>44%</b>
<b>Petty trading</b>	7	2	-	-	20	3	<b>23</b>	44%	25%	<b>40%</b>
<b>Vegetable gardening</b>	4	3	-	-	7	4	<b>11</b>	16%	33%	<b>19%</b>
<b>Artisanal</b>	1	-	-	-	4	2	<b>6</b>	9%	17%	<b>11%</b>
<b>Housework</b>	4	-	-	-	5	-	<b>5</b>	11%	-	<b>9%</b>
<b>No work</b> <sup>350</sup>	3	-	-	-	3	-	<b>3</b>	7%	-	<b>5%</b>
<b>Business</b>	2	-	-	-	2	1	<b>3</b>	4%	8%	<b>5%</b>
<b>Gold panning</b>	1	-	-	-	1	-	<b>1</b>	2%	-	<b>2%</b>
<b>Mining services</b>	-	-	1	-	1	-	<b>1</b>	2%	-	<b>2%</b>
<b>Nursing</b>	1	-	-	-	1	-	<b>1</b>	2%	-	<b>2%</b>
<b>Construction training</b>	-	-	1	-	1	-	<b>1</b>	2%	-	<b>2%</b>
Not asked	30	11	30	11	3	2	5	-	-	-
Average no. of livelihoods pursued per household	-	-	-	-	2.7	3.3	3.0	-	-	-

Unfortunately the other interviewers rarely specified exactly with whom interviewees lived and what livelihood each household member did. Thus it is not possible to confidently ascertain the gender distribution of activities amongst the interviewees' mining households from our statistics. However, from what we do have there seems to be a pattern wherein the men do the mining, either the men or women engages in farming or vegetable gardening and then the women and children sell the produce to bring in a daily income or use it to feed the miner's workers<sup>351</sup>. For example:

*“You see, mining and farming go side by side. During farming season, though Fridays is been recognized as resting day for mining, they normally spend it in the farm to help the women, like brushing swamp, transplanting and some other activities. And after Friday, they can return back on the mining while the women still pursuing their farming. So is like farming and mining are going side by side.”<sup>352</sup>*

<sup>350</sup> When interviewees were asked what the other people in their households did, some said their wives had no work. Unfortunately our interviewers did not push for clarification on what ‘no work’ actually means. For example does this mean the women do nothing in the home or does the interviewee just not consider caring for the family (e.g. housework, cooking etc.) to be work?

<sup>351</sup> Livelihood strategies workshop, 30<sup>th</sup> July 2004, Peiyima Focus group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004, various interviews and field observations.

<sup>352</sup> Male participant, Peiyima focus group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

*“At times I break from the mining and I go to my garden for some time ... In the rainy season ... I go to my cassava farm. I have a garden and a plantation. On my plantation I grow cocoa and coffee. I sell them to Koidu ... I grow cassava and cocoa to make sure we always have money. My wife sells the cassava, sometimes cooked, with pepper, onions and other things in the market. She sells the stuff we grow, but my aunty buys stuff in Tomboudu to sell in Koidu. Now I mine in the dry season and farm in the wet season, but even during the dry season I go to my farm on a Friday and to church on Sunday.”<sup>353</sup>*

The logic in this predominant combination is that the household thereby manages to balance financial security (small-scale farming and trading) with the possibility of financial gain (diamond mining). In fact, participants in the Peiyima focus group admitted that, generally speaking, the men in their community are only able to pursue mining as a livelihood because their wives’ daily labour brings in the goods which maintain the family’s welfare: without their wives support, incidental or small as it might be, they would not be able to mine<sup>354</sup>. This pattern – with the woman providing for the daily needs while the man brings home occasional windfalls – and the great uncertainty of returns from mining that lead me to assert that in diamond communities the women’s labour is at least as important as the men’s, *if not more so*. Women provide certainty and day-to-day security which releases the man of these immediate responsibilities and allows him to invest his labour and hope in mining at the risk of gaining nothing. Without women doing the work they do, the men could not mine. Greater attention therefore needs to be paid to understand how the women in mining communities might enhance the productivity of their own activities whilst maintaining their financial security in order to buffer mining communities from the devastating effects of declining productivity, especially if people resolutely continue to mine.

#### **7.2.4 Other Strategies for Building Assets and Reducing Vulnerability**

The pursuit of certain livelihoods can create other opportunities for building assets or reducing risk. Dependency on patrons or patrimonial relationships is in itself a livelihood strategy; individuals call on their patron, or the more secure family member, to contend with risks as and when they arise. In exchange, the patronised offers loyalty, submits to the patron’s authority, and is effectively at the patron’s beck and call (cf. Wood 2002 and Jackson 1982). People want to be the patrons, not the patronised<sup>355</sup>. Relationships of patronage bring obligations; patronage is a system of favours and expectations in which both parties are expected to play their roles in accordance with the hierarchy<sup>356</sup>. Patronage is so endemic to Sierra Leonean society that anyone who has money or social position can find him/herself called upon by more vulnerable members of their community to assist them in times of need (see also chapter 6). It is this ability to assist the needy which legitimises the needed’s position of power and authority in the community<sup>357</sup>. They are expected to help. If a patron wishes to maintain his social position, he must meet these expectations. In some cases patrons manage to raise the funds legitimately (i.e. through honest business). In many cases in Sierra Leone however, patrons will not actually have the resources they require to meet people’s expectations. For this reason, he himself may have a patron, who in turn will have his own patron and so on. This string is pulled taut to breaking point when the needy are making more requests than the patrons can attend to. This is what happened in Sierra Leone during the 1970s and 1980s (see chapter 5). Patronage may provide social security to the needy in the absence of a functioning state, but not without a cost.

Being corrupt is also a livelihood strategy. Corruption is motivated by both greed and need and operates all levels and in all spheres of Sierra Leonean society. There are many types of corruption, including extortion, collusion, thievery, and so on (Le Billon 2003a). Patronage makes corruption desirable (to reinforce one’s social position through the accumulation and distribution of wealth) as well as possible (the extortion of bribes from the needy is made possible by one’s position as the gatekeeper or the agent of change). In turn the culture of corruption makes the role of patron desirable because of the accessibility

<sup>353</sup> Interview 23, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004. Similar things said in Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>354</sup> Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>355</sup> Interview 23, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

<sup>356</sup> Interview with official from Network Movement for Justice and Development, 5<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

<sup>357</sup> Interviews with Mary Musa and Femi Kamara, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004 and 20<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

to wealth and political advantage it brings. Therefore the position of patron and the practice of corruption are both in themselves livelihood strategies.

There are other, more honest alternatives for increasing one's security. One strategy is to invest in one's children's education (see social capital). Another method is to build one's financial stocks through safekeeping (see financial capital). Another, albeit one with more hermeneutic than instrumental value for some, is religion. We asked interviewees if there was any extra way they could ask God or Allah to enhance their chances of finding diamonds or to protect them and their family from harm. Many diggers and miners said they prayed for these reasons. Charity and sacrifices were also common. Some gave money or food to the needy (old, poor, and children) or to Imams or Reverends to pray for them to find diamonds<sup>358</sup>. Others sacrificed clean water, kola nuts, rice, flour, biscuits or bread either because of dreams or based on advice from oracles and fortune tellers<sup>359</sup>. Some sacrificed animals (usually a goat) and shared the meat with people in the community in order to bring them luck<sup>360</sup>.

### **7.3 Eliminating Insecurities - Emancipatory strategies**

Emancipatory strategies usually involve social activism but they can also involve military action. The Sierra Leonean war was an attempt at emancipation for the lumpenproletariat (see chapter 4). Regardless of the means, the purpose of emancipatory strategies is to challenge authority and transform the terms of access to those assets people need to maintain or improve their resiliency. Social activism is commonplace in Kono after the war, especially around issues of youth, gender, democracy & governance, and diamonds. The Movement of Concerned Kono Youth (MOCKY), Network Movement for Justice and Democracy (NMJD), Alluvial Diamond and Gold Miners' Association of Kono (ADAGMAK) and Global Rights are just a few examples of community-based organisations struggling to take advantage of post-conflict enthusiasm for change to redefine Kono culture and the terms of inclusion and exclusion. Many of these CBOs have partnerships with international donors and NGOs. Many are also involved in the Peace Diamond Alliance<sup>361</sup>. Like these CBOs, the DSRP's mining cooperatives are intended to be vessels of emancipation for members. Their very existence creates new possibilities for non-violent action and organisation in artisanal diamond production and marketing, and industry governance.

There are a plethora of impediments to emancipation for vulnerable groups in Kono society. The three which interviewees discussed with me were respect for authority, fear of authority and the inability to engage in the larger issues because of immediate personal need. In what follows I present two rather large extracts from the Peiyima Focus Group. This first extract follows on from a very interesting discussion on what brings respect in Kono society. Its value is that it reveals that despite an awareness of how to challenge bad government, activism has never happened, at least in this community.

Estelle: *you say that honesty is very, very important and you say that being able to get down and sacrifice yourself for the people, understand the people is very, very important and sometimes just the job that you do [e.g. as a doctor], because it contributes to people and it helps people is very, very important. So these are all the things you think about when you elect a chief, yes?*

Man: *Yes.*

Estelle: *So what happens if a chief turns out to have been very clever and make you believe he is like this but then when he has the power, he is not honest and he doesn't care about the people, and he only does things for himself. What happens then? Does that happen? And if it does happen, what can the people do about it?*

Babar: *[in Krio] Supposing somebody seems to be having all these qualities mentioned just to be elected as chief in the society and later change from these qualities, what would be the next step?*

Man: *It can happen. When it happens, in our tradition when we elect chief or an authority we must have to be give respect him until his death, and therefore we continue to give the chief our loyalty. ... As long as we have elected you, we cannot remove you from power. As long as you are not going with the right way, we believe that God will one day put you to death.*

<sup>358</sup> For example, interviews 6, 11, 14 and 32.

<sup>359</sup> For example, interviews 10, 16 and 18.

<sup>360</sup> For example, interviews 18, 23, AA-10, AA-12, AA-13, and AA-14.

<sup>361</sup> See appendix 6.

...

Woman (town chief's wife): [speaks Krio]

Babar: [translates] *So she is saying that even though they have their traditional chiefs who are normally not removed but if ... you actually are not conforming or complying with what you actually promised the people, normally ... the people will grow vexed ... and you (the chief) must have somebody closer to you who may be sounding the opinion of people and you must be told that ... people are vexed about your attitude and such and such. ... If you still continue your wrong-doings and so on, sometimes you will remove yourself because they (the community) will go into civil disobedience, you call them for meetings, they don't turn up, you allocate work to them, they don't carry it out or duties to them, they don't carry it out, so will sit down and really know I am ruining myself or I am ruining the society.*

...

Estelle: *So has it ever happened that a chief has done a very bad job and that people have been unhappy and he has decided, OK, I will no longer be a chief?*

Babar: *Has that ever happened in society then?*

Group: *No.*

...

Estelle: *So and will it ever happen in Kono?*

Man: [inaudible] *we know the way they were brought up.*

Babar: *Are you saying they are always correct in their doings?*

Man: *Yeah. [inaudible]*

Babar: *So in other words it is not because they are always good, but because they like holding on power?*

Man: *Yes.*

...

Estelle: *but how does that make you feel? Does it make you feel that you have no control over these things? That you are at the mercy of these big men? Or do you just think, ah, that's the way it is, and get on with life. Or does it make some people feel, this is not good enough, I want to change it! How does it affect people? How does it affect you in your life?*

Babar: *How do you feel when you elect chief who later behaves badly in the society without listening to any advice?*

Man: [Estelle's translation:] *It's bad for the society. It disorganizes people, it doesn't bring any development to the area if the chief doesn't comply with the subjects then. Like when you give them something to do they don't do it, when you call them for a meeting, they don't go, and when the chief knows [inaudible] he's not going to think, he's not going to do anything. He won't plan anything. So it's no benefit to the society.*

Babar: *So it's actually deteriorated the society, as this man has said.*

...

Estelle: *Do they ever organize themselves and challenge the authorities?*

Babar: [translates]

Estelle: *Or they do they do things without his permission. So they say, we want this so we are going to do it without their permission.*

Babar: [translates]

Group: *It's never happened.*

One interviewee spoke frankly about people's trepidation to question their authorities:

Estelle: *What about the control of the industry, if the management of the industry was much more in the hands of the people and less in the hands of the chiefs, would that be better or worse?*

Interviewee: *It would be better because the indigenes and the poor man, when there is better chance you can make something better for the other people. But the authorities feel they are already rich so they can do anything they want. So nobody will ask them. But the poor man, someone would be there to ask him.*

Estelle: *But why don't people ask them [the chiefs]?*

Interviewee: *When you ask them, tomorrow you will be in jail<sup>362</sup>.*

Through its attempts to reform community governance into a participatory endeavour, the DSRP is trying to forge just this sense of reciprocal responsibility and accountability by building the state-society contract.

<sup>362</sup> In order to protect the interviewee's identity, I will not reference who or when this was said.

In what follows next, participants are reflecting on why the chiefs do not work in their interests, especially in relation to Koidu Holdings (previously Branch Energy), a company in Tankoro which has proceeded with its kimberlite mining before adequately fulfilling its agreement with the local community to relocate about 200 property-holders who live within its blast zone.

Man: *You see like, when Tejan Kabbah came, [speaks about the company saying that though they did not fulfil their promises, he doesn't blame the company, he blames the chiefs for not intervening in the favour of the people. The chiefs are just interested in satisfying their own selfish wishes].*

...

Man: *I blame the authorities but I also blame some of we the youths..., because we are not united. But if we are united, I believe that we can ... form a formidable force that can influence the decision of the chiefs.*

...

Estelle: *So why, what is stopping you from doing that, organising and coming together?*

Man: *We all have different interests.*

Man: *Because of this war, that made all things collapse.*

Babar: *But why isn't that unity there for pushing things, if what this man is saying is true?*

Man: *The unity isn't there now.*

Man: *... There's no man making an example.*

Man: *[speaks and gives examples of how when united they can make things happen]*

...

Man: *[speaks]*

Babar: *... for you to get people together in the first place, people have to sacrifice their time. But like now we have some of us here who are pressing, the Mummy is pressing to go to weed her farm because work is going past and sometimes when you even call youths to meeting, some of them will tell you, I mean, yesterday I didn't have food. My family went without food and I am going to get some, what, some nuts for my kids or some bananas for my kids. Do you have to stop that person? So poverty is really influencing.*

Man: *[speaks].*

Babar: *Well he cited selfishness and illiteracy as being some of the things responsible for the disunity. Eh, a lot of people really do not understand the issues that are raised. Say, for example, you call people to meetings and so on, you want a particular developmental programme to be undertaken by the community, because people do not even have the know-how, they are not even aware of such issues, they may trivialise it for some other issues. And it would be difficult to really bring people together if they don't even have the know-how or any understanding in such issues.*

Man: *[speaks about programmes and people being more interested in finding their diamonds. Even an hour sacrifice is too much.]*

Babar: *OK, he, I look at it as being the same poverty. People look for immediate benefits. I mean, you come with things today and they know they are not going to get an immediate benefit from or that they have an interest in. It has to be something that brings an immediate benefit. ... You say this is for the future development of these places and they say, no, man, I am going to look out for my diamonds or I am going to my farm. It has to be something that brings immediate benefit to them.*

This extract shows the reasons people put survival (coping with and mitigating against risks) before change (eliminating risks). Hunger, ignorance, and short-term interests, as well as the fear of jeopardising social contacts which are central to people's ability to cope, impede social unity and social activism. When people are forced to live hand to mouth day by day, social activism is really a luxury that only the less vulnerable can afford to indulge in.

#### **7.4 Summary - Why and how do people mine as a livelihood?**

This DSRP focuses on diamonds alone, but almost all individual diggers and miners we interviewed in Kono combined their diamond activities with other livelihoods, especially gold mining, artisanal work, vegetable gardening and petty trading for female diggers and miners, and trading and farming for men<sup>363</sup>. Most diggers and miners combined only 2 livelihoods; those who combined more than three were war widows. The most common livelihood combinations were mining and farming or mining and trading. Mining is not always the principal livelihood, but, in an environment where access to credit for investing in other livelihoods is a challenge, mining may be used as a means of raising capital to invest in other

<sup>363</sup> Awareness of these links motivated their interest in a livelihoods study.

aspects of miners' and diggers' individual or household livelihoods. Where mining *is* the principal livelihood, the other livelihoods combined with it are used to bring security or to provide regular money to invest in the mining operations, for example to support the mining gang or buy tools.

People mine because it is the best option out of a limited few that are viable and because they believe doing so is the best way of getting money (and thus security) 'quick-quick'. This is why so many diggers said that mining brings *more* financial security than other livelihoods, claims which at first left me a little bewildered. Yet for some people it does! And so long as others succeed in sifting five carat gems out of the mud and so long as other livelihood options cannot offer substantial returns or similar exit potential, this hope of a better tomorrow will continue to draw people into the mines<sup>364</sup>. Artisanal diamond mining is a type of hedging wherein people compromise short-term financial security for the sake of possible future gains and thus, hopefully, long-term security. Trading and farming, the two most common livelihoods pursued by diggers and miners and by other members of mining households, bring in small money more regularly than mining. This financial strategy, whereby one person pursues a livelihood which brings in a small, regular income while the other, the digger, works with the hope of the lucky windfall, provides mining families with the security to attend to their basic needs while investing in their dreams and the hope of the quick 'exit'.

This household strategy is not so irrational if one considers the limited potential of other livelihoods to provide long-term security and the possibility of real prosperity given the current state of the local economy where consumer markets are cash-strapped and weak (business is usually done on a credit basis) and desirable livelihoods are impossible because people cannot get the credit to set themselves up. Some diggers and miners concede that mining would not be their livelihood of choice if they had other feasible options but, for the time being, these options do not exist. Mining as a livelihood is therefore a rational response to a weak local economy with limited viable and preferable alternatives.

### **7.5 Conclusion**

This analysis into the social landscape of poverty within the artisanal diamond mining sector has revealed that the most vulnerable people who participate in the diamond industry are generally those who do not fit the stereotype of the typical diamond miner, i.e. women (especially war widows and former bush wives), children, older people, migrants (see also Richards, Bah & Vincent 2004), and non-Konos. It has also revealed that diggers are more vulnerable and less resilient than miners and that opportunities in the industry are differentiated according to identity and wealth.

This study of livelihoods has also revealed that limited credit options for non-mining activities, gender discrimination, and exploitation of diggers contribute to the creation and maintenance of poverty in the community. In this conclusion I review the implications of these revelations for the DSRP's objective to bring prosperity to Sierra Leone.

The desire for people to pursue non-mining livelihoods exists but the viability of these alternatives is limited by their relative actual or perceived earning potential or because people cannot access the necessary start-up capital. In Kono there is a severe paucity of credit options for non-mining activities. This is partly because diamond profits are exported as capital flight (see chapter 5) but mostly because investors prefer to reinvest in more diamond operations, which concentrates available capital into mining-related economic activities and social services (see chapter 6). This homogenises the economy and ties all economic productivity into diamond productivity. This is typical of artisanal mining communities (Labonne & Gilman 1999). Yet diamond mining is getting more expensive and requiring less labour as operations are scaled up to cope with declining productivity causing a diminishing of fruitful opportunities. As the artisanal diamond economy begins to decline, so will the Kono economy more widely, impoverishing the community even more unless preparations are made for this inevitable transition by helping increase the feasibility and desirability of alternative livelihood options. If successful, this would also bring the advantage of tightening the labour market for diggers and so should

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<sup>364</sup> Peiyima Focus Group, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

help miners to better support and reward diggers for their labour. The DSRP states that it will encourage the pursuit of alternative livelihoods to mining but nothing has really been done on this so far. This might actually be a job more suited to a different institution, but it is an important one: the promotion of alternatives outside of mining is essential to achieving prosperity in Kono.

The second issue is gender discrimination. The diminution of women's contributions to the household, to mining operations, and to the economy and the exclusion of consideration for their needs, capabilities and potentials obstructs meaningful social development (see also Labonne & Gilman 1999). Whilst the DSRP is paying attention to gender issues, I would assert that it is of central importance if the programme is to work for wider prosperity. Women need to be more meaningfully involved, not just in political decision-making, but in the economy as well. Fortunately, gender mainstreaming is an objective of the Government's National Recovery Strategy (2003d). Since it is women's labour which sustains the family, effort should be made into investing *in those livelihoods women want to pursue* to expand their productivity as a means of decreasing poverty, revving up Kono's economic engine, and emancipating women through the creation of opportunity. For example, gold mining, which is a more reliable source of income than diamond mining and is mostly conducted by women in Kono, may be one good place to start. So far it has received limited attention from donors and development agencies, though I am aware that this possibility has already been considered by MSI's technical advisor to the programme.

On a more technical note, there is some potential for the DSRP to integrate the promotion of women's productivity in non-diamond sectors through the cooperative schemes. It is already intended that the cooperatives will be encouraged to invest in the other economic activities, but it may be worth considering the concerted promotion of investment in women's livelihoods. For example, if the scheme made it compulsory that a minimum percentage, say 55%, of those activities to be invested in must be done by women then the benefits are obvious: this will either preclude investment in diamond mining, in line with current discriminatory practices, and so force diversification and development of other sectors, or it would increase the participation of women in *productive* types of diamond mining as the cooperatives would want to invest their profits into profitable mining enterprises.

Beyond this specific suggestion, there is certainly room for more gender mainstreaming in the programme. While improvements are being made all the time, female inclusion is not adequately undertaken as of yet. The gender specialist I interviewed was adamant on this point<sup>365</sup>, citing the example of the almost complete absence of women in the PDA doing jobs such as security, driving, or cleaning, whereas other NGOs had made a point of employing and building the capabilities of women in all these professions<sup>366</sup>. If the promotion and diversification of women's livelihoods are central to prosperity, then active encouragement of women to take on traditionally male roles within the PDA itself can only be a good thing. On another point, female participation in the executive committee was discussed in chapter 6. Most importantly, perhaps, is the lack of information on the positive and negative impacts of mining activities on women in Kono, on how they are included and excluded, on how they are vulnerable and resilient, and on their potential as significant economic and political actors in Kono society. Some work has been done on gender issues in artisanal mining communities more generally (e.g. Hinton, Veiga & Beinhoff 2003), but a specific study into women and the Kono diamond industry would be pertinent. MSI has recognised that the DSRP has a role in coordinating local and international efforts to respond to women's issues in ADM as they are looking to work with a gender systems analysis project<sup>367</sup>.

Another issue of concern within the industry is that diggers are more vulnerable than miners, they are more exploited than miners, and indeed they are exploited *by* the miners. The DSRP is aiming to empower diggers through the structure of benefits within the mining cooperatives, of which diggers comprise 80% of members<sup>368</sup>. Diggers will receive a minimum wage of \$2 a day and a share of the profits

<sup>365</sup> Interview with Cecilia Mattia, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2004.

<sup>366</sup> There is one lady who runs the office in Freetown and another who works in the accounting department in Koidu.

<sup>367</sup> Email from technical advisor, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2005.

<sup>368</sup> Email from technical advisor, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2005.

and diggers are being trained in valuing. Realistically, however, it will be impossible to educate all diggers in this way which raises the possibility of simply empowering some to be able to exploit others, for example if diggers in mining cooperatives decided to use their profits to support their own separate mining operations (e.g. gado) outside of the cooperatives. Nonetheless, empowerment has to start somewhere and how those who are empowered choose to *use* that power will be something to be considered in the future should there be evidence that these abuses are actually happening. For now, it is enough to simply get IDM up and running in order to benefit those whom it can reach. Better some than none.

The DSRP is therefore attending to gender issues and diggers' exploitation within mining, but it is not attending to another principle cause of poverty, which is homogenisation of the economy around diamonds. The programme itself, of course, is a diamond-oriented programme which sees prosperity through diamonds as the means of achieving peace. However, it either has not asked them or has not made explicit the answers to the questions, "whose poverty?" and "whose prosperity?" the programme will actually affect except to promote its objective to bring prosperity to the people of Kono through restructuring industry management. Notwithstanding the technical director's assertion that meeting all the livelihood needs of miners is not the intention or purpose of the DSRP<sup>369</sup>, there are opportunities for improving the programme's capacity for alleviating poverty through greater consideration of how diamond mining as a livelihood links in with other aspects of the economy and community life more generally, through nurturing partnerships with local and international NGOs and CBOs and through pursuing some imaginative, perhaps ambitious, policies as part of the IDM, such as a designated minimum percentage of profits to be invested in women's livelihoods as suggested above. Expanding its view to consider these is the next stage in achieving the programme's objectives.

In the next and concluding chapter, I draw together my analyses of poverty, war, and the structure and processes of the diamond industry in order to critique the programme more generally.

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<sup>369</sup> Email from technical advisor, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2004.

## **Chapter 8 – Conclusion**

It has been very difficult to evaluate the DSRP, partly because it is so comprehensive and complex and constantly developing, but also because my exposure to it has only been through documents and conversations and email communications with MSI employees as analysing the industry and ADM as a livelihood was the priority whilst in Kono at the expense of studying the programme itself. This means that whilst the analysis of the relations between war, poverty and diamonds has been substantive, the conclusions about the programme are tentative and to a certain extent dependent upon which information has been provided to me by the people who are running it.

Certainly the overall conception of the programme is hard to fault. Its design is highly innovative, progressive and, to a certain extent, post-developmental. It moves beyond traditional development projects, which presume all can be fixed with infrastructure and economic growth (cf. Ferguson 1990). It aims to be inclusive of grassroots interests and opinions, it promotes participatory governance of its institutions, it is attempting to empower miners and mining communities to take control of their own futures, it is promoting responsibility and accountability, and, unlike other neoliberal projects which aim to diminish the state, it has acknowledged that, whilst markets are to be the instruments for directing the desired social transformations, the state must be re-capacitated and made fit to survey and discipline these markets in order to make them function appropriately. It is in fact a heavily political project, though its politics are disguised in technocratic strategies. It is also comprehensive, incorporating the interests of state, market and society through a programme concerned with policies, people and process. In sum, it is very well designed! But of course no project when put into practice transpires as it was intended! The project's managers have faced huge challenges in achieving the programme's objectives. It should not be forgotten that the DSRP is being conceived and implemented in a fast-paced, highly disorganised and persistently corrupt, patriarchal, gerontocratic environment of post-conflict recovery, and that it depends on the prerogatives of its donors, including when and if funds should be made available. In the face of these challenges, the progress which has been made by all of its participants is commendable, but it is because of these challenges that a critical examination is pertinent.

The primary objective of this thesis has been to evaluate the assumptions, objectives and strategies of the Diamond Sector Reform Programme (DSRP) in order to identify those which might be inappropriate or useful in accordance with the programme's goals to prevent war and increase prosperity in the diamond regions. The technique for conducting the critique has been to analyse how the diamond industry, and ultimately therefore the DSRP, is embedded in Kono's society and economy in order to understand what is preventing diamonds from being used to fuel development at least in the areas where they are mined. The main questions which have therefore guided this thesis have been:

- What caused the war and what did diamonds have to do with it?
- What are the structures and processes which comprise the diamond industry?
- What causes poverty and what do diamonds have to do with it?
- Has the DSRP adequately incorporated understandings of the previous three points?
- How and why do people use the diamond resource to try to reduce their poverty and make themselves more secure in this period of post-conflict recovery?
- Based on this analysis of the relations between the diamond industry, war and poverty, what is the DSRP attending to adequately and inadequately in its bid to make diamonds work for peace and prosperity?

The DSRP is owned and directed by all those people who have participated in its formulation and implementation, i.e. its donors (USAID, but also DFID and the World Bank), the Government of Sierra Leone, the members of the PDA (traditional leaders, CBOs, iNGOs, and industry actors), and MSI. The DSRP is trying to ensure that the "Sierra Leone diamond trade contributes positively to peace and prosperity" (Moyers 2003: 22) by working on policy (DIPAM), participatory politics (PDA), and process (IDM). IDM is a model of resource governance whose main purpose is to ensure "that Sierra Leone's diamonds can never again be used to fund conflict" (MSI 2004a: 2). It aims "to address local issues that

promote smuggling and inhibit enforcement” and perceives the reduction of poverty as a means of achieving this (MSI 2004a: 2). It puts decriminalisation before development.

### ***Causes of War & the DSRP***

This thesis has revealed that the principal causes of war were state failure caused by the mismanagement of a kleptocratic regime bent on serving their personal interests above those of their citizenry. This abuse of political responsibilities created widespread and escalating social disenfranchisement and insecurity, political and economic alienation of youth, the absence of educational and employment opportunities, and youth lumpenisation. Whilst in its documents it promotes its activities more as strategies to make war less possible than less desirable (see MSI 2004a), the programme works to limit grievances in so far as its strategies to improve industry management will bring benefits to people through increased state revenues (some of which are redistributed to diamond communities through the Diamond Area Community Development Fund), improved state capacity and integrity, and participatory governance, and its efforts to counter corruption and discrimination in the industry.

### ***The Political Economy of the Artisanal Diamond Industry & the DSRP***

This study has revealed that it is not just young, male migrants who work in the mines, but women, old men, and Konos as well. Additionally, there are large differences between diggers and miners both in roles, functions, capabilities and securities. Significantly, the diggers are more vulnerable to exploitation than miners. The DSRP recognises this last point in so far as the mining cooperatives are targeted at helping diggers, and diggers are better represented in the PDA today given the increased number of cooperatives which are members<sup>370</sup>. I did not find evidence that it paid special attention to the needs and capabilities of the unconventional diggers and miners and of how opportunity is differentially structured in the industry.

This investigation also challenges the view that miners subsist in a form of debt bondage to supporters and has revealed the following in relation to support:

- There are many different *types* of relationships of support which exist between various actors in the diamond industry, not just between miners and dealers.
- Not all supporters are dealers, therefore. Some may even be diggers who support their own gang;
- Miners choose supporters based on friends’ recommendations as to who is most trustworthy and fair. There was a high level of trust and goodwill from a high proportion of the miners and diggers interviewed towards their supporters.
- Lebanese support is not necessarily more malignant than support from an indigene or a Maraka. Indeed the relative demonisation of the Lebanese in comparison to the Marakas in the general literature on diamond smuggling and exploitation (not by the DSRP) does not necessarily reflect current practice, but may be based on a pre-war understanding of the industry’s political economy that is somewhat outdated given contemporary conditions.
- Support may be formal or informal, substantial or piecemeal, occasional or regular. Informal and occasional support is especially common between illegal diggers or miners and Maraka dealers or community elders. Formal, regular support is most common between Lebanese dealers or international buyers and miners operating more substantial operations.
- The relationship of support is not necessarily a business relationship, but is often a relationship of patronage, that is of dependency and relief, instead or as well. Supporting mining operations is just one option for a patron. Where the relationship *is* primarily business-based and formally conducted, then the relationship between the miner and his/her supporter can be understood as a partnership.
- In practice, miners are not as obligated to their supporters as the DSRP presumes, even when the relationship is formal. Some have several supporters, some will cheat their supporters, and others will change supporters between operations if their experience with the previous one was unsatisfactory.
- It would be possible for relationships of support to be fairer if a system of arbitration were institutionalised which would rule on disputes based on the facts and not on who can pay more.

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<sup>370</sup> See Appendix 6.

Moyers's version of the exploitative supporter and weak and helpless miner may be a case of an imagined or exaggerated problematique, in line with James Ferguson's critique of the World Bank's development interventions in Lesotho in 1980s (Ferguson 1990). It is more likely, however, that it is based on an *historical* understanding of the power relations and terms of exchange which structure the industry. Certainly during the reign of Siaka Stevens the Lebanese dealers were empowered at the expense of the ordinary indigene (Zack-Williams 1995; Reno 1995). After the war, however, both the Lebanese and indigenes have found themselves much worse off than they were before (cf. Fithen 1999). Although today the Lebanese obviously have the upper hand in re-establishing themselves given their experience, social capital, and access to external financing, the playing field is slightly more level than it was prior to the war. There is a mutual need and dependency which means that the current relationship is not disempowering in every case, but may even be doing the opposite.

This raises some questions about whether and how the supporter–miner/digger relationship should be treated by the DSRP's endeavours to “make diamonds work for peace and prosperity”. Rather than targeting the communities who have traditionally provided support to miners and the supporter-miner relationship itself, it may be better to target the *terms of exchange* within these relationships (i.e. patronage and patrimony) as it is these which disempower and prevent diggers and miners from improving their security. A deeper study into how diggers/miners and supporters understand their relationship would inform this conclusion as well as help ensure that the DSRP can include traditional supporters who could have a potentially fruitful role in injecting financial capital into the local economy and providing protection for some less secure members in their community. Indeed, a lack of consideration of how to include the non-indigenous dealing community is possibly harmful in the long run as it may stir up new grievances which could destabilise the region in the future<sup>371</sup>. Space has been made for the Lebanese and ECOWAS communities in the PDA, but their level of participation has been low and the Lebanese dealers' opinions of the Alliance, as they expressed them to me, betray a deep-founded mistrust and resentment towards it<sup>372</sup>. It may be advisable for the Alliance to attempt to nurture more constructive and trustful relations with these communities in order to assuage potentially volatile situations in the future. This would encourage them to bring their interests to the table, to participate more eagerly in the PDA, and may increase transparency in the industry more generally.

Potential for future grievance also exists in the changing geography of productivity in the diamondiferous regions. Artisanal mining is becoming decreasingly viable over time. Even if the DSRP's cooperatives successfully cope with this by scaling up production, there will be some people who continue to mine using less sophisticated methods of extraction and organisation. To a certain extent therefore the DSRP has understood this changing productivity, but more needs to be done in local communities to assist the transition away from diamond-centred economies and to enable the progressive scale-up of operations and the promotion of livelihood alternatives.

### ***The Causes of Poverty & the DSRP***

The analysis presented in this thesis suggests that the principal impediments to diamond wealth fuelling development in the diamond areas are:

- the diversion of this wealth to other countries owing to the predominance of foreigners operating in productive roles (i.e. as supporters and dealers) in the industry;
- the homogenisation of the local economy around diamond-related industries and services;
- the exploitation of diggers to the point that they do not have the basic resources (time and money) to build the other assets necessary for them to pursue more profitable livelihoods;
- a contradictory culture of dependency and hyper-individualism to the point of parasitism, owing to an environment of chronic survivalism;
- discrimination in the allocation of diamond benefits and resource accessibility based especially on issues of gender, but also on age, tribe and nationality;

<sup>371</sup> One Sierra Leonean I discussed my findings with on 14<sup>th</sup> January 2004 believed this was a real possibility.

<sup>372</sup> Interview with Lebanese dealers, 6<sup>th</sup> August 2004.

- the perpetuation of patronage as the principle means of social securitisation and the determinant of exclusion and deprivation.

The DSRP is indirectly dealing with the issue of capital flight by increasing competition in the markets for buying diamonds and providing credit for diamond operations which will divert some of the funds which would have been invested abroad by the ECOWAS and Lebanese dealers and supporters. The PDA has so far contended with economic homogenisation only rhetorically with its gestures towards promoting non-mining livelihoods. I cannot emphasise enough the importance of increasing the viability of desirable non-mining livelihoods as a strategy of increasing local prosperity. Economic diversification and increasing people's livelihood options can only make Kono stronger and people freer. In relation to the exploitation of diggers, progress has been made in establishing diggers' rights and increasing their profits within the industry through the cooperatives. With regard to discrimination, the DSRP has helped the Government standardise and advertise the costs of licenses, but officials continue to accept 'handshakes', and so the distribution of licenses continues to be inequitable. Of course 'handshakes' are understood as traditional and part of the culture and so their prevention might not just be impossible but also culturally inappropriate. Yet tackling corruption is central to the sustainability of peace and so there must at least be open debate about the value and implications of 'handshakes' in local culture, and perhaps even the establishment of a law which would hold officials punishable should they accept a 'gift' larger than a maximum amount to be determined participatorily by license-holders, officials, and international advisors.

There is also room for improvement with regard to the DSRP's treatment of gender issues in mining, although the progress it has made so far should not be overlooked. The DSRP, and the community it is trying to assist, would benefit greatly from the creation of a gender desk in the PDA or the involvement of a gender specialist, and preferably one with experience of gender issues in artisanal mining communities or in West Africa, to help integrate a feminist perspective into the design and implementation of its projects and facilitate the involvement of women at all levels of the programme.

Dependency and hyper-individualism are coping and mitigating strategies in Kono society. They are a symptom of extreme and widespread vulnerability. With the state unable to provide proper social protection and in light of the very low levels of trust people feel towards the state, then social security is nurtured through patrimonial relationships. Many who have strong enough asset profiles to intensify their existing livelihoods or pursue a more lucrative alternative may be prevented from doing so by the perpetual "pinch-pinch" of familial obligations or by the outright theft and abuse by family members<sup>373</sup>. This can be a major setback in people's attempts to improve their security. This is an aspect of Sierra Leonean culture that exists independently of the diamond industry. Given that the DSRP is a diamond programme, there is not much it can do in this regard.

Perhaps the hardest things to tackle, however, are patronage and patrimonialism. Patronage is the traditional system of exchange in the diamond industry and patrimonialism is the traditional system of support and relief in diamond communities. The DSRP does not mention patronage whatsoever in its documents, perhaps because it is so much a taken-for-granted and everyday aspect of West African culture (and is possibly recognised as practically impossible to alter). Yet to a very large degree patronage and patrimonialism were responsible for the impoverishment, disenfranchisement and lumpenisation of the nation, which inspired the war (Richards 1996; Archibald & Richards 2002; Peters & Richards 1998). Fanthorpe's observation that "aid agencies cannot avoid becoming political actors in a post-conflict situation like Sierra Leone" (2003: 55) certainly applies to the DSRP because there is a risk that the PDA, like other local institutions, could become an instrument of such patrimony, which elites will use to strengthen their networks of dependency and to distribute benefits and to call in favours. Given that the DSRP has as one of its aims the transformation of local attitudes to governance and especially the promotion of notions of responsibility and accountability, which inevitably require the promotion of a degree of individualism, then it is to some degree confronting patronage head-on. It is trying to move

<sup>373</sup> For example, interview with Amienatta Conteh 5<sup>th</sup> August 2004. See also appendix 8 and chapter 6.

diamond governance in Kono from a system in which the relations of protection and promotion which determine people's opportunities, rights, and responsibilities are hierarchically constituted, to one in which these relations are reciprocally arranged based on principles of equity and independence. The success of the programme rests in its ability to normalise these notions of independence and personal responsibility in Kono's diamond relations and, if it manages, this, it will have provided people options for protection and promotion outside of the networks of patronage. By creating this choice, the programme is emancipating.

### ***Mining as a Livelihood & the DSRP***

The standard interpretation of diamond mining is that it is not so much a livelihood as a gamble (Smillie, Gberie & Hazelton 2000). This view has led many to believe that diamond mining is intrinsically 'bad' and something that should not be encouraged<sup>374</sup>. It has also made donors less enthusiastic to offer development assistance to diamond communities<sup>375</sup>. This thesis has tried to demonstrate how and why people use the diamond resource to try to reduce their poverty and increase their security. It has suggested that people mine, not because of some casino mentality, but as a rational strategy for coping with and mitigating against a high risk environment in a weak local economy with limited viable and preferable livelihood options. People who had never mined before the war are now mining to try to rebuild their lives after it. For the time being the majority operating at the level of production are less inspired by greed than need and in particular the need to improve their shelter and raise capital to embark on their preferred livelihoods. The people managing the programme obviously respect people's decision to mine as a rational strategy and are willing to roll up their sleeves to support them and help them take the industry in the direction they, as local people and as owners of their industry, want. This attitude can far more constructively help people improve their livelihoods than that which assumes that people should not be mining in the first place because it is an intrinsically 'bad' activity with negative social, economic, and environmental consequences. These externalities may exist, but as far as the people of Kono are concerned, they believe that mining also brings good things like quick money, respect, social influence, and the hope of a better future. Most I spoke to choose to do it for these reasons, not because of greed, and that should be respected and worked with.

People do not pursue mining as a singular occupation. All the licence-holders combined their mining with some other activity, as did the vast majority of diggers; the 4 who only mined had productive positions as foremen or field organisers. Most people mine because they believe it will prove to be more profitable and bring money more quickly than other occupations. As productivity declines, this will be less the case for people operating outside of mechanised operations. The DSRP is therefore timely in trying to make mining a more viable livelihood through the cooperatives scheme. Its singular focus on the cooperatives, however, is limiting it from engaging with the most vulnerable diggers and miners, for example the old, women, and the sick, who may not be welcomed in the cooperatives. These people usually do overkicking and often illegally. A possible solution might be the designation of certain areas which are no longer payable for usual mining activities as legal sites for overkicking (see chapter 5).

### ***The DSRP***

IDM is highly commendable, but is not enough in itself to achieve peace and prosperity in Sierra Leone because it does not adequately attend to the particular needs, possible contributions and potential grievances of women, migrants, and dealers who operate in the diamond industry. Although the DSRP is about more than IDM<sup>376</sup>, it does not pretend to be a development project or to be singularly capable of achieving peace and yet it has stirred up something with great potential to move the Kono diamond industry forward and shed its reputation of being a site of "blood" or "poverty" diamonds. As peace settles in Kono, as most interviewees believed it would, people's priorities will move from maintaining peace (and saving money in case they need to flee once more) to building prosperity and stability. The

<sup>374</sup> Interview with Ministry of Mines Official, 12<sup>th</sup> July 2004, and with Mary Musa, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004.

<sup>375</sup> Conversations with Helen Temple, who formerly worked at the International Rescue Committee in Sierra Leone, and an employee of Cause Canada in July 2004.

<sup>376</sup> Email from technical advisory, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2005.

DSRP could begin to serve as a vehicle for this transition now that the IDM project is almost up and running. To do this it would have to widen its net of whose prosperity it aims to improve. It is for this reason that this thesis has been timely in considering how the programme and its constituent projects tie in with and affect people's attempts to improve their livelihoods in Kono.

The DSRP is a novel and potentially revolutionary project in post-conflict resource governance. In spite of the various challenges it has faced, it has done much to contribute to peace and prosperity in Kono. Its success rests on recognition that poverty and war are politically constituted and on its style of adaptive and participatory management. The next test will be adapting it to suit the political particularities of other post-conflict resource communities.

As I conclude, therefore, it is necessary to remind the reader that my findings can only be tentatively presented as facts owing to the small size of this study's sample. I therefore proffer them as hypotheses for future studies in order to deepen understanding and provide more accurate and dependable conclusions upon which the DSRP, and other post-conflict resource industry management programmes, might base some of their decisions. I therefore make my suggestions humbly and with great respect for what has been achieved thus far by the local communities, government bodies, NGOs, CBOs, donors and international consultants who are conceiving of and putting into effect the DSRP. The greatest test of course will be in how all the people who have lent me their time, experiences, opinions, and selves in the development of this study, as well as the people of Kono in general, react to this thesis. I do not expect them to agree with me. I only wish that the study will contribute more positively than negatively to their and others' efforts to help populations, bruised and battered by years of war based around diamonds, make the existence of diamonds a positive stimulant in their pursuit of social wellbeing and personal contentment.

### Appendix 1 The Research Calendar and Summary of Team Activities in Kono

Week Commencing	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY	SUNDAY
14-Jun-04	Estelle arrives from UK	Preliminary interview with <b>Frank Karefa-Smart</b>	Introductions to <b>Ousman Kamara (Deputy Director of Mines, Ministry of Mines), Lawrence Myers (GGDO)</b> Drive to Kono	Introductions to PDA team <i>Office admin</i>	Introduction to Gbense speaker, Chief Kamanda p.m. Meeting with human rights NGOs interested in social & environmental impacts of mining	<i>Office admin</i> <i>Explore Koidu</i>	a.m. Walk around perimeter of Koidu town through mining sites afternoon off
21-Jun-04	Visit mining sites - <b>Little Sefadu, Bakundu, Down Bollop</b>	Introduction to & informal interview with <b>Braveheart Cooperative (Amienatta Conteh)</b>	<i>Office admin</i> – combine proposals	Introduction to & informal interview with <b>Kono Dealers' Association (Prince Saquee, Chairman)</b>	Intros to <b>GBENSE Chief</b> Kaimachende (paramount) <b>TANKORO Chiefs</b> Nyandebo (regent) & Jabba (speaker), S.G. Kamanda (Treasurer) & <b>Mary Musa</b> (Chair, Tankoro Town Council)	<i>Office admin</i> – combine proposals	Informal interview with <b>Paul Temple</b>
28-Jun-04	Introduction to and informal interview with <b>Bandafayie Basama Women's Group</b>	<i>Office admin</i>	<i>Office admin</i>	<i>Office admin</i> - complete pilot questionnaires	Pilot interviews <b>Down Bollop, TANKORO</b> 2 miners 1 digger (woman)	<i>Office admin</i> - design questions for key informants & dealers	Day off
05-Jul-04	<i>Office admin</i>	<i>Office Admin</i> - complete 1st draft questionnaires Interview with MMR	<b>10am-5pm</b> <b>Gbongema Town (Njiam)</b> <b>NIMIKORO</b> 1 miner 1 digger 1 teacher	<b>10am-5pm</b> <b>Yengema, NIMIKORO</b> (Danaya Co-op (PDA)) 2 Diggers	<b>10am -5pm</b> <b>Little Sefadu, GBENSE</b> Brave Heart Co-op (PDA) 2 Diggers 4 p.m. housekeeper & digger (brothers)	<b>10am</b> Prince Saquee test dealers questionnaire and arrange dealer interviews <b>CANCELLED</b>	Day off
12-Jul-04	<i>Office admin</i> - complete 2nd draft questionnaires Andrew Abdulai joins team	<b>Sewafe &amp; Bendika, NIMI YEMA</b> 1 miner, 2 diggers	<b>Peyima, KAMARA</b> Focus Group Interviews - 1 miner, 1 digger	<i>Office Admin</i> – complete 3rd draft questionnaires Mahmoud joins team	<b>Tombodu, KAMARA, Benkomo Cooperative</b> 4 diggers, 2 health workers	<i>Office Admin</i> - Logistical planning on how to organise 3 workshops	Estelle & Helen travel to Freetown

Week Commencing	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY	SUNDAY
19-Jul-04	Estelle & Helen in Freetown (interviews with MMR, GGDO, exporter & industry experts) Andrew - arrange focus groups & workshops Babar – arrange interviews with informed sources			<b>Tefeya, SANDOR</b> 1 miner (Andrew) Ibrahim Sebba & Michael Conteh join team Estelle returns to Kono Helen leaves country	<b>Tefeya, SANDOR</b> 1 miner 3 diggers (Andrew, Ibrahim & Michael) Estelle interview government official and expert on gender issues	10 a.m. Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop I at PDA	Andrew & Babar to Sandor & Nimikoro to sensitise for future interviews and workshops
26-Jul-04	<b>Tefeya, SANDOR</b> 3 divers	<b>Yormandu, SANDOR</b> 3 Miners 3 diggers  Estelle int. MOCKY <sup>377</sup>	<b>Bandafayie, NIMIKORO</b> 4 Miners (3 women) 6 diggers (3 women) (whole team)	<i>Office Admin</i> WORKSHOP planning and finalisation	WORKSHOP - household strategies and seasonal calendars (15 people - mining households) at PDA offices	10 a.m. Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop II at PDA offices POSTPONED p.m. <i>Office Admin</i> - complete final draft of questionnaires	Day off
02-Aug-04	Team to sensitise Nimi Yema Tankoro Estelle – day with Frank Karefa-Smart: interview international dealer & intros to industry experts, chiefs	<b>Jaiama, NIMI YEMA</b> 6 diggers Estelle – day with Frank: Council of Chiefs in Sewafe & interview with Kono dealer in evening	<b>Kuakuyima, TANKORO</b> 6 diggers (1 woman) Estelle int. NMJD <sup>378</sup> and visit to Africa Gold and Diamonds in Tefeya	<b>Kuakuyima, TANKORO</b> 3 diggers Estelle – tour of AG&D and Gemlico operations, interviews with journalist & woman miner	<b>Yengema, NIMIKORO</b> 5 diggers (1 woman) Estelle – interviews with Maraka dealer, Lebanese dealers & PDA spokesman. Dinner with Lebanese dealers	9.30 a.m. - 5.30 p.m. rescheduled Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop II 5.30 p.m. TEAM DEBRIEF	Estelle interview with industry expert
09-Aug-04	Team to Tongo, Estelle leaves Sierra Leone						

<sup>377</sup> Movement of Concerned Kono Youth

<sup>378</sup> Network Movement for Justice and Development

*Appendix 2a***Diggers' Questionnaire**

Name of Interviewer \_\_\_\_\_  
 Province \_\_\_\_\_  
 District \_\_\_\_\_  
 Village \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date \_\_\_\_\_

Time Start: \_\_\_\_\_

Time End: \_\_\_\_\_

Where did the interview take place?  
 \_\_\_\_\_

How did this affect the interview?  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**4. Post-Interview Section to be Completed by Enumerator**

How private was the interview	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Very private	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Somewhat public	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Very public
Did you feel that this interviewee was distracted during the interview	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Concentrated	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Somewhat distracted	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Very distracted
Did you feel that the interviewee was willing to share information or was he more reluctant to share?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Willing to Share	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Reluctant to share
Did you feel that the interviewee was telling the truth all the time, some of the time, or hardly ever?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood the concepts we used?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood why we wanted the information?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel comfortable interviewing this person?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Comfortable	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not Comfortable

Did Interview End Before Completion? Yes

Why: \_\_\_\_\_

**Background Information**

	<i>I'm going to start by asking you some general questions about yourself and your family. I will then ask you questions about your job.</i>	
<b>Personal information / (Vulnerability) Context : What are the population trends in mining &amp; why?</b>		
Trends	[Enter the Respondent's Sex]	1. <input type="radio"/> Male                      2. <input type="radio"/> Female
Trends	What <b>year</b> were you born? [ <i>If the respondent does not know, ask him/her to estimate his/her age</i> ]	19 ____                      or                      ____ years
Trends	What is your nationality?	1. <input type="radio"/> Sierra Leonean 2. <input type="radio"/> non-Sierra Leonean _____ [Specify]
Trends	Where were you born?	Reg/Dis/Chiefdom ____-____-____ [ # from codebook]
Trends	Where were you living before the war began?	Reg/Dis/Chiefdom ____-____-____ [ # from codebook]
Trends	Where did you live during the war? When did you go and come back from there?	Reg/Dis/Chiefdom ____-____-____ [ # from codebook] From _____ to _____ and _____ to _____
Trends	What did you do while you were there?	
Trends	When did you come to Kono?	____-____-____
Trends	What is your religion?  <b>[Do NOT Prompt] [Choose One]</b>	1. <input type="radio"/> None                      2 <input type="radio"/> Christian 3. <input type="radio"/> Adventist                      4. <input type="radio"/> Muslim 5. <input type="radio"/> Traditional Religion: _____ [Specify] 6. <input type="radio"/> Other: _____ [Specify]
Trends	What languages do you speak? <b>[Do NOT Prompt]</b> Which of these languages do you speak best? <i>[Circle Language Spoken best]</i>	____-____-____-____-____ [Enter # from codebook]
Trends	What is your tribe? <b>[Do NOT Prompt]</b>	_____ and also _____
Trends	What is your highest level of education?  Class I – VI = Primary School Form I – VI = Secondary School <b>Codes For Colonial Educ System</b>	1) <input type="radio"/> No school 2) <input type="radio"/> Some primary school    3) <input type="radio"/> Completed primary 4) <input type="radio"/> Some secondary school    5) <input type="radio"/> Completed secondary 6) <input type="radio"/> Some university                      7) <input type="radio"/> Completed university 8) <input type="radio"/> Some Institute/ Polytechnic    9) <input type="radio"/> Completed Institute/ Poly
Family Background	What was the highest level of education of your father?  <b>[Do NOT Prompt] [Choose One]</b>	1) <input type="radio"/> No school 2) <input type="radio"/> Some primary school    3) <input type="radio"/> Completed primary 4) <input type="radio"/> Some secondary school    5) <input type="radio"/> Completed secondary 6) <input type="radio"/> Some university                      7) <input type="radio"/> Completed university 8) <input type="radio"/> Some Institute/ Polytechnic    9) <input type="radio"/> Completed Institute/ Poly
Family Background	What was the highest level of education of your mother?  <b>[Do NOT Prompt] [Choose One]</b>	1) <input type="radio"/> No school 2) <input type="radio"/> Some primary school    3) <input type="radio"/> Completed primary 4) <input type="radio"/> Some secondary school    5) <input type="radio"/> Completed secondary

		6) <input type="radio"/> <i>Some university</i> 7) <input type="radio"/> <i>Completed university</i> 8) <input type="radio"/> <i>Some Institute/ Polytechnic</i> 9) <input type="radio"/> <i>Completed Institute/ Poly</i>	
Livelihood strategies (Migration)	Do you spend the whole year in Kono? If not, how much time do you spend in Kono? When? And how much elsewhere? [ <i>ensure you know where they are the whole year</i> ] Why do you go there?	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No _____ to _____ (in Kono) _____ to _____ (in _____) Why: _____	
Family structure	Are you married? (How many wives do you have?)	1. <input type="radio"/> single, never married 2. <input type="radio"/> divorced / separated 3. <input type="radio"/> widowed	4. <input type="radio"/> Married, monog. 5. <input type="radio"/> Married, poly _____ wives
Family structure	How many children do have? What ages? Which ones are in school? What do the others do?	_____ children	_____ ages (circle the ones in school) Occupations:
Family structure	Do all your children live with you?		
Family structure	Do you look after any other children? Who? Why? Which ones are in school? What do the others do?	_____ children	_____ ages (circle the ones in school) Occupations:
Family structure	Who lives with you here in Kono? [ <i>List all who live with him/her, including wives and children</i> ]	males _____ females _____ children _____	
Family roles/responsibilities	What do the other people in your household do? <b>NB including women</b>		
Family Background	Who in your family has been involved in mining in the past? What did they do?		
Family Background	And what about today? Who else in your family is involved in mining today? What do they do?		
Family Background	Do they mine in the same place as you or somewhere else?		
<b>Mining Activities</b>			
Livelihood strategies	When did you start in the mining industry? Did you ever have a break from mining? Why? What did you do instead?	Since _____ Break from _____ to _____ Why? What instead?	
Diamond industry roles	What did you do when you very first started? (e.g. e.g. waterboy / overkicking / washing / stripping) What did you do next? For how long? And until now, how else has your mining career developed?	1. _____ Months/years 2. _____ Months/years 3. _____ Months	
Livelihood strategies	What happened so that one day you decided to start mining? [ <i>motivation – what made mining the most desirable/possible livelihood option</i> ]		

Livelihood strategies	Tell us about your very first day. What happened so that that day you went into a pit? (When you first began in the industry, how did you do it?)											
	What type of mining are you operating / supporting just now? [Tick all that apply] If you're not mining just now, why not?	<input type="radio"/> Small-scale mining (machinery) <input type="radio"/> Artisanal mining <input type="radio"/> Overkicking (washing tailings) <input type="radio"/> Washing (gravel) <input type="radio"/> riverbed mining (diving) <input type="radio"/> riverbed mining (no diving) <input type="radio"/> dry ground / terraced mining <input type="radio"/> Gado <input type="radio"/> Other _____ <i>Specify</i> <input type="radio"/> Not mining just now _____										
TS & P	A. Just now, do you work alone or in a gang? If you work alone, are there other people around? If you work in a gang, do you work for a licence-holder?	A. <input type="radio"/> <i>Alone</i> With other people around <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No B. <input type="radio"/> <i>Gang</i> Licence-holder <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No										
<i>If you work ALONE or WITH PEOPLE AROUND:</i>												
Structures (gang)	Why do you work alone and not in a gang?											
Social/human capital	If you work alone, do you ever have anybody help you with your work? Who? What do they do?											
Processes (system)	Who do you have to share your winnings with? In what proportion?											
<i>If you work in a gang:</i>												
Structures (gang)	Are there any women in your gang? How many men and women are in your gang?	<table style="width:100%; border:none;"> <tr> <td style="width:50%; text-align:center;">___ <b>Men</b></td> <td style="width:50%; text-align:center;">___ <b>Women</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td>___ diggers</td> <td>___ water-boys/girls</td> </tr> <tr> <td>___ mines managers</td> <td>___ cooks</td> </tr> <tr> <td>___ divers</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>___ other</td> <td>___ <i>Specify</i></td> </tr> </table>	___ <b>Men</b>	___ <b>Women</b>	___ diggers	___ water-boys/girls	___ mines managers	___ cooks	___ divers		___ other	___ <i>Specify</i>
___ <b>Men</b>	___ <b>Women</b>											
___ diggers	___ water-boys/girls											
___ mines managers	___ cooks											
___ divers												
___ other	___ <i>Specify</i>											
Structures (gang)	If there are women in your gang, what do they do?											
Structures (gang)	What are the ages of the oldest and youngest people in your gang?	<b>Youngest:</b> ___ (Years) <b>Oldest:</b> ___ (Years)										
Structures (gang)	What is your position in your mining gang?											
Trends	Is there a predominant ethnicity in your gang? Is there any special reason for this?	<input type="radio"/> yes <input type="radio"/> no   What _____ Why _____										
Structures (gang)	Tell me about the other people involved in your mining operations. <b>(PROMPT if necessary):</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Do you have a foreman who comes to the site everyday to supervise?</li> <li>• Do you have a license-holder? Does he support you or is there another financier? (supporter)</li> <li>• Do you have a watcher for the night-times if the gravel is productive? Who does that?</li> <li>• Do you have waterboys or children who come and help out?</li> </ul>	<input type="radio"/> Foreman _____ <i>specify</i> <input type="radio"/> License-holder _____ <i>specify</i> <input type="radio"/> Supporter _____ <i>specify</i> <input type="radio"/> Watcher _____ <i>specify</i> <input type="radio"/> Children _____ <i>specify</i> <input type="radio"/> Others _____ <i>specify</i> <i>(tick all that apply)</i>										

Rights	What are the responsibilities of the licensee/supporter towards you? <b>[DO NOT PROMPT]</b>	<input type="radio"/> shelter <input type="radio"/> rice _____ cups per day <input type="radio"/> death expenses <input type="radio"/> health <input type="radio"/> money _____ Le / day <input type="radio"/> transport <input type="radio"/> family welfare <input type="radio"/> children's education										
Processes (gang)	What system does your gang use for allocating winnings?	<input type="radio"/> tributors (wage only) <input type="radio"/> pre-negotiated % of cash <input type="radio"/> pre-negotiated % of gravel (e.g. bucket or pile system) <input type="radio"/> post-negotiated price (I buy the diamonds from them) <input type="radio"/> Other _____ <i>specify</i>										
Processes (gang)	Do all the diggers get the same percentage of the winnings or do they get different percentages?	1) <input type="radio"/> Equal %    2) <input type="radio"/> Not equal %										
	If you don't get equal amounts of the winnings, how are the winnings distributed and why this way? (i.e. what are the conditions for hierarchy?)											
Processes (gang)	Do you get any perks from your boss? When do you get these? (i.e. only when diamonds are found? Or when the work is tedious?)	<input type="radio"/> tobacco <input type="radio"/> jamba <input type="radio"/> palm wine <input type="radio"/> women <input type="radio"/> Other _____ <i>specify</i> because: _____										
Trust	Here is a line. I want to know how much you trust the other diggers. If this end means you don't trust them at all and this end means you trust them completely, how much would you say you trust them? Why?	0                      1                      2                      3                      4 _____ because _____										
Relationships Trust	Again, please mark on the line how much you trust your boss (i.e. your licence-holder / supporter). Why?	0                      1                      2                      3                      4 _____ because _____										
<b>EVERYONE:</b>												
Relationships	If you were a licensee-holder and had diamonds to sell, who would you take them to? Why that person? <b>[PROMPT]</b>	<input type="radio"/> Lebanese <input type="radio"/> Maraka <input type="radio"/> Sierra Leonean <input type="radio"/> Other <input type="radio"/> nationality unimportant. Why? _____										
Natural resources (land)	What other things do diggers do to make money? Which of these have you done? Tell us about it.											
Livelihood Strategy	What else have you done to make a living besides mining? What was it? <b>[Do NOT Prompt]</b> <b>[Choose One]</b>  When did you do it?	<table border="0"> <tr> <td>1. <input type="radio"/> No</td> <td>6. <input type="radio"/> Teacher</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. <input type="radio"/> Farmer</td> <td>7. <input type="radio"/> Medical Worker</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. <input type="radio"/> Trader</td> <td>8. <input type="radio"/> Artisan</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. <input type="radio"/> State functionary</td> <td>9. <input type="radio"/> Other</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5. <input type="radio"/> Soldier</td> <td>_____ (<i>Specify</i>)</td> </tr> </table>	1. <input type="radio"/> No	6. <input type="radio"/> Teacher	2. <input type="radio"/> Farmer	7. <input type="radio"/> Medical Worker	3. <input type="radio"/> Trader	8. <input type="radio"/> Artisan	4. <input type="radio"/> State functionary	9. <input type="radio"/> Other	5. <input type="radio"/> Soldier	_____ ( <i>Specify</i> )
1. <input type="radio"/> No	6. <input type="radio"/> Teacher											
2. <input type="radio"/> Farmer	7. <input type="radio"/> Medical Worker											
3. <input type="radio"/> Trader	8. <input type="radio"/> Artisan											
4. <input type="radio"/> State functionary	9. <input type="radio"/> Other											
5. <input type="radio"/> Soldier	_____ ( <i>Specify</i> )											
Routine	Nowadays, do you mine everyday?	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No										

	<p>Do you have another activity you do as well just now to bring money or food to the house?</p> <p>When do you do this?</p> <p>And do you take a day off from mining for any other reason? (e.g. holy day?)</p> <p>(Target information: <b>what are the other main activities you do each day of the week?</b>)</p>	<p>Occupation: ____ [Enter Code from last question or]</p> <p>1. Monday _____</p> <p>2. Tuesday _____</p> <p>3. Wednesday _____</p> <p>4. Thursday _____</p> <p>5. Friday _____</p> <p>6. Saturday _____</p> <p>21. Sunday _____</p>
Human capital	What other skills do you have which you could use to find work? <b>[PROBE HERE]</b>	
Livelihood Strategy	If there were no diamonds in Kono, what would you be doing to make a living? <b>[realistically]</b>	
Livelihood options	Is there another job you would prefer to do instead of mining? <b>[ideally]</b> If not, then that's OK! Tell us why you like mining so much.	
	Do you think you will ever achieve this? (short-term vs. long-term commitment to mining – how long would you put up with getting not enough from mining?)	
Livelihood Strategy	Why do you mine instead?	
Livelihood Strategy (tradeoffs)	Compared to this other [realistic] occupation you could do, do you feel mining gives you...	<p>1) Money? <input type="radio"/> More <input type="radio"/> less <input type="radio"/> no difference</p> <p>2) Powerful contacts? <input type="radio"/> More <input type="radio"/> less <input type="radio"/> no difference</p> <p>3) Health? <input type="radio"/> Better <input type="radio"/> worse <input type="radio"/> no difference</p> <p>4) Knowledge/skills <input type="radio"/> Better <input type="radio"/> worse <input type="radio"/> no difference</p> <p>5) Financial Security <input type="radio"/> More <input type="radio"/> less <input type="radio"/> no difference</p> <p>6) Physical Security <input type="radio"/> More <input type="radio"/> less <input type="radio"/> no difference</p>
Natural assets	How often do you find gold? When you find it, what do you do with it?	
<b>LIVELIHOOD ASSETS</b>		
Health / Social capital	Who pays for any treatment or drugs you might need?	
Food / Human Capital	Do you or your family ever go hungry? When and why?	
Conflict	What kinds of conflict happen between diggers? Why?	
Structures	What can you tell us about those relationships you have which offer you protection, for example if somebody wishes to cause you physical harm or steal from you? (protection networks)	
Education	Do you know of any training or education opportunities that are available to diggers?	
Education	Have you taken advantage of any of these opportunities, if not why not? If yes what have you gained from them?	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No
Education	What kind of training or improvement	

	opportunities would you like to see?	
<b>FINANCIAL CAPITAL</b>		
Security	How regularly is your household able to provide adequately for its basic needs (i.e. the food, health, shelter and education you require to get by)?	<input type="radio"/> never <input type="radio"/> rarely <input type="radio"/> sometimes <input type="radio"/> often <input type="radio"/> always
security	How regularly is your household able to enjoy treats (i.e. meat, new clothes, improving the house, entertainment, consumables)?	<input type="radio"/> never <input type="radio"/> rarely <input type="radio"/> sometimes <input type="radio"/> often <input type="radio"/> always
Income stability	How often do you get winnings once you are washing the gravel?	<input type="radio"/> never <input type="radio"/> rarely <input type="radio"/> sometimes <input type="radio"/> often <input type="radio"/> always
Income stability	When was the last time you got winnings? How much did you get? What did you do with it?	When _____ Leones
Support	How many people do you support regularly with this income? Who are they? Where are they?	<i>[Enter Number. Include anyone for whom they are the major source of support]</i> _____ Who _____ Where _____
Migration	If they live far away, in what form do you send the money? (e.g. cash, seeds, livestock, food, cloth etc.)	
Support	Does anyone regularly support you? If yes, Who? Why that person? How? (i.e. for food, cash, shelter, school fees etc.?) If no, is that because you don't need support, or because you don't have anyone who can support you?	<input type="radio"/> yes Who: _____ How: _____ <input type="radio"/> no, because _____
Income stability	Who else contributes to the household? What do they bring?	
Income liquidity	On average, and if you know, how much do they bring each day/ week? How stable is that income?	_____ /day OR _____ /week
Houshold roles & responsibilities	Who is the principle money-earner in your family? And who brings in the regular income?  <b>[Do NOT Prompt] [Choose One.]</b>	<input type="radio"/> Me <input type="radio"/> Mother / father <input type="radio"/> Brother / sister <input type="radio"/> Son / daughter <input type="radio"/> Male / Female Cousin <input type="radio"/> Aunt / Uncle <input type="radio"/> Others (specify) _____
Savings	Do you ever manage to spend any income or winnings for safekeeping? On what?	
Livelihood strategies – priorities	If you were to get some smallish winnings today, say 30,000 leones, how would you spend that money?	
Priorities –LS	And medium winnings, say \$100 (300,000 leones)?	
Priorities –LS	And big winnings, say \$1,000 (3 million leones)?	
<b>Social Capital</b>		
Social capital	When you or your family need help for school fees or supplies, who do you go to first? Why? And second? Why?	1 <sup>st</sup> _____ 2 <sup>nd</sup> _____ 3 <sup>rd</sup> _____

	And 3 <sup>rd</sup> ? Why?	
Social capital	When you or someone in your family is sick or injured, who do you go to for help first? Why? And second? Why? And 3 <sup>rd</sup> ? Why?	1 <sup>st</sup> _____ 2 <sup>nd</sup> _____ 3 <sup>rd</sup> _____
Social capital	When you and your family don't have enough food, who do you go to for help first? Why? And second? Why? And 3 <sup>rd</sup> ? Why?	1 <sup>st</sup> _____ 2 <sup>nd</sup> _____ 3 <sup>rd</sup> _____
Social capital	If you wanted credit to invest /reinvest in business, who would you ask to lend you the money first? Why this person? What would their conditions be? And if they wouldn't help you, who would you go to 2 <sup>nd</sup> ? Why? And 3 <sup>rd</sup> ? Why?	1 <sup>st</sup> _____ 2 <sup>nd</sup> _____ 3 <sup>rd</sup> _____
Social capital	And when you or your family has a problem with the authorities, who would you go to first for help? And second? And 3 <sup>rd</sup> ? Why?	1 <sup>st</sup> _____ 2 <sup>nd</sup> _____ 3 <sup>rd</sup> _____
Social capital	Who comes to you for help? Why do they come to you and not other people?	
PDA Social capital / structures	What do you know about the Peace Diamond Alliance?	
PDA	Are you involved with the PDA? In what capacity?	<input type="radio"/> yes <input type="radio"/> no How _____
PDA	In what ways do you think the PDA will affect how the diamond industry works?	
Group	Are you a member of any kind of social groups or network like a youth group or a cooperative? Which ones?	<input type="radio"/> yes <input type="radio"/> no Who _____
Group	What kinds of issues does the group deal with?	
Group	What benefits do you get from being a member?	
Group	Are you a member of any kind of friendship group other than your mining gang?	
Group	Do you have any method of assisting each other when things get tough? What do you do?	
Group	What about your mining gang? Do you have any method of assisting each other when things get tough?	
Trust	Who do you have the most confidence in in the industry? Why? And who do you have the least confidence in? Why?	Most confidence: _____ Because: _____ Least confidence: _____ Because: _____
Trust	Of the local authorities, who do you have the most and the least confidence in? Why?	Most confidence: _____ Because: _____ Least confidence: _____

		Because: _____		
<b>Physical Capital</b>				
Possessions	What possessions do you and your family own which you can use to make money (e.g. bicycle, sewing machines etc.)			
Possessions	What other possessions do you have which you can trade or use for credit if you need to?			
Physical capital	Do you rent or own or are you provided with your accommodation here? If your accommodation is rented, how much do you pay per week/month	1) <input type="radio"/> Rent _____ Leones/week / month (circle) 2) <input type="radio"/> Own                      3) <input type="radio"/> Provided		
Physical capital	If your accommodation is provided, who pays for it?	1) <input type="radio"/> Licence-holder    2) <input type="radio"/> Supporter    3) <input type="radio"/> Family 4) <input type="radio"/> Other _____ <i>Specify</i>		
Priority - Infrastructure	Which of the following don't you have access to?	1) <input type="radio"/> Good shelter                      2) <input type="radio"/> Clean water 3) <input type="radio"/> Transport                              4) <input type="radio"/> Good tools 5) <input type="radio"/> Information                          6) <input type="radio"/> Land		
Priority – Infrastructure	Of those you've said you don't have, if you could have any one, which would it be? Why? <b>[PROMPT]</b> <b>[Choose ONE only]</b>	1) <input type="radio"/> Good shelter                      2) <input type="radio"/> Clean water 3) <input type="radio"/> Transport                              4) <input type="radio"/> Good tools 5) <input type="radio"/> Access to information    6) <input type="radio"/> Access to land		
<b>Livelihood strategies</b>				
Asset combinations & Priorities	Which of the following makes it hardest for you to cope? <b>[PROMPT]</b>	<input type="radio"/> lack of land <input type="radio"/> lack of contacts <input type="radio"/> poor literacy/numeracy <input type="radio"/> lack of skills <input type="radio"/> poor health	<input type="radio"/> poor tools <input type="radio"/> Poor shelter <input type="radio"/> Lack of transport <input type="radio"/> Other ( <i>Specify</i> ) _____	
Asset combinations & Priorities	But if you could have any ONE of the following, which would it be and why? <b>[PROMPT]</b>	<input type="radio"/> More or better land <input type="radio"/> More powerful contacts <input type="radio"/> Better literacy/numeracy <input type="radio"/> Better skills <input type="radio"/> Better health	<input type="radio"/> Better tools <input type="radio"/> Better shelter <input type="radio"/> Better transport <input type="radio"/> Other ( <i>Specify</i> ) _____	
TS & P	What needs to change so you can have this improvement?			
☞ I am going to ask you about the way things are in the community where you live. I will read a list of things and for each one I would like you to tell me whether you think that these things happen and are directly related to mining.				
Conflicts over land	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Crime	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Gender-based violence (domestic violence)	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Abuse of alcohol or non-medical drugs	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Prostitution	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know

Distrust among neighbours	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Corruption of local authorities	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Environmental damage	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
HIV/AIDS	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know

**NB Only ask if they are migrants:**



Now I would like you to think about the way things are in Kono compared to non-mining areas, I will again read a list of things and for each one I would like you to tell me whether you think that these things are better, worse or the same in Kono than that other place, and whether that is related to mining or not. I would also like you to tell me what place you are thinking of

Access to education	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Access to medical care	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
More opportunities for employment	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Rapid renovation of war damaged buildings	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Wider availability of goods on the market and in shops	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Increased entertainment opportunities	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Better living conditions / quality of life	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
What do you know about the diamond area community development funds? What benefits have you seen come from these?					
So in your opinion, what would help diamonds work for peace and prosperity, why?					

**Final Open Question**

Do you have any other comments you would like to make or views that you would like to share before we end this interview?	
---	--

**! END OF INTERVIEW !**

**Post-Interview Section to be Asked of Interviewee**

Is there anything you think we missed out in this interview? What?			
Did you feel comfortable enough to talk openly at all times?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not really	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Yes
What could we do to improve how we do these interviews?			

**Appendix 2b**

**Miners' Questionnaire**

**For licence-holders, mines managers, and foremen**

Name of Interviewer \_\_\_\_\_  
 Province \_\_\_\_\_  
 District \_\_\_\_\_  
 Village \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date \_\_\_\_\_

Time Start: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Time End: \_\_\_\_\_

Where did the interview take place? \_\_\_\_\_

How did this affect the interview? \_\_\_\_\_

**5. Post-Interview Section to be Completed by Enumerator**

How private was the interview	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Very private	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Somewhat public	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Very public
Did you feel that this interviewee was distracted during the interview	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Concentrated	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Somewhat distracted	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Very distracted
Did you feel that the interviewee was willing to share information or was he more reluctant to share?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Willing to Share	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Reluctant to share
Did you feel that the interviewee was telling the truth all the time, some of the time, or hardly ever?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood the concepts we used?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood why we wanted the information?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel comfortable interviewing this person?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Comfortable	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not Comfortable

Did Interview End Before Completion? Yes

Why: \_\_\_\_\_

**1 Main questions**

<p> Our first questions are general ones about who you are. Then we'll ask you some questions about your involvement in the mining industry.</p>		
<p><b>(Vulnerability) Context: What are the population trends in mining &amp; why?</b></p>		
Trends	[Enter the Respondent's Sex]	1. <input type="radio"/> Male                      2. <input type="radio"/> Female
Trends	What <b>year</b> were you born? [If the respondent does not know, ask him/ her to estimate his/ her age]	19 ____ or ____ years
Trends	What is your nationality?	1. <input type="radio"/> Sierra Leonean 2. <input type="radio"/> non-Sierra Leonean _____ [Specify]
Trends	Where were you born?	Reg/Dis/Chiefdom ____-____-____ [codebook #]
Trends	Where were you living before the war began?	Reg/Dis/Chiefdom ____-____-____ [codebook #]
Trends	Where did you live during the war? What dates did you go and come back from there?	Reg/Dis/Chiefdom ____-____-____ [codebook #] From _____ to _____ and _____ to _____
Trends	What did you do while you were there?	
Trends	When did you come to Kono?	_____
Trends	What is your religion?  <b>[Do NOT Prompt]</b> <b>[Choose One]</b>	1. <input type="radio"/> None                      2 <input type="radio"/> Christian 3. <input type="radio"/> Adventist                4. <input type="radio"/> Muslim 5. <input type="radio"/> Traditional Religion: _____ [Specify] 6. <input type="radio"/> Other: _____ [Specify]
Trends	What languages do you speak? <b>[Do NOT Prompt]</b> Which of these languages do you speak best? [Circle Language Spoken best]	_____ [codebook #]
Trends	What is your tribe? <b>[Do NOT Prompt]</b>	_____ and also _____
Trends	What is your highest level of education?  Class I – VI = Primary School Form I – VI = Secondary School <b>Codes For Colonial Educ System</b>	1) <input type="radio"/> No school 2) <input type="radio"/> Some primary school    3) <input type="radio"/> Completed primary 4) <input type="radio"/> Some secondary school   5) <input type="radio"/> Completed secondary 6) <input type="radio"/> Some university            7) <input type="radio"/> Completed university 8) <input type="radio"/> Some Institute/Polytechnic 9) <input type="radio"/> Completed Institute/ Poly
Family Background	What was the highest level of education of your father?  <b>[Do NOT Prompt]</b> <b>[Choose One]</b>	0) <input type="radio"/> No school                    1) <input type="radio"/> Don't Know 2) <input type="radio"/> Some primary school    3) <input type="radio"/> Completed primary 4) <input type="radio"/> Some secondary school   5) <input type="radio"/> Completed secondary 6) <input type="radio"/> Some university            7) <input type="radio"/> Completed university 8) <input type="radio"/> Some Institute/Polytechnic 9) <input type="radio"/> Completed

		<i>Institute/ Poly.</i>	
Family Background	What was the highest level of education of your mother? <b>[Do NOT Prompt]</b> <b>[Choose One]</b>	0) <input type="radio"/> No school                      1) <input type="radio"/> Don't Know 2) <input type="radio"/> Some primary school    3) <input type="radio"/> Completed primary 4) <input type="radio"/> Some secondary school   5) <input type="radio"/> Completed secondary 6) <input type="radio"/> Some university                7) <input type="radio"/> Completed university 8) <input type="radio"/> Some Institute/ Polytechnic   9) <input type="radio"/> Completed Institute/ Poly	
Livelihood strategies (Migration)	Do you spend the whole year in Kono? If not, how much time do you spend in Kono? When? And how much elsewhere? Why do you go there? <b>[ensure you know where they are the whole year]</b>	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No _____ to _____ (in Kono) _____ to _____ (in _____) Why: _____	
Family structure	Are you married? (How many wives do you have?)	1. <input type="radio"/> single, never married 2. <input type="radio"/> divorced / separated 3. <input type="radio"/> widowed	4. <input type="radio"/> Married, mono 5. <input type="radio"/> Married, poly _____ wives
Family structure	How many children do have? What ages? Which ones are in school? What do the others do?	_____ children	_____ ages (circle the ones in school) Occupations:
Family structure	Do all your children live with you?		
Family structure	Do you look after any other children? Whose? Why? Which ones are in school? What do the others do?	_____ children	_____ ages (circle the ones in school) Occupations:
Family structure	Who lives with you here in Kono? <b>[List all who live with him/her, including wives and children]</b> <b>[Key information: family or not, how many people]</b>	males _____ females _____ children _____	
Family roles/responsibilities	What do all the other people in your household do? <b>NB including women</b>		
Family Background	Who in your family has been involved in mining in the past? What did they do?		
Family Background	And what about today? Who else in your family is involved in mining today? What do they do?		
<b>Mining activities</b>			
Livelihood strategies	When did you start in the mining industry? Did you ever have a break from mining? Why? What did you do instead?	Since _____ Break from _____ to _____ Why? What instead?	
Diamond industry	What did you do when you very first started? (e.g.	4. _____ from _____ to _____ (i.e. _____ M/Y)	



(system)	with? In what proportion? How did you decide on these proportions?	
Structures (gang)	Besides your diggers and these other people you have told me about, what can you tell me about the other people involved in your mining operations. <b>(PROMPT if necessary):</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Who is your licence-holder?</li> <li>Do you have a watcher for the night-times if the gravel is productive? Who does that?</li> <li>Do you have children who come and help out? What do they do?</li> <li>Do you have women who cook or do anything else for the diggers? Who?</li> </ul>	<i>(tick all that apply)</i> <input type="radio"/> License-holder _____ <i>specify</i> <input type="radio"/> Watcher _____ <i>specify</i> <input type="radio"/> Children _____ <i>specify</i> <input type="radio"/> Others _____ <i>specify</i>
Structures (gang)	Are there any women in your mining gang? How many? How many men are in your gang?	_____ <b>Men</b> _____ <b>Women</b>
Structures (gang)	If there are women or children who help you out, what do they do?	_____ diggers          _____ water-boys/girls _____ mines managers          _____ cooks _____ divers          _____ other _____ <i>Specify</i>
Responsibilities	What are your responsibilities towards your diggers? i.e. what are all the things that you pay for?  <b>[Do not PROMPT]</b> <b>[Tick all that apply]</b>	<input type="radio"/> shelter <input type="radio"/> rice _____ cups per day <input type="radio"/> death expenses <input type="radio"/> health <input type="radio"/> money _____ Le per _____ <input type="radio"/> transport <input type="radio"/> family welfare <input type="radio"/> children's education
Financial capital	How much do these things cost you on average? <b>[complete rice and money from information given above]</b>	<b>shelter</b> _____ per _____ <b>transport</b> _____ per _____ <b>rice</b> _____ per _____ <b>money</b> _____ per _____ <b>Health</b> _____ per _____ <b>funeral</b> _____ per _____ <b>family</b> _____ per _____ <b>education</b> _____ per _____
Trends	Is there a predominant ethnicity amongst your diggers and/or washers? Is there a reason for this?	<input type="radio"/> yes <input type="radio"/> no          What _____ Why _____
Processes (gang)	What system do you use for allocating winnings to your diggers?	<input type="radio"/> tributors (wage only) <input type="radio"/> pre-negotiated % of cash <input type="radio"/> pre-negotiated % of gravel (e.g. bucket/pile system) <input type="radio"/> post-negotiated price (I buy the diamonds from them) <input type="radio"/> Other _____ <i>specify</i>
Processes (gang)	Do all the diggers get the same percentage of the winnings or do they get different percentages?	1) <input type="radio"/> Equal %          2) <input type="radio"/> Not equal %
Processes (gang)	If they don't get equal amounts of the winnings, how are the winnings distributed? Why is it done this way? (i.e. what are the conditions for the hierarchy?)	How _____ Why: _____
Trust	Here is a line. I want to know how much you trust your diggers. If this end means you don't trust them at all and this end means you trust them completely, how much would you say you trust your diggers to treat you fairly? Why?	0                  1                  2                  3                  4

Relationships	If you had the choice, who would you prefer to sell your diamonds to? Why?	<input type="radio"/> Lebanese <input type="radio"/> Maraka <input type="radio"/> Sierra Leonean <input type="radio"/> Other <input type="radio"/> nationality unimportant. Why? _____
Livelihood strategies	Did you have a previous occupation? What was it? When did you do this?  <p style="text-align: center;"><b>[Do NOT Prompt] [Choose One]</b></p>	10. <input type="radio"/> No                      15. <input type="radio"/> Teacher 11. <input type="radio"/> Farmer                      16. <input type="radio"/> Medical Worker 12. <input type="radio"/> Trader                      17. <input type="radio"/> Artisan 13. <input type="radio"/> State                      18. <input type="radio"/> Business person functionary                      10. <input type="radio"/> Other 14. <input type="radio"/> Soldier                      _____
Livelihood strategies / Routine	Nowadays, do you mine everyday?  Do you have another activity you do as well just now to bring money or food to the house?  When do you do this?  And do you take a day off from mining for any other reason? (e.g. holy day?)  (Target information: <b><i>what are the other main activities you do each day of the week?</i></b> )	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No Occupation: _____ [Enter Code from last question or] 7. Monday _____ 8. Tuesday _____ 9. Wednesday _____ 10. Thursday _____ 11. Friday _____ 12. Saturday _____ 13. Sunday _____
Livelihood options	If you were not mining, what would you be doing to make a living? <b><i>[realistically]</i></b>	
Livelihood options	Is there another job you would prefer to do instead of mining? <b><i>[ideally]</i></b>	
Livelihood options	Why do you mine instead? <b><i>[i.e. what makes mining the more desirable or more possible option?]</i></b>	
Livelihood options	Compared to this other occupation you could do, do you feel mining gives you...	1) Money? <input type="radio"/> More <input type="radio"/> less <input type="radio"/> no difference 2) Powerful contacts? <input type="radio"/> More <input type="radio"/> less <input type="radio"/> no difference 3) Health? <input type="radio"/> Better <input type="radio"/> worse <input type="radio"/> no difference 4) Knowledge/skills <input type="radio"/> Better <input type="radio"/> worse <input type="radio"/> no difference 5) Financial Security <input type="radio"/> More <input type="radio"/> less <input type="radio"/> no difference 6) Physical Security <input type="radio"/> More <input type="radio"/> less <input type="radio"/> no difference
<b>LIVELIHOOD ASSETS</b>		
<b>Natural Capital</b>		
Livelihood strategies	Besides mining, do you do anything else with the land you have licensed? What?	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No
Natural capital	Do you have access to any land other than that which you mine? Where? What do you do with it?	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No Reg/Dis/Chiefdom _____ What: _____
licensing	When you go to the chief to apply for your licence, do you always get the land you want? If not, why not?	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No

		because _____
Natural capital	Are your mines as productive as you expected them to be? If not, why not?	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No because _____
Natural capital	What could be done to make your mines be made more productive? Why aren't you doing this?	
reclamation	When you are finished mining a site, do you do anything to return the land to a more natural state? Why (not)?	
Policy	What facilities or resources exist to help you reclaim the land if you or others want to?	
Natural capital	Is this an area where gold is found? How often is it found? When it is found, what happens to it?	<input type="radio"/> never <input type="radio"/> rarely <input type="radio"/> sometimes <input type="radio"/> often <input type="radio"/> always
<b>FINANCIAL CAPITAL</b>		
Security	How regularly is your household able to provide adequately for its basic needs (i.e. the food, health, shelter and education you require to get by)?	<input type="radio"/> never <input type="radio"/> rarely <input type="radio"/> sometimes <input type="radio"/> often <input type="radio"/> always
Security	How regularly is your household able to enjoy treats (i.e. meat, new clothes, improving the house, entertainment, consumables)?	<input type="radio"/> never <input type="radio"/> rarely <input type="radio"/> sometimes <input type="radio"/> often <input type="radio"/> always
Income stability	How often do you get winnings once you are washing the gravel?	<input type="radio"/> never <input type="radio"/> rarely <input type="radio"/> sometimes <input type="radio"/> often <input type="radio"/> always
Liquidity	When was the last time you got winnings? What was it? Can you tell me approximately much you got for it?	_____ when _____ ct (gem/industrial) _____ Leones
Support	Besides your diggers, how many people do you support with this income? Who are they? Where are they?	Who: _____ _____ (number) Where: : _____
Support	Does anyone regularly support you? If yes, Who? Why that person? How? (i.e. for food, cash, shelter, school fees etc.?)	<input type="radio"/> yes Who: _____ How: _____ <input type="radio"/> no, because _____
Income stability	Who else contributes to your household? What do they bring? (e.g. food, cash)	
Income liquidity	On average, how much do they bring each day / week? How stable is that income?	_____ per day OR _____ per week
Household roles & responsibilities	Who is the principle money-earner in your family? And who brings in the regular income? <b>[Do NOT Prompt]</b> <b>[Choose One.]</b>	<input type="radio"/> Me <input type="radio"/> Mother / father <input type="radio"/> Brother / sister <input type="radio"/> Son / daughter <input type="radio"/> Male / Female Cousin <input type="radio"/> Aunt / Uncle <input type="radio"/> Others (specify) _____
Liquidity	Overall then, and if you are comfortable telling us, what do you estimate the average weekly income for your family to be <b>[Note: Include only cash income]</b>	_____ [Enter Income in Leones]
Expenditure	Again, if you are comfortable telling us, what do you spend the regular income on?	
Expenditure	And when you get winnings, what do you spend that income on?	
Savings	Do you ever manage to spend any income or	

	winnings for safekeeping? On what?	
Credit	Do you currently have loans outstanding? How does that affect you and your family?	
Priorities – LS	If you were to get a good one carat gem today, what would you spend the winnings on?	
Priorities – LS	And what about a good 10 carat gem? What would you spend that on?	
<b>Social Capital</b>		
Social capital	When you or your family need help for school fees or supplies, who do you go to first? Why? And second? Why? And 3rd ? Why?	1 <sup>st</sup> _____ 2 <sup>nd</sup> _____ 3 <sup>rd</sup> _____
Social capital	When you or someone in your family was sick or injured, who do you go to for help first? Why? And second? Why? And 3rd ? Why?	1 <sup>st</sup> _____ 2 <sup>nd</sup> _____ 3 <sup>rd</sup> _____
Social capital	When you and your family don't have enough food, who do you go to for help first? Why? And second? Why? And 3rd ? Why?	1 <sup>st</sup> _____ 2 <sup>nd</sup> _____ 3 <sup>rd</sup> _____
Social capital	If you needed credit to invest/reinvest in business, who would you ask to lend you the money? Why this person? What would their conditions be? And if they wouldn't help you, who would you go to 2 <sup>nd</sup> ? Why? And 3rd ? Why?	1 <sup>st</sup> _____ 2 <sup>nd</sup> _____ 3 <sup>rd</sup> _____
Social capital	When you or your family has a problem with the authorities, who would you go to first for help? And second? And 3rd ? Why?	1 <sup>st</sup> _____ 2 <sup>nd</sup> _____ 3 <sup>rd</sup> _____
Social capital	Who comes to you for help? Why do they come to you and not other people?	
PDA Social capital / structures	What do you know about the Peace Diamond Alliance?	
PDA	Are you involved with the PDA? In what capacity?	<input type="radio"/> yes <input type="radio"/> no How _____
PDA	In what ways do you think the PDA is affecting how the diamond industry works?	
Group	Are you a member of any kind of social groups or network like a youth group or a cooperative? Which ones?	<input type="radio"/> yes <input type="radio"/> no Which _____
Group	What kinds of issues does the group deal with? (what is the purpose of the group?)	
Group	What benefits do you get from being a member?	
Group	Are you a member of any kind of friendship group?	
Group	Do you have any method of assisting each other when things get tough? What do you do?	
Trust	Who do you have the most confidence in in the diamond industry? Why? And who do you have the least confidence in? Why?	Most confidence: _____ Because: _____ Least confidence: _____ Because: _____

Trust	Of the local authorities, who do you have the most and the least confidence in? Why?	Most confidence: _____ Because: _____ Least confidence: _____ Because: _____
<b>Physical Capital</b>		
Possessions	What possessions do you and your family own which you can use to make your labour more productive (e.g. bicycle, sewing machines etc.)	
Possessions	What other possessions do you have which you can trade or use for credit if you need to?	
Physical capital	Do you rent or own or are you provided with your accommodation here? If your accommodation is rented, how much do you pay per week/month	1) <input type="radio"/> Rent _____ Leones per week / month (circle) 2) <input type="radio"/> Own                      3) <input type="radio"/> Provided
Physical capital	If your accommodation is provided, who pays for it?	1) <input type="radio"/> Licence-holder 2) <input type="radio"/> Supporter 3) <input type="radio"/> Family 4) <input type="radio"/> Other _____ <i>Specify</i>
Priority - Infrastructure	Which of the following don't you have access to?	1) <input type="radio"/> Good shelter                      2) <input type="radio"/> Clean water 3) <input type="radio"/> Transport                      4) <input type="radio"/> Good tools 5) <input type="radio"/> Information (e.g. radio)                      6) <input type="radio"/> Land
Priority – Infrastructure	Of those you've said you don't have, if you could have any one, which would it be? Why? <b>[PROMPT]</b> <b>[Choose ONE only]</b>	1) <input type="radio"/> Good shelter                      2) <input type="radio"/> Clean water 3) <input type="radio"/> Transport                      4) <input type="radio"/> Good tools 5) <input type="radio"/> Access to information                      6) <input type="radio"/> Access to land
<b>HUMAN CAPITAL</b>		
Structures	What can you tell us about those relationships you have which offer you protection, for example if somebody wishes to cause you physical harm or steal from you? (protection networks)	
Education	Do you know of any training or education opportunities that are available to licence-holders? What can you tell me about these?	
Education	Do you know of any government support schemes that are available to licence-holders?	
Education	What kind of support do you think the government should be giving to licence-holders?	
<b>Livelihood strategies</b>		
Asset combinations & Priorities	Which of the following makes it hardest for you to cope? <b>[PROMPT]</b>	<input type="radio"/> lack of land <input type="radio"/> lack of contacts <input type="radio"/> poor literacy or numeracy <input type="radio"/> lack of skills <input type="radio"/> poor health <input type="radio"/> poor tools <input type="radio"/> Poor shelter <input type="radio"/> Lack of transport <input type="radio"/> Other ( <i>Specify</i> )
Asset combinations & Priorities	But if you could have any ONE of the following, which would it be and why? <b>[PROMPT]</b>	<input type="radio"/> More or better land <input type="radio"/> More powerful contacts <input type="radio"/> Better literacy or numeracy <input type="radio"/> Better skills <input type="radio"/> Better health <input type="radio"/> Better tools <input type="radio"/> Better shelter <input type="radio"/> Better transport <input type="radio"/> Other ( <i>Specify</i> )
TS & P	What needs to change so you can have this	

improvement?					
<p>☛ I am going to ask you about the way things are in the community where you live. I will read a list of things and for each one I would like you to tell me firstly whether you think that these things happen and secondly, if they do happen, whether they are directly related to mining or not</p>					
Conflicts over land	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know	
Crime	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know	
Gender-based violence (domestic violence)	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know	
Abuse of alcohol or non-medical drugs	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know	
Prostitution	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know	
Distrust among neighbours	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know	
Corruption of local authorities	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know	
Environmental damage	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know	
HIV/AIDS	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know	
<p>☛ Now I would like you to think about the way things are in Kono compared to non-mining areas. I will again read a list of things and for each one I would like you to tell me whether you think that these things are better, worse or the same in Kono than that other place, and whether that is related to the existence of the mining industry in Kono or not.</p>					
Access to education	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Access to medical care	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
More opportunities for employment	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Rapid renovation of war damaged buildings	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Wider availability of goods on the market and in shops	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Increased entertainment opportunities	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Better living conditions / quality of life	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
<p>What do you know about the diamondiferous area community development funds? What benefits have you seen come from these?</p>					
<p>So in your opinion, what would help diamonds work for peace and prosperity, and why?</p>					

**2 Final Open Question**

Do you have any other comments you would like to make or views that you would like to share before we end this interview?

**! END OF INTERVIEW !**

**3 Post-Interview Section to be Asked of Interviewee**

Is there anything you think we missed out in this interview? What?			
Did you feel comfortable enough to talk openly at all times?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not really	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Yes
What could we do to improve how we do these interviews?			

**Appendix 3a, Bank Manager, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004**

1. What can you tell us about the Bank and its role in the local economy?
2. What local economic opportunities do you perceive have come directly from mining? (evidence)
3. And what indirectly? (evidence)
4. Which types of people use the bank? Who doesn't? (i.e. Is it mostly non-nationals?)
5. What is the maximum loan the bank would most probably give to an exporter? And a dealer? And a supporter? A license-holder? A digger?
6. What are the requirements to get a small loan? And a big loan?
7. If people aren't happy to offer their homes and plantations as collateral, what other kinds of collateral would the bank accept?
8. Do they offer any types of microcredit schemes? Can he tell me the number of loans given under these schemes? How capable and/or willing are borrowers to repay the loans? What needs to change locally so these schemes might work?
9. We have heard that it is generally easier for foreigners to get bank loans than nationals. In your experience, is this so? Why? What can be done about this?
10. What can you tell me about the role your bank will play in the PDA's credit scheme? (storing diamonds / managing the loans??)
11. Does the fact that this is a diamondiferous area have any effect on the local exchange rate? i.e. what kind of effect does having all these US \$ around have?
12. What kinds of economic changes do you believe needs to occur for this region to develop? Is this the kind of things DACDF funds should be used for?
13. What kinds of social changes do you believe need to occur for this region to develop?
14. What kinds of political changes do you believe need to occur for this region to develop?
15. How does the bank assess the relative level of risk when comparing mining, commercial farming, small-scale farming, trading etc. Which is riskiest? Which is least? Why?
16. What types of mining is the bank most prepared to support? Why?
17. In your experience, how do people become successful in this local economic environment? (i.e. nationals) Do they tend to pursue single livelihood strategies (i.e. one business only) or many? What is the most successful combination in your view?
18. In your opinion, which is most important in this society: money or social contacts? Why?

**Final Open Question**

<p>Do you have any other comments you would like to make or views that you would like to share before we end this interview?</p>	
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**! END OF INTERVIEW !****2 Post-Interview Section to be Asked of Interviewee**

Is there anything you think we missed out in this interview? What?			
Did you feel comfortable enough to talk openly at all times?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not really	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Yes
What could we do to improve how we do these interviews?			

**6. Post-Interview Section to be Completed by Enumerator**

Did you feel that this interviewee was distracted during the interview	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Concentrated	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Somewhat distracted	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Very distracted
Did you feel that the interviewee was willing to share information or was he more reluctant to share?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Willing to Share	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Reluctant to share
Did you feel that the interviewee was telling the truth all the time, some of the time, or hardly ever?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood the concepts we used?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood why we wanted the information?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel comfortable interviewing this person?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Comfortable	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not Comfortable

Did Interview End Before Completion? Yes

Why:

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**Appendix 3b: Assistant Director of the Ministry of Mineral Resources, 20<sup>th</sup> July 2004**

Industry governance and development

1. What plans does the ministry have for developing the industry in the future? Besides these things, in your opinion, what more could be done a.) to develop the industry, and b.) to ensure that it benefits the people?
2. What is the government doing to encourage a cutting and polishing industry, i.e. rudimentary and industrial?
3. What can you tell us about how the productivity of artisanal mines is changing and how this will affect the industry and Kono society in the future?
4. We're aware that the government has set aside a fund for reclaiming mining land. How is this scheme supposed to work? Why isn't it working?
5. We're aware there are other exploitable minerals in Kono, like gold, for instance. Why aren't these being exploited yet? What plans exist to do so?

Legality

Part of our objective is to understand the challenges the government faces in helping make diamonds a force for peace and prosperity here in Sierra Leone, but especially in Kono. Therefore we want to understand people's incentives for operating outside of the legal industry.

**ILLEGAL MINING**

6. Do you think attitudes to illegal mining have changed since the end of the war? How? Why?
7. What can you tell us about the unlicensed mining which goes on in Kono?
  - Which types of people tend to mine without licenses? Why is this?
  - What do unlicensed miners do with their diamonds?
8. In your experience, what prevents people from mining legally? (besides being able to pay for the licence)
9. Do you think it would be easier for more people to mine legally if the licensing process was changed? For example, if they could pay for their licence in monthly instalments? (or if there were mining licenses for people who want to mine alone?)

**DEALING**

10. What can you tell us about the scheme for training up ECOWAS citizens as dealers? i.e. coaxers? Is it working? We've heard that no SL are taking part. Why is this?
11. We've heard that the number of Sierra Leonean dealers has been increasing in recent years. What do you know about the relationship between the national and non-national dealers in Kono?
12. In your opinion, is there more or less legal dealing done than illegal dealing? In what proportions?
13. Would you say that attitudes to smuggling have changed since the end of the war? How? Why?
14. What actions are the government taking to make smuggling a less viable option?

15. I'm sure you've heard the allegations made against largely the Lebanese communities and their alleged connections to Al Qaeda and Hizb Allah. How do you feel about this?
16. At each stage of the legal diamond chain, are there dominant ethnicities which operate at that level? i.e. what is the predominant ethnicity among the diggers, the licence-holders, the dealers, the exporters? What about the illegal diamond chain?
17. Statistics show that the government has received about \$800m this year so far. To your knowledge, how has this money been spent? How would you like to see it spent?

**Various levels of dishonesty.**

18. In an earlier discussion it was said that if you're not corrupt or making money by illegal or dishonest means, you're not smart. Do you feel that this view is a norm? Why does this view exist?
19. I understand that there are different forms of dishonesty and corruption which are possible in the mining industry and I'm trying to get clear what these are. For example, diggers will steal diamonds from their gang; people who are in positions of power are paid off to use their position to influence a decision or to take certain action; or government officials will sometimes use public money for personal gain. Firstly, do you agree that I'm understanding these things quite well? What other possible scenarios might exist in Kono society that I haven't considered yet? How do you see it?
20. Out of those scenarios we've discussed, which do you think is most damaging to local wellbeing?
21. What is the ministry doing to weedle out corruption in the industry?
22. Have attitudes to corruption changed since the end of the war? How? Why?
23. What improvements have been made in limiting corruption? What evidence is there of this?
24. And what types of corruption would be most difficult to minimise? Why?
25. In your opinion, how do people gain position in Sierra Leonean society?
26. So which is most important in Sierra Leonean society: money or social contacts? Why?
27. From our interviews it is clear that those individuals working in the diamond industry are reliant upon networks of patronage. What about can you tell me about these networks? How have they changed since before the war? i.e. how have they emerged? How would you characterise the relationships within these networks?
28. Some people have said that diamonds were a factor in causing and fuelling the war. Do you agree with this? Why?
29. So in your opinion, what would help diamonds work for peace and prosperity, why?

**Stats**

30. Can you give me stats on how many mining licences were issued in the past few years for the country as a whole and for Kono?
31. What proportion of licensed miners are from Kono?
32. How many dealing licences are issued for Kono? And for Sierra Leone? How many are pending?
33. How many legal and illegal artisanal mines exist in the Kono district? What area do they cover?

34. What can you tell us about the unlicensed mining which goes on here in Kono?
- How many miners and what % operating in Kono are illegal?
  - What area of land in Kono is mined legally vs. illegally?
  - Which types of people tend to mine without licenses? Why is this?
  - How do their mining practices differ from those of licensed miners?  
i.e. Do unlicensed miners work in gangs or alone? Why is this? Where/when do they mine?
  - What do unlicensed miners do with their diamonds?

**Final Open Question**

<p>Do you have any other comments you would like to make or views that you would like to share before we end this interview?</p>	
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**! END OF INTERVIEW !**

**3 Post-Interview Section to be Asked of Interviewee**

Is there anything you think we missed out in this interview? What?			
Did you feel comfortable enough to talk openly at all times?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not really	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Yes
What could we do to improve how we do these interviews?			

**3. Post-Interview Section to be Completed by Enumerator**

Did you feel that this interviewee was distracted during the interview	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Concentrated	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Somewhat distracted	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Very distracted
Did you feel that the interviewee was willing to share information or was he more reluctant to share?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Willing to Share	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Reluctant to share
Did you feel that the interviewee was telling the truth all the time, some of the time, or hardly ever?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood the concepts we used?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood why we wanted the information?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel comfortable interviewing this person?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Comfortable	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not Comfortable

Did Interview End Before Completion? Yes

Why: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**Appendix 3c: Health Professionals, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2004**

1. Tell me about your job. Where else have you worked as a health professional?
2. Tell me a little about your health centre here.
3. For whom do you provide health services?
4. How much does an ordinary check-up cost? Would you say this cost is the same throughout mining communities or does it differ? How does this price compare to non-mining communities?
5. How many doctors work here? And nurses? And what population do they serve?
6. Do you have any plans for improving the health centre here?
7. Has the community organised any health initiatives?
8. Are there any miner-specific initiatives that you know about either in your community or elsewhere? What can you tell me about them?
9. What are the main chronic sicknesses which affect miners and their families throughout the year?
10. How much does it cost to treat these sicknesses?
11. What usually happens if someone cannot afford to pay for the treatment?
12. Which sicknesses are most common at certain times of the year? i.e. do these sicknesses have peak seasons? When? (i.e. seasonality of disease)
13. How frequent are epidemics? (such as sleeping sickness, lassa fever and cholera) When did you last have a bout of each of these in this area?
14. What are the main causes of death among miners?
15. What are the main injuries which affect miners?
16. How much does it usually cost to treat these sicknesses?
17. How common are sexually-transmitted diseases in this community compared to non-mining communities? And compared to larger towns like Koidu?
18. What is the prevalence of HIV/Aids in this community? Is it even known? Do you think the risk of HIV is higher or lower in mining communities than in other communities, or is the risk the same?
19. What action is being taken to improve local environmental health? i.e. provision of clean water, health education, gender-based health education etc.
20. What evidence of domestic abuse do you see as a doctor? Do you feel women in mining villages are injured more frequently or more severely from gender-based violence than in other communities, or is there no difference?

21. Do you ever get any cases of people being injured because of remnants of war, that is unexploded ammunition, landmines and so on?
22. In your view, what is the single most important action which could be taken which would improve local health?
23. In your opinion, how does the health of mining communities compare with non-mining communities? E.g. farming communities.

**Final Open Question**

<p>Do you have any other comments you would like to make or views that you would like to share before we end this interview?</p>	
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**! END OF INTERVIEW !**

**4 Post-Interview Section to be Asked of Interviewee**

Is there anything you think we missed out in this interview? What?			
Did you feel comfortable enough to talk openly at all times?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not really	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Yes
What could we do to improve how we do these interviews?			

**4. Post-Interview Section to be Completed by Enumerator**

Did you feel that this interviewee was distracted during the interview	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Concentrated	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Somewhat distracted	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Very distracted
Did you feel that the interviewee was willing to share information or was he more reluctant to share?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Willing to Share	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Reluctant to share
Did you feel that the interviewee was telling the truth all the time, some of the time, or hardly ever?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood the concepts we used?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood why we wanted the information?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel comfortable interviewing this person?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Comfortable	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not Comfortable

Did Interview End Before Completion? Yes

Why: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

### **Appendix 3d: Mines Monitoring Officer, 12<sup>th</sup> July 2004**

How did you get involved in the mining industry? What have been your various roles in it?

So you've been involved in mining for x years now. What can you tell us about how the industry has changed since then? In what ways is the artisanal mining industry different today to how it was before and during the war?

What do you feel people think about how the mining industry is currently working? How content are they with that? (How likely do you feel war is again?)

You did a study for NMJD on artisanal mining. What was the main lesson from your study?

#### **Legality**

Part of our objective is to understand the challenges the government faces in helping make diamonds a force for peace and prosperity here in Sierra Leone, but especially in Kono. Therefore we want to understand people's incentives for operating outside of the legal industry.

#### **ILLEGAL MINING**

35. Do you think attitudes to illegal mining have changed since the end of the war? How? Why?
36. What can you tell us about the unlicensed mining which goes on here in Kono?
  - How many miners and what % operating in Kono are illegal?
  - What area of land in Kono is mined legally vs. illegally?
  - Which types of people tend to mine without licenses? Why is this?
  - How do their mining practices differ from those of licensed miners?
    - i.e. Do unlicensed miners work in gangs or alone? Why is this? Where/when do they mine?
  - What do unlicensed miners do with their diamonds?
37. In your experience, what prevents people from mining legally? (besides being able to pay for the licence)
38. Do you think it would be easier for more people to mine legally if the licensing process was changed? For example, if they could pay for their licence in monthly instalments? (or if there were mining licenses for people who want to mine alone?)
39. We've heard that the number of Sierra Leonean dealers has been increasing in recent years. What do you know about the relationship between the national and non-national dealers in Kono?
40. In your opinion, is there more or less legal dealing done than illegal dealing? In what proportions?
41. Would you say that attitudes to smuggling have changed since the end of the war? How? Why?
42. What actions are the government taking to make smuggling a less viable option?
43. At each stage of the legal diamond chain, are there dominant ethnicities which operate at that level? i.e. what is the predominant ethnicity among the diggers, the licence-holders, the dealers, the exporters? What about the illegal diamond chain?

#### **Various levels of dishonesty**

44. In an earlier discussion it was said that if you're not corrupt or making money by illegal or dishonest means, you're not smart. Do you feel that this view is a norm? Why does this view exist?

45. In your view, where is the biggest potential for corruption in Kono society?
46. I understand that there are different forms of dishonesty and corruption which are possible in the mining industry and I'm trying to get clear what these are. For example, diggers will steal diamonds from their gang; people who are in positions of power are paid off to use their position to influence a decision or to take certain action; or government officials will sometimes use public money for personal gain. Firstly, do you agree that I'm understanding these things quite well? What other possible scenarios might exist in Kono society that I haven't considered yet? How do you see it?
47. Out of those scenarios we've discussed, which do you think is most damaging to local wellbeing?
48. What can you tell us about the types of collusion and intimidation which exist in the diamond industry? What are the impacts of these on wider society?
49. Have attitudes to corruption changed since the end of the war? How? Why?
50. What improvements have been made in limiting corruption? What evidence is there of this?
51. And what types of corruption would be most difficult to minimise? Why?
52. It seems to me that the industry can go in 3 directions:
1. As it is now with some people getting more advantages than others,
  2. ethnicisation of the sector (i.e. with diamonds under greater control from local communities);
  3. industrialization of the sector (i.e. with diamonds under the control of industrial (foreign) companies)
- Which direction would you like to see the country take? Why?  
Which is more likely to set the stage for peace, and which is more likely to set the stage for war?
53. What do you know about the diamondiferous area community development funds? What benefits have you seen come from these?
54. Some people have said that diamonds were a factor in causing and fuelling the war. Do you agree with this? Why?
55. So in your opinion, what would help diamonds work for peace and prosperity, why?

 I am going to ask you about the way things are in Kono society. I will read a list of things and for each one I would like you to tell me whether you think that these things happen and are directly related to mining, and why this is.				
Conflicts over land	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Crime	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Sexual violence against women	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Abuse of alcohol or non-medical drugs	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Prostitution	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Distrust among neighbours	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Corruption of local authorities	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Environmental damage	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
HIV/AIDS	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Use of personal weapons	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Anything else?				

Stats

- 56. Can you give me stats on how many mining licences were issued in the past few years for the country as a whole and for Kono?
- 57. What proportion of licensed miners are from Kono?
- 58. How many dealing licences are issued for Kono? And for Sierra Leone? How many are pending?
- 59. How many legal and illegal artisanal mines exist in the Kono district? What area do they cover?

**5 Final Open Question**

<p>Do you have any other comments you would like to make or views that you would like to share before we end this interview?</p>	
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**! END OF INTERVIEW !**

**6 Post-Interview Section to be Asked of Interviewee**

Is there anything you think we missed out in this interview? What?			
Did you feel comfortable enough to talk openly at all times?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not really	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Yes
What could we do to improve how we do these interviews?			

**5. Post-Interview Section to be Completed by Enumerator**

Did you feel that this interviewee was distracted during the interview	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Concentrated	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Somewhat distracted	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Very distracted
Did you feel that the interviewee was willing to share information or was he more reluctant to share?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Willing to Share	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Reluctant to share
Did you feel that the interviewee was telling the truth all the time, some of the time, or hardly ever?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood the concepts we used?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood why we wanted the information?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel comfortable interviewing this person?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Comfortable	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not Comfortable

Did Interview End Before Completion? Yes

Why: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

### **Appendix 3e: Lebanese Dealers, 6<sup>th</sup> August 2004**

NB All dealers were asked questions based on this format. Questions were selected according to the mood of the interview and the apparent comfort of the dealers.

1. What happened so that one day you decided to work in the diamond industry?
2. And how did it actually happen? How did you become a dealer?
3. Who in your family has been involved in the diamond industry the past? What did they do?
4. And what about today? Who else in your family is involved in the diamond industry today? What do they do?
5. So what else can you tell me about your background in the diamond industry?
6. Which of your life's experiences has been most valuable in providing you with the skills to be a dealer?

#### **Business and economic opportunities associated with mining**

7. Do you have any other roles in the diamond industry besides dealing?  
If so, what are they? Why do you do these things as well as dealing? Which would you say is your main activity?
8. I have noticed that some dealers operate other businesses like supply stores alongside their dealerships. Do you have any other businesses? What are they?  
How do these businesses complement your diamond dealing interests? (Why did you choose these businesses?)
9. How did the war affect your businesses?  
How was it to do business before the war? And how has it been to do business since the war? What has changed for the better and for the worse?
10. How do dealers tend to get information about the politics of the industry and the climate for investment?
11. What is the biggest risk you take as a dealer? What do you do to mitigate that risk?
12. What other things threaten the security of your businesses? What can you do to minimise these threats?

#### ***Understanding relationships and competition***

13. Are you involved in any formal or informal association, like a dealers' association, football club, or a youth/Lebanese association?  
What benefits does membership bring you?
14. What can you tell us about your relationships with other dealers? e.g. one dealer spoke of an 'economic war' between the Lebanese and Sierra Leonean dealers. What do you think about this?  
Why does this 'war' exist?
15. Is there competition or cooperation between the Lebanese and Sierra Leonean dealers? What about between the Lebanese and the Marakas? And the Sierra Leoneans and the Marakas?
16. I want to understand how dealers encourage miners to come and sell to them. (*Football story*) What other strategies do you know of that dealers have used to attract business?

17. And once you have got those clients, how do you keep them?
18. What can dealers do to build good relationships with their buyers? Do dealers tend to sell to just one person or many?
19. If you are comfortable telling me, how much might you buy a good 1 carat gem for? And how much would you sell it for? Do you know what it would then be worth on the international markets?
- \_\_\_\_\_ digger \_\_\_\_\_ licence-holder \_\_\_\_\_ supporter \_\_\_\_\_ dealer \_\_\_\_\_ exporter  
\_\_\_\_\_ international buyer
20. To your knowledge, at which point of the supply chain is the biggest profit made? Why is this?
21. What can you tell me about the role of coaxers in the industry? What do they do? Whose interests do they serve best?  
(What benefits do coaxers bring dealers? And miners? And the industry more broadly?)
22. How important then are coaxers to a successful dealership?
23. I have been told that coaxers are mostly Fullah or Maraka, and not Sierra Leoneans. Why is this?
24. During our research others have told us about this 'university of the Opuneye'. What function does the Opuneye play in the diamond industry? What benefits does it bring? What disadvantages?
25. How easy is it for an illegal dealer to sell diamonds into the legal market? What must he/she do?
26. Who do you feel is more likely to smuggle diamonds: an illegal miner, an illegal digger, an illegal dealer (e.g. a member of the Opuneye), or a businessman in need of hard currency?
27. If a dealer ever encounters a problem with the local authorities, who can he go to to arbitrate? What can dealers do to protect themselves from unjust actions or decisions done against them? Can you give me an example?
28. In your opinion, what kind of relationship does the Lebanese dealing community have with the chiefs?
29. How important do you feel it is to keep favour with the chiefs?
30. And what about the government? What kind of relationships does the dealing community have with local national government? What kinds of things must dealers do to keep their favour?
31. In the interviews I've conducted with miners and diggers, I ask them whom they trust most in the industry and whom they trust least. Most of them say that the people they trust least are the dealers. Why is this? What would you say?

**International interest in the Kono diamond industry**

32. To your knowledge, who are the external investors who are trying to get involved in the Kono diamond industry?
33. What protocols must these people go through to get involved in this very tight market?
34. How do you feel the Kimberley Process has affected your business?

***How support networks function***

35. We are aware that dealers often help miners by acting as supporters. How does a dealer choose who to support?
36. To your knowledge, what proportion of dealers support mining gangs? Who is most likely to support legal mining: the Lebanese / Sierra Leonean / Maraka dealers? And illegal mining? Why is this?
37. What advantages does supporting bring to dealers? And to dealers' other businesses? And what disadvantages?
38. What kinds of things can supporters do to protect their investment? For example, is there anything a supporter can do to stop miners/diggers cheating on their commitment to sell diamonds to them only?
39. What obligations do supporters have to the people they support? (Food, medical, shelter etc)
40. What are the typical terms for supporting a miner? i.e. how do you decide how to allocate the winnings?
41. What is your opinion of the activities of the Peace Diamond Alliance? (anti-supporter drive) Presuming the PDA is successful in creating an alternative credit source for miners, what affect do you think it will have on those dealers who currently support miners?
42. In an earlier discussion it was said that if you're not corrupt or making money by illegal or dishonest means, you're not smart. Do you feel that many people in Sierra Leone hold this view? Why does this view exist?
43. What do you think about the Diamond Area Community Development Fund? What benefits have you seen come from this fund?
44. From the research I've done it is clear that systems of patronage continue to be central in how the diamond industry has been governed. What can you tell me about these local networks?
45. How have these patronage systems changed since before the war?
46. Some people have said that diamonds were a factor in causing and fuelling the war. Do you agree with this? Why?
47. In your opinion, what was Charles Taylor's real influence on the initiation and continuation of the war here? Now that Taylor has gone, are you more optimistic that diamonds can be a force for peace and development, and not war and stagnation? Why?
48. So in your opinion, what would help diamonds work for peace and prosperity, why?

***Social issues associated with mining***

☞ I am going to ask you about the way things are in Kono society. I will read a list of things and for each one I would like you to tell me whether you think that these things happen and are directly related to mining, and why this is.				
Conflicts over land	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Crime	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Sexual violence against women	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Abuse of alcohol or non-medical drugs	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know

Prostitution	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know	
Distrust among neighbours	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know	
Corruption of local authorities	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know	
Environmental damage	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know	
HIV/AIDS	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know	
Use of personal weapons	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know	
Anything else?					
<p>☛ Now I would like you to think about the way things are in Kono compared to non-mining areas, I will again read a list of things and for each one I would like you to tell me whether you think that these things are better, worse or the same in Kono than that other place, and whether that is related to mining or not. What place are you thinking of?</p>					
Access to education	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Access to medical care	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
More opportunities for employment	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Rapid renovation of war damaged buildings	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Wider availability of goods on the market and in shops	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Increased entertainment opportunities	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Better living conditions / quality of life	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated

### Final Open Question

Do you have any other comments you would like to make or views that you would like to share before we end this interview?	
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**! END OF INTERVIEW !**

### 7 Post-Interview Section to be Asked of Interviewee

Is there anything you think we missed out in this interview? What?			
Did you feel comfortable enough to talk openly at all times?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not really	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Yes
What could we do to improve how we do these interviews?			

### 6. Post-Interview Section to be Completed by Enumerator

Did you feel that this interviewee was distracted during the interview	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Concentrated	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Somewhat distracted	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Very distracted
Did you feel that the interviewee was willing to share information or was he more reluctant to share?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Willing to Share	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Reluctant to share
Did you feel that the interviewee was telling the truth all the time, some of the time, or hardly ever?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood the concepts we used?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood why we wanted the information?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel comfortable interviewing this person?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Comfortable	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Uncomfortable

Did the interview end before completion? Yes  Why: \_\_\_\_\_

**Appendix 3f - Chairwoman of Kono District Council, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004**

1. To begin with, why don't you tell us about your background in local government?

Local culture

2. As a woman, what do you find most difficult about your culture? And what about serving as a local councillor?
3. Besides gender, what are the principle hierarchies which exist within the local culture? How are these differences in status established and maintained?
4. To what extent does age determine the role one can play in local society? And in the mining industry more specifically?
5. What about gender?
6. At what point does a child become an adult?
7. With this in mind, what can you tell me about child mining? Does it still go on? In what guise? (Why did they suddenly clear all children from the mines?)

Livelihood strategies

8. What can you tell us about local families' typical household strategies?
9. Are there any differences between mining and non-mining households in terms of their ability to cope and their strategies for doing so?
10. To what extent do cultural characteristics determine people's ability to improve their own security?

Corruption

11. In an earlier discussion it was said that if you're not corrupt or making money by illegal or dishonest means, you're not smart. Do you feel that this view is a norm? Why does this view exist?
12. In your view, where is the biggest potential for corruption in Kono society?
13. I understand that there are different forms of dishonesty and corruption which are possible in the mining industry and I'm trying to get clear what these are. For example, diggers will steal diamonds from their gang; people who are in positions of power are paid off to use their position to influence a decision or to take certain action; or government officials will sometimes use public money for personal gain. Firstly, do you agree that I'm understanding these things quite well? What other possible scenarios might exist in Kono society that I haven't considered yet? How do you see it?
14. Out of those scenarios we've discussed, which do you think is most damaging to local wellbeing?
15. What can you tell us about the types of collusion and intimidation which exist in the diamond industry? What are the impacts of these on wider society?
16. Have attitudes to corruption changed since the end of the war? How? Why?
17. What improvements have been made in limiting corruption? What evidence is there of this?
18. And what types of corruption would be most difficult to minimise? Why?

Local government & DACDF

19. In your experience, do local people have more faith in traditional structures or national government to do the just thing by them?
20. What do you think about the Diamond Area Community Development Fund? What needs to change so that it can really do what it's supposed to be doing?
21. Besides the DACDF, how else could the community benefit from diamond revenues? Why isn't that happening?
22. Do you feel we are beyond war, or is there a possibility that peace could be destroyed? If so, how and why?
23. Since the war, are people more inclined to resort to violence when dealing with social, economic or political problems?
24. In your opinion, in what other ways does the war affect local security presently? E.g. Is it more commonplace for people to carry guns?
25. Do you feel the police serve the interests of the people, the government, the strongmen, or themselves?
26. What are the factors either which force or encourage people to smuggle?

Security

27. What special legislation exists for the diamondiferous regions as opposed to other parts of the country? What are the impacts of this? E.g. does this make the place more or less stable, in your opinion?
28. To your mind, how are things changing for the better locally? Can you give us some examples?
29. What about for the worse at the local level? (What are the principle trends which threaten the security and wellbeing of the community?) Again, can you give us some examples?

☞ I am going to ask you about the way things are in Kono society. I will read a list of things and for each one I would like you to tell me whether you think that these things happen and are directly related to mining, and why this is.				
Conflicts over land	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Crime	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Sexual violence against women	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Abuse of alcohol or non-medical drugs	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Prostitution	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Distrust among neighbours	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Corruption of local authorities	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Environmental damage	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
HIV/AIDS	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Use of personal weapons	1 <input type="radio"/> related	2 <input type="radio"/> not related	3 <input type="radio"/> doesn't happen	4 <input type="radio"/> don't know
Anything else?				
☞ Now I would like you to think about the way things are in Kono compared to non-mining areas, I will again read a list of things and for each one I would like you to tell me whether you think that these things are better, worse or the same in				

Kono than that other place, and whether that is related to mining or not. What place are you thinking of?					
Access to education	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Access to medical care	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
More opportunities for employment	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Rapid renovation of war damaged buildings	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Wider availability of goods on the market and in shops	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Increased entertainment opportunities	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated
Better living conditions / quality of life	1 <input type="radio"/> better	2 <input type="radio"/> worse	3 <input type="radio"/> same	4 <input type="radio"/> related	5 <input type="radio"/> unrelated

### Final Open Question

<p>Do you have any other comments you would like to make or views that you would like to share before we end this interview?</p>	
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**! END OF INTERVIEW !**

### 8 Post-Interview Section to be Asked of Interviewee

Is there anything you think we missed out in this interview? What?			
Did you feel comfortable enough to talk openly at all times?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not really	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Yes
What could we do to improve how we do these interviews?			

### 7. Post-Interview Section to be Completed by Enumerator

Did you feel that this interviewee was distracted during the interview	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Concentrated	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Somewhat distracted	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Very distracted
Did you feel that the interviewee was willing to share information or was he more reluctant to share?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Willing to Share	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Reluctant to share
Did you feel that the interviewee was telling the truth all the time, some of the time, or hardly ever?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood the concepts we used?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood why we wanted the information?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel comfortable interviewing this person?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Comfortable	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not Comfortable

Did Interview End Before Completion? Yes

Why: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**Appendix 3g – Network Movement for Justice and Democracy, 4<sup>th</sup> August 2004**

1. Tell me about how NMJD began – what motivated its founding?
2. And what is its role today in local society? What are its objectives?
3. What type of people join NMJD? What proportion of NMJD's members are involved in mining? What benefits do they get from being a member?
4. Tell me about NMJD's campaign for just mining. What are NMJD's concerns about mining?
5. What are your opinions about the Peace Diamond Alliance?
6. How do you feel the PDA has impacted the Kono diamond industry?
7. How do you think it will impact the industry in the future?
8. What is the biggest challenge the PDA will face in trying to achieve its objectives?
9. What is the biggest challenge NMJD faces?
10. What do you think about the DACDF?
11. Would you say that attitudes to smuggling have changed since the end of the war? How? Why?
12. What can you tell me about how diamond smuggling has changed since the end of the war?
13. What are the factors which either force or encourage people to smuggle?
14. Have attitudes to corruption changed since the end of the war? How? Why?
15. What improvements have been made in limiting corruption? What evidence is there of this?
16. In your opinion, what types of corruption would be most difficult to minimise? Why?
17. From the research I've done it is clear that systems of patronage continue to be central in how the diamond industry has been governed. What can you tell me about these local networks?
18. How have these patronage systems changed since before the war?
19. How are Liberian patronage networks operating with Sierra Leonean ones?
20. Some people have said that diamonds were a factor in causing and fuelling the war. Do you agree with this? Why?
21. In your opinion, what was Charles Taylor's real influence on the initiation and continuation of the war here? Now that Taylor has gone, are you more optimistic that diamonds can be a force for peace and development, and not war and stagnation? Why?
22. So in your opinion, what would help diamonds work for peace and prosperity, why?

**Final Open Question**

<p>Do you have any other comments you would like to make or views that you would like to share before we end this interview?</p>	
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**! END OF INTERVIEW !**

**9 Post-Interview Section to be Asked of Interviewee**

<p>Is there anything you think we missed out in this interview? What?</p>			
<p>Did you feel comfortable enough to talk openly at all times?</p>	<p><sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not really</p>	<p><sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some</p>	<p><sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Yes</p>
<p>What could we do to improve how we do these interviews?</p>			

**8. Post-Interview Section to be Completed by Enumerator**

<p>Did you feel that this interviewee was distracted during the interview</p>	<p><sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Concentrated</p>	<p><sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Somewhat distracted</p>	<p><sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Very distracted</p>
<p>Did you feel that the interviewee was willing to share information or was he more reluctant to share?</p>	<p><sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Willing to Share</p>	<p><sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither</p>	<p><sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Reluctant to share</p>
<p>Did you feel that the interviewee was telling the truth all the time, some of the time, or hardly ever?</p>	<p><sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time</p>	<p><sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time</p>	<p><sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever</p>
<p>Did you feel the interviewee understood the concepts we used?</p>	<p><sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time</p>	<p><sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time</p>	<p><sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever</p>
<p>Did you feel the interviewee understood why we wanted the information?</p>	<p><sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time</p>	<p><sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time</p>	<p><sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever</p>
<p>Did you feel comfortable interviewing this person?</p>	<p><sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Comfortable</p>	<p><sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither</p>	<p><sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not Comfortable</p>

Did Interview End Before Completion? Yes

Why: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

### **Appendix 3h – Spokesperson of the PDA, 6<sup>th</sup> August 2004**

1. What exactly is your role in the PDA?
2. What were you doing before you took on this position?
3. How did the PDA come about? i.e. what motivated its founding and how was the project designed?
4. How participatory was the design process? [fairly – initiated by USAID, but supported by community] How were problems and solutions identified and prioritised?
5. Who decided what the objectives of the PDA should be?
6. What are the motivations and objectives of the various stakeholders in getting involved in the PDA? What incompatibilities exist between the various objectives and interests of the stakeholders?
7. So who does not want to see the PDA work? What are they doing to stop it? (Whose interests does the PDA work against?)
8. Who is in charge of implementing the objectives of the PDA?
9. Who is in charge of monitoring and evaluating its success? What monitoring systems have been tested and established?
10. Are there any plans to do an institutional assessment of the PDA, like the ones the PDA does of its members? (e.g. MOCKY, ADAGMAK) Why (not)?
11. Do you know when MSI will pull out? Will USAID pull out at the same time?
12. What are the prospects for success when MSI & USAID pull out? Who will perform the role of secretariat and overseer? How vulnerable will their disengagement make the process?
13. Who has been elected to the executive committee to represent the interests of the dealing community?
14. What issues have arisen around who has been elected onto the Executive Committee? (for example Kono dealers association)
15. Who is excluded from the Executive Committee? Who is over/under-represented? Why?
16. Have there been any incidences yet when members have broken the code of conduct?
17. Has the PDA decided yet what an acceptable living wage would be for workers in each of the Alliance enterprises, as set out in the key directives of the Code of Conduct? Who decided what a fair wage for the miners and diggers should be?
18. What success has there been in training people as valuers? What wider affects has this had?
19. Do you really think the PDA has been successful in its objectives so far? Against what are you measuring that success?
20. What are the biggest challenges the PDA faces?

21. Do you believe the PDA is helping to streamline the industry or are there as many layers as ever before?
22. What do you think the PDA's contributions are to building peace in Kono? Give me examples.
23. So how confident are you that Kono will remain stable with or without UNAMSIL? (Is there evidence of improvement in those issues which inspired the war?)
24. What kinds of economic changes do you believe needs to occur for this region to remain stable? And to develop?
25. What kinds of social changes do you believe need to occur for this region to remain stable / develop?
26. What kinds of political changes do you believe need to occur for this region to remain stable / develop?
27. In the interviews I've been doing miners know about the PDA to a certain extent (some of them had just heard of it, but didn't really know what it was about, though they were part of a member cooperative) but diggers don't. What is the PDA doing to help those below miners on the vulnerability scale?
28. Do you believe the mining communities are ready to take on the degree of responsibilities that the credit scheme will involve? (explore support system vs. credit scheme)

#### **Dealing Community**

29. What can you tell me about the relationships between the different types of dealers? For example, one dealer spoke of an 'economic war' between the Lebanese and Sierra Leonean dealers. What do you think about this? Why does this 'war' exist?
30. Is there competition or cooperation between the Lebanese and the Maraka dealers? And what about the Sierra Leoneans and the Marakas?
31. During our research others have told us about the Opuneye and its role in the illegal dealing and smuggling of diamonds. If the PDA is trying to limit smuggling, what is it doing about the Opuneye?
32. What do you know about the 5 country committee?
33. In the interviews I've been conducting with miners and diggers, I ask them whom they trust most in the industry and whom they trust least. Most of them say that the people they trust least are the dealers. Why is this?
34. And how would you answer that question? Who do you trust most in the industry? And who do you trust least?
35. Besides the chance of finding a fabulously large stone, what is the key to success in Kono society? How important is it to be close to the chiefs to be successful in Kono society?
36. What can you tell me about the relationship between the police and the Ministry of Mines?
37. And what about between the police and the chiefs?

#### **Smuggling**

38. To your knowledge, who are the external investors who are trying to get involved in the Kono diamond industry? Where do they come from? Why are they coming to Sierra Leone and not to other diamondiferous countries in Africa?
39. Who do you feel is more likely to smuggle diamonds: an illegal miner, an illegal digger, a legal dealer, an illegal dealer or a businessman in need of hard currency?
40. Would you say that attitudes to smuggling have changed since the end of the war? How? Why?
41. What can you tell me about how diamond smuggling has changed since the end of the war? (e.g. coming in)
42. How has the Kimberley Process affected the diamond industry? Is it really making mining more legal? (think eastern provinces, Opuneye, in-smuggling etc.)

**Industry Governance**

43. What can you tell me about the roles the chiefs have in the diamond industry, besides the granting of mining licences?
44. It seems to me that the industry can go in 3 directions in the future:
  - **Sovereignty** (as now)
  - **democratisation** (private property)
  - **industrialization** (i.e. upscaling extraction methods, e.g. KH or Africa Gold & Diamonds)
 Which direction is most likely?  
 Which do you think is most desirable? Why?
45. What do you think about DACDF? What benefits have you seen come from this fund?
46. What’s going on with their DACDF funds in Kamara chiefdom?
47. Some people have said that diamonds were a factor in causing and fuelling the war. Do you agree? Why?
48. So in your opinion, what would help diamonds work for peace and prosperity, why?

**10 Final Open Question**

Do you have any other comments you would like to make or views that you would like to share before we end this interview?	
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**! END OF INTERVIEW !**

**11 Post-Interview Section to be Asked of Interviewee**

Is there anything you think we missed out in this interview? What?			
Did you feel comfortable enough to talk openly at all times?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not really	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Yes
What could we do to improve how we do these interviews?			

**9. Post-Interview Section to be Completed by Enumerator**

Did you feel that this interviewee was distracted during the interview	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Concentrated	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Somewhat distracted	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Very distracted
Did you feel that the interviewee was willing to share information or was he more reluctant to share?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Willing to Share	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Reluctant to share
Did you feel that the interviewee was telling the truth all the time, some of the time, or hardly ever?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood the concepts we used?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel the interviewee understood why we wanted the information?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> all of the time	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Some of the time	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Hardly ever
Did you feel comfortable interviewing this person?	<sup>1</sup> <input type="radio"/> Comfortable	<sup>2</sup> <input type="radio"/> Neither	<sup>3</sup> <input type="radio"/> Not Comfortable

Did Interview End Before Completion? Yes

Why: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

## Appendix 4a: Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop I, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004

### Agenda

- 10.00 **PRAYERS**
- 10.05 **OVERVIEW OF THE DAY** (purpose, consent forms, other workshops)
- 10.25 **ICE-BREAKER**
- 10.45 **SEASONALITY of the MINING INDUSTRY**
  - 10.55 Mining Procedures
  - 11.05 Personal Calendars
  - 11.15 Group Calendar
  - 12.30 Break
- 12.40 **STRUCTURE OF THE MINING INDUSTRY – Winnings Allocation Systems**
  - 12.40 What are they? (list the systems)
  - 12.55 How do they work and who uses which one predominantly?
  - 13.05 Pros / Cons (Win/lose table)
  - 13.45 How has the predominant system changed over time? Why?
- 14.10 **END**

### **10.00**

- i.) Personal prayers *(5 minutes)*
- ii.) Purpose of the day, *(10)*
  - agenda
  - who can stay all day?
  - Who can come back another day?
- iii.) Ethics review form *(10)*
- iv) Ice-breaker (**Pairs – ask partner 3 questions and report to group after 10 minutes**) *(20)*
  - Who do you admire most? Why?
  - What's your favourite food?
  - If you were an animal, what would you be? Why?

### **10.45**

#### A. The seasonality of the artisanal mining industry

**Objective:** to understand how opportunities and risks change over the year for licence-holders

**Objects of analysis:**

- different styles / tasks of mining over the year
- Seasonal fluctuations in labour availability, fuel availability, equipment costs, food costs, shelter costs over the year, sicknesses/health AND therefore TOTAL COSTS for each month
- What are the average costs/expenses incurred in a season? (ref credit scheme)
- mining calendars

**Techniques:**

1. *Group discussion of typical mining procedure – i.e. get licence (chief – ministry), trip, wash, overkick, reclaim?* *(10)*
2. *Personal calendars – everyone completes their own* *(10)*
3. *Group discussion to produce general calendar for mining styles / tasks over the year* *(12)*
4. *Expand group calendar to explore ONE AT A TIME seasonal fluctuations in:*
  - **labour supply** *(10)*
    - how does labour supply change over the year? And because of what? (e.g. in-migration in dry vs. out-migration in wet?) What else are people doing at these times of year, if they're not mining?

- **fuel supply** (10)  
Does fuel supply change over the year? If so, how and why? What are the stimuli? (bad roads, international markets) (shocks vs. seasonalities)

- **equipment costs** (15)  
How do the prices of these tools change according to the time of year?  
a.) a water pump?  
b.) A generator?  
c.) a bulldozer?  
d.) The plant?  
How much does it cost per day to use them in the wet season, in the dry season?  
For how many days in a typical year would you use each of these?  
And how often does it pay off to use these? Why?  
 never  rarely  sometimes  frequently  always

What	Cost (\$/day)	How many days / year	Payoff?
Water pump			
Generator			
Bulldozer			
The plant			
The rocker			

- **food costs** (7)  
how does the cost of rice change over the year? What is the average rice consumption/digger/day?
  - **shelter costs** (8)  
how does the cost of accommodation change over the year? What is the average amount you pay per day/week/month per digger for their shelter?
  - **trends in health / sickness** (10)  
Which sicknesses tend to affect your diggers most? (e.g. diarrhoea / dysentery, malaria) How do these change over the year? [rates % affected per month]  
Which injuries tend to affect your diggers most? How do these change over the year?
5. *Are there any other significant costs which we have overlooked? Do these change over the year or are they stable?* (1 - 10)
  6. *Group discussion about the overall cost of a mining season.* (10)

**12.30 / 40**                      **10 minute break (if 12.30)**

\*\*\*\*\*

**12.40**                                      **B. How the artisanal mining industry is structured**

**Objective:** to understand the structures of the artisanal industry

**Object of analysis:**

1. **winnings allocation systems a.) between the licence-holder and the supporter, b.) between the diggers and the supporter/licence-holder, and c.) amongst the diggers**

**Technique:**

GROUP DISCUSSION to compile 3 lists of the different allocation systems currently used a.) between the licence-holder and the supporter, b.) between the diggers and the supporter/licence-holder, and c.) among the diggers? (10)

- tributors (wage only)
- pay-per-win system (pre-negotiated %)
- post-negotiated %
- post-negotiated pricing
- two-pile system
- kabadu/gado

(If any of these aren't mentioned, we ask what other systems are there that you know about?)

- Discussion point: Is there a trend for illicit miners to use one system? And legal miners? (5)
- Discussion point: How do all of these systems work? (15)
- Disc. point: Do miners tend to use different allocation systems according to the season? Why? (4)
- Disc. point: Do miners tend to use different allocation systems according to mine productivity? (4)
- What are the benefits and disadvantages of each one? (Pros/cons table & Relative win lose table)

**Pros / cons of different systems** (20)

System	Advantages	Disadvantages
tributors (wage only)		
pay-per-win system (pre-negotiated %)		
post-negotiated %		
post-negotiated pricing		
two-pile system		

**Win/ lose for different actors** (12)

System	Diggers	Licence-holder	Supporter
tributors (wage only)	Win / lose?	Win / lose?	Win/ lose?
pay-per-win system (pre-negotiated %)	Win / lose?	Win/ lose?	Win / lose?
post-negotiated %	Win /lose?	Win / lose?	
post-negotiated pricing			
two-pile system			

- **Discussion point:** How did these systems originate? [go through each in turn] (10)
- **Discussion point:** Which of these do you use? Why do you use that particular system? (key reasons)(7)
- How does the supporter's terms affect/determine which system you use? (7)
- How has the allocation of winning changed and why? Pre during and post war?[ Compile a matrix of predominant systems pre and post war] (10)

**How allocations systems have changed over time**

	Predominant System	Why
<b>Pre-war</b>		
<b>During the war</b>		
<b>Post-war</b>		

**14.15 END**

### **Appendix 4b: Mining families' Livelihood Strategies Workshop, 30<sup>th</sup> July 2004**

#### **WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES:**

- How mining families combine mining with other activities (e.g. farming, petty trading, etc.) to provide for their basic and cultural needs and to satisfy their desires;
- What are the risks associated with these strategies; exposure to risk/vulnerability – investment risk & securitisation (i.e. seasonality, livelihood strategies & how these expose them to risks and secure them against risks) ; various types of risk – financial, human, physical, natural, social
- What families do to increase their ability to cope with the typical problems which arise from these strategies;
- What needs to change so that they might be better able to improve their lives, according to their own desires.

#### **09.45**

- i.) Personal prayers (5 minutes)
- ii.) Purpose of the day, (10)
- iii.) Ethics review form (10)
- iv) Exercise (Pairs – ask partner 3 questions and report to group after 10 minutes) (20)
  - Who is your favourite person and why?
  - What's your favourite colour?
  - If you could live anywhere, where would it be? Why?

\*\*\*\*\*

#### **10.30 TASK ONE: What do the livelihood 'portfolios' of diggers' and miners' families look like?**

**Objective:** What are the various livelihood options available to diamond miners and their families?

**Task:**

- i.) **List top 5 available options** on board (mining, farming, trading, artisanal work, skilled work etc.) (7)
- ii.) Expand on each option in turn, e.g. (farming – swamp rice, upland rice, vegetable, fruit, coffee plantations etc., mining – independent overkicking, supported overkicking, independent mining, supported mining, gado/kabudu)
- iii.) **Group discussion** on the pros (rewards) and cons (risks) of each sub-option (4+15 per option x 5=95)

Livelihood option	Livelihood sub-option	Pros	Cons	Man	Woman	Children
Farming	Swamp rice farming	2 harvests	Poor health	✓ (30%)	✓ (60%)	(10%)
	Upland rice farming etc.			✓	✓	
Mining	Overkicking (independent/illegal)		Small winnings	✓	✓	✓
	Overkicking (supported/legal)				✗	✗
Trading	Food stuffs			✗	✓	✓
	Clothes					
Artisanal work	Gara tie-dying					
	Embroidery					
Skilled work	Tool makers					
	Tailoring			✓		

- Objectives:**
- a.) In the household, who does which activity and why (man, woman, child)?
  - b.) Amount of time devoted to each activity by different household members

**Task:** **Group discussion** on roles (see above table) and % time dedicated by each household member (man, woman, child) to each activity (go back to table) (30)

### 12.40 Break for lunch

#### 13.30

**Objective:** Which livelihood options do miners and their families tend to do?

**Task:** Do a **tally of participants' households' engagement** with the various suboptions (which ones do people in their households do?) (10)

**Objective:** What are miners' and mining families' seasonal livelihood strategies?

**Task:** Divide into pairs (literate + illiterate) to do seasonal calendar of principal activities (15)

#### 13.55

**Objective** Relative profitability and security of different suboptions (income potential)

**Task:**

- i.) **Divide into 5 groups** according to individuals' principal activities. e.g. Group A does 'farming', group B does 'mining'. Each group ranks the sub-options in each option for profitability first. When they've finished this, tell them to do the same but for financial security. (13)
- ii.) **Each sub-group reports back to group** (3)
- iii.) **Group review** of the rankings and discussion on whys (15)
- iv.) **Group discussion** to rank the 5 sections (farming, mining, trading, artisanal work, skilled work) in terms of profitability and then security (10)

#### 14.25

**Objective:** Which livelihood options are more or less possible? For what reasons?

**Task**

- i.) **Group discussion to look at OBSTACLES for each sub-option.**
- ii.) What can prevent people from embarking on this activity?  
(e.g. gender / age, lack of money, lack of contacts, lack of market for goods, skills) (45)
- iii.) What's the biggest obstacle for embarking on each activity? (Circle it)
- iv.) What can prevent people from doing this activity successfully? (e.g. poor health, poor market) (45)
- v.) What's the biggest issue which prevents people from doing each activity successfully? Circle it?

### OBSTACLES

Livelihood option	Livelihood sub-option	Obstacles – (human, financial, physical, social, natural capitals)
Farming	Swamp rice farming	Lack of access to land Lack of seeds etc. Good health
	Upland rice farming etc.	
Mining	Overkicking (independent)	
	Overkicking (supported)	
Trading	Food stuffs	
	Kola nut	
Artisanal work	Gara tie-dying	
	Embroidery	
	Tailoring	
Skilled work	Tool makers	
	Mechanics	

**15.55**

**Objective:** Which livelihood options would miners/diggers and their families prefer? What makes these more or less desirable?

**Task:**

- i.) I want you to sit quietly for a minute and consider which of these activities you would like to do most, if you could. This can be the activity you currently do; it doesn't have to be something different.
- ii.) Go round group and ask quickly what these are. (5)
- iii.) If you've chosen a different strategy to the one you do now, I want you to think about why you would prefer to do this. In other words, what can it do for you that your current livelihood strategy cannot? i.e. what is the desired outcome? (what can it bring you that's good and what can it prevent that's bad).  
If you've chosen the same strategy as the one you do now, I want you to think about what needs to change to make that better for you.  
Report individually to the group. Say what you currently do, what you'd rather do and what it would do that is good for you. [emphasise group attention, respect, option to not say] (20)

**16.20**

**Objective:** To consider which livelihood outcomes are not achievable though current livelihood strategies.

**Task:**

- i.) **Group discussion** on why people cannot achieve their preferred livelihood outcomes (10)  
"I would like you to consider in pairs what 2 other things you would like most to change in your life besides that which we've discussed already. If you are comfortable, I'd like us to go around the group and share what we would like to change in our lives and what is stopping us from making that change."
- ii.) **Group discussion** on what needs to change
  - a.) to make diamond mining a more viable choice for those who do it, and (10)
  - b.) to make other livelihood options more viable choices for those miners who want to do something different. (10)

**16.50 FEEDBACK****17.00 END**

## Appendix 4c: Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop II, 7<sup>th</sup> August 2004

Preparations:    Agenda  
                       Map of Kono drawn on a flip chart  
                       Transportation/registration sheet  
                       Workshop consent forms  
                       Feedback sheet

### 10.00

- i.) Personal prayers        *(5 minutes)*
- ii.) Purpose of the day, *(5)*
  - agenda
  - who can stay all day?
  - Who can come back another day?
- iii.) Ethics review form        *(5)*
- iv) Ice-breaker (**Pairs – ask partner 3 questions and report to group after 8 minutes**) *(15)*
  - If you could visit any country, which would it be and why?
  - What's your favourite day of the year?
  - For you, what is the best thing about Sierra Leone?

### 10.30

#### B. How the artisanal mining industry is structured

**Objective:** to understand the structures of the artisanal industry

#### **2. The changing productivity of mines**

**(20)**

DISCUSSION POINT: Are your mines as productive as you expected them to be? If not, why not? Can you show us on this map where mine productivity has been decreasing in recent years? Where continues to enjoy reliable winnings?

What new places are known of that are productive? How do you know this? Who is getting to mine this land?

What could be done to make your mines more productive? Why aren't you doing this?

### 10.50

#### **3. Licensing Procedures & Patterns and Access to Land**

DISCUSSION POINTS:

- Two people want access to mine the same piece of land. How does the chief decide who gets priority? Ideally? And in reality? (What happens if two miners want to mine the same land?) **(9)**
  - Someone wants to mine a villager's farmland? What happens? **(9)**
  - What happens if you want to mine where there is a commercial plantation? (real vs. ideal) **(9)**
  - When you go to the chief to apply for your licence, do you always get the land you want? If not, why not? **(9)**
  - Do you know how much the surface fees will be before you go to the chief? **(6)**
  - Once you get your mining licence, do you have to pay any extra fees? To whom? **(9)**
- So, for example, we understand that when you get winnings some people have to pay the chief a %. Is this so? Why? Is it an official fee? Which status of chief demands it?**

- Mapping access to land to mine – DISCUSSION POINT: How does ownership and rights to ownership of land differ across the district? (9)  
 Map of Kono showing chiefdoms.  
 Category one: chiefdom authorities are the only custodians of the land  
 Category two: chiefdom authorities AND some families are the only custodians of the land  
 Category three: no chiefdom authorities are custodians; families are the custodians.  
 (Where mining goes on, chiefs have authority; where mostly agriculture, tends to be families)  
 How do you feel about this?
  
- Licence security:  
 How secure is your licence once you have it?  
 What can you do to protect your access to that land?  
 Under what conditions might a license be revoked? (5)  
 (What does the security of your license depend on?)

**11.55**

**4. Ranking corruption and profit (25)**

- explain task
- hand out forms
- collect forms
- collate results
- discuss with group

\*\*\*\*\*

**12.20 LUNCH**

\*\*\*\*\*

**13.00**

**C. How the artisanal mining industry has changed over the past 20 years (i.e. since before and during the war in Sierra Leone)**

**Patronage & power relations**

**“How do support networks (i.e. patronage) work in Kono society?”**

1. Actors
2. Dilemmas
3. Relationships

**Techniques:**

- A. ACTORS & RELATIONSHIPS - name all the industry actors and build up the commodity chain and relationships map (45)**
  - a.)** piece of A4 paper for each actor, name industry actors in the supply chain (specify different types of actors, e.g. Lebanese, SL and Maraka dealers) and who act on the supply chain (i.e. authorities), (8)
  - b.)** construct legal and illegal supply chains on wall using sticky tape and a4 (Babar), (7)
  - c.)** copy to flipchart when completed (Estelle), (3)
  - d.)** draw arrows to show types of exchanges (write on the white pieces of paper what each person gets out of their involvement, e.g. money, accommodation, authority, capacity to influence. Push for what TYPE of power when they say power – how power is used – benevolence, intimidation, collusion, authoritarianism,)
    - i.)** who gets what & why, (10)
    - ii.)** who controls access, (5)
    - iii.)** who is excluded & why (12)

**13.45**

**B. Compile a list: What are the main dilemmas you face as miners? (principle risks)**

- who to sell to
  - how much to sell for
  - who to borrow from (for support)
  - who to recruit
  - how to allocate winnings
  - where to mine
  - how to mine
  - physical security
  - financial security
  - access to good tools blah blah.
- i.) Compile the list of dilemmas (10)
- ii.) What are the main risks associated with each of these decisions and what can you do to reduce each of these risks? (45)
- iii.) How do the above actors influence each of these decisions? i.e. What is their role in increasing or reducing your risks? How? (30)
- iv.) What opportunities do each of these actors create for you? What opportunities do they deny you either directly or indirectly?

Dilemmas	Risks	Actors	Influence on risk	How	Opportunities/limitations
Who to sell to	They'll cheat you of your money	Dealers Supporters  Coaxers	↑ ↑ risk of losing money ↓ risk of bad price	bound to them – no market Introduce you to a dealer you can trust	Potential for future support
<b>Etc.</b>					

*Objective:* How do these actors and the terms of their relationships structure the field of possible and impossible livelihood choices / mining strategies and prospects for miners and diggers?

**14.10 HIGH TRUST**

- Amongst all of these people, which relationships generally enjoy the most trust? Why? [Circle these in a different colour]
- **Discussion point:** What is it that brings trust to these relationships? (i.e. what are the terms of goodwill in these relationships?) e.g. cultural characteristics / power relations - family, loyalty, money, favours, political influence, reciprocity / mutuality etc.

**14.30 LOW TRUST**

Which suffer the least trust? Why? [circle these in a different colour]

- **Discussion point:** In relationships where there is poor trust, how do the actors ensure that the outcome will be in their interests?
- So which are the key relationships a licence-holder must nurture to ensure s/he can be successful in her livelihood? What can a licence-holder do to ensure favour / engender trust with these people?(8)
- What do miners do to ensure favour/engender trust with their supporters / dealers? What are the terms of trust? (7)
- What do miners do to ensure favour/engender trust with their diggers? What are the terms of trust?(6)

- What do they need to do to ensure favour with the authorities (i.e ministry, police, local govt, chiefs) (7)
- When there is competition or bad faith between the big men, how does this affect community relationships at the lower levels? (e.g. Gbense/Kamara conflict or the Prince Saquee/Gbondo (Koquema) dispute) (7)
- What can a Kono man do (i.e. use these types of relationships) to gain favour with someone powerful, over somebody else? (5)
- (How many competing networks exist? How are they characterised?)
- **Based on what we've learned from this diagram, which actors' behaviour needs most to change to change most to make mining a more viable (i.e. secure) livelihood. What can be done to encourage such changes?** (15)

## 15.25 FEEDBACK FORM

## *Appendix 5a*

### **Interview Consent Form**

#### **Empowering Diamond Miners in Sierra Leone through Innovation in Governance**

This consent form relates to the study of the Peace Diamond Alliance project and the wellbeing of diamond miners, diggers and community members in the district of Kono, Sierra Leone. The study is done by researchers from the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, and Helen Temple. The contact person and researcher is Estelle Levin (1-604-732-0145 / 076 758 662). This research is part of her Masters thesis, which will be available to the public. The research will also be used to inform a report for Management Systems International-USAID on their peacebuilding and development programme in Sierra Leone. The chief researcher is Assistant Professor Philippe Le Billon (1-604-822-9935). The purpose of the research is to understand better what needs to change to help artisanal diamond diggers, miners and their families improve their lives. You will be asked to answer questions which relate to the following issues:

1. What assets do people in the mining industry and their families use to cope with everyday insecurity and extraordinary events?
2. How do people in the mining industry and their families combine these assets to make a living?
3. In what ways do the organisations in the mining industry affect mining households and the community in Kono?
4. In what ways do the various policies, laws, cultural practices and social impacts affect mining households, the community and the mining industry in Kono?
5. What are the tradeoffs individuals and households make in favour of mining?
6. What needs to change so the people in the mining industry and their can achieve their desired livelihood outcomes?
7. In light of these findings, what can organisations such as the Peace Diamond Alliance and donors do to help the community make diamonds work for peace and prosperity?

My University, the University of British Columbia, needs me to inform you that:

- Your name will be kept confidential, no one else than us will know it as we will keep our notes and tapes locked in Estelle's office. What you are telling us may be used for research papers, publications and paper presentations at academic conferences. **Your anonymity will also be respected in the published outcomes of this project unless you specifically agree to be quoted:**  
**I agree  - I do not agree  Please initial here:**
- Our discussion will be between one and two hours.
- You will receive no money or benefits for participation.
- You have the right to ask questions about this study and to have them answered.
- If you have any concerns about your rights or treatment as a research subject, you may contact **the Research Subject Information Line** in the UBC Office of Research Services and Administration, at 1-604-822-8598.
- Participation in this project is strictly voluntary; you can **refuse to participate, or stop and withdraw at any time** without any problem for your relationship with the researchers or UBC.

Please acknowledge that you have received a copy of this consent form by signing below:

I ----- (printed name) agree to participate in an interview according to the terms outlined above.

Date:

Signature:

Thank you very much for your kind assistance in this research.  
Estelle Levin & Helen Temple

*Appendix 5b*

**Focus Group Consent Form**

**Empowering Diamond Miners in Sierra Leone through Innovation in Governance**

This consent form relates to the study of the Peace Diamond Alliance project and the wellbeing of diamond miners, diggers and community members in the district of Kono, Sierra Leone. The study is done by researchers from the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, and Helen Temple. The contact person and researcher is Estelle Levin (1-604-732-0145 / 076-758-662). This research is part of her Masters thesis, which will be available to the public. The research will also be used to inform a report for Management Systems International-USAID on their peacebuilding and development programme in Sierra Leone. The chief researcher is Assistant Professor Philippe Le Billon (1-604-822-9935). The purpose of the research is to understand better what needs to change to help artisanal diamond diggers, miners and their families improve their lives. You will be asked to answer questions which relate to the following issues:

1. What assets do people in the mining industry and their families use to cope with everyday insecurity and extraordinary events?
2. How do people in the mining industry and their families combine these assets to make a living?
3. In what ways do the organisations in the mining industry affect mining households and the community in Kono?
4. In what ways do the various policies, laws, cultural practices and social impacts affect mining households, the community and the mining industry in Kono?
5. What are the tradeoffs individuals and households make in favour of mining?
6. What needs to change so the people in the mining industry and their can achieve their desired livelihood outcomes?
7. In light of these findings, what can organisations such as the Peace Diamond Alliance and donors do to help the community make diamonds work for peace and prosperity?

It is a requirement of the ethical policy of the University of British Columbia to inform you that:

- Your identity will be kept confidential, by locking the office and the filing cabinet in which the notes and tapes recorded during the interview will be kept and that a password will be required to access information kept on a computer hard drive. However **confidentiality cannot be promised because the researcher cannot prevent other group members from revealing what was discussed in the group.**
- Some parts of the interviews may be used for research papers, publications and paper presentations at academic conferences. **Your anonymity will also be respected in the published outcomes of this project unless you specifically agree to be quoted:**

I agree       I do not agree       Please initial here:

- The total amount of time that will be required from you will be between 1 and 3 hours.
- You will receive no money for participation.
- You have the right to ask questions about the study and to have them answered.
- If you have any concerns about your rights or treatment as a research subject, you may contact **the Research Subject Information Line** in the UBC Office of Research Services and Administration, at 1-604-822-8598.
- Participation in this project is strictly voluntary; you can **refuse to participate or withdraw at any time** without jeopardy to your relationship with the researcher or UBC.

Please, acknowledge that you have received a copy of this consent form by signing below:

I ----- (printed name) agree to participate in a focus group according to the terms outlined above.

Date:

Signature:

Thank you very much for your kind assistance in this research.

Estelle Levin & Helen Temple

**Workshop Consent Form****Empowering Diamond Miners in Sierra Leone through Innovation in Governance**

This consent form relates to the study of the Peace Diamond Alliance project and the wellbeing of diamond miners, diggers and community members in the district of Kono, Sierra Leone. The study is done by researchers from the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, and Helen Temple. The contact person and researcher is Estelle Levin (1-604-732-0145 / 076-758-662). This research is part of her Masters thesis, which will be available to the public. The research will also be used to inform a report for Management Systems International-USAID on their peacebuilding and development programme in Sierra Leone. The chief researcher is Assistant Professor Philippe Le Billon (1-604-822-9935). The purpose of the research is to understand better what needs to change to help artisanal diamond diggers, miners and their families improve their lives. You will be asked to answer questions which relate to the following issues:

1. What assets do people in the mining industry and their families use to cope with everyday insecurity and extraordinary events?
2. How do people in the mining industry and their families combine these assets to make a living?
3. In what ways do the organisations in the mining industry affect mining households and the community in Kono?
4. In what ways do the various policies, laws, cultural practices and social impacts affect mining households, the community and the mining industry in Kono?
5. What are the tradeoffs individuals and households make in favour of mining?
6. What needs to change so the people in the mining industry and their can achieve their desired livelihood outcomes?
7. In light of these findings, what can organisations such as the Peace Diamond Alliance and donors do to help the community make diamonds work for peace and prosperity?

It is a requirement of the ethical policy of the University of British Columbia to inform you that:

- Your identity will be kept confidential, by locking the office and the filing cabinet in which the notes and tapes recorded during the interview will be kept and that a password will be required to access information kept on a computer hard drive. However **confidentiality cannot be promised because the researcher cannot prevent other workshop participants from revealing what was discussed in the workshop.**
- Some parts of the interviews may be used for research papers, publications and paper presentations at academic conferences. **Your anonymity will also be respected in the published outcomes of this project unless you specifically agree to be quoted:**

**I agree**  **- I do not agree**  **Please initial here:**

- The total amount of time that will be required from you will be between 2 and 6 hours.
- You will receive no money for participation.
- You have the right to ask questions about the study and to have them answered.
- If you have any concerns about your rights or treatment as a research subject, you may contact **the Research Subject Information Line** in the UBC Office of Research Services and Administration, at 1-604-822-8598.
- Participation in this project is strictly voluntary; you can **refuse to participate or withdraw at any time** without jeopardy to your relationship with the researcher or UBC.

Please, acknowledge that you have received a copy of this consent form by signing below:

I ----- (printed name) agree to participate in a workshop according to the terms outlined above.

Date:

Signature:

Thank you very much for your kind assistance in this research.

Estelle Levin & Helen Temple

**Appendix 6: PDA Members as of September 2004<sup>379</sup>**

<b>Member category</b>	<b>Member Name</b>
<b>CBO (general)</b>	Inter- Religious Council of Sierra Leone National Awareness Development Association Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU)
<b>CBO (industry)</b>	Sierra Leone Indigenous Miners Movement (SLIMM) Alluvial Gold and Diamond Miners' Association of Kono District (ADAGMAK) Association of Sierra Leone Master Trainers Kono Diamond Dealers' Association Five Country Committee United Mine Workers Union
<b>CBO (women)</b>	50/50 Group Kuendondoya Women's Association
<b>CBO (youth)</b>	CAFÉ Youth Association Movement of Concerned Kono Youth (MOCKY) Tankoro Youth Development Association Kono District Youth League
<b>Mining Cooperatives</b>	Brave Heart Miners and Multi Purpose Cooperative Society Chanja-Bumpeh Alluvial Diamond Miners cooperative Society Danaya Mining Cooperative Society Demamah Mining Cooperative Koakoyima Diamond Miners Cooperative Society Komafeneh Cooperative Society Kono District Women's Cooperative Society Mortatay Diamond Mining Cooperative Society Nimikoro Mining Cooperative Society Nimiyama Mining Cooperative Nyurndema Cooperative Society Peyee Miners and farmers Cooperative Society Sandor Diamond Miners Cooperative Society Sandor Mining Cooperative (SAMCO) Sukudu Miner's Cooperative Society Swemaya Miner's Cooperative Society Tayorma Mining Cooperative Society Tefeya Mining Cooperative Teneko Women's Cooperative Society Wona Musu Mining Cooperative Society Yorkadu Mining Cooperative Society
<b>Donor</b>	U.K. Department for International Development (DfID) United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
<b>Industry (international)</b>	DeBeers Group K.B. Mining (Exporting Company) Koidu Holdings Precision Diamond Company Rapaport Group
<b>Industry (local)</b>	Magbele Mining Company Meya Development Company Sakuma Mining Company Sidibay Kaba Mining Company, Nimikoro

<sup>379</sup> See MSI 2004d.

<b>Local government</b>	Gbense Development Committee Koidu/New Sembehun Town Council Kono District council Kono District Council of Chiefs Sandor Development Committee Tankoro Development Committee
<b>National Government</b>	Ministry of Mineral Resources Ministry of Trade and Industry
<b>NGO (international)</b>	Global Witness
<b>Other</b>	CCSL KOFAMCO Yormo Development Association

*Appendix 7*

**Mining Equipment and Labour Costs**

What	Notes	Cost/day (dry season)	Cost /day (wet season)	Fuel quantity (gallons)	Fuel cost (Le)	Total cost (dry) (\$/day)	Total cost (wet) (\$/day)	No. of days/yr (min. depth)	No. of days/yr (max. depth)	Total (\$/annum) Minimum \$1=Le2650	Total (\$/annum) Maximum \$1=Le2650	Pay off
<b>D8 Bulldozer</b>	8a.m. - 6 p.m. 5' to 30' depth	\$1,500	\$1,500	50	Le 425,000	\$1,660.38	\$1,660.38	3	14	\$4,981.13	\$23,245.28	Frequently
<b>D6 Bulldozer</b>	8a.m. - 6 p.m. 5' to 30' depth	\$1,200	\$1,200	50	Le 425,000	\$1,360.38	\$1,360.38	4	21	\$5,441.51	\$28,567.92	Frequently
<b>Excavator</b>	presumed 3' - 10' depth range	\$1,000	\$1,000	45	Le 382,500	\$1,144.34	\$1,144.34	7	14	\$8,010.38	\$16,020.75	Sometimes
<b>Digger</b>	Cost of labour	Le 7,000	Le 7,000	0	0	\$2.64	\$2.64	365	365	\$964.15	\$964.15	Always
<b>Shovel*</b>	Replace 1 every 2 months	Le 14,500	Le 14,500	0	0	\$0.08	\$0.08	122	122	\$10.18	\$10.18	n/a
<b>3" Robin Petrol water pump</b>	may be paid for with a 1/6 share of the gravel	Le10,000	Le 10,000	10	Le 90,000	\$37.74	\$37.74	122	122	\$4,603.77	\$4,603.77	Always
<b>4" Lister</b>	Diesel water pump	Le60,000	Le 100,000	10	Le 85,000	\$54.72	\$69.81	122	122	\$6,675.47	\$8,516.98	Always
<b>6" Lister</b>	Diesel water pump	Le100,000	Le 150,000	10	Le 85,000	\$69.81	\$88.68	122	122	\$8,516.98	\$10,818.87	Always
<b>8" Lister</b>	Diesel water pump	Le 200,000	Le 250,000	15	Le 127,500	\$123.58	\$142.45	122	122	\$15,077.36	\$17,379.25	Always
<b>The Plant</b>	uses 3" Robin and commotor	Le 100,000	Le 100,000	10	Le 87,500	\$70.75	\$70.75	30	60	\$2,122.64	\$4,245.28	Always
<b>The Rocker</b>	uses 3" Robin, equiv. to 8 men shaking /day	Le 30,000	Le 30,000	5	Le 45,000	\$28.30	\$28.30	75	150	\$2,122.64	\$4,245.28	Always
<b>Shaker*</b>	Replace every 2 weeks	Le 5,000	Le 5,000	0	0	\$0.14	\$0.14	122	122	\$16.44	\$16.44	n/a
<b>Washer</b>	Cost of labour	Le 7,000	Le 7,000	0	0	\$2.64	\$2.64	365	365	\$964.15	\$964.15	Always

\* Shaker and shovel costs based on interviews, presumed washing season of 4months a year and presumed digging season of 4 months a year

\* Based on information given at Structure of the Mining Industry Workshop, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2004

## Appendix 8 – Examples of Parasitism

Extract A. Interview with Amienatta Conteh, 5<sup>th</sup> August 2004:

“I was selling first of all the stuff I brought from the US. Cos I went to New York, I bought clothing, shoes, jewellery, ... Jean, jean bags. Everything. Cosmetics. I shipped it. So the things landed here. ... I had sent them some money to get me an apartment. They did not get the apartment. They had eaten the money up. I sent some money to buy me palm oil. ... When I returned, I saw the palm oil some of it and I kept buying some more thinking that this would be a kind of stored value [E: exactly] so if the going got rough I know I have some palm oil I will just ship back to the US and just find my way and go back and start doing something. So the palm oil was stored in my brother’s storage. So they kept stealing these things ... When I locked the store, I would give the key to my sister ... (But) when I gave the key and I leave maybe, say I go to town with one of his sons, who was my favourite at that time, we would go to town ... the boy would say, “Auntie, ah! Uncle had sent me to do some errand. Can you please wait?” I’d say, “OK. You go ahead,” and then he would go right back to the house, and they would steal, they’d open the store, they would take these things, they would give to their friends, they would sell, they would do anything they would want to do. I kept realising that ... the count was going low. But then I believed them. So at the end of the day I realised everything was gone. ...by then I’d got a place. So after that I decided I was going to sell my palm oil. I was trying to go back. But then I had left some money with a friend. My last pay check, I left that money with my friend in the US. I told her to put in her account because if I had placed, put it in my own account, the bank charges would have eaten all the money. So I decided I was going to leave it with her. So after that, in fact, the war, upcountry was getting tense, and tense, and tense, ... So I had to run – was it, about 98 or 99? ... So I went to Conakry. I was there to go back [to the USA]. ... [Amienatta explains how her daughter died at this time and another friend cheated her of her other, remaining palm oil]... I called my friend, I told her, “I said now the going has really gotten rough. I need to return. First of all I told her to send me the renewal licences for Maryland ... So she did that. And then I said, now well send me the money ... So my cousin gave me an address because she used to work at USAID. ... This money got stuck. This lady said she sent the money. And she kept calling me, “did you receive it?” And I said, “I have not received the money” and I kept asking my cousin, “how about the money”. She said, “aah, I’ve not seen it” and it was like that every day, every day, every day, every day, every day. At the end of the day, I went to the post office, I checked, they told me USAID luggages, their mail bag we don't tamper with because they’re sealed. It comes from the US sealed. All we do is they sign for it, we just hand it to them. ... But this woman said no, the money she didn’t get it. But then after a while I realised ... she had started buying stuff to sell. That’s how I know that this money has arrived and she has misused my money. I didn’t have a choice, I didn’t have a way out, I didn’t have a help, I didn’t know anybody. I decided, I have to return to Freetown. So Freetown I don’t have money, I don’t have a house, I don’t have family because they had abandoned because I had just come back. I returned here with 5,000 [leones]. I came here, I didn’t have food ..., No husband, no boyfriend, no house, no family, no nothing. So I stayed in Freetown. Things were really hard for me. Really, really hard. There were days without food. It came to a point one day when, as I was like walking, I met a man. This man just liked me. That’s how I got this boyfriend. OK, he liked me, I didn’t believe in him ... He started helping me ... He was an African, but from another country. Nigerian. He gave me at that time \$2,000. ... I paid for an apartment, ... I got a shop. I decided I was going to have ... a house and the pharmacy ... [explains how the Nigeria soldier was killed in battle] ... So we got so close, he really took care of me. And then after that when I had this shop, this restaurant, this pharmacy. I had two shops selling food stuff. The one was manned by Elsa. Elsa told me his troubles, told me he’d sold some stuff, the money got stolen and the second batch ..., a relative of mine came and wanted him to lend the money, ... So he lent her the money, five million, and she needed to go and fix an engine on her vehicle and that she would pay the money later. ... Up to this day nobody paid me a dime. The second shop was manned by Richard. He was like an older brother. He was there in the shop. I had travelled again at the same time. When I returned he told me the shop was broken into and everything was gone. I came, there was no shops. These two shops were gone. The pharmacy, I had left my older brother, the same mother, and he was manning the restaurant. He was sleeping with the purchasing officer, the cashier, the shop-girl, all these girls that were working ..., every one of them were his girlfriends and he kept going out with these

girls, everybody was chopping my money. When I came back the money he had collected, he didn't give me a dime to this day. ... I decided to renovate and start all over. So that's how I started again but everything I lost it. So at the end of the day finally I left because then business had gone low, ECOMOG had gone, and there was not much business happening there. The pharmacy, I left Junior there. Junior was taking my medicine and supplying other pharmacies. ... When I went to the pharmacy almost the medicine was gone. No money, no medicine, no explanation. So that's how I hit bottom. I finally hit bottom."

Extract B: Interview with Female Miner, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2004:

Miner: [speaks Krio]

Babar: She is at Bandafayie here, controlling certain lands and properties and she cannot determine, nobody determines when you die and when you don't. She has got her pit and whether the kids are grown up or they are very young, you die and leave the kids behind and somebody else comes because that person knows she is now gone and so on, the kids cannot really protect such properties and they just take them or drive them off such properties, saying that they do not belong to them because they are children or they do not have the access to control such properties. She is asking how do we look at that? How do we feel about that?

Estelle: But why wouldn't they be protected? Do they not have family that would protect them?

Miner: There are no family to protect them.

Babar: Why do people step in and drive them from their property?

Miner: The man and woman died. How are the children supposed to know their rights?

Babar: She is saying, she may have gone, let's say the husband is no more and you have only the kids left but this person takes advantage because she knows or he knows that some of the kids that are left and they can't really get enough protection and they are bullied and taken off such properties. They don't know their rights, probably, like she may know.

Miner: How do you think about the people?

Estelle: I think the people that do that are bad people. Does that happen?

Miner: Yes.

Estelle: Did that happen to your family?

Miner: Even in this town!

Estelle: People came and they moved the children when the family died?

Miner: Yes.

Estelle: Where did the children go?

Miner: They have no family.

Estelle: Who looks after the children now?

Miner: Nobody. [explains further]

Babar: They don't have really the kind of power or knowledge that you would think can really protect them with regards the infiltrator.

Estelle: is the infiltrator a relative?

Miner: They are normally people who are towns-mates, they may have read the situation, they know they can take advantage of a particular situation in the town.

Estelle: All for their own gain and regardless of the children's rights? [yes] Did this happen before the war or is it only now after the war this happens?

Miner: After and before the war. Even after this war I understood something about this.

Estelle: So the children now do not have access to their property. Can the chief not stop this?

Babar: They are relatives really of the children. These are people who were friends of the parents who actually knew the story of the property. There was a close relationship to the family and so on. The friend is gone, the kids are there, he takes advantage of the situation. Normally chiefs enter into cases, matters that are taken to them.

Estelle: but they do not interfere in stuff that they see is wrong. Even when it is children?

Babar: Yes. That is what she is saying. [he asks her why the chiefs won't intervene]

Miner: [speaks]

Babar: Chiefs don't take up matters until they're really taken to them because they cannot read what the problem is.

Estelle: So why doesn't somebody go to the children and inform them that their rights are being violated.

Babar: And that is what she is saying. Sometimes there are friends who go to the children and tell them that this and this are your rights and these were your properties and so on.

Miner: How do you see? It is not right, huh?

Extract C: Interview with Housekeeper, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

Estelle: So you think you're more vulnerable to people trying to steal from you and maybe hurt you because you're a housekeeper?

Housekeeper: Yes.

Estelle: And have you ever been vulnerable? Has anybody ever tried to hurt you before or your family?

Housekeeper: Well, they have been trying it but as for me, I don't have to look at them because, like my family the last time, I took my money, I gave to them so that they could buy some palm oil for me but they took the money so when the time came for me to get the oil to make the sale, there was no oil.

Estelle: So they think they can do that to you because you have all this money?

Housekeeper: Yes.

Estelle: And these are people you've helped at other times as well and they still do that?

Housekeeper: Yes! They still do it!

Extract D: Interview with Mary Musa, Chairwoman of District Council, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2004.

“Positions are normally associated with wealth here. People feel that when you are in position you have all the money, you have all the answers to their problems and so the expectations are very high. you get up in the morning, you have about ten or more people waiting outside. [Really?] Yes. Waiting outside, making requests for this, for that, for their children's school fees, houses to be built, children having been born, they can't afford clothes. But if you are not careful and are in charge of funds, you end up coming corrupt. This is what I tell them. I say, move around now. People laugh at me because of the old car I am using. They feel that in this position I am holding I should have a Mercedes Benz, I should have a brand new car. So some of them even say, “she has money! She doesn't want to buy”. So they associate positions with money. They assume that as long as you are in position, you have the money. So we need to do a lot of sensitisation, to talk to our people. I tell them that I don't have money and you expect me to solve all your personal problems with the resources I get; at the end of the day, what can I do for you? Nothing. But it's very difficult to get them to understand ... There are some who've made a lot of money but pretend they have no money and so are able to maintain their wealth.”

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